

LANGUAGE AND NATURE IN THE CLASSICAL ROMAN WORLD

EDITED BY GIUSEPPE PEZZINI
AND BARNABY TAYLOR



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A familiar theme in Greek philosophy, largely due to the influence of Plato's *Cratylus*, linguistic naturalism (the notion that linguistic facts, structures, or behaviour are in some significant sense determined by nature) constitutes a major but under-studied area of Roman linguistic thought. Indeed, it holds significance not only for the history of linguistics but also for philosophy, stylistics, rhetoric, and more. The chapters in this volume deal with a range of naturalist theories in a variety of authors including Cicero, Varro, Nigidius Figulus, Posidonius, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The result is a complex and multi-faceted picture of how language and nature were believed to interrelate in the classical Roman world.

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Contents

<i>List of Contributors</i>	page vii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xi
 Introduction: First Thoughts on Language and Nature <i>Giuseppe Pezzini and Barnaby Taylor</i>	 I
1. Posidonius' Linguistic Naturalism and Its Philosophical Pedigree <i>Alexander Verlinsky</i>	15
2. Lucilius on Latin Spelling, Grammar, and Usage <i>Anna Chahoud</i>	46
3. Nigidius Figulus' Naturalism: Between Grammar and Philosophy <i>Alessandro Garcea</i>	79
4. Naturalism in Morphology: Varro on Derivation and Inflection <i>Wolfgang D. C. de Melo</i>	103
5. What's Hecuba to Him? Varro on the Natural Kinship of Things and of Words <i>David Blank</i>	121
6. Linguistic Naturalism in Cicero's <i>Academica</i> <i>Tobias Reinhardt</i>	153
7. Linguistic Naturalism and Natural Style: From Varro and Cicero to Dionysius of Halicarnassus <i>Casper C. de Jonge</i>	171

8. Natural Law and Natural Language in the First Century BCE <i>James Zetzel</i>	191
<i>Bibliography</i>	212
<i>Index Locorum</i>	226
<i>Index Nominum et Rerum</i>	236

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Abbreviations

<i>CAG</i>	<i>Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca</i> . Berlin. 1882–1909.
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> . Berlin. 1862–.
<i>CLE</i>	<i>Carmina Latina Epigraphica</i> . Leipzig. 1895–1926.
<i>CRF</i> ³	O. Ribbeck (ed.), <i>Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta</i> , ii: <i>Comicorum Romanorum praeter Plautum et Syri quae feruntur sententias Fragmenta</i> , 3rd ed. Leipzig. 1898.
<i>DK</i>	H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 10th ed. Berlin. 1961.
<i>FDS</i>	K. Hülser (ed.), <i>Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker</i> . Stuttgart. 1987–1988.
<i>FGrH</i>	F. Jacoby (ed.), <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Berlin and Leiden. 1923–1958.
<i>FPL</i> ⁴	J. Blänsdorf (ed.), <i>Fragmenta poetarum Latinorum</i> , 4th ed. Stuttgart and Leipzig. 2011.
<i>FRHist</i>	T. J. Cornell et al. (eds.), <i>The Fragments of the Roman Historians</i> . Oxford. 2013.
<i>GG</i>	<i>Grammatici Graeci</i> . Leipzig. 1867–1901.
<i>GL</i>	H. Keil (ed.), <i>Grammatici Latini</i> . Leipzig. 1855–1880.
<i>GRFF</i>	G. Funaioli (ed.), <i>Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta</i> . Leipzig. 1907.
<i>GRFM</i>	A. Mazzarino (ed.), <i>Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta aetatis Caesareae</i> , 2nd ed. Turin. 1955.
<i>IAR</i> ⁶	P. E. Huschke (ed.), <i>Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae reliquiae</i> , 6 th ed. Leipzig. 1908–1927.
<i>LS</i>	A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (eds.), <i>The Hellenistic Philosophers</i> . Cambridge. 1987.
<i>OLD</i>	P. Glare (ed.), <i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> . Oxford. 1968–1982.
<i>Pocc.</i>	P. Poccetti, <i>Nuovi documenti italici</i> . Pisa. 1979.
<i>RE</i>	<i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> . Stuttgart. 1894–1980.

- SVF J. von Arnim (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*.
Leipzig. 1903–1924.
- TLL *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. Leipzig. 1900–.
- TRF³ O. Ribbeck (ed.), *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*, i:
Tragicorum Romanorum Fragmenta, 3rd ed. Leipzig. 1897.
- Ve. E. Vetter, *Handbuch der italischen Dialekte*. Heidelberg. 1953.

Whenever possible, references to Latin authors follow the norms established by the *OLD* or (for later texts) *TLL*. Abbreviations of Greek authors and works are usually as listed in LSJ (Liddell–Scott–Jones *Greek–English Lexicon*). Exceptions or additions are: Cassiod. *Orth.* (= Cassiodorus *De orthographia* GL 7.143–210.5); Dem. (= Demosthenes); Diog. Laert. (= Diogenes Laertius); Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* (= Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Antiquitates Romanae*); Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* (= *Epistola ad Herodotum*); Gal. (= Galen); Galen *PHP* (= *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*), *Aff. dig.* (= *De affectuum dignotione*), *Pecc. dig.* (= *De peccatorum dignotione*), *Ord. lib. prop.* (= *De ordine librorum priorum*); Gell. (= Gellius *Noctes Atticae*); Philo *De incorr. mundi* (= *De incorruptibilitate mundi*), *Deter.* (= *Quod deterius potiori insidiari solet*), *Leg. alleg.* (= *Legum allegoriae*), *Mut. nom.* (= *De mutatione nominum*), *Opif.* (= *De opificio mundi*), *QG* (= *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim*), *Sobr.* (= *De sobrietate*); Plutarch *De Stoic. repugn.* (= *De Stoicorum repugnantibus*); Posidonius *Ep.* (= *Epistulae*); Sext. Emp. *Math.*, *Pyr.* (= Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos*, *Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposes*); Ter. Scaur. (= Terentius Scaurus); Vel. Long. (= Velius Longus).

Introduction: First Thoughts on Language and Nature

Giuseppe Pezzini and Barnaby Taylor

quare duce natura †si, quae imposita essent uocabula
rebus, ne ab omnibus his declina[n]tus putarent.

Varro, *De lingua Latina* 8.10

One of the key questions in language studies, both ancient and modern, concerns the relationship between language and reality: how has extra-linguistic reality influenced the emergence, development, and structures of language? This question is at the core of several advances in the last century, including the development of theories arguing for the biological regulation of the structures of language (generative grammar) and the pioneering investigation of the neuro-biological mechanisms regulating language use (neurolinguistics). This question is no less productive in ancient thought, both Greek and Roman. Ancient theorists conceived of the question in terms of the relationship between language and nature (*physis/natura*), and the essays gathered in this volume deal with theories from the Roman world according to which linguistic facts, structures, or behaviours are in some significant sense determined by nature. We refer to such theories as instances of ‘linguistic naturalism’.

Linguistic naturalism is a familiar notion in classical studies, and is perhaps most well-known from a particular theory articulated in Plato’s *Cratylus*. This version of linguistic naturalism suggests that the relationship between lexical units and natural referents is non-arbitrary; it is normally contrasted with notions of ‘conventionalism’.¹ Given the canonical position of the *Cratylus*, and the fragmentary status of other relevant sources, Plato’s version of linguistic naturalism, and the related dichotomy *nature* vs. *convention*, have pervaded modern studies of the subject and have often obscured the variety and complexity of theories that predicated a meaningful relation between language and nature. As has been recognized

¹ See below, p. 4.

since antiquity, Greek theories of linguistic naturalism extended far beyond the Cratylan model to encompass quite distinct ideas, such as that of Epicurus, whose primary concern was to explain the historical emergence of language as a natural process.²

In this volume we have deliberately adopted an inclusive definition of linguistic naturalism in order both to broaden the traditionally narrow understanding of naturalist theories, and to enhance the appreciation of their variety and productivity in a neglected set of sources. Each of the essays gathered here aims to delineate one or other of the complex roles played by nature in the linguistic thought of the Classical Roman world, in both Greek and Latin sources.

Nature, as is well known, is no easy concept to pin down: it is invoked by ancient authors in numerous and diverse contexts, and the names used for it (‘φύσις’, ‘*natura*’) have a bewildering variety of possible meanings.³ While ancient discussions of nature can be underpinned by highly sophisticated systems of thought demanding close and careful analysis (e.g. Stoicism), we find just as often that ‘nature’ in ancient texts is little more than a buzzword, possessing just the right combination of rhetorical appeal and conceptual fuzziness to allow it to be effectively employed in argument without the backing of a consistent theoretical structure.⁴ This is as true for ancient linguistic thought as it is for any other domain of inquiry: as in contemporary linguistics, questions concerning to what extent linguistic structures and behaviours may be considered natural were central to much of the most sophisticated thinking about language in antiquity;⁵ at the same time, the concept of nature is sometimes deployed in linguistic discussions in ways that can seem disorganized or even inconsistent.⁶ Here we seek to do appropriate justice to cases in the former category, without ignoring or excusing those that fall into the latter. Some of the papers gathered here focus on the naturalist thought of contemporary Greek writers who exerted major influence at Rome; some, focusing more directly on Roman texts, are concerned with the roles played by various conceptions of nature (including but not limited to

² See below, pp. 7–9.

³ Lovejoy and Boas (1935) were famously able to list no fewer than 66 different meanings of the terms ‘φύσις’ and ‘*natura*’.

⁴ See Zetzel, in this volume, for an articulation of this feature of ancient naturalist thought.

⁵ For the points of contact between the concerns of contemporary linguists and the claims of ancient linguistic naturalists see Joseph 2000.

⁶ See, for example, de Melo, in this volume, and Zetzel, in this volume, discussing the range of different meanings of ‘*natura*’ in Varro’s *De lingua Latina*.

those inherited from the Greek philosophical tradition) in Roman linguistic theories; others consider nature as a rhetorical motif, and ask what different rhetorical constructions of nature can tell us about the beliefs and motivations of the Roman authors who deployed them in linguistic contexts. Our concern in this introductory chapter is to set the scene, giving a (necessarily brief) overview of naturalism in Greek linguistic thought, outlining what we consider to be the most salient distinctions between naturalist theories of different types, before going on to explain how each paper fits into the volume as a whole. The following account of different forms of Greek linguistic naturalism is by no means exhaustive. We hope, however, that it gives a useful overview of several influential theories, while also demonstrating something of the variety of Greek naturalist theories that were inherited by authors in the Roman world.

Linguistic naturalism is an omnipresent notion in Greek thought. Its origins may arguably be traced back to Homer and Hesiod, with their distinction between divine (natural) and human (corrupted) language,⁷ as well as to Pythagoras and his belief in the magical power of words.⁸ Linguistic naturalism became a specific object of enquiry with the Sophists and pre-Socratics, before passing through a key stage of development in Plato's *Cratylus*; from there it went on to influence the philosophers of the Hellenistic age and beyond. Central to ancient expressions of linguistic naturalism was the slogan 'names are by nature', which, as ancient authors were well aware, could be used to refer to a wide variety of distinct theses. The fifth-century philosopher Proclus (AD 412–485), in his commentary on Plato's *Cratylus*, constructed a typology of potential meanings borne by the phrase 'by nature', relating different meanings to different ancient linguistic theories.⁹ He was followed in this by his pupil, the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius (AD c. 440–c. 520), who includes a similar

⁷ Cf. Gera 2003: 49–57.

⁸ Cf. Garcea, in this volume.

⁹ *In Cra.* 17: 'The term 'natural' can be understood in four ways: (1) as both the whole essences of the animals and plants and their parts; (2) as their activities and powers, like the lightness of fire and its heat; (3) as the shadows and reflections in mirrors; or (4) as fabricated images which are similar to their archetypes. Epicurus, in accordance with the second [*deuteron* Usener; *proton* MSS] sense, thought that names are natural like the principal functions of nature, i.e. the faculty of speech and sight, and as is the activity of seeing and hearing so too is that of naming. Thus the name is natural as a function of nature. Adopting the fourth sense, Cratylus says that the name of each thing is proper, because it was appropriately put by those who first put names skilfully and knowledgeably. For Epicurus used to say that these men put names not knowledgeably but when they were naturally moved like those who cough, sneeze, moo, bark and sigh. Socrates says, in accordance with the fourth sense, that, while names are natural as products of knowledgeable thought and not of natural appetite, but of the imagining soul, they are assigned to objects as properly as possible at the beginning' (transl. Duvick 2007).

(albeit simpler) typology, showing the clear influence of Proclus,¹⁰ in his commentary on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*.¹¹ This concern to distinguish between different forms of naturalism, or different meanings of 'by nature', was shared by authors as varied as Sextus Empiricus,¹² Demetrius Lacon,¹³ and Origen.¹⁴ Not only did there exist numerous distinct theories of linguistic naturalism, but not all such theories were mutually compatible: certain fundamental features of Epicurus' linguistic naturalism, for example, were strictly at odds with certain fundamental features of the Stoic naturalist theory.¹⁵

While, as pointed out above, Plato's *Cratylus* was neither the beginning nor the end of Greek naturalism about language, its considerable scope and influence make it a good place from which to begin an overview of the field. In the dialogue, the Heraclitean philosopher Cratylus defends the thesis that each thing has a correct name, which belongs to it by nature. Names are natural, according to Cratylus, insofar as they are descriptions of the natures of their referents, and this descriptive property of names is rooted in the mimetic properties of the elementary sounds and letters out of which they are composed. The practice of etymology (examples of which occupy the long central section of the dialogue) enables us to decode the description hidden in each name, and so to rediscover the thought of those early language-users who first assigned names in each language. According to Cratylus, this primordial, natural language had a divine origin and quality, and its close association with nature granted it a strong epistemic function: saying a name equated to knowing and 'capturing' its referent. Hermogenes, Cratylus' disputant, opposes this naturalist theory with two arguably distinct claims combined into one position: the correctness of names, according to Hermogenes, is determined not by nature, but by individual choice, and, furthermore, by agreements between different members of a linguistic community (384c–e).¹⁶

¹⁰ Sheppard 1987. ¹¹ *In Int.* CAG 4.5.34.10–35.12. ¹² *Math.* 1.142–3.

¹³ *PHerc.* 1012 col. 67.1–10 Puglia. ¹⁴ *Cels.* 1.24 = Epicurus, fr. 334 Usener; *SVF* 2.146.

¹⁵ See Verlinsky, in this volume.

¹⁶ Socrates, at 385a and 385d, likewise combines a claim about whatever a polis chooses as a name, with a claim about whatever an individual chooses as a name; the same slide is made again, later in the dialogue (435a), when Socrates moves from a discussion about interpersonal linguistic understanding to talk about Cratylus 'making a convention with himself'. There has been considerable discussion, well beyond the scope of this introduction, of whether or not such a combination of views is justifiable (the case against: Kahn 1973: 158–9, Williams 1982: 80, Baxter 1992: 18–19; the case in favour: Barney 2001: 24–30, Sedley 2003: 51–4, Ademollo 2011: 40–8). One thing that should be quite clear is that a regularity in a person's idiolect (what Socrates calls a 'convention with oneself'), while arguably similar to a convention (Lewis 1983: 182), is not a convention *stricto sensu*, conventions being necessarily interpersonal (Lewis 1969).

For Hermogenes, then, there is no natural correctness of names; rather, the principles guiding the use of names are arbitrary and, what is more, conventional.

Cratylus' thesis is the most well-known example of a type of linguistic naturalism according to which there is, or can be, a natural connection between a name and its referent. Debates concerning this 'referential' form of naturalism appear to extend back into the sixth and fifth centuries BC: Proclus, in his commentaries on *Cratylus* and *First Alcibiades*,¹⁷ attributes to Pythagoras a naturalist theory which rejects the possibility of arbitrary naming and asserts that names in fact imitate the 'forms of the intellect'.¹⁸ In his commentary on the *Cratylus* he also relates four arguments of Democritus against the thesis that the connection between names and referents is natural.¹⁹ The wider issue under discussion in *Cratylus* – the correctness of names – is there associated with the sophists Prodicus (at 384b) and Protagoras (at 391c), although there is little evidence on the basis of which to ascribe to either of them a naturalist theory of the correctness of names.²⁰ The mimetic form of referential naturalism defended by Cratylus seems to have later influenced the Stoics, who, according to Origen, believed that the first names were imitative of the things to which they referred.²¹ Other theories of referential naturalism – theories that do not have description or resemblance at their heart – survive from the ancient world. According to Galen, for example, Chrysippus held that certain Greek pronouns, in being spoken, caused the head and lips of the speaker to 'point' in the direction of the pronoun's referent.²² This is a theory of referential linguistic naturalism (positing as it does a natural connection between word and referent), rooted not in description, or mimesis, but rather in deixis. This theory was later adopted and adapted by the Roman Pythagorean philosopher Nigidius Figulus, whose version of it is explored in Garcea's contribution to this volume. Yet another form of referential naturalism emerges from certain accounts of etymology, according to which the derivational relation between a secondary word and a primary word reflects an analogical relation between the referents of each word. One version of such a theory postulates that the connection between a word and its referent is natural insofar as the

¹⁷ *In Cra.* 16; *In Alc.* 259. ¹⁸ On which theory see Duvick 2007: 114–15. ¹⁹ *In Cra.* 16.

²⁰ Everson 1994a: 3; for an attempt to demonstrate the naturalism of Prodicus see Baxter 1992: 151–6.

²¹ *C. Cels.* 1.24 (*SVF* 2.146): μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα. See Long 2005, Verlinksy, in this volume, Blank, in this volume.

²² Gal. *PHP* 2.2.10–11 = *SVF* 2.895; see further Garcea, in this volume.

structure of that part of the lexicon to which the word belongs resembles the structure of that part of nature in which the referent resides. Traces of such a theory are found, for example, in Varro, whose notion that the relationships between words mirror the relationships between things is discussed in Blank's contribution to this volume. Trypho's concept of 'συμπάθεια between signifier and signified', explored by both Chahoud and Garcea in this volume, clearly concerns a form of referential naturalism.²³

The earliest theory of linguistic naturalism to survive from antiquity, however, is of a quite different character. Towards the beginning of the second book of his *Histories*,²⁴ Herodotus relates a story about the Egyptian king Psammetichus, which he ascribes to the priests of the temple of Hephaistos at Memphis. Seeking to find out which was the oldest people on earth, Psammetichus devised the following experiment: two newborn children were to be isolated in a shepherd's hut. There they would be cared for, in silence, with the expectation that they would grow up to speak the language of the earth's oldest people. When the children, after a while, came to say the word '*bekos*' while gesturing for food, Psammetichus concluded that the Phrygians were the oldest of all peoples, '*bekos*' being the Phrygian word for bread. Psammetichus' experiment was underpinned by certain assumptions about the naturalness of language: not only does he assume that the language faculty is innate in human beings, he also assumes that humans are born with latent dispositions to speak a certain language in particular (this naturally spoken language being the oldest of all languages). On Psammetichus' view, some (but, we must assume, not all) linguistic behaviour is purely natural, requiring no input whatever from culture or instruction. Accordingly, Psammetichus' linguistic assumptions may be called naturalist.

Psammetichus' naturalism is the first explicit evidence from antiquity for what (following Proclus)²⁵ we shall call 'functional' linguistic naturalism – the thesis that language is a function of human behaviour. Functional theories and referential theories (like that of Cratylus) are quite distinct from one another: it is possible to hold to a referential theory without also holding to a functional theory – the natural fit between names and their referents posited by a referential theory may be thought to have its origins not in natural human behaviour but rather in the intervention of

²³ See Chahoud, in this volume, pp. 56–9, Garcea, in this volume, pp. 98–101.

²⁴ Hdt. 2.2.

²⁵ In *Cra.* 17; see above.

a being with superhuman knowledge.²⁶ Likewise, it is possible to hold to a functional theory without also holding to a referential theory: compare *De interpretatione* 16a27–8, where Aristotle emphatically rejects referential naturalism ('no name is a name by nature but only when it has become a symbol'), with *Politics* 1253a9–10, where humans are said to possess rational language (λόγος) by nature – a clear statement of a weak sort of functional naturalism.²⁷

Proclus (*In Cra.* 17) cites the linguistic theory of Epicurus as an example of functional naturalism. While we believe this to be quite correct, it does not tell the whole story. In Epicurus' theory, functional linguistic naturalism is limited to the first stage of human development, and governs in particular the original assignments of names to things. Early humans, according to Epicurus (*Ep. Hdt.* 75), naturally and compulsively assigned names in response to sensory impingement from objects in the external world. The first acts of naming, therefore, were regulated both by internal human nature and by external, natural reality.²⁸ These original names were later refined and expanded upon by human reason (*Ep. Hdt.* 76). Epicurus, therefore, subscribed to an evolutionary model of functional naturalism, according to which the first names were not freely chosen but fully determined by nature: natural linguistic behaviour automatically regulated the first steps of the evolution of language, which was only later overtaken by the developing powers of reason and convention, freeing language from natural determination. Epicurus' functional naturalism, then, is both limited, insofar as it applies only to a certain stage in the evolution of language, and extreme, entailing as it does that the linguistic behaviour of early humans was not only natural, but was fully determined by the mechanistic processes of nature. The linguistic determinism inherent in Epicurus' theory is by no means a necessary feature of functional naturalist theories: Aristotle, for example (who, as we have seen, believed humans to possess rational language by nature), would no doubt have rejected it.

The Epicurean theory (or part of it) underpins what is perhaps the most well-known expression of linguistic naturalism in Roman literature. Lucretius sums up the origins of language in two terse lines, followed by a brief (and, as he admits, loose – *non alia longe ratione*) analogy (5.1028–32):

²⁶ A thesis defended by Cratylus at *Cra.* 438c. See further Ademollo 2011: 34–5.

²⁷ Οὐθὲν γάρ, ὥς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων; on which see Kullmann 1991: 99.

²⁸ See further Brunschwig 1994, Everson 1994b, Atherton 2005, 2009, Reinhardt 2008.

At uarios linguae sonitus natura subegit
 mittere et utilitas expressit nomina rerum
 non alia longe ratione atque ipsa uidetur
 protrahere ad gestum pueros infantia linguae,
 cum facit ut digito quae sint praesentia monstrent.

And nature compelled them to utter the various sounds of the tongue, and *utilitas* expressed the names of things. Not much different from how speechlessness itself seems to draw children to gesture, when it makes them point out what is present with a finger.

This passage (together with the 58 lines of *comparanda* and further arguments that follow) presents a particularly thorny example of Roman naturalist discourse. The meaning of *utilitas* at 1029, and, especially, the nature of the relationship between the two clauses in 1028–9, has been the subject of significant disagreement, in particular with regard to the number and nature of distinct processes at play here.²⁹ Most modern readings understand the two clauses of 1028–9 to be referring to two distinct aspects of the first, natural stage of linguistic development on the Epicurean model (as seems to be demanded by the analogy with infant gesture, as well as by the following *comparanda* drawn from animal behaviour), rather than reading the second clause as referring to Epicurus' second, rational stage. According to one reading, it may be concluded from this passage that Lucretius, unlike Epicurus at *Ep. Hdt.* 75–6, seeks to suppress the role played by convention and arbitrariness in the history of language, stressing instead the power of nature.³⁰ If correct, this would demonstrate a desire by a Roman philosopher not only to replicate Greek linguistic naturalism in his own work, but also to enhance its significance relative to conventionalist alternatives.

Following 5.1028–32 we find 58 further lines of *comparanda* and supporting arguments: first (1033–40), a comparison of early human utterance and infant gesture with the behaviour of young animals who possess apparently instinctive knowledge of the use of their natural faculties; then (1041–55) a sequence of arguments against the possibility of an original name-giver (on whom see more below); finally (1056–90), an *a fortiori* demonstration that the expressive power and variation of animal cries renders the denotative power of the human race, *cui uox et lingua*

²⁹ The salient points are summarized and treated by Campbell 2003 ad loc., Verlinsky 2005, and Reinhardt 2008.

³⁰ Snyder 1980: 22 for 'Lucretius' rather single-minded emphasis on the natural origins of language and his consequent neglect of his master's ideas about *logismos*.

uigeret, unsurprising. This final argument has proved particularly problematic for the Epicurean theory, with one significant treatment questioning whether the quasi-linguistic processes envisaged by Epicureans as taking place in the first stage of linguistic development should be counted as communication at all.³¹

In formulating his evolutionary theory of functional naturalism, Epicurus explicitly rejects what he sees as the alternative: the notion that the first names emerged not by nature but rather by imposition (*Ep. Hdt.* 75). In so doing, he is rejecting a widespread theory according to which names were imposed at a specific time in the past by the deliberate choices of enlightened individuals (*onomathetai*). This theory of imposition (*thesis*) can be traced back to Pythagoras, is taken for granted by all speakers of the *Cratylus*, and was apparently an important tenet of the Stoics. One can therefore also postulate a dichotomy between *physis* and *thesis*, with *physis* understood in a determinist, evolutionary sense. This dichotomy also parallels a contrast between different theories about the historical development of language: proponents of *thesis* tend to believe that language degenerated from an original natural state, to be recovered through the work of linguists and poets (cf. de Melo, in this volume); conversely, Epicurus seems to hold a progressive view, according to which language evolved from a simple to a more elaborate and rational form. As is shown by Blank in his chapter, a particularly complex version of *thesis* is found in Philo's exegesis of Genesis, where the creation of man by God coincides with man's endowment with the power of naming (and thus possessing) things. While Adam's acts of naming (*theseis*) are deliberate rational choices, which distinguish them from the first acts of naming on Epicurus' evolutionary model, they are nonetheless said by Philo to be carried out spontaneously (ἴν' ἀπ'αυτοματίῃ τὰς θέσεις), as Adam 'acts under the self-moving rational nature given him by God'.³² We have in Philo, then, a naturalist account of the origins of language that combines the notion of natural, spontaneous behaviour with the notion that the first names were imposed by deliberate human choice. The variety and flexibility of theories under discussion in this brief introduction make it clear that linguistic naturalism is a 'liquid' notion, varying according to different philosophical and theological Weltanschauungen and their particular notion of what exactly *natura* is. The label 'linguistic naturalism' therefore needs constant qualification, as it can evoke discrete and independent theories.

³¹ Atherton 2005. On this passage see also Stevens 2008.

³² See below, pp. 123–4.

The scope of this volume is by no means limited to philosophical and grammatical texts, but extends to include any domain of inquiry that may be said to implicate linguistic thought (e.g. rhetoric, stylistics, poetics). This methodology is informed by the variety and complexity of the object of inquiry: because Roman linguistic thought was developed and expressed across several disciplines, it cannot be confined to any one modern disciplinary framework. Throughout the period under consideration, for example, nature was invoked in discussions of correct literary style, with the ‘natural style’ often being understood to approximate to, or imitate, ordinary language. While such notions of natural style are, on one level, distinct from more obviously philosophical claims of the sort outlined above, one of the aims of this volume is to highlight possible points of contact and areas of interpenetration between stylistic norms and linguistic theories (see here in particular De Jonge’s chapter).

The [first chapter](#) begins our journey into linguistic naturalism at Rome by dealing with an important figure in the history of Roman Stoicism. Alexander Verlinsky addresses the linguistic theory of Posidonius of Apamea (135–51 BC), as it related both to Stoic orthodoxy and to the naturalist theories found in Plato’s *Cratylus* and Epicurus. A former student of Panaetius,³³ Posidonius taught philosophy in Rhodes, where he was visited by highly influential Roman figures, including Pompey (twice),³⁴ and Cicero;³⁵ he was familiar also with Publius Rutilius Rufus,³⁶ and visited the city of Rome on at least one occasion.³⁷ Verlinsky argues that Posidonius combined elements from both Cratylan and Epicurean naturalist theories in order to develop Stoic linguistic naturalism in such a way as to render it impermeable to the traditional accusation that it could not account for the existence of different languages. Besides recalling important archetypes of Greek linguistic naturalism, Verlinsky’s paper illustrates two of its main varieties, the functional (Epicurus) and the referential (*Cratylus*, Stoics), as well as an original attempt to combine them. The Greek philosophical background adumbrated in this first chapter is of central importance to the volume as a whole, given the major role played by Stoic linguistic theory in several of the papers that follow.

³³ *Suda* s.v.; Cic. *Off.* 3.8, *Div.* 1.6 (= *test.* 1a, 9, 10 Edelstein–Kidd).

³⁴ For Pompey and Posidonius see Strabo, 11.1.6, Pliny, *Nat.* 7.112, Cic. *Tusc.* 2.61, Plut. *Pompeius* 42.5 (= *test.* 35–9 E.–K.).

³⁵ For Cicero and Posidonius see Plut. *Cicero* 4.5, Cic. *Fat.* 5–7, *N. D.* 1.6, 123, 2.88, *Fin.* 1.6, *Tusc.* 2.61, *Hort.* fr. 50 Grilli, *Att.* 2.1.2 (= *test.* 29–34 E.–K.).

³⁶ Cic. *Off.* 3.10 (= *test.* 13 E.–K.). ³⁷ *Suda* s.v.; Plut. *Marius* 45.7 (= *test.* 1a, 28 E.–K.).

The [second chapter](#) expands on Stoic referential naturalism but moves more firmly onto the Roman side: in her paper, Anna Chahoud presents a thorough analysis of the spelling precepts proposed by Lucilius in book 9 of his satires, with a special attention to those apparently associable with a Stoic naturalist position. The chapter investigates to what extent Lucilius' pronouncements reflect a serious philosophical doctrine, and whether they are a genuine representation of Republican Latin practices that may be reconstructed from other sources. Chahoud's analysis of Lucilius' fragmentary evidence raises broad questions concerning the author's perception of correctness, variation, and error, as well as the relations between these notions and that of naturalness. Chahoud's chapter also usefully introduces a key feature of Roman linguistic naturalism, namely its theoretical fluidity and its tendency to coalesce with other fields and discourses, such as, in particular, the field of grammar.

Alessandro Garcea continues the investigation of Roman versions of linguistic naturalism and addresses, in considerable detail, the 'mysterious figure' (thus Rawson) of Nigidius Figulus, a famously learned Pythagorean active in Rome in the mid-first century BC. Garcea scrutinizes the evidence for Nigidius' linguistic theories, demonstrating the presence of a naturalist foundation supporting various different facets of his overall theory of language: his belief in the articulatory symbolism of personal pronouns; his theory of morphological analogy; his search for semantic values in traditionally 'weak' grammatical units such as conjunctions and prepositions. Garcea gives emphasis to Nigidius' 'ethical' etymologies, thereby introducing a key practical ramification of ancient naturalism: the heuristic or probative function of etymology. The importance of Stoic influence (especially that of Chrysippus) on Nigidius' inquiries into each of these linguistic domains is stressed throughout. Moreover, in order to describe the peculiarities of Nigidius' radical naturalism, Garcea introduces a comparison between Nigidius and Varro, the Roman polymath who played a key role in the development of linguistic thought at Rome.

This theory of natural morphology, which could be described as a 'formal naturalism' and compared, in some respects, to modern theories of formal grammar, is at the centre of Wolfgang de Melo's chapter. Like that of several other contributors to this volume, de Melo's focus is on Varro's treatise *De lingua Latina*, six books of which survive, and which tells us more about Roman Republican attitudes to language than any other single source. *De lingua Latina* also provides a further example of the extent of interpenetration between philosophical and grammatical discourses in the Roman Republic. De Melo's paper scrutinizes the notion

of *natura* in Varro's work, pointing out that Varro uses the term in 'two not entirely separate' senses, referring in the etymological books to the outside world 'reflected imperfectly in language', and in the morphological books to a natural regularity which is there contrasted with human inconsistency. The act of the name-giver is, according to Varro, free and (mainly) arbitrary, and the naming process is not governed by natural laws. Human imposition or thesis is somehow influenced by *natura*, but as a model of regularity and rationality, not as an agent driving the process (as, for example, in Epicurus' evolutionary account of language development). The body of the chapter focuses on morphology and inflection, and especially on Varro's notions of *declinatio naturalis* (= inflection) and *declinatio uoluntaria* (= derivational morphology). Besides shedding light on the ambiguity of the term *natura* and its related naturalisms, the chapter introduces other important aspects of ancient linguistic naturalism, such as the idea that language has undergone corruption, and that its primordial state of natural rationality may be recovered by philosophers and poets.

David Blank develops the analysis of Varro's own linguistic naturalism, as expounded in his *De lingua Latina*. Blank sets out to demonstrate a link between Varro's view that the etymological relations between words depend on relations between things, and the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis* (Varro twice acknowledges the influence of Stoic thinkers on his own linguistic work: *L.* 5.9, on Cleanthes; 6.2, on Chrysippus). The body of the chapter analyses Varro's notion of *declinatio* (derivation), and its aforementioned subtypes of *declinatio naturalis* and *declinatio uoluntaria*. Both types of derivation exhibit a close relationship between words, which, according to Varro, mirrors the relationship between things. However, if in the *declinatio naturalis* the relation between words emerges naturally and spontaneously, the *declinatio uoluntaria* is instead the work of the name-giver, who perceives a common relation in different things and uses a particular mode of derivation to make new words that express that relation, thereby 'appropriating' an aspect of the structure of reality. Part of Blank's prefatory argument involves the demonstration of a close connection between *oikeiosis* (a theory of central importance to Stoic ethics) and Chrysippus' linguistic theory. This demonstration marks a major step forward in the understanding of the relationship between Stoic linguistic thought and the wider Stoic philosophical system.

Moving beyond Varro and his 'professional' interest in language, the next chapters consider forms of linguistic naturalism in other authors active in Rome in the late Republic and the early Empire, namely Cicero

and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In parallel with this ‘non-professional’ focus, these chapters address linguistic naturalism in the broad sense outlined at the beginning of the introduction, and thereby widen the scope of the investigation to highlight the penetration of linguistic naturalism into the general cultural discourse of the late Republic and early Empire.

Tobias Reinhardt’s contribution focuses on Cicero’s representation, in his *Academica*, of an epistemological debate between Stoics and Academics. In particular, Reinhardt is interested in the linguistic dimension of each school’s claim that while their theory of knowledge is natural, their opponents’ is unnatural. Identifying in the speech of Lucullus an argument regarding the factivity of verbs meaning ‘to remember’, Reinhardt argues that Lucullus’ defence of the Stoic position includes an argument that relies on an ‘implicit’ kind of linguistic naturalism, according to which ‘our linguistic practices mirror reality’: for Lucullus, the factivity of these verbs reflects how such things really are, and, moreover, does so not merely by convention. After discussing Lucullus’ naturalist assumptions, Reinhardt moves on to Cicero’s account of the Academic position, seeking to demonstrate that it, too, relies on a form of implicit linguistic naturalism.

In the following chapter Casper De Jonge discusses aspects of linguistic naturalism in the work of the Greek historian and rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus (active at Rome at the end of the first century BC). The chapter starts with an account of the theory of natural style in Dionysius, who engaged with the linguistic thought of Chrysippus, and was influenced by Varro. De Jonge goes on to demonstrate various points of contact between Dionysius’ Atticist theory of natural style and naturalist ideas expressed by Cicero and (especially) Varro: the notion of natural style is echoed in Cicero; the notion that nature is man’s teacher in the imposition of words is shared by Dionysius and Varro; and Dionysius’ exploration of how natural language may be considered an accurate representation of reality is fruitfully compared with the theories of Varro and the Stoic theory of categories. De Jonge’s paper neatly straddles the divide between Latin and Greek linguistic thought, as expressed in Roman texts of the first century BC. Two other notions associable with linguistic naturalism are introduced in De Jonge’s chapter, namely the role of nature in stylistic theory, and natural word order.

The stress on the theoretical fluidity of Roman linguistic naturalism, encountered throughout the volume, is taken to the next level in James Zetzel’s paper, which ends the collection. Zetzel is highly sceptical about the possibility of identifying a consistent discourse of linguistic naturalism

in Roman texts: proposing his own analysis of *natura* in Varro's *De lingua Latina*, he characterizes nature in such contexts as a multi-faceted rhetorical motif, terms for which bear different meanings on different occasions, with the result that 'claims to rely on nature are necessarily inconsistent and incoherent'. Zetzel then moves on to a fragment of Varro's *De sermone Latino*, comparing its (naturalistic) language to that of a wide range of other naturalist discourses of the late Republic and early Empire (political theory, rhetoric, and law) in which appeals to 'nature' are made in widespread contexts and varying senses. Zetzel's paper challenges some of the tenets discussed in the previous chapters and could be described as a deconstructive conclusion to the whole volume; at the same time, however, it confirms its main claims, i.e. the complexity of the naturalist discourse on language at Rome, its pervasiveness and interpenetration with other cultural discourses, and the necessity for us to look beyond the narrow confines of traditional, Cratylan notions of linguistic naturalism.

Posidonius' Linguistic Naturalism and Its Philosophical Pedigree

Alexander Verlinsky

The importance of Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135–c. 50 BC) for the Roman intellectual life of the late Republic and the Empire (especially in its first two centuries) can hardly be overestimated. His philosophical and scientific work, of which we now have only fragments, ranged from the traditional fields of Stoicism – natural philosophy, logic, ethics (including moral psychology) – to the painstaking investigation of disciplines which either were considered by the earlier Stoics only in an insignificant way (meteorology, astronomy), or were completely beyond their interests (history, physical, mathematical, and ethnic geography). This encyclopedic approach won for him already during his lifetime and soon after his death the authority of the *maximus omnium Stoicorum* (Cic. *Hort.* fr. 50 Grilli = *test.* 33 E.–K.),¹ among both professional philosophers and Roman *dilettanti* like Pompey. The influence of his innovative work, and the polemical reaction to it (the two often going hand in hand) is found in later centuries in moral philosophy and psychology (Seneca, Galen), natural philosophy, astronomy, and mathematics (Geminus, Seneca, Pliny the Elder, Cleomedes), as well as history and geography, both mathematical and physical (Caesar, Diodorus of Sicily, Strabo).

In view of this considerable impact in different fields, Posidonius is an appropriate starting point for a discussion of the subject of linguistic naturalism at Rome, since Roman thinkers and writers were exposed to traditional Greek theories on linguistic naturalism through his work. As will be seen, Posidonius' contribution to Stoic naturalism was original, but is obscure to us in many respects, since it did not win considerable popularity.

Although Posidonius' texts were excerpted primarily because of his astonishing polymathy, the later evidence provides us with a glance at

¹ References to evidence for Posidonius are given according to the now standard edition of Edelstein and Kidd 1989; references to other collections (Jacoby = *FGrH*, Theiler = *Th.*) only when a given piece is omitted by Edelstein and Kidd or when it has been presented differently by Jacoby or Theiler.

the scope and the typical features of his bold attempt to integrate the achievements of science and scholarship into the system of Stoic philosophy. The excessive emphasis typically placed by the outstanding earlier scholars of Posidonius (K. Reinhardt, M. Pohlenz) on the heterodoxy of the Apamean with respect to particular doctrines has since given way to a more securely evidenced picture of him as a philosopher who modified some doctrines of his predecessors, and filled in the gaps, but aimed at the conservation and endorsement of the fundamental principles of the Stoic system.² The main novelty of Posidonius' achievement is now seen not as the radical revision of Stoic philosophical orthodoxy, but rather as an attempt to build a many-branched scientific foundation for the earlier Stoic creed. Along with the investigation of particular scientific problems, inspired by personal interests which were not typical of the earlier Stoics, Posidonius aimed at constructing a system of philosophical and scientific knowledge which would provide a hierarchy of causal explanations for empirical facts,³ and thus enhance the traditional Stoic understanding of the universe as a set of all-penetrating chains of causes.

One small piece of Posidonius' teaching which I will revisit in this paper is his attempt to complement the linguistic naturalism of the Stoics with an explanation, along naturalist lines, of the differences between languages, in order to render Stoic naturalism immune to what was often considered to be one of the main challenges to the naturalist stance. It illustrates well, in spite of the meagre evidence for this part of the Posidonian theory, both his fidelity to the main tenets of Stoic philosophy (of which linguistic naturalism was an essential component at least since Chrysippus), and his readiness to complement them with the results of up-to-date scientific research, together of course with his own original and bold hypotheses. Another important aspect of Posidonius' approach, namely his keenness to offer solutions to the problems of his predecessors, seems also to be visible in our case, although the discussion I try to reconstruct remains necessarily hypothetical.

The evidence for the views of Posidonius' Stoic predecessors on the origin of language is meagre.⁴ The Stoics' notorious commitment to etymology

² For a survey of earlier scholarship see Reinhardt 1953; the general contemporary view is best presented by Kidd 1988 (see also his portrait of Posidonius as a thinker in Kidd 1999).

³ The theoretical (although limited) exposition of this standpoint is Simp. in *Ph.* pp. 291.21–292.31 Diels (from Geminus' *Epitome* of Posidonius' *Meteorologika*) = fr. 18 E.–K.; for discussion of this difficult text, see Kidd 1978 and Kidd 1988, Algra 1991, White 2007, Verde 2016.

⁴ The most substantial studies on the Stoic view on the origin of language are Barwick 1957a: 29–79 (a pioneering work which is, however, now in need of a substantial revision), and, more recently, Atherton 1993: 68, 92–130, 136–8, 146, 154–9, 243–4, 429, 489, 495, Tieleman 1996: 196–218, Allen 2005, Long 2005; cf. also the brief notice in Pohlenz 1972 (originally 1948): 1.40–1, 2.23. There is little, if any, evidence, as these scholars confess, for the details of the process.

goes back minimally to Chrysippus. A considerable number of his etymologies are preserved; they seek, for the most part, to decode quasi-philosophical meaning which corresponds to Chrysippus' own view of the subject in question.⁵ Galen attests that Chrysippus used etymology as an argument in favour of his own philosophical position (Gal. *PHP* 2.2.5 De Lacy = *FDS* 247). As one of the more striking examples, he cites Chrysippus' famous argument that when one pronounces the pronoun *ego* the lower lip at the syllable *e-* moves towards the chest, thus proving that the heart, not the brain, is the real 'I', i.e. the ruling part of the soul; the next syllable, *-go*, is pronounced in full conformity with the same symbolic meaning, contrary to the pronoun *ekeinos*, in which the syllable *-kei-* modifies the meaning of *-e-*, transferring its pointing to 'I' from the speaker to another person, by adding the notion of distance (Gal. *PHP* 2.2.9–11 De Lacy = *SVF* 2.895). This example is remarkable because it shows that Chrysippus was already attempting to analyze the simple and, admittedly, most primitive words into their elements (see further on this point Garcea, in this volume). As Galen notices (ibid. 2.2.13), Chrysippus' remark on *ekeinos* in this context was provoked by the obvious difficulty that two words with the opposite meanings contain the same element, namely *-e-*. This immediately evokes a famous difficulty in the *Cratylus* (434d): the word *sklerotes*, which on the whole conveys the notion of harshness, contains not only the sounds which are associated with this feature but also *-l-*, which has the opposite symbolic meaning. Chrysippus' solution of the problem is the opposite of that of the interlocutors in the *Cratylus* (435b–d): he does not yield to the admission that there is inevitably some conventional element in words (which are in general appropriate to the features of the things they designate), but attempts instead to maintain that sounds acquire additional symbolic capacities due to their neighbouring elements (*e+go* points to 'this-I', *e+kei* to 'that-I').⁶

Chrysippus' views on how words acquired their phonetic composition, and thus their linguistic meaning, are not known in detail, but it is attested that he referred to the imposition of names when discussing etymology (*SVF* 2.914).⁷ This implies that words for him are the results of intentional

⁵ For examples of the etymologies of the earlier Stoics, for the most part belonging to Chrysippus (they are not included in von Arnim's collection), see *FDS* 650–80 (see also Hülser 1987–1988: xli–xlix on etymologies and their relation to the question of the origin of language). Chrysippus also wrote two treatises devoted to the subject of etymology.

⁶ Cf. Long 2005: 42, who plausibly shows how the etymologies in Aug. *Dial.* This is abbreviated *Dial.* in the *Index Locorum*. 6 may be regarded as a sort of 'improvement' on Socrates' radical naturalism in the *Cratylus*.

⁷ This welcome early evidence is pertinently noticed by Allen 2005: 18–19.

acts of naming, as opposed to the spontaneous acts we find in the Epicurean account.⁸ This is quite expected, and follows the stance laid out in Socrates' speech in the middle part of the *Cratylus*, both in his use of etymology for the decoding of philosophical meanings and, especially, in his attempt to push the search for these meanings back to the primitive words and even to their elements.⁹ On the evidence we have, the early Stoic approach to the principles of language is that of Socrates in the *Cratylus* – the search for ways of proving that a given word is appropriate to a given thing. The assumption which underlies this search is that decoding words by means of etymology, or pointing to the imitative capacities of words, will reveal the rational understanding of the world possessed by those who first created said words.¹⁰ As in the *Cratylus*, this most naturally leads to the conviction that language was created by the imposition of skilfully created words onto things, without going into detail as regards who was responsible, how they arrived at the idea of naming,

⁸ The exposition of Stoic dialectic in Diogenes Laertius contains one further reference to the role it assigns to the imposition of names (7.83 = *SVF* 2.130 = *LS* 31C): Καὶ τοιοῦτοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς οἱ Στωικοί, ἵνα μάλιστα κρατύνωσι διαλεκτικὸν αἰεὶ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ πράγματα διὰ τῆς ἐν λόγοις θεωρίας ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅσα τε τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου τυγχάνει καὶ αὐτὰ πάλιν ὅσα τοῦ ἠθικοῦ (εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν τί δεῖ λέγειν;) περὶ τε ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, ὅπως διέταξαν οἱ νόμοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. δυοῖν δ' οὐσαὶν συνθεῖσιν ταῖν ὑποπιπτοῦσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἥ μὲν τί ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων σκοπεῖ, ἥ δὲ τί καλεῖται. καὶ ὧδε μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὸ λογικόν. (The text of T. Dorandi). The text is difficult (the parenthetical sentence is possibly corrupt). Its sense cannot be as *LS* 1.95 put it, that 'the Stoics deny that etymological technique is part of real dialectic' (cf. Long 2005: 48). Against this interpretation is both the general context, the crucial importance of dialectic in view of the tasks the sage has, and the immediately following sentence, not printed in *LS*: virtue embraces the capacities of consideration of what the thing is and of what is its proper name. On the other hand, Tieleman (1996: 197 n. 6) mistakenly denies the value of the passage as evidence for the Stoic theory, because he thinks that it refers to 'a conventional origin of language'. In fact it means that without dialectic the Stoic sage would not be able to make judgements about the 'correctness of names', that is, to judge whether or not names have been correctly assigned by laws to things (Long himself earlier held the view I stand for, see Long 1996b: 88 [104]; *LS* 2.187 signal the change of mind); I do not think that Mansfeld's drastic emendation of the text is necessary (Mansfeld 2000). This has nothing to do with conventional imposition but immediately evokes the famous reasoning in the *Cratylus* (388b–e; 390c–e) that words are imposed on things by 'law' and thus are made by a competent legislator, and that only a dialectician who employs the words for teaching about things may evaluate the work of a legislator, i.e. whether the words are appropriate or not. Although the date of this doxographicum is not clear, it is a confirmation of the 'mainstream' Stoic interest in etymology as a tool of cognition and of its sticking to rational imposition in the question of the origin of language, both in agreement with the *Cratylus* and obviously following Plato's lead. Furthermore, if this understanding of the text is correct, this means that together with Plato's Socrates the Stoics did not ascribe to the ancient creators of names infallible correctness in imposition.

⁹ For Chrysippus' emphasis on the appropriateness of words, which points to naturalism proper and not merely to an occasional reliance on etymology, see Tieleman 1996: 205.

¹⁰ Long (2005: 38–9) cites the evidence of Cornutus *De Natura Deorum* p. 76.2–5 on the ancient creators of the names of gods, who were the philosophers of nature, for what seems to me a correct interpretation of the position of Chrysippus. Long (1996a: 74 n. 34) rightly notices that it is not necessary to see in Cornutus a reflection of Posidonius' teaching.

and how other people were taught to do the same.¹¹ Let us look now at Posidonius' impact.

Posidonius' theory of the origin of language attracted little attention even in the epoch of Pan-Posidonianism, perhaps understandably given the notorious scarcity of the relevant evidence. There were attempts in the time of the Pan-Posidonian *Quellenforschung* to ascribe to Posidonius various passages in Greek and Roman authors on the origin of language, but the credentials for their Posidonian provenance turn out, on scrutiny, to be for the most part rather weak. Thus, Rudberg found in Posidonius, on the basis of such ascriptions, a more considerable emphasis on the role of imposition of names in the origins of language, in contrast to the orthodox Stoic view, but although he was right that the interest in the *process* of the origin of culture and, presumably, of language, was untypical for Posidonius' Stoic predecessors, there is no evidence that Posidonius' real innovation was the emphasis on imposition.¹²

¹¹ In spite of their interest in the phonetic aspects of language (in the cases of Chrysippus and, especially, Diogenes of Babylon), the earlier Stoics only maintain the fundamental opposition of unarticulated animal sounds to articulated human ones, without asking the question of whether this articulation is inherent to human language, or is a cultural acquisition; see Cic. *N. D.* 2.129: the articulatory ability of man, as opposed to animals, is one of the proofs of nature's craft in the process of creation and her providential care of human beings, as in Socrates' argument in Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.12. The argument holds in either case, regardless of whether this ability develops naturally or demands further invention and teaching.

¹² Rudberg's (1918: 56–7, 90–2) reconstruction of Posidonius' theory was based either on passages which were for some reason claimed for Posidonius by earlier scholars, or on those which mention the wise imposers of names: the latter seemed to correspond to Posidonius' specific emphasis on the role of sages in the origin of culture. In fact, not only is the ascription of these pieces to Posidonius dubious, but even the underlying views are sometimes hardly compatible. The passages on the wise imposers of names clearly adapt the influential teaching of Plato's *Cratylus*, and, even if they were adapted by the Stoics, have nothing to commend them as specifically Posidonian. Thus, Cic. *Tusc.* 1.62, which cites the doctrine of the imposer of names ascribed to Pythagoras (*qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae uisum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina* ...; cf. *Tusc.* 5.5), corresponds to the Pythagorean *akousma* (58C 4 DK) for which Cicero provides the earliest known evidence. This *akousma* itself is, in all probability, Plato's teaching under a Pythagorean disguise, since the following notice on the inventor of writing (*aut qui sonos uocis, qui infiniti uidebantur, paucis litterarum notis terminauit*) is a clear reminiscence of Plato's *Philebus* 18b–d. The general context of this notice, the praise of the role of divine wisdom (= philosophy, 1.64) in political and technical discoveries, may go back to Posidonius, as was often supposed (see, most recently, Zago 2012: 242–5); if the praise of the name-giver was also borrowed from Posidonius (this is not certain, but I see no reason to deny this, contrary to Zago 2012: 245, who argues that the whole piece is of a heterogeneous origin), this would be a welcome confirmation that he accepted Plato's and orthodox Stoics' view on the imposition of names, but would add nothing to our knowledge of his specific doctrines. *Rep.* 3.3 (*eademque* [sc. *mens humana*] *cum accepisset homines inconditis uocibus inchoatum quiddam et confusum sonantes, incidit has et distinxit in partes, et ut signa quaedam sic uerba rebus inpressit*) is part of the catalogue of inventions of human reason; it was ascribed to Posidonius because of a surface similarity with the *Tusculans* piece. It admits a stage of unarticulated human sounds which are not yet imposed on things, which is not attested for the Stoics (nor for Posidonius); this stage is also not implied in the passage from the *Tusculans* and was ignored by Plato. This view itself is in fact old and is attested from the second half of the fifth

The most reliable and promising piece of evidence for Posidonius' views on the origin of language, which is unfortunately tantalizingly brief, shows unambiguously that his innovation of the earlier Stoic views was a more refined version of naturalism. The evidence is provided by Strabo (2.3.7 = fr. 49.310–63 E.–K.), who in his work sharply criticized but extensively drew on Posidonius' *On the Ocean*, a treatise devoted to the mathematical, physical, and ethnographic geography which contained his theory of the zonal division of the *oikoumene*. Strabo blames Posidonius for contradictions in this theory: after criticizing existing theories of the division of the areas of the *oikoumene* into continents, and proposing instead to divide it into zones which are parallel to the equator (*klimata*), which might explain the differences between the animals, plants, and climates of these zonal areas by their closeness either to the frigid or to the torrid zones, Posidonius then refutes his own argument and praises again the existing division into continents (fr. 49.310–17 E.–K.).¹³ Some additional features of

century BC (see the evidence in Verlinsky 2005); the *De re publica* passage looks like a combination of Pl. *Prt.* 322a with the teaching of *Cratylus*, and might be Cicero's own work, but even if he drew here on a Stoic source, or specifically on Posidonius, the origin of language, again, is depicted in terms of traditional teaching. Manilius' remark on the development of language (1.85 *tunc et linguas accepit barbara leges*), often ascribed to Posidonius on the assumption that Manilius' astrological ethnography depends on him (see, most recently, Theiler 1982), refers probably in the vaguer form to the same development as *Rep.* 3.3, and the ascription of it to Posidonius would give the same insignificant effect; but the assumption of a Posidonian provenance for Manilius' ethnographical excursus is itself dubious (see below, p. 42). Even less informative is Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 2.15c (on the wise imposers of names) which is simply an echo of Plato's *Cratylus*. In a quite different vein is the account of the development of language in Vitruvius 2.1.1, which was ascribed to Posidonius by Rudberg, following Poppe 1909, who argued that Vitruvius' theory of culture in 2.1 is Posidonian. Poppe's claim was rightly modified or even denied (see Cole 1990: 193–5), and the linguistic part of this theory, which is relevant here, on the one hand does not mention the wise imposers of names, and on the other treats the imposition as accidental (i.e. takes a conventionalist stance – *quotidiana consuetudine uocabula ut obtigerant constituerant*), and thus contradicts the above-mentioned passages. The same is true for the origin of language in Diodorus of Sicily (1.8.3–4), which is close to Vitruvius and was mainly for this reason ascribed to Posidonius by some scholars: the initial sounds of the first humans are confused; they are articulated gradually, and then assigned to things; since this imposition had an accidental character in various parts of the world, different languages appeared. Cole's claim that both Diodorus and Vitruvius go back ultimately to Democritus still seems to me the most attractive proposal. The main evidence for Democritus' linguistic theory (Proclus, *In Cra.* 16.6.20–7.16 Pasquali = 68B 26 DK) on the arbitrary character of the relation of names to things is close enough to Diodorus' and Vitruvius' accidental imposition, although Democritus, on Proclus' evidence, discussed only the arbitrary relation within one language and did not refer to arbitrariness as the cause of the origins of different languages (see Verlinsky 2006). Dio Chrysostomus 12.28, which presents the emergence of language as a gradual process of imposition of names appropriate to things, may in fact be Stoic, and may be relevant for Posidonius' views (see below).

¹³ Str. 2.3.7 = fr. 49 E.–K.: Ἐπιχειρήσας δὲ αἰτιάσθαι τοὺς οὕτω τὰς ἡπείρους διορίσαντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ παραλλήλοις τίσι τῷ ἰσημεριῷ, δι' ὧν ἐμελλόν ἐξαλλάξεις δεῖκνυσθαι ζώων τε καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ἄρων, τῶν μὲν τῇ κατεψυγμένῃ συναπτόντων τῶν δὲ τῇ διακαυμένῃ, ὥστε οἰνοὶ ζώνας εἶναι

Posidonius' position can be retrieved from Strabo's ensuing criticism: he treated the zonal differences just mentioned, as well as ethnic differences, including differences of language, as the effects of providence (fr. 49.317–19 E.–K.), i.e. he assumed or argued that these differentiating climatic influences are beneficial. As follows from Strabo's counter-argument, the ethnic differences include, apart from languages, capacities of developing crafts and sciences (fr. 49.319–26 E.–K.).¹⁴

Strabo blamed Posidonius not only for the alleged contradiction but also for confusing the causal factors: ethnic and linguistic differences arise, according to Strabo, not from providence but from 'accident and chance';¹⁵ he thus put in doubt both the beneficent character of ethnic differences and the possibility of explaining them. At the end of the whole discussion he blames Posidonius' excessively 'physical' manner of treating geographical problems, and relates this to his generally 'aetiological' mode of investigation, in which he follows Aristotle, and which is rejected by 'our people', i.e. by the Stoics, because of the 'obscurity of causes' (fr. 49.360–3 E.–K.). Scholars usually treat this final passage, no doubt correctly, as reflecting the

τὰς ἡπείρους, ἀνασκευάζει πάλιν καὶ ἐν ἀναλύσει δίκης γίνεται, ἐπαινῶν πάλιν τὴν οὖσαν διαίρεσιν, θετικὴν ποιούμενος τὴν ζήτησιν πρὸς οὐδὲν χρησίμως.

¹⁴ The contradiction of which Strabo accuses Posidonius, viz. his approval of the existing division of the *oikoumene*, is illustrated by his explanation of the different physical properties of the Indians (living in Asia) and the Ethiopians (living in Libya): although they live along the same latitude, they differ due to the relative dryness/moistness of their habitats. The allegation of contradiction does not hold: apart from latitude, Posidonius also admitted other factors which influence climatic differences, and through them the differences in constitutions of living beings, see Kidd 1988: 268. The East–West difference to which Strabo refers here is probably related to Posidonius' distinction of the dry East and the moist West, see Kidd 1988: 802, but cf. Shcheglov 2006: 517–18.

¹⁵ αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται διατάξεις οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας γίνονται, καθάπερ οὐδὲ αἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη διαφοραί, οὐδ' αἱ διάλεκτοι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἐπίπτωσιν καὶ συντυχίαν. Strabo's own position (fr. 49.319–27 E.–K.) is that although some ethnic differences depend on latitude [*para klimata*, not 'in spite of the latitude' (Kidd), cf. fr. 280.15], the other, presumably more important, ones, are the products of 'imposition' (*thesei* MSS) in linguistic matters, or of 'exercise and habituation' in crafts, arts, and typical preoccupations. Strabo accused Posidonius of confusing these factors. His argument (for what it is worth) is that (a) the crafts and sciences *after somebody started* (i.e. introduced) *them* prevail in any climate; (b) the scholarly abilities of Athenians in contrast to Spartans and even to Thebans (who live closer to them still) cannot depend on latitude; by the same token, Babylonians and Egyptians cannot owe their scientific abilities to the climate. The question of how much Strabo assigns to natural factors in the development of specific ethnic facilities remains mysterious, but the main point of his disagreement with Posidonius is the evaluation of those achievements which they both cannot regard other than as rational – the creation of languages, the invention of crafts, different kinds of knowledge, etc. Strabo understandably suppresses the question of inventions and discoveries which are more easily associated with natural predispositions, and substitutes them with the learning of already invented knowledge, easily reducing this to habituation. But Posidonius certainly had in view just the origin, not the cultivation, of differences, viz. scientific discoveries, creation of specific languages, types of education, etc.; thus he did not confuse the role of nature with that of human habituation – he attempted to give a reasonable account of the role of natural factors in these rational discoveries.

‘mainstream’ Stoic position, and use it to establish the correct conclusion that Posidonius went further than the Stoics before him in looking for the causes of concrete events and processes.¹⁶

It is plausible to see in Strabo’s criticism of Posidonius’ explanation of regional differences between the nations the same orthodox Stoic attitude – both lack of interest in such a causal approach, which expands on phenomena which have little philosophical importance, and admission that the causes in this field, i.e. the causal nexus of geography, environment, psychology, and history, are difficult or even impossible to investigate. Granted that we have no evidence contra, we can confidently use Strabo as a proof that Posidonius’ attempt to explain the differences of language (and also habit) between nations was an innovation on orthodox Stoicism.

One piece of evidence of the same negative character can be added. In a very different context, in the *Letters to Lucilius* (90) Seneca criticizes Posidonius for assigning the technical achievements of human civilization to the primordial sages – the proto-philosophers – and for looking for detailed explanations of how they came to their discoveries. According to Seneca, these inventions, contrary to morality, laws, and political institutions, have nothing to do with philosophical wisdom, and should be ascribed to *usus*, i.e. to everyday practice and experience (90.35).¹⁷

Although Seneca does not deny that there was a sort of inventiveness at work in the accomplishment of these discoveries, he certainly rejects the possibility of ascertaining the exact causes of technical inventions, as Posidonius sought to do, and denies their beneficent character. This gives us a hint that not only the differences between cultures in respect of their

¹⁶ Kidd (1971: 210–11) pertinently compares Strabo’s statement with Chrysippus’ response to his opponents (Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 1045b = *SVF* 2.973) that although there are no causeless events, the causes of some of them are obscure to our minds (it is implied that some causes cannot be discovered in principle). Cf. Kidd 1988: 73, Frede 1987a: 130–1. Strabo’s positive assertion that the differences between the nations are due to ἐπιπτώσεων καὶ συντυχίων does not mean that he departs from the Stoic position; more problematic is his denial that these differences are the effects of Providence, since all events for the Stoics are determined and fate, *heimarmene*, is, according to them, coexistent with Providence – there are no events which are not ultimately providentially beneficial. Nevertheless, the Stoics certainly distinguished between actions which (subjectively, from the point of view of an agent) are in harmony with the *heimarmene*, and those which attempt to resist it (vainly, of course). This is approximately the point of Strabo’s criticism – as the orthodox Stoics before him, he does not see any value in explaining the factors which effect the differences – the causality which is at work here consists of the causal actions of the legislators and educators motivated by circumstances and their unreasonable responses to them. I thus do not think that there are reasons to doubt Strabo’s Stoic commitment in this passage, as Hatzimichali (2017) recently did.

¹⁷ *Non de ea philosophia loquor, quae ciuem extra patriam posuit, extra mundum deos, quae uirtutem donauit uoluptati, sed de illa, quae nullum bonum putat nisi quod honestum est, quae nec hominis nec fortunae muneribus deleniri potest, cuius hoc pretium est, non posse pretio capi. Hanc philosophiam fuisse illo rudi saeculo, quo adhuc artificia deerant et ipso usu discebantur utilia, non credo.*

intellectual achievements, but also the course of technical progress itself, were not discussed by Stoics before Posidonius (and by the Stoic 'mainstream' after him).

Seneca's criticism is different from that of Strabo but both point in the same direction: mainstream Stoicism after Posidonius (and, presumably, also before him) did not inquire after the causes of cultural achievements. The impression which these two pieces of evidence convey squares well with the silence of our sources on any elaborated Stoic views of the origin of culture. There is no authentic evidence for Zeno's views on this subject.¹⁸ We have the statement, probably going back to Chrysippus (Lact. *De ira Dei* 13 = *SVF* 2.1172), and which was used as an argument against the Academics, that necessity and experience would reveal the utility of many things now thought to be hostile to human kind, as they had already revealed this in the past.¹⁹ This demonstrates the relevance of the subject of cultural progress for the Stoics, but the interest in explaining human discoveries here does not go beyond a general reference to the factors determining progress, just as in Seneca.²⁰ Granted that there is no other evidence for Stoic interest in the subject of cultural progress beyond this, it seems not to be too bold to propose that mainstream Stoicism did not have any detailed doctrine of cultural progress in terms of aetiology; minimally, we can maintain that the origin of human language, and also of technology, did not receive detailed examination among the Stoics before Posidonius.

In contrast, Posidonius' theory in this field was broad: according to Seneca, it embraced the development of morals and of political institutions, and also of various branches of technology.²¹ In these fields Posidonius attempted to give explanations of human inventions and to establish

¹⁸ Contrary to Edelstein 1967: 138, the views which are attacked by Theophrastus in Philo, *De incorr. mundi* 24 = *SVF* 1.106 do not belong to Zeno, as David Sedley has demonstrated (Sedley 1998b, Sedley 1998a: 166–85).

¹⁹ See Edelstein 1967: 145 on this statement. See Sedley 2007: 234–5 on the other Stoic responses to Epicurean and Academic accounts of the evils of the universe.

²⁰ Balbus' catalogue of human inventions (Cic. *N. D.* 2.150–3), which is used as a proof of the aloofness of human nature, and thus of the purposefulness of creation, probably sheds light on the mainstream Stoic treatment of the subject: even if Balbus' speech has some relation to Posidonius, as the scholars suppose, this particular piece may well be inherited from mainstream Stoicism. There is no interest here in the causes of singular discoveries or in the details of the process of cultural development, as was typical for Posidonius; the human achievements here listed are only manifestations of man's happy initial facilities granted by the providential God. Persaeus' teaching on the divinization of things useful for humankind and then, in the next step, of their inventors (*SVF* 1.448), certainly confirms Stoic interest in inventions, but does not need to be part of a broader discourse on the origin of civilization in the manner of the Epicurean school (I'm grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this volume for reminding me of Persaeus).

²¹ See the recent detailed reconstruction of Zago 2012, and also Alesse 2012.

causal connections between them, so that their development was presented as a gradual process. Posidonius' standpoint was that there is a strict continuity in the development of philosophy from the very beginning of human existence up to the later stages which are traditionally labelled as 'philosophy': all pioneering human achievements in technology, agriculture, and politics are *philosophical* inventions. Seneca disagreed with Posidonius insofar as this concerned technology (Seneca defends the 'hard primitivist' stance, arguing that even elementary improvements of human life are superfluous because they lead to moral deterioration), but agreed insofar as it concerned development in the moral and political fields (he, however, is prone to denying the title of philosophical wisdom for the wise – the *sapientes* – who were active before moral philosophy started; Posidonius, on the contrary, insisted on continuity).

Some further points should be stressed. Posidonius' view of the development of culture is strongly intellectualist and elitist – humankind at its very beginning voluntarily, because of its moral integrity, obeyed the power of the wise, who were their kings, like the animal herd; all subsequent discoveries were also made by outstanding persons. In this respect Posidonius clearly follows the example of Plato, with his philosophically wise name-givers in the *Cratylus*, and probably also of his Stoic predecessors, who took over this motif from Plato in their etymological exercises. Notice that before Posidonius neither Plato (with some exceptions, such as *Philebus* 16c) nor even less the Stoics, as far as we can judge, treated the other fields of human culture as having emerged due to philosophical intellectuals. This was certainly Posidonius' innovation (being distinct from the account of mainstream Stoicism), giving the traditionally revered 'first inventors' the place of honour in the integral history of philosophy.

Next, as follows from Seneca's polemics, the reason for evaluating the outstanding persons as philosophers (they are just philosophers, not the Stoic sages) was for Posidonius, first, that they met, at that moment, the pressing needs of humankind (see *Ep.* 90.16 on the cold), being guided not by self-interest but by care for the rest of humankind; and, second, because the first step in discoveries in every field was notoriously difficult: Seneca, with some irony, cites Posidonius' claims that the craft of grinding and baking bread was invented through the imitation of chewing and digesting food, or that ships were invented through analyzing the anatomical structure of fishes (see *Ep.* 90.22). The meaning of this hypertrophic intellectualism becomes clear once we understand it as a polemical response to Epicurus' theory of human discoveries as being due to compulsion by nature or to imitation of natural processes: seeing that, as pioneers, the

inventors had no teacher apart from nature itself, they should be rather seen as natural philosophers, like the name-givers of the *Cratylus*.²²

In view of this impact of the *Cratylus* on Posidonius' intellectualist stance, and also because the earlier Stoics were committed to treating names as the impositions of the wise, it is improbable that he failed to treat the origin of language in the same intellectualist vein as moral and technical discoveries, although this particular point is not mentioned by Seneca. Strabo provides a welcome testimony that the origin of differences between languages was treated by Posidonius as an effect of the providential influence of the natural environment.²³ I will argue that the context in which it is made strongly suggests that language was for Posidonius one of the philosophical inventions, and that environmental influences served as an additional factor in all other fields of discovery. But, before this, I will propose another important predecessor of Posidonius' views.

Although evidence for the details of Posidonius' theory is scarce, in terms of the number of branches of human culture it discusses, and in terms of the attention it gives to (a) the aetiology of inventions and their mutual relations, and to (b) the causes of human progress in general, his theory can in fact be compared with only one other: that of Epicurus. It is not my purpose in this paper to discuss in detail the relation of Posidonius' views on the origin of culture to Epicurus' views, which, surprisingly, has

²² Both of these reasons are obfuscated by Seneca, who responds to the first with 'hard primitivist' claims and to the second with the repetitive 'empirical' argument that the first inventors of crafts need not be persons of higher intellectual ability than those who are now engaged in these occupations and make occasional improvements to them; he does not fail to notice, however, Posidonius' implied rebuttal of such a claim: *omnia haec sapiens quidem inuenit; sed minora quam ut ipse tractaret* [sc. the further improvements] *sordidioribus ministris dedit* (90.25) – philosophy is thus preoccupied with the first inventions only.

²³ Zago (2012: 174–5 with n. 63) denies that Posidonius ascribed to the ancient sages the creation of language, because language was not mentioned by Seneca in his criticism of Posidonius in *Letter* 90. According to Zago, Posidonius did not ascribe true philosophical wisdom to a stage as early as that at which language appeared (cf. pp. 217–26). He is thus inclined to interpret the Stoic theory of the origin of language as a natural process which is inherent to the whole of humankind, and agrees with Allen that the sages could be only the leaders, but not the creators of words, in this process. I do not believe that Seneca's silence can serve as an argument, because he is selective in citing Posidonius and treats, for the most part, points of disagreement. Moreover, Seneca's direct citation from Posidonius (*Ep.* 90. 7 = Posidon. fr. 284.22–4 E.–K.) attests that the latter ascribed to philosophical wisdom, for instance, the invention of primitive building, before which people lived dispersed in caves or in the hollows of trees. The philosophical persons thus start operating at a very primitive stage; a stage which corresponds to one at which the germs of society and of linguistic communication appeared in other theories, such as the Epicurean one (Lucr. *DRN* 5.1011–23, cf. 948–57). But if the ascription of Dio's reasoning to Posidonius (see below) is plausible, it might imply that language in his theory was, at least initially, the product of rational invention, but was ascribed not to the single sages but rather to the whole of humankind, who acted as rational name-givers (this is, I believe, what Allen supposes to be 'mainstream' Stoic teaching, although he does not cite evidence for this).

seldom attracted the attention it deserves. In fact there are reasons to think that Epicurus' theory was, for Posidonius, both the standard – in its aetiological approach to inventions and in its attempt to reconstruct the whole causal chain of human progress – on which his own doctrine of culture, innovating on orthodox Stoicism, could be modelled, and, simultaneously, the main target of his attack, in its general tendency to deny the providential care of the gods and the primary role of rationality in human achievements. Epicurus (*Ep. Hdt.* 75–6) attempted to explain cultural discoveries by such factors as natural compulsion, most obviously in his idea of the spontaneous origin of proto-words, and direct learning from nature, i.e. the imitation of natural processes, like the invention of cooking following observation of the softening power of the sun's warmth (*Lucr. DRN* 5.1101–4), trying to eliminate any supposition of supernatural or extraordinary wisdom as an operative force in inventions.²⁴ It is noticeable that Posidonius employed a pattern of explanations similar to that of the Epicureans (see above on the imitation of natural processes), presenting inventions as starting from observations, but requiring also the rational penetration of nature, thus stressing, most probably against Epicurus, that culture is the product of outstanding intellectual efforts (and thus possibly demonstrating the divine care which is manifest in this development, contrary to Epicurus). It would be most natural for Posidonius to use Plato in this polemical reshaping of Epicurus' theory, giving a more consistent and more realistic form to Plato's non-systematic reasoning on this subject, such as the presentation in the *Cratylus* of the knowledge of the earliest humans as philosophical or proto-philosophical, or the ascription of human technical and scientific inventiveness to divine gifts or divine teaching, or the focus on the special closeness of the earliest humans to the gods and of the care of the latter for humankind.²⁵ Once again, the pattern for this Posidonian critical re-interpretation of Epicurus' aetiology in the spirit of Plato was, in a way, created by Epicurus himself. Epicurus, while building his own theory of culture, critically addressed Plato's

²⁴ We know one of the aims of this Epicurean polemic, namely the rebuttal of the claim that names were imposed (and thus that language was invented) by an extraordinarily wise person; here the polemic relies on arguments against aprioristic invention modelled on the argument against the divine creator (see below pp. 43–4).

²⁵ Scholars have often noticed some affinity between Posidonius' views, which are for the most part known from Seneca, and Lucretius' treatment of the origin of civilization, and have supposed the influence of the former on the latter. There are, however, considerable reasons to believe that this affinity implies the dependence of both on Epicurus' lost teaching in his *On Nature*, which Lucretius followed closely (see Sedley 1998a), and which Posidonius used in a polemical fashion. I hope to endorse these claims in my forthcoming paper on Posidonius' debt to Epicurus in his theory about the origin of culture.

relevant views (such as the ascription of language to the primordial *nomothetai*), and sometimes endorsed the doctrines of Plato's opponents, placing them in a modified form in his own account of the development of culture.²⁶ In what follows I will discuss, however, independently of this larger claim about Posidonius' general theory of culture, only his views on the origin and development of language, in their possible relation to both of his outstanding predecessors, Plato and Epicurus.

One important aspect of Posidonius' views concerning the dependence of language on geographic differences is known from Strabo's discussion of the Eremboi-problem in *Od.* 4.84 (on Menelaus' travelling), Αἰθιοπᾶς θ' ἰκόμεν καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἑρεμβούς (Str. 1.2.34 = fr. 280 E.-K.; 16.4.27 = fr. 281 E.-K.). Posidonius followed the view of Zeno of Citium, who interpreted Homer's Eremboi as Arabs, but unlike Zeno he did not recommend altering *Eremboi* to *Arabes* in Homer's text. He proposed instead that Homer used the designation of Arabs current in his time, viz. either *Eremboi* or, with a slight alteration, *Aramboi*.²⁷

²⁶ Thus, for instance, the origin of justice from the primitive covenants, which was rejected by Plato, was placed by Epicurus in a reshaped form in his account of the evolution of society, in such a way, arguably, as to make it immune to Platonic arguments (and of course also to bring it into compliance with the tenets of Epicurus' own teaching). I hope to discuss this and other relevant subjects in a forthcoming paper on the origin of Epicurus' approach to the beginnings of language and culture.

²⁷ In 1.2.34 = fr. 280 E.-K. Strabo ascribes to Posidonius no emendation of Homer's text, and there are some reasons to think that the view he himself asserts, that it is not necessary to change the reading of a text which has the authority of antiquity, is Posidonius' one: Strabo refers here to the regularly occurring 'change of the name' (*tou onomatos metaptosis*, fr. 280.5–6), and further says that *Eremboi* is the Hellenized form of the ethnic name of the Arabs which was current in ancient times, the distortion having been provoked by the popular etymology of Eremboi from *eis ten eran embainein*; in fact, in fr. 281a.22–30, Posidonius similarly ascribes to Homer the distortion of the self-designation of the Syrians, *Aramaioi* into *Arimoi* (*Il.* 2.783), and cites other cases of similar distortions of Oriental proper names, which is presumably the same point Strabo makes when speaking of *metaptosis* in 1.2.34. The exact position of Posidonius is not clarified further by 1.2.34 = fr. 280; we are told only that he proposed restoring the original meaning of Homeric *Eremboi* on the basis of kinship of Arabs, Armenians, and Syrians and their common features (the attested ethnic names of Arabs here are only *Eremboi* and *Arabes*). However, according to Strabo 16.4.27 = fr. 281a.11–13 E.-K., Posidonius, contrary to Zeno, who changed *Eremboi* into *Arabes*, γράφει τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἀλλάξει 'καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἑρεμβούς,' ὡς τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοὺς νῦν Ἀραβας οὕτω καλέσαντος, καθάπερ καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλων ὠνομάζοντο κατ' αὐτόν. This is the manuscript text, and the quotation suggests that Posidonius did not change the text. But the words πιθανώτερον . . . γράφει τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἀλλάξει (i.e. Posidonius proposed a reading which is more convincing than Zeno's because he changed the text only a little) seem to suggest that Posidonius did propose an alteration. G. Kramer in his edition (Kramer 1852) accordingly changed Ἑρεμβούς at fr. 281a.13 and 18 into Ἀραμβούς, following the marginal variant in F at the latter place (Tyrwhitt 1788: 66–7 already, without knowledge of this manuscript, proposed Ἀρεμβούς); this form is plausible because, on the one hand, *Aramboi* is closer to the *Aramaioi* and *Armenioi* than *Eremboi*, and, on the other, the resulting transformation of the name *Aramaioi* – *Aramboi* – *Arabes* is more plausible than *Aramaioi* – *Eremboi* – *Arabes*. It is interesting that, according to one group of the scholia to *Od.* 4.84, the alternative reading to Ἑρεμβούς was 'reading with –α–', cited by manuscripts of the scholia

Both reports of Posidonius' reasoning by Strabo are essentially the same, but they mutually complement each other in some interesting ways. According to the earlier one, (1.2.34 = fr. 280 E.–K.), one should read *Eremboi* (or *Aramboi*) in Homer and understand this to mean Arabs, since three peoples, Arameans (Syrians), Armenians, and Arabs, are very similar in their languages, modes of living, physical characteristics, and life in close proximity to each other.²⁸ The similarity of these peoples is greater, the closer they are to each other: the Syrians and those Armenians and Arabs who dwell in Mesopotamia have some differences, in accordance with their geographical locations (notice that the main cause of differences within Mesopotamia is the latitude – *klima* – of the habitats of these nations), but the similarity of peoples prevails; the larger differences between the Syrians and the Armenians and Arabs beyond Mesopotamia (most Armenians and Arabs dwell naturally beyond its borders) thus prove that all these peoples initially formed a unity and inhabited Mesopotamia.²⁹

variously as Ἀραμбоῦς / Ἑρεμбоῦς (p. 181.21–2 Dindorf), which might serve as a confirmation that Posidonius' reading was Ἀραμбоῦς. So far, Kramer's Ἀραμбоῦς seems to be convincing, and Kidd (p. 956) admits that Strabo here reports a slightly different version of Posidonius' view in comparison with the earlier citation at fr. 280, supposing that Posidonius discussed the subject on several occasions, both in *On the Ocean* and in the *History*. This might be the case, but, alternatively, in order to harmonize both pieces, I would propose that Strabo's second report (fr. 281) does not imply that Posidonius changed Homer's text, but that παρά μικρόν ἀλλάξει means, brachylogically, that he ascribed to Homer a small alteration of the pristine name of the Arabs, viz. of some name which was closer to Aramaioi and Armenioi than Arabes, into *Eremboi*. His explanation, ὡς τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοὺς νῦν Ἀραβας οὕτω καλέσαντος, καθάπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὠνομάζοντο κατ' αὐτόν, thus refers not to the real (self-)designation of the Arabs in that time but to the variant of it current among the Greek contemporaries of Homer. This has the advantage of keeping the manuscript text of Strabo intact, and of harmonizing Posidonius' statements in both passages; it also accords with Posidonius' statement that Homer and his contemporaries distorted the ethnic name of all Syrians *Aramaioi* into *Arimoi* in the continuation of the latter passage (Strabo, we recall, himself endorses this strategy in his explanation of Homeric *Eremboi*, and seems to ascribe it to Posidonius in the former passage, fr. 280.5–6). The reading Ἀραμбоῦς in the second passage, fr. 281a.18, from the margin of F, might well be correct here and thus give us the real self-designation of the Arabs in ancient times according to Posidonius. However, it could equally be an ancient or Byzantine emendation provoked by a line of reasoning similar to that of modern scholars, i.e. that *Eremboi* is not similar enough to *Aramaioi* and *Armenioi* (by the same token, it is quite possible that the form Ἀραμбоῦς or Ἑρεμбоῦς cited by the scholia to the *Odyssey* was invented by those who thought that Homer had in mind Arabs, independently from Posidonius' reasoning about the kinship of the three peoples, cf. Lehrs 1882: 237). Notice that in fr. 280.23 Strabo, while arguing that the Arabs' ancient self-designation is akin to *Aramaioi* and *Armenioi*, calls the Arabs by two names, *Arabes* and *Eremboi*, and does need any additional form, like *Aramboi*. This makes me suspect that Posidonius did not mention the exact self-designation of the Arabs in ancient times (understandably, because it is not attested) and pointed out only that it was at that time closer to *Aramaioi* and *Armenioi*.

²⁸ Cf. the discussion of this passage by David Blank, in this volume, pp. 136–9.

²⁹ τὸ γὰρ τῶν Ἀρμενίων ἔθνος καὶ τὸ τῶν Σύρων καὶ Ἀράβων πολλὴν ὁμοφυλίαν ἐμφαίνει κατὰ τε τὴν διάλεκτον καὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τοὺς τῶν σωμάτων χαρακτήρας, καὶ μάλιστα καθὼς πλησιόχωροί εἰσι.

Although the following sentence is badly damaged, it is clear that Posidonius pointed to some other peoples, also living in Syria and having characteristics similar to those of each other and to those of the Arameans, Arabs, and Armenians, the ethnic names of whom are also of a similar kind (καὶ οἱ Ἀσσύριοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀριανοὶ παραπλησίως πως ἔχουσι καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους).³⁰ In the end, Posidonius maintained (presumably arguing from the kinship of all these peoples) that their ethnic self-designations are also akin (not only that they sound similar), and that the Homeric Eremboi (this was the main point of the whole discussion) points to the ethnic name of Arabs, the Eremboi being a distorted form of an ancient self-designation of the Arabs, something like Aramboi.³¹

The next citation by Strabo of the same (or similar) reasoning of Posidonius on Homeric *Eremboi* (Str. 16.4.27 = fr. 281a E.–K.) makes the same point in a more concise form – one should read in Homer *Eremboi* (or *Aramboi*), because of the similarities between and, accordingly, the kinship of, Arameans, Armenians, and Arabs; their ethnic names are thus also kindred, and *Eremboi* points to a name that is similar to *Aramaioi* and *Armenioi* – but is more explicit on the crucial point of the underlying theory: these three peoples are in fact the descendants of a single people which was later split into three tribes. According to the environment of their new abodes they gradually changed their ethnic features in accordance with their *klimata*, viz. the latitude (the differences presumably were greater, the further away they moved from their initial abode: see the report of Strabo (fr. 280) discussed above). The diverging ethnic names

δηλοῖ δ' ἡ Μεσοποταμία ἐκ τῶν τριῶν συνεστῶσα τούτων ἔθνων· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ὁμοιότης διαφαίνεται. εἰ δέ τις παρὰ τὰ κλίματα γίνεται διαφορὰ τοῖς προσβάροισι ἐπὶ πλεόν πρὸς τοὺς μεσημβρινοὺς καὶ τούτοις πρὸς μέσους τοὺς ὄρους, ἀλλ' ἐπικρατεῖ γὰρ τὸ κοινόν.

³⁰ The names were variously emended, cf. Kidd 1988: 954–5; the *Aramaioi* seems to be wrong – it is further adduced as the self-designation of the Syrians (cf. 16.4.27 on *Arimaioi* – *Aramaioi*).

³¹ εἰκάζει γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔθνων τούτων κατονομασίας ἐμφερεῖς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι. τοὺς γὰρ ὑφ' ἡμῶν Σύρους καλουμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν Σύρων Ἀραμναίους καλεῖσθαι· τούτῳ δ' ὁικνεῖναι τοὺς Ἀρμενίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀραβας καὶ Ἑρεμβούς, τάχα τῶν πάλα Ἑλλήνων οὕτω καλούντων τοὺς Ἀραβας, ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἐτύμου συνεργούντος πρὸς τοῦτο. ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ εἰς τὴν ἕραν ἐμβαίνειν τοὺς Ἑρεμβούς ἐτυμολογοῦσιν οὕτως οἱ πολλοί, οὓς μεταλαβόντες οἱ ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον Τρωγλοδύτας ἐκάλεσαν. (Kidd thinks that the underlined words are Strabo's addition to Posidonius, because he derives the name of Eremboi from its popular Greek etymology; but this could easily be a part of Posidonius' reasoning, as Radt (2002–2011: 8.394) admits, if he retained Eremboi in Homer's passage; the point would be that Homer used the self-designation of the Arabs in the distorted form which was inspired by the popular etymology): οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν Ἀράβων οἱ ἐπὶ θάτερον μέρος τοῦ Ἀραβίου κόλπου κεκλιμένοι, τὸ πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ Αἰθιοπία.

are the result of these ethnic divergences, i.e. their languages gradually changed under the influence of a new environment.³²

These scraps of Posidonius' theory confirm that local affinity was for him the main explanation of similarities in language (as well as in national habits), and that languages were thought to diverge together with the separation of parts of the same people from each other. This gives a picture of the evolution of both language and culture as a natural and appropriate response to the environment, and of ensuing changes under the influence of new environmental conditions. It might seem that Posidonius' views on the origin of different languages also entails something like the spontaneous and mechanical reactions of the creators of language (or simply of the initial language-speakers) to their specific environment, thus bringing him close to a stance of mechanistic determinism in linguistic matters. For this reason, his theory seems to invite a comparison with the doctrine of the Hippocratic *On Airs* (5.4, 6.5, 7.2, 8.7, 15.5 Diller) on immediate climatic influences on human phonetics. Nevertheless, this would be a hasty inference. First, differences in language were, for Posidonius, on the same level as differences in habits, scientific discoveries, and moral customs. All these specific features are not only the necessary effects of environmental influences, but also the result of rational responses to them. As for languages, there is already one hint in the exposition of Posidonius' views in Strabo that he resisted the mechanistic interpretation of linguistic difference. Strabo's account shows indirectly that change of locality did not mean necessarily linguistic differentiation, as is shown by the persistence of the ethnic name of Arabs both in and out of Mesopotamia. Additionally, the language of Arabs in and out of Mesopotamia (as well as other ethnic peculiarities) would have remained the same in spite

³² μάλλον περί τῶν Ἑρεμβῶν ἢ ζήτησις, εἴτε τοὺς Τρωγλοδύτας ὑπονοητέον λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τῆν ἐτυμολογίαν βιαζόμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς τὴν ἔραν ἐμβαίνειν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν γῆν, εἴτε τοὺς Ἄραβας, ὁ μὲν οὖν Ζήνων ὁ ἡμέτερος μεταγράφει οὕτως 'καὶ Σιδονίους Ἄραβας τε'. πιθανώτερον δὲ Ποσειδώνιος γράφει τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἀλλάξει 'καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἀραμβούς (Cramer; Ἑρεμβούς MSS)', ὡς τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοὺς νῦν Ἄραβας οὕτω Ἀραμβούς, ὡς τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοὺς νῦν Ἄραβας οὕτω καλέσαντος, καθάπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ὠνομάζοντο κατ' αὐτόν. φησὶ δὲ <ταῦτα secl. Radt> τρία ἔθνη συνεχῇ ἀλλήλοις ἰδρυμένα ὁμογένειάν τινα ἐμφαίνειν πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ διὰ [τοῦ]το παρακειμένοις ὀνόμασι κεκληθῆσαι, τοὺς μὲν Ἀρμενίους τοὺς δὲ Ἀραμαίους τοὺς δὲ Ἀραμβούς (F marg. Ἑρεμβούς sett.)· ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπὸ ἔθνους [ἐνός] ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐστὶν εἰς τρία διηρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν κλιμάτων διαφορὰς αἰ καὶ μάλλον ἐξαλλαττομένων, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρῆσασθαι πλείοσιν ἀνθ' ἐνός. οὐδ' οἱ Ἑρεμβούς γράφοντες πιθανοί· τῶν γὰρ Αἰθιοπῶν μάλλον ἴδιον. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀρίμους ὁ ποιητής, οὓς φησι Ποσειδώνιος δέχεσθαι δεῖν μὴ τόπον τινὰ τῆς Συρίας ἢ τῆς Κιλικίας ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς γῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν Συρίαν αὐτήν· Ἀραμαῖοι γὰρ οἱ ἐν αὐτῇ· τάχα δ' οἱ Ἕλληνες Ἀριμαίους ἐκάλουν ἢ Ἀρίμους. αἱ δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων μεταπτώσεις καὶ μάλιστα τῶν βαρβαρικῶν πολλαί· καθάπερ τὸν Δαριήκην Δαρεῖον ἐκάλεσαν, τὴν δὲ Φάρζιριν Παρύσατιν, Ἀταργάτιν δὲ τὴν Ἀθάραν· Δερκετῶ δ' αὐτὴν Κτησίας καλεῖ.

of migrations. To better understand this aspect of the theory (namely, the persistence of ethnic distinctions) one should remember that the 'orthodox' Stoic view was that language emerged through imposition, i.e. through rational assignment of names appropriate to objects. There is no evidence that Posidonius departed from this view, and it is entirely plausible that he treated the differences of languages, like the other ethnic differences he discussed, as the result of the combined effect of the natural environment and human creativity. We should add to this the typical ancient emphasis on the initial phase of the process as the decisive one. Posidonius' theory of human culture thus appears to entail a series of fundamental discoveries which were somehow influenced by climatic differences, rather than automatic responses to environmental influences. In the particular case of language, the theory would involve the rational imposition of names, somehow influenced by specific climatic influences; these may stimulate further divergences in language due to migrations of native speakers, and even the splitting of the language into new languages, but again this occurs not mechanistically but rather through the rational acts of the later impositors of names, who somehow take these changes into account; at the same time, a simple migration of a person or of a group would not effect a considerable linguistic change, in spite of living in a new environment, because there is no 'impositor' who would fix these changes. It is worth noticing that the Hippocratic theory explains only phonetic differences, but does not attempt to explain the lexical differences which are of course most important for language differentiation – presumably, it tacitly assumes them to be the effect of 'rational' inventions, according to the prevailing view. According to the *Cratylus*, a language is exposed permanently to the deformations of the initial words by the native speakers, but is basically created by the initial impositions of names to things; there is no idea that later partial changes, even if they are shared now by all speakers of the language, would fundamentally change the set of relations between words and *nominata* that were created by the initial authoritative legislative acts.

In order to better understand the character of Posidonius' innovation, it is important to keep in mind that his claim regarding the influence of the natural environment on ethnic differences has a respectable Stoic ancestry. The influence of climate on different mental abilities of representatives of various nations was already admitted by Chrysippus (Cic. *Fat.* 7 = *SVF* 2.950).³³

³³ For a suggestion of how these differences could have had a providential character, see Sedley 1993, who stresses the role of the air each nation breathes, and the relevance of the air for the

Panaetius argued for climatic influences on individual differences (Cic. *Div.* 2.94), and for the influence of *terrarum situs* (ibid. 96–7), i.e. of climate, on the physical and psychic faculties of different peoples, opposing it to the theory of the influence of the moon (and stars) on the child at the time of birth.³⁴

However, Posidonius' own teaching seems to be different from that of each of his predecessors. Galen summarizes it as follows: differences in the characters of both animals and human beings depend on differences in their physical constitutions: those who are broad-chested and warmer are braver, those who are wide-hipped and colder are more cowardly. National characters are, accordingly, different in respect of cowardice and bravery, love of pleasure and industriousness, depending on the area in which each people live, because the affective motions of the soul always follow the disposition of the body, which varies considerably with the temperature (*krasis*) of the environment. Posidonius also mentioned differences in temperature and density of blood in human beings and animals, which also, apparently, depend on the environment, and serve in all probability as the immediate explanation of differences in affective motions (Gal. *PHP* 5.5.22–5, 1.320.22–322.25 De Lacy = fr. 169.84–96 E.–K.). National characters arising from these recurrent psychic motions are thus, ultimately, the effects of climatic influence, brought about via the intermediary of the constitution of the blood.³⁵

Chrysippus, as far as we know, only claimed that the mental capacities of nations somehow depend on the air they breathe, in a manner parallel to the influence of salutary or pestilent environments upon physical qualities (Cic. *Fat.* 7). Posidonius' theory goes far beyond this in elaborating the causal mechanism of environmental influences; unlike Chrysippus, he believed that climatic factors display their influence on physical predispositions to affective states. The differences between nations thus lay not in the intellectual capacities but in the prevailing

psychological state of the individual (which is a pneumatic state) (p. 331). On Chrysippus' position and Cicero's arguments against it, see Bobzien 1998: 294–7.

³⁴ Panaetius rejected astrology (Cic. *Div.* 2.88), and doubted the validity of divination in general (Cic. *Div.* 1.6), see Alesse 1997: 269 ad test. 136–9; the testimony on Stoic supporters of *heimarmene* notoriously omits Panaetius (Diog. Laert. 7.149).

³⁵ For the influence of climate on affective motions cf. Schmidt 1980: 18–21, Hahm 1989: 1350. We need not suppose, with Schmidt, that the different national characters somehow developed from the initial unity of mankind (19 n. 24, following K. Reinhardt); this initial unity is not attested in the evidence for Posidonius' teachings. Posidonius' point is only that the psychic features which are approximately identical in all human beings at the moment of birth then become different because of environmental influences. According to this account, the main factors are warm and cold (the same is implied by Strabo's criticism), and it seems correct to render *krasis* as 'temperature' (Kidd), not as 'climate' in the broad sense, *pace* Schmidt 1980: 19 n. 25.

emotional dispositions, such as the bravery of one nation or the cowardice of another.³⁶ Thus, Posidonius who, unlike Panaetius, returned to Chrysippus' teaching on the overall domination of the *heimarmene*, now made it a much more accountable and investigable system of natural causes, stretching from planetary motions at the top, to human psychology, individual and national, at the bottom.³⁷ The idea of climatic influence could thus be happily integrated into the whole of cosmic causality, since the distribution of climatic zones depends on their proximity to the sun. One more aspect can be added: it is probably not accidental that Strabo, in his polemics with Posidonius, mentions the advantageous dispositions of nations, and not their faults, whereas Chrysippus, according to Cicero's *De Fato*, only mentions these differences to show that some nations have hindrances which are fatal to the development of reason (cf. Galen on Chrysippus preferring the Greeks to the rest of humankind). Presumably, for this reason, Posidonius claimed, in opposition to mainstream Stoicism, that national differences demonstrate the work of the cosmic divine Providence. One may guess that he meant that they are beneficial for the corresponding part of humankind, as appropriate responses to the challenges of their environment, but also that they somehow contribute to the benefit of the whole; not only may

³⁶ This difference is a part of Posidonius' wider disagreement with Chrysippus on the psychology of affects, which we know primarily from Galen's report on the debate. Contrary to Chrysippus, who treated affects as the result of wrong judgements, Posidonius claimed a certain autonomy of affective predispositions; reason can either control affects or unduly yield to them, thus preserving freedom of choice (see Kidd 1971: 206–8). The scope of Posidonius' departure from Chrysippus, as well as from mainstream Stoicism became the subject of intensive scholarly debates (see esp. Tieleman 2003: 198–287). It is sufficient for my purposes that there is indisputable evidence for Posidonius' innovation in the psychological explanation of ethnic differences, even if Galen simplifies Chrysippus' views, and if the latter admitted that rationality is somehow affected by non-rational factors.

³⁷ Posidonius was committed to astrology and to divination in general, see Aug. *Civ.* 5.2 = Cic. *Div.* fr. 4 Giomini (the role of astrology in Chrysippus' teaching is debatable: see Ioppolo 2013: 99–118, in favour of its considerable role; Long 1982: 130–2, 152, in favour of its insignificance). While Posidonius' system of zone ethnography looks purely scientific on Strabo's account, this does not rule out that the phenomena usually treated by astrology also played a role in it; for astrology itself was for him the science or craft which collects the facts pointing to the *sympatheia* of the whole, even if astrology cannot discover the causes which underlie these data (see Cic. *Div.* 2.47 = fr. 109 E.–K. with Long 1986: 221–2). See also *Fat.* 5–7 = fr. 104 E.–K.: Posidonius defends the validity of predictions even if they come true only in homonymous relation to the things which (on a surface understanding) featured in the predictions; these are on a par with the other unexplainable coincidences in human fortunes (ibid.). The latter seems to imply that Posidonius, a tireless seeker of causes, hoped that science would discover in the future what sort of interconnection underlies such cases (notice that the mainstream Stoics held the view that etymology detects the kinship of words even if they related to remote *nominata* or those with contrary features).

bravery give an example to the whole of humankind, but so too may the affective dispositions that result in vicious moral states, like greediness, stimulate intellectual activities which are ultimately beneficial for all humans, such as, for example, arithmetic, invented by the Phoenicians (see Kidd 1978 on the subordinate but necessary role of science in relation to philosophy, according to Posidonius).

Now let us look at Posidonius' view of language differences. As we have seen, Chrysippus and the other Stoics before Posidonius were proponents of a form of linguistic naturalism. But their main concern was to maintain the appropriateness of certain words (especially those which seem to be the simplest ones) to the objects they designate; these attempts were made with Greek words only; it is difficult to see how such a theory could refute the conventionalist thesis about the multitude of different languages.

So far, this evidence suggests that Stoic naturalism before Posidonius did not involve any attempt to explain the existence of differences between languages, or to rebut the claim that said differences prove the correctness of the conventionalist theory. Strabo's reaction to Posidonius' theory shows that the orthodox Stoic answer was that these differences go back to causes of which it is enormously difficult or even impossible to give an account. It might imply that, according to orthodox Stoicism, the most primitive words imitate in some way or other the qualities of their *nominata*, but it is difficult to say why these imitative words vary in their phonetic content.

We do not know much about Posidonius' position in linguistic matters. Some of his etymologies are preserved, but they say little about his theoretical views: of course the Stoic commitment to etymologizing is well known (and is even overestimated), and Posidonius was presumably no exception, but etymological explanations can be found everywhere, for instance in Aristotle, whose theoretical stance was conventionalist. More relevant are some scraps of Posidonius' argument that the *syndesmoi*, which include for him not only conjunctions but also prefixes and prepositions, have their own semantic value – a theory which is contrary to the orthodox Stoic position;³⁸ at least some of them were called in this context 'the conjunctions which are according to nature' (Apollonius Dyscolus, *Conj. GG* 2.1.214.4–20 = fr. 45 E.–K.); Posidonius argued also that the Greek conjunction *epei* is composed of the conjunction *ei* and the preposition *epi*, and so has an etymology (fr. 192 E.–K.). It is thus possible that,

³⁸ See Kidd 1988: 200, who refers to Diog. Laert. 7.58, against the view of Frede 1987d: 330 that the 'naturalness' of conjunctions was already the orthodox Stoic view.

at least in some aspects, Posidonius' naturalism was more radical than that of his predecessors. It also shows that naturalism according to Posidonius is not reduced to etymological 'correctness', as was the case for the earlier Stoics.

Keeping this in mind, let me now return to Strabo's evidence. Posidonius' theory of the dependence of ethnic differences (including language) on climate has usually been viewed as belonging to the tradition of climatic ethnography which begins with the Hippocratic *On Airs*. But, in fact, we find in this tradition no attempt to take into account the existence of different languages (only some phonetic differences are noticed, as pointed out above, p. 31). It is more promising to suppose that Posidonius, in providing his obviously innovative explanation of the differences of languages along naturalist lines, took into account the famous passage from Plato's *Cratylus* which contains the earliest known argument against the conventionalist thesis concerning the differences between languages (the latter being brought forward in the dialogue by Hermogenes at *Cra.* 385d). Socrates' answer (389a5–390a10) constructs an analogy between the name and the tool:³⁹ just as the craftsman, having in mind the general type of tool he produces will produce every time a specific type of this tool in accordance with the material on which the tool should work, and uses, accordingly, a specific material to produce this tool, similarly the craftsman of names, having in mind the general type of name for a thing, will produce an appropriate name for each thing, which can have variable elements (syllables); such names will be appropriate no matter what elements they are made of, and the varying names for one and the same thing will, accordingly, be appropriate in different languages; the generally appropriate name for each thing will be its *physei onoma*, and the true imposer of names (*nomothetes*) is a person who is able to put the general type of name for each thing in variable letters and syllables (390d9–e5). So far, the analogy of the name and the tool seems to work, but one thing that remains puzzling is why the creators of language in different countries should make words for the same things from different elements. There is an important hint at it in the analogy which Socrates uses: the smith producing the drill *even for one and the same purpose* does not always use the same kind of iron for it (see Ademollo 2011: 136–7), but it remains nevertheless the right drill, provided that the generally appropriate form of

³⁹ It seems to me certain that Hermogenes uses these differences as one of the arguments in favour of his conventionalist stance, and that Socrates' tool-analogy serves as its refutation (cf. Ademollo 2011: 76, who is more cautious).

drill is preserved, no matter whether this drill has been produced among the Greeks or among the Barbarians. By the same token, while words can be made up of different phonetic material, each word remains the correct word for the thing in question if it reproduces the generally appropriate type of word for this thing, and the creator of such a word in one language is not worse than in another. This implies that the creators of words have no other option but to employ the material they have at their disposal, or in other words, that the words are composed of the elements which exist before the act of formation of the words starts, and these elements are not identical in different peoples.⁴⁰

The interlocutors are obviously satisfied with this refutation of conventionalism, but the difficulty which this analogy implies becomes evident when one looks at Socrates' further development of the naturalist theory: it is necessary to prove that the first, most primitive words, down to which the process of etymologizing will inevitably come, and which cannot themselves be further etymologized, are still appropriate to the things they designate. Socrates thus attempts to show that these words can be reduced to sounds, and that these sounds have mimetic faculties – they imitate the properties of the things which the corresponding words designate (424b–425c). Now, if we look at this theory from the perspective of the name–tool analogy, it becomes clear that the previous argument against conventionalism falls down. If every element of the most primitive word imitates some feature of the *nominatum*, and together in combination they imitate all its essential features, then there simply cannot be various words for one and the same *nominatum*, and the differences between languages cannot be explained along naturalist lines. It is not altogether clear whether Plato thought that the explanation of the differences between languages from the naturalist standpoint is refuted by this pushing of naturalism to its radical extreme, or, vice versa, that one should sacrifice radical naturalism in order to save the earlier explanation.⁴¹ Nevertheless, Cratylus in the dialogue has to admit that there is inevitably a conventional element in words which are made of matter that imitates the qualities of the *nominata*.

But whatever Plato's final view on the matter might be, it is clear that radical phonetic naturalism of the strict analytical kind found in Socrates' theory fails to explain the existence of different languages. It seems

⁴⁰ For the place of this reasoning in the whole argument of the *Cratylus* see Sedley 2003: 45–6, 66–7.

⁴¹ See the discussion of whether this radical naturalism contradicts the admission of the different words appropriate for one and the same thing, viz. of the existence of different languages, in Ademollo 2011: 137–8.

plausible that Epicurus took this difficulty into account when bringing forward his own naturalistic explanations of language differences. According to Epicurus (*Ep. Hdt.* 75–6), words (or, at least, the original words in each language), are natural in two senses: (1) because they are utterances provoked by certain emotional reactions to certain objects, and thus are not somebody's purposeful creations, and (2) because these utterances correspond to the *nominata*, i.e. to the objects which evoke these words. But these utterances vary from people to people because (a) the same things provoke different visual representations and different emotions in different places, presumably because things of the same type have their own particular features depending on the land in which they are found, and (b) there are, additionally, differences between nations themselves, in accordance with differences in their locations; this possibly implies some physiological and/or climatic peculiarities which influence the utterances (cf. the Hippocratic *On Airs*). This answer differs fundamentally from that of Plato (spontaneous utterances versus purposefully created words), but it shares with it one important assumption, namely that similar things should produce basically identical words. That Epicurus assumes this is also implied by Lucretius' argument from the various sounds of animals; in spite of their variety there is one fundamental type of utterance which corresponds to a certain situation and a certain emotion; in the same way, although the variety of human sounds greatly supersedes that of animals, a certain object produces in humans a certain emotion and a certain utterance (5.1056–90); additional factors with a bearing on the situation will include the peculiar features of objects, and probably also the influences of each peculiar environment. It is easy to see why the Epicureans did not sacrifice the correlation between specific things and specific words, but only softened it – otherwise it would be impossible to claim that in every given language there is an objective and necessary bond between the *nomen* and the *nominatum*; one would expect instead that different words are uttered in accordance with varieties of particular instances of these objects and with various occasional additional influences; the words we employ for each object would be the result of conventional legislation. The Epicurean theory presumes instead that a thing of a certain type produces basically an identical utterance in every situation and everywhere (a sort of essentialist assumption), but that there are also linguistic variations which develop together with the development of differences between the instances of the same *nominatum*, between the environments in various lands, and possibly also between the physiologies of different nations.

Epicurus' theory of the spontaneous origin of appropriate words avoids one of the difficulties which the naturalist theory in the *Cratylus* entailed. There is no trace in the Epicurean theory of an attempt to demonstrate that every element of the word corresponds to some feature of the *nominatum*; there is no correspondence of elementary sounds to the elementary parts of the *nominatum*. Objects evoke utterances with a certain phonetic content, and, contrary to Plato, the differences in the content of words for the same things can be plausibly explained by reference to local varieties of the things themselves and by reference to differences of environment.⁴²

Now let us look at the Stoic theory from this perspective. As we have already seen, the Stoics, beginning at least from Chrysippus, were committed to the view that language was created by the philosopher-like name-givers, and that etymologizing (in the broad Stoic sense) allows us to follow the origin of words back to their meaningful elements (sounds and syllables). The most detailed exposition of Stoic naturalism, at Aug. *Dial.* 6,⁴³ complements this scarce evidence; it shows the Stoic view to be in accordance with Socrates' second naturalistic discourse in the *Cratylus*: the etymology of every word can be discovered, and in order to escape infinite regression, it is necessary to assume that there are words which cannot be etymologically explained through other words; it remains to admit that they imitate the thing directly. These *cunabula uerborum* are either onomatopoeic, sound-imitating words like *hinnitus*, *tinnitus*, *balatus*, which imitate the sounds of physical objects or of animals; or words like *uepris*, 'torn-bush', or *mel*, *ubi sensus rerum cum sonorum sensu concordarent*, i.e. words whose sounds, harsh or gentle, evoke feelings which are similar to those which these things themselves evoke. The other words of this primitive kind, which designate things which cannot be imitated directly, were simply transferred onto them (with some modifications) from things of the first kind, according to the principles of proximity, similarity, and even contrariety between the corresponding *nominata* (see Barwick 1957a: 29–30, Long 2005, Allen 2005). Augustine also

⁴² The difficulty connected with Epicurus' theory is that one cannot argue that the primitive words of language correspond to the things which they designate – they cannot be etymologically true designations, because they are mechanically composed of sounds which have no linguistic meaning. In all probability, their appropriateness for the things they designate was only proved by the association of these words with the simplest and the chronologically earliest concept related to a given thing in the mind of the bearers of this language (*prolepsis*).

⁴³ Not in SVF; see FDS, and for the connection with Varro, see Barwick 1957a, Hülser 1987–1988.

mentions that words owe their mimetic capacities to the singular sounds of which they are composed.⁴⁴

The evidence of Origen (*C. Cels.* 1.24 = *SVF* 2.146) is unfortunately tantalizingly brief: the Stoics belong to the *physei*-party in the debate regarding the relation of words to objects (*physei* as opposed to the conventional imposition promoted by Aristotle), since their '*protai phonai*' imitate the things designated by the names; in accordance with this they introduce 'the elements of etymology'.⁴⁵ Since the *phonai* in the next sentence on the Epicurean doctrine refers to the proto-words, the same meaning can be assigned also to the Stoic *protai phonai*: they are thus, like Augustine's *cunabula*, the first, i.e. non-etymologized, words, not the singular sounds.⁴⁶ The primitive words imitate reality and are thus first in the sense of being non-derivative; they are also presumably historically first, because nobody ever spoke by means of singular sounds. But is it plausible that these words are the 'elements of etymology', i.e. those words to which all other words can be reduced by means of etymological analysis, as Long understands it?⁴⁷ One category of these words, the onomatopoetic words (*hinnitus*, *tinnitus*, etc.), certainly is not. But the words which imitate the properties of things via the similar effects of their soundings do this by means of their parts, syllables, or sounds. I suggest that they are the Stoic 'elements of etymology'.

So far, in view of Chrysippus' position, it is quite possible that the Stoics before Posidonius were committed to the extreme form of naturalism of the middle part of the *Cratylus*. It is understandable that such a theory was not amenable to attempts to take into account the differences between languages, regardless of whether its proponents were aware that the extreme naturalist stance of the middle part of the dialogue challenges the attempt to explain these differences along more moderate lines in the earlier part of it.

⁴⁴ He notices in general *lenitas uel asperitas litterarum*, and in analyzing the word *uis*, which belongs to the *cunabula*, he describes the sound of *u* as *crassum* and *quasi ualidum sonum* (see Barwick 1957a: 28).

⁴⁵ Λεκτέον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ὅτι ἐμπέπτει εἰς τὸ προκείμενον λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρρητος, ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων· πότερον, ὡς οἴεται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει εἰσὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἢ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα, καθὼ καὶ στοιχεῖα τινα τῆς ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν, ἢ, ὡς διδάσκει Ἐπικύρου, ἐτέρως ἢ ὡς οἴονται οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀπορρηγάντων τῶν πρώτων ἀνθρώπων τινὰς φωνὰς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων.

⁴⁶ For the identity of both see Barwick 1957a: 29.

⁴⁷ The meaning of the sentence καθὼ καὶ στοιχεῖα τινα τῆς ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν is not altogether clear (cf. Long 2005: 37–8) but it is unlikely that it means, as Long renders it, [they] 'introduce the primary sounds as elements', because of the indefinite τινα; rather it means 'they introduce accordingly [i.e. in accordance with mimetic features of the first words] certain elements of etymology' (*ta prota onomata* instead of *ai protai phonai* in Long is a misprint).

Now, it seems plausible that both attempts to explain language differences, Plato's and Epicurus', were taken into account by Posidonius; his own solution is clear to us only insofar as he explained these differences with reference to geographic and climatic differences, and that he saw in them the action of Providence. It is not difficult to decide what position Posidonius took on Epicurus' defence of the spontaneous origin of words against Plato's theory of their creation by wise name-givers. Posidonius' culture is created by the wise men, and it is plausible that his view of the origin of language corresponded to Socrates' naturalism in the *Cratylus* – the different languages were created by the wise name-givers. But Socrates' reasoning was improved by Posidonius' on one significant point: it remains unexplained in the *Cratylus* just why the creators of language make appropriate names for the same things from different sounds. Epicurus' theory might provide such an explanation: the differences of word form are determined by (a) specific visual impressions and affects, and (b) ethnic differences which depend on the area in which the creators dwell. Although much in this tantalizingly brief statement remains obscure, I take it in the sense that (a) (seemingly) identical things had their own local peculiarities and thus impress upon humans differently, and the accompanying emotions evoked by these impressions (emotions are responsible immediately for the character of sounds) are again different because attitudes to similar things might be different in various areas (for instance, nations can react differently to sun or rain), and (b) there are differences between the peoples themselves, presumably in their physiology and, accordingly, in their phonetic capacities.

Posidonius' theory of zonal influences on different languages was compared above to the Hippocratic theory of the *On Airs*; but that theory had a very limited scope, and has nothing to do with linguistic naturalism, since it explains only phonetic differences, not differences of lexical character. Epicurus' influence is much more probable since the primary purpose of his theory is to explain how the existence of different words for (seemingly) the same things can be compatible with the claim that words are inherently related to their objects, and since it employs a wider system of factors in its explanation.⁴⁸ Now, Posidonius' theory of the dependence of national temperaments on emotions which are specific to a given area

⁴⁸ We should bear in mind the following difference: the Epicurean words are meaningless beyond the things they refer to, while Plato's have their own meaning which corresponds to the features of the *nominata*. I would not rule out the possibility that Epicurus himself used an explanation like that of *On Airs*, but only if he also supposed some influence of climate on differences of human phonetics, which is not certain.

(see above) made it possible for him to account for differences in languages along the lines of Epicurus' theory. Of course, contrary to Epicurus, the emotion-dependent elements of language in Posidonius were only the material from which the imposers of words created the further etymologically appropriate words and the further structure of language, along similar lines to Plato's explanation of the differences between languages.⁴⁹

There is a passage in Vitruvius which possibly, but not certainly, goes back to Posidonius (Vitr. 6.1.3–12 = *FGrH* 87 F 121 = fr. 71 Theiler).⁵⁰ It gives an idea of what sort of providence is at work in the different kinds of physical constitution and different characters in various geographical zones: the main cause of differentiation is the proximity of a region to the sun, and the quantity of warmth and moisture which results; the differences of physical constitution and temperament which are produced by these factors fit the environment in which the nations live: thus the north produces larger and stronger bodies, with a large amount of blood, light skin and eye-colour, which are appropriate for war but badly adapted to the heat and fevers of the south; and, vice versa, the people in the south, stunted, with a small amount of blood, dark-skinned and dark-eyed, are

⁴⁹ There is also one additional aspect of Epicurus' theory which could be helpful for Posidonius. Plato's linguistic naturalism is of the essentialist kind – the appropriate words, which should correspond to the essential features of things, are compressed definitions, and the sounds into which these words can be resolved are imitations of the features of named things. The aporia at the end of the *Cratylus* shows that the wise name-givers should grasp these features without words in order to implement this knowledge into sounds; but this either makes the words redundant for knowledge, or makes doubtful the existence of such sages. The Stoic view of language, although admitting the role of rationality in the creation of words, is a far cry from this radical intellectualism. Although very different from Epicurus' theory, is it nevertheless empirical in its operations, as Stoic epistemology is. The acquisition of concepts in the Stoic theory is a rational process, not a perceptual one (which, on the contrary, Epicurus' is); it has, nevertheless, a thoroughly empirical character, and is remarkably close to Epicurus' theory in understanding this process as a gradual accretion of perceptual impressions. Also, according to the orthodox Stoic theory, speech is related to the *phantasiai* of things, not to the things themselves and their qualities (Diog. Laert. 7.49 = *SVF* 2.52; see also Diog. Laert. 7.63 = Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.70), see Long 1971b: 82–4. On the evidence we possess, this connection is attested only for the existing language in the Stoic theory, but according to Epicurus the *phantasiai*, which were accompanied by the emotions, evoked the sounds (future words) from the first human beings; the *phantasiai* thus serve as psychological intermediaries between things and words. I would cautiously suppose that Posidonius, who preserved the basic Stoic dogma that *phantasiai* have simultaneously a perceptual and an intellectual character, could employ to his advantage the role Epicurus assigns to *phantasiai* in word formation in his own adaptation of Plato's name-givers: the *phantasiai*, which are specific to every nation, are the most probable contributors to the elementary matter of language, i.e. of the 'first', rudimentary words out of which the name-givers go on to compose further words.

⁵⁰ The name of Posidonius is not adduced (for this reason this passage is not included in Edelstein–Kidd), but the ascription is considered possible by Trüdinger 1918: 122; cf. Kidd 1988: 272, who does not deny 'echoes' of Posidonius' doctrine; against Posidonius as the source for Vitr. 6.1 see Ferrary 2014: 382–94.

not brave in war but are very hardy as concerns heat and fevers (Vitr. 6.1.3–4). This corresponds broadly to what Posidonius could have in view, and in this context the effects of climate on human phonetics also appear (6.1.5–8). They can be reduced, according to Vitruvius, to the same two causes – warmth and moisture, with the nations who live in the south producing high-pitched sounds, and those who live in moist regions producing deep sounds (*ita et hominum corpora uno genere figurationis et una mundi coniunctione concepta alia propter regionis ardorem acutum spiritum aeris expriment tactu, alia propter umoris abundantiam grauissimas effundunt sonorum qualitates* (6.1.8)). The idea might be related to Posidonius' theory, but in any case it does not shed light on the crucial point, namely the differences between languages as concerns lexica.

K. Reinhardt inferred from this passage, combining it with Str. 2.3.7 and Manil. 4.731, that according to Posidonius different languages developed from the original unity just as the different physical constitutions and psychic types did.⁵¹ It is not entirely clear what he had in view, but Posidonius' theory certainly does not envisage the original unity of all languages. Strabo maintains the dependence of the formation of languages on climate,⁵² and Vitruvius (6.1.8) stresses that the physical constitutions of human nations formed under the same constellations, i.e. simultaneously, at the time of the first origin of humankind, differ nevertheless in accordance with climatic influences. It is unlikely that the account he followed would have omitted the important point that initially all these nations were born in the same place; and only this, according to the principle stated here, would make them have the same initial language. Rather, Posidonius' theory, like that of Epicurus, entails the principal identity of words for the same things in the localities which are close to one another, and growing differences between the words for the same things in accordance with local differences.

There is an interesting passage in Dio Chrysostom's *Olympic Oration* (12.27–9 von Arnim = fr. 368 Theiler) on a certainly Stoic teaching about the origin of culture and language which can with some plausibility be ascribed to Posidonius.⁵³ It is part of an account of the origin of human

⁵¹ Reinhardt 1953: 680–1. He was followed by Spoerri 1959: 140 n. 27.

⁵² There is no explicit idea that singular languages, when they are divided because of migrations, are differentiated due to geographic differences, although it cannot be ruled out. The evidence we have (Str. 16.4.27) points only to differentiation in self-designation of the parts of the formerly single nation, and this implies the differentiation of languages themselves; but the reason for this is not stated openly.

⁵³ See Binder 1905: 27–31, and, more cautiously, Dragona-Monachou 1976: 29–30 in favour of similarity to Posidonius' teaching. The credentials of Posidonius' authorship increase if, as I think is

culture, which serves as a proof that the first people had to come inevitably to the idea of the divine providence. The beauty of human speech, which they must have perceived, is testimony to this providential care. Dio mentions, on the one hand, the pleasure and clearness of sounds uttered by humans, and, on the other, the clearness and epistemic value of said sounds, which was recognized when the people assigned them to things. After that, the people became able to receive from one another the memories and the apprehensions of endless things (12.28).⁵⁴ A remarkable aspect of this theory is that it does not imply that the initial sounds were confused or unarticulated, as is claimed in most theories of language evolution. In this regard, it reminds us of the Epicurean theory, in which there is no stage of confused sounds which makes the invention of artificial articulation inevitable; the sounds become immediately related to things, as they are uttered spontaneously as emotional responses to them.⁵⁵ Of course the teleological tint of Dio's theory – the peculiar beauty of natural human sounds – is alien to the Epicurean theory. Just this aspect of Dio's theory would accord with Posidonius' view of the influence of environment on the initial 'matter' of language, because according to him, it is not eliminated by any artificial improvements.

The assigning of words to things in Dio's theory suggests a theory of imposition of words onto things, as opposed to the naturalism of the Epicurean type, and we can take this as additional support for the idea that the Stoic theory was similar to Plato's imposition of names, rather than to Epicurus' spontaneous process of uttering words. But Dio's theory depicts the creation of language as a collective process, rather than as an invention of the wise imposers of names. There is no evidence for the method of imposition according to the orthodox Stoic view, and the *Cratylus*, as has been noticed, avoids any detailed description of imposition. If Dio's theory bears on Posidonius' theory, this collective process would make sense as a response to the Epicurean attack against the earlier theory of the 'imposer' of names (most probably, against the one developed in the *Cratylus*),

the case, the Stoics before him did not elaborate their views on the origin of culture in a detailed form; but this can be a circular argument.

⁵⁴ ὁρῶντες καὶ φωνὰς ἀκούοντες παντοδαπὰς ἀνέμων τε καὶ ὕλης καὶ ποταμῶν καὶ θαλάττης, ἔτι δὲ ζώων ἡμέρων καὶ ἀγρίων, αὐτοὶ τε φθόγγον ἥδιστον καὶ σαφέστατον ἰέντες καὶ ἀγαπῶντες τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς τὸ γαῦρον καὶ ἐπιστήμον, ἐπιθέμενοι σύμβολα τοῖς εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀφικνουμένοις, ὥς πᾶν τὸ νοηθὲν ὀνομάζειν καὶ δηλοῦν, εὐμαρῶς ἀπείρων πραγμάτων [καὶ] μνήμας καὶ ἐπινοίας παραλαμβάνοντες.

⁵⁵ Although I have tried to argue that the Epicurean theory implies the gradual natural articulation of sounds in the course of human historical development, together with the growing refinement of their emotions (see Verlinsky 2005: 87–90).

which proceeds through three arguments: (1) it is incredible that somebody could invent imposition without seeing other people communicating between themselves, and thus not understanding the utility of non-invented language; (2) it would have been impossible to teach words to other people, who would not understand their utility; (3) it would have been impossible for a hypothetical inventor to collect people together to teach them the language, before the language had been invented.⁵⁶ Dio's theory is immune to these arguments: it depicts the creation of language as a rational but collective process: it is not an invention of a single person, but rather starts, without external impulse, in the whole of humankind. This does not rule out the role of outstanding individuals (Posidonius' sages) in the creation of meaningful words attached to things, but their activity corresponds to the need of the whole of humankind.

Epicurus' theory also includes a second stage (*Ep. Hdt.* 76) – that of imposition. It does not change the natural correspondence of words to things, but only makes communication more convenient, and it is tempting to think that Epicurus has in mind some unification of words which had already been related to things through spontaneous utterances (see Verlinsky 2005: 71–7). The latter point is debatable, but the persistence of the initial natural words and their links to the objects they designate is beyond doubt. Now, it is not necessary to treat the impositions in Dio as radically different from the impositions of Epicurus' second stage. We cannot say exactly how Dio understands this process, but he certainly does not have in view that next to the beautiful and pleasant initial sounds, the new words are created artificially as different from the earlier ones; rather they can be understood as rational linguistic signs composed of naturally arising phonetic elements (the Stoic *stoicheia*).⁵⁷

Dio's piece seems to give the most explicit and detailed version of what the Stoic theory of the imposition of names might have been, given their stress on the rationality of humankind (duly reflected in the original

⁵⁶ The arguments are cited by Lucretius (5.1041–55) and Diogenes of Oinoanda (fr. 12 Smith) in very similar and complementary accounts which most probably draw on Epicurus; there is the additional testimony of Sextus Empiricus that similar arguments were used against the atheistic idea of the invention of religion which, as we know, was criticized by Epicurus in *On Nature*, Book 12, devoted to the origin of culture: see Kleve 1963 and further Verlinsky 1998.

⁵⁷ Even this process of the assigning of words to things is not entirely alien to Epicurus' theory, as Lucretius' words suggest (*at uarios linguae sonitus natura subegit | mittere et utilitas expressit nomina rerum*, 5.1028–9), where the second half probably points to the process of using sounds for designating objects, which is intermediate between the emission of spontaneous sounds and the rational stage of imposition, which itself serves as a kind of regulation of the connections between words and things which arose spontaneously; see Verlinsky 2005: 83–6.

language), their insistence on imposition, and their emphasis on the imitative abilities of human language. At the same time, it is unlikely that such a view was developed by the earlier Stoics, given their lack of interest in speculating on the origin of human culture, and the Posidonian provenance seems to be more credible granted his detailed reasoning on this subject, including on the origin of language. Dio's theory, without explicitly mentioning the problem, certainly implies the natural origins of different languages, in accordance with Posidonius' attested view.

Of course it cannot be proved definitely that Dio depends on Posidonius and that his theory of language is influenced by Epicurus. However, I would maintain that Dio's reasoning, for which some have proposed Posidonian provenance on other grounds, shows the specific Posidonian interest in the problems of the origin of culture and language which is not attested for the other Stoics of importance. Equally, the revisionist appropriation of the Epicurean ideas which this passage shows is in accord with Posidonius' *modus actionis* in the creation of his alternative theory of the origin of language and culture.

To summarize, in spite of the elusiveness of Posidonius' views on the origin of language, it is certain that its main and innovative feature was the attempt to explain the differences of languages along naturalist lines, for which he probably creatively used and reformed the analogous attempts of Plato and Epicurus. For many reasons, most of all because of the unpopularity of Posidonius' scientific approach in the later Stoa and the growing orthodoxy, his new doctrines in this field did not attract much attention in further philosophical debates (the result of my paper is that we have even less evidence for his views than it is usually assumed). Still, Posidonius' idea of the climatic influences upon differences between languages via prevailing psychological dispositions is a remarkable attempt in the history of linguistic naturalism which anticipates similar theories in modern times. As for the history of ancient naturalism, this part of his teaching shows once more a pervasive influence of the *textus classicus* in this field, Plato's *Cratylus*. I have not attempted to investigate Posidonius' influence on Cicero and Varro in the question of the imposition of names – this is a different, and difficult, task which may promise a better understanding of the relationships between their respective ideas, even in the event of a negative result.

*Lucilius on Latin Spelling, Grammar, and Usage**Anna Chahoud^f*

The earliest pronouncements on Latin spoken and written usage come to us from a literary figure in the late second century BC, i.e. the Roman satirist Gaius Lucilius (180 / 168?–103 / 102), who had a pervasive influence on authoritative writers on Latin of the late Republic. Lucilius' personal poetry – the first of the kind to appear on the Roman stage since Ennius' experimental miscellaneous *saturae* – was characterized by an assertive voice delivering views on an unprecedented variety of themes. That language was a favourite theme is evidenced by the significant number of metalinguistic comments in the fragmentary remains of Lucilius' notoriously large production, which included a systematic treatment (Book 9) of Latin orthography and morphology.

Critical studies of Lucilius' linguistic views generally agree on the Stoic-oriented ancestry of his theoretical background, with particular reference to the eccentric development of the Stoic theory of meaning into the so-called principle of 'συνπᾶθεια between signifier and signified' as formulated by the Alexandrian analogist Trypho in the late first century BC.² Lucilius' perspective on how the Latin language works (or should work) is

¹ I am grateful to Jim Adams, as ever, for suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the anonymous referee for comments that have helped me clarify aspects of my argument. I would also like to thank Jacopo Tabolli for expert advice on Faliscan inscriptions, Martine Cuypers on Dionysius Thrax, and Ashley Clements for generous guidance on Hellenistic philosophy of language.

² See Garcea, in this volume, pp. 98–101 and Introduction, in this volume, pp. 5–6 on 'referential naturalism'. Sommer (1909), who first referred to a 'συνπᾶσχειν-*Theorie*', prompted decades of scholarly debates on Lucilius' orthographic rules: Kent 1911, Fay 1912, Fay 1913, Kent 1913a, Kent 1913b, Colson 1921, Suess 1927, Pepe 1943, Mariotti 1960: 29–38, Belardi 1985: 207–11, Belardi and Cipriano 1990, Belardi 1990, Biddau 2006, Biddau 2008. The topic of *geminatio uocalium* in particular, which originated with Ritschl 1867, was recently revived in light of the evidence offered by the New Gallus papyrus (Anderson, Parsons and Nisbet 1979: 127–8, Somerville 2007). Lucilius' grammatical fragments were edited separately by Funaioli 1907: 32–50 (= *GRFF*) and (a selection) Pisani 1950: 82–4.

the earliest evidence in Latin for a position of ‘naturalist rationalism’³ applying the principle of natural correspondence between form and meaning to all fields of linguistic inquiry. To what extent Lucilius should be taken seriously is the subject of the present investigation – not so much to establish whether Lucilius’ pronouncements reflect a serious philosophical doctrine (whether appropriated by the satirical writer or put in the mouth of one of his characters), and exactly what that doctrine might be: there is little way of discovering a definite answer to these questions, when all relevant textual evidence comes without a context, fragmentary and mediated by later sources. The topic discussed in this volume rather suggests the usefulness of an inquiry into the ways in which Lucilius’ ‘naturalism’ – however defined, motivated and integrated with competing criteria for correctness – may give a satisfactory representation of Republican Latin practices as may be reconstructed from other sources. As this volume abundantly shows, ‘nature’ is a central concept in the development of Roman linguistic thought,⁴ and one that impacts on definitions of correctness and change, regularity and anomaly, norm and usage. My main concern is therefore with Lucilius’ attitude to linguistic norms and to language change, which requires an examination of the views of this Roman intellectual (Section 1) in relation both to his theoretical background (Section 2) and to linguistic phenomena attested largely through documentary evidence and the tendentious appropriations of later grammatical writers (Section 3).

1 Lucilius’ Lectures on Latin

1.1 *The Context of Transmission*

Many of Lucilius’ fragments, as with the vast majority of fragmentary Republican Latin, have come down to us through the ‘guardians of language’ of Late Antiquity. Grammatical fragments, however, have an earlier transmission between the late Republic and the first two centuries of the Imperial age. Varro reports two etymologies of Lucilius in Book 5 of *De lingua Latina*.⁵ Quintilian quotes Lucilius four times in his discussion

³ Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 134, applying the definition to both Lucilius and Nigidius Figulus (see further Garcea, in this volume).

⁴ See further Uhlfelder 1966 and, to a lesser extent, Uhlfelder 1963. The author’s lucid overview on the role of nature (1966) and attitudes to language change (1963) in Roman linguistic thought has little to say on Lucilius and other fragmentary authors of the Republican period.

⁵ Var. *L.* 5.63, 5.80.

of grammar and orthography in Book 1, and twice in relation to *compositio* in Book 9 of the *Institutio oratoria*.⁶ Writing *de orthographia* under Hadrian, Velius Longus and Terentius Scaurus transmit the majority of fragments on spelling rules.⁷ These authors in various degrees draw on late Republican sources, notably Nigidius Figulus and Varro, while also bearing witness to their own times' changes in the language and in its analysis. It is perhaps significant that Lucilius is cited as an authority on grammar and usage at important times for the history of the Latin language and writing – the Varronian age of debate on analogy; the aftermath of the emperor Claudius' failed orthographic reform, which is still topical in Quintilian; and the archaizing age of Hadrian.

1.2 Topics

Metalinguistic comments feature already in Lucilius' early iambo-trochaic satires, and in a number of passages transmitted with no indication of the original book. Topics range from etymology (1160 M. = *GRFF* 37 *praetor* from *prae ire*; 1340 M. *uis est uita*) to stigmatized features of usage: solecisms (1100 M. = *GRFF* 38 and 1215–17 M. = *GRFF* 39 *intro / intus*), barbarisms (1130 M. = *GRFF* 34 rustic *Cēcilius* and 1322 M. = *GRFF* 35 Vettius) and hyper-urban affectations (964 M. = *GRFF* 33 *pertisum* for *pertaesum*). We find for the first time in Lucilius terms that will enter the later scholarly tradition, namely *geminare* (381 M.) applied to the duplication of graphemes,⁸ and the phrase *uerbum inusitatum* (650 M.), glossed as *zetematium* and used polemically to reject obsolete forms and affectations. When Cicero (*Brut.* 259) uses the expression *inusitatis uerbis* to censure the diction of Sisenna, 'reformer of current usage' (*quasi emendator sermonis usitati*),⁹ he does it immediately after setting 'bad speakers' (among whom is Pacuvius, Lucilius' target at 650 M.) against the pure Latinity of Laelius, Furius Philo, and Scipio (and, one might add, Lucilius). As we will see below, Lucilius did not divorce his interpretation of linguistic phenomena

⁶ Quint. *Inst.* 1.6.8 (Lucil. 357 Marx); 1.7.15 (364–6 M.; 367–8 M.); 1.7.19 (371 M.) (see Ax 2011 ad locc.); 9.4.38 (149–50 M.); 9.4.113 (84–5 M.).

⁷ Vel. Long. *GL* 7.47.5–6 (Lucil. 377–8 M.); 47.8–9 (379–80 M.); 56.7–9 (364–6 M.); 56.11–12 (369–70 M.); 56.13–14 (358–61 M.); 60.15; 62.1–2 (374–5 M.); 63.3 (374 M.); 65.15–16 (381 M.). Ter. Scaur. 6.2.2 Biddau = *GL* 7.18.17 (Lucil. 351 M.); 6.2.2 B. = *GL* 18.19–22 (352–5 M.); 6.3.2 B. = *GL* 19.1–5 (358–61 M.).

⁸ Naturally the verb was not a new coinage; cf. Ter. *Ad.* 172 *nisi caues geminabit (pugnus uel sim.)*.

⁹ Cf. Uhlfelder 1963: 24.

from observation of current speaking and writing practices – provided they were good usage.

Lucilius also brought aesthetic considerations into linguistic analysis and linguistic choices when dealing with cacophony (377–8 M. = *GRFF* 15 on the *cacosyntheton* sound of ‘r’) and euphony (1168 M. = *GRFF* 41 *euphona* defined as *uerba magis sonantia ... quasi uocalia*). He gave examples of artful repetition (1130 M. = *GRFF* 40 *bonum schema*) and humorously condemned *atechnon* mannerism (181–8 M.); he may have discussed ‘original models’ of versification (1111 M. *archetypa*).¹⁰ The Greek terminology that Lucilius puts in the mouth of his satiric personae is but a nod to contemporary discussions of artistic language, by Crates of Mallos and other figures known through Philodemus, *On Poems*, from whose account ‘we get the impression of a continuing discussion in the Hellenistic period of the relationship between content (διάνοια) and form, especially composition and arrangement of words into lines (σύνθησις), and its ensuing effects of sound (εὐφωνία)’.¹¹ Lucilius’ dissertation on *poema* and *po(i)esis* in Book 9 (339–47 M. = *GRFF* 4–5) is a favourite subject of Hellenistic critics of all philosophical orientations, from Neoptolemus of Parium to the Stoic Posidonius to the Epicurean Philodemus.¹² Lucilius’ poetry was a vehicle of contemporary (Greek) ideas concerning the relation between language, literary criticism, and poetics, without seeming to adhere to any specific school of thought systematically.¹³

1.3 ‘Orthography’

Lucilius’ most substantial (and controversial) contribution to grammatical science is the full-length lecture on orthography in Book 9 (338–82 M.), dated c. 116–110 BC. Lucilius dealt not only with rules of spelling but also with facts of pronunciation. That the satirist (or one of his speakers) was concerned with *orthographia* is clear from explicit references to writing in the late grammarians who either cite Lucilius or refer to his views on orthography: *alii ... quorum est Lucilius ... scriptitauerunt* (Vel. Long. *GL*

¹⁰ This much disputed fragment is transmitted in the *De metris Horatianis* of Atilius Fortunatianus, *GL* 7.278.17: *quod si omnia uelis cognoscere et nomina et genera metrorum ... ueteres legemus, id est, ut ait Lucilius, archaeotyra, unde haec sunt nata*. For the manuscripts’ *archeotyra* Marx substituted *archaeotera*, Timpanaro (ap. Mariotti 1960: 38 n. 4) *arch(a)etypa*; working on the latter’s suggestion, Morelli (1976: 112) viewed Fortunatianus’ citation as an adaptation for the sake of syntactical integration and proposed to read <illis> *archetypis, unde haec sunt omnia nata*.

¹¹ Schenkeveld and Barnes 1999: 223.

¹² Asmis 1992: 212–13, Schenkeveld and Barnes 1999: 223–4, Gutzwiller 2010: 343–5.

¹³ Lehmann 2004: 179. Cf. Koster 2001.

7.56.2), *Lucilius* ... *iubet scribi* (Ter. Scaur. *GL* 7.18.23); *cetera per 'c' scribuntur; hoc quoque Lucilio uidetur* (Cassiod. *Gramm.* *GL* 7.149.1). On the other hand, some quotations do include mention of pronunciation, for example the discussion of assimilation (*maluerunt et dicere et scribere* (Vel. Long. *GL* 7.62.18), and to the 'more refined diction' of those who say 'll' rather than 'rl' (Vel. Long. *GL* 7.65.15 *elegantioris sermonis uiri geminare malunt quam r litteram exprimere*). Isidore, when making a general point on correctness, stated that the purpose of Lucilius' listing of 100 solecisms was to illustrate 'a norm of correct speech' (Isid. *Orig.* 1.33.5 *regulam recte loquendi*). What Lucilius – as opposed to his late sources – might have meant by 'correct' is the focus of my discussion below.

1.3.1. *The Logic of Spelling*

The surviving fragments address (a) the name and sound of the letters 'r' and 's'; (b) the spelling of the long vowels [ā] and [ī]; (c) the graphemic disambiguation of the desinential homographs/homophones [-ī] and [-ae]; (d) the assimilation of groups of consonants in compound verbs. Two lines (e) seem to refer to the quantity of [e], but in fact stigmatize a phonomorphological change (*feruo* not *ferueo*). As my detailed discussion will necessarily have to be selective, it may be useful to lay out the text and anticipate Lucilius' 'rules' and rationale (italicized) right from the outset.

- (a) *There is a natural correspondence between the name and sound of the letters 'r' and 's'.*

(377–8 M. = *GRFF* 15 *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.47.1)
 'r' non multum est hoc cacosyntheton atque canina
 si lingua dico; nihil ad me; nomen hōc¹⁴ illi est.

The letter 'r': it makes no great difference if I say it in an ugly sound-unit and in dog-language: it's no concern of mine, that's its name.

(379–80 M. = *GRFF* 15 *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.47.7)
 's' nostrum et semigraeci quod dicimus sigma
 nil erroris habet.

Our 's' and what we half-Greeks call 'sigma' has no fault in it.

- (b) *The writing of [ā] and [ī] must conform to a rational norm validated by best (Greek) usage rather than extending recent (Latin) conventions arising from the inconsistency of local usage:*

¹⁴ Apparatus: enim *Marx*.

‘a’, not ‘aa’, for [ā], singular ‘i’, plural ‘ei’ for [ī].¹⁵

(351 M., 352–5 M. = *GRFF* 8 *ap.* Ter. Saur. 6.2.2 Biddau = *GL* 7.18.17)
 ‘a’ primum est, hinc incipiam et quae nomina ab hoc sunt 351 M.
 [deinde] . . .
 ac primum, longa <an> brevis syllaba, nos tamen unum 352 M.
 hoc faciemus et uno eodemque ut dicimus pacto
 scribemus ‘pacem’ ‘Pacideianum’, ‘aridum’ ‘acetum’,
 ‘Ἀρεῖς’ ‘Ἀρεῖς’ Graeci ut faciunt.¹⁶ 355 M.

The letter ‘a’ comes first, I’ll begin from there, and the names of the letters that come after it . . .

And first, be the syllable long or short, nevertheless we’ll use only one letter for this, and write in one and the same way as we say: ‘pācem’ ‘Pācideianum’, ‘āridum’ ‘ācetum’, as the Greeks do with ‘Ἀρεῖς’.

(358–61 M. = *GRFF* 10 *ap.* Ter. Saur. 6.3.2 Biddau = *GL* 7.19.1;
 Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56.13; Mar. Victor. *GL* 6.18.3)
 ‘mille hominum, duo milia’ item: huc ‘e’ utroque opus: ‘meille’; 358 M.
 ‘militiam’ tenues ‘i’; ‘pilam’ in qua lusimus, ‘pilum’
 quo piso, tenues; si plura haec feceris ‘pila’ 360 M.
 quae iacimus, addes ‘e’, ‘peila’ ut plenius fiat.¹⁷

A thousand (*mille*) men and two thousands (*milia*) likewise: here ‘e’ is needed in both cases: ‘meille’. *militiam*: you’ll use a slender ‘i’. The *pila* (ball) we play with, the *pilum* (pestle) I pound with: you’ll use a slender ‘i’. If you make the word plural, *pila* (spears) which we throw, you’ll add ‘e’ to make the word fuller.

- (c) *The disambiguation of desinential homographs/homophones must respect the natural correspondence between meaning and word form, symbolically signalling plurality and/or addition by a ‘fuller’, ‘richer’ form, i.e. one that contains more letters.*

- (i) gen. sing. ‘-i’, dat. sing. ‘-ei’, nom. plur. ‘-ei’ for [ī]

(362–3 M. = *GRFF* 10a *ap.* Char. 99.7 Barwick)

¹⁵ For both fragments transmitted by Terentius Scaurus I print Biddau’s text (2008), which rests on persuasive arguments (ad loc. and in Biddau 2006).

¹⁶ Apparatus : 351 [deinde] *grammatici* 352 a primum longa brevis *codd.* a primum longa <an> brevis *Ritschl* ‘<a>a’ primum longa, <‘a’> brevis *Marx* : ac primum, longa <an> brevis *Biddau* 354 *Pacideianum* *Baehrens* (cf. Housman 1907: 72) : placide ianum. Against the paradosis (accepted by Marx) Vine 1993: 280 argues that unlike *pacem* (pāc- / paac-) and *aridum* (ār- / aar-), *ianum* has no match in inscriptions (*Iaanus): see further below.

¹⁷ Apparatus: 358 *meille* *Colson* : mille : miles *Scaliger* 360 *piso* *Baehrens* : ipso *codd.* : pinso *Scaliger*. For discussion of this passage see Mariotti 1960: 25–9, Biddau 2006: 155–8, with full bibliography 155 n. 1 (and cf. n. 2 above); Biddau 2008: 148–52.

porro hoc si filius 'Luci'
fecerit, 'i' solum, ut 'Corneli' 'Cornifici'que.

Also, if the son 'of Lucius' does this, only one 'i', as in 'of Cornelius' and 'of Cornificius'.

(364–6 M. = *GRFF* 10b *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.59.5; Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.15; Char. 99.12 B. = Var. fr. inc. sed. 232.7–8 Goetz–Schoell)
iam 'puerei uenere' 'e' postremum facito atque 'i',
ut 'puerei' plures fiant. 'i' si facis solum,
'pupilli', 'pueri', 'Lucili', hoc unius fiet.

Now in 'puerei (children) came', put 'e' and 'i' in the ending, just so *puerei* become plural. If you put one 'i' *pupilli*, *pueri*, *Lucili*, this will become (genitive singular) 'of an orphan', 'of a boy', 'of Lucilius'.

(369–70 M. = *GRFF* 10d *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56.8)
'hoc illi factum est uni', tenue hoc facies 'i':
'haec ille fecere', addes e, ut pinguius fiat.

'It was done for him alone (*illi uni*): you'll make this 'i' simple: 'they (*illei*) did this': you'll add 'e' for the word to become richer.

(367–8 M. = *GRFF* 10c *ap.* Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.15)
'mendaci' 'furi'que addes 'e', cum dare 'furei'
iusseris.

To a liar (*mendaci*) and thief (*furi*) you'll add 'e', when you prescribe to give 'to a thief in the dative (*furei*).

- (ii) dat. sing. (and nom. plur.?) 'ae' for [-ai]; gen. sing. '-ai' (?)

(371 M. = *GRFF* 11 *ap.* Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.19, a reference without quotation)
'ae' syllabam, cuius secundam nunc 'e' litteram ponimus, uarie per 'a' et 'i' efferebant quidam semper ut Graeci, quidam singulariter tantum, cum in datiuum uel genetiuum casum incidissent . . . est in hac quoque parte Lucili praeceptum, quod, quia pluribus explicatur uersibus, si quis parum credet, apud ipsum in nono requirat.

The syllable 'ae', which now has 'e' as second letter, was formerly expressed by 'a' and 'i', by some writers in all circumstances (as in Greek), and by others only in the singular, when they came to the dative or genitive . . . Lucilius has advice to give about this too; but it occupies several lines, and I must ask the sceptical reader to consult the poet himself, in Book 9.

(372 M. = *GRFF* 11a *ap.* Mart. Cap. 3.266)
Lucilius in datiuo casu 'a' et 'e' coniungit dicens:

‘huic Terentiae Orbiliae Licinius . . .

Lucilius joins ‘a’ and ‘e’ in the dative when he says:

‘Licinius . . . to Terentia and Orbilia’¹⁸

- (d) *There is no need to differentiate spellings for one and the same pronunciation, as is the case for assimilation of prefixes in verbal compounds:*

(374 M. = GRFF 12b ap. Vel. Long. GL 7.63.3)

‘abbibere’: <hic> non multum est ‘d’ siet an ‘b’.

abbibere: be it ‘d’ or ‘b’, it does not make much difference.

(375 M. = GRFF 12 ap. Vel. Long. GL 7.62.1)

atque ‘accurrere’ scribas | ‘d’ne an ‘c’ non est quod quaeras atque labores.

And there’s no reason to scrutinize and agonize over whether *accurrere* should be written with ‘d’ or ‘c’.

(381 M. = GRFF 13 ap. Vel. Long. GL 7.65.15)

‘pelliciendus’, quod est inducendus, geminat ‘l’.

The word *pelliciendus*, meaning ‘he must be led in’, doubles the ‘l’.

- (e) *Phono-morphological change is rejected in favour of the original Latin form, which retains the natural correspondence between sound and meaning.*

(356 M. = GRFF 9 ap. Non. p. 503.21 Mercier (808 Lindsay))

feruere ne longum, uero hoc lictoribus tradam.

feruere must not be long, I’ll actually hand it over to the lictors.

(357 M. = GRFF 9a ap. Quint. Inst. 1.6.8; Non. p. 503.1 M. (807 L.);

Prisc. GL 2.479.16)

feruit aqua et feruet, feruit nunc, feruet ad annum.

Water boils and will boil: it boils now, will boil a year from now.

Even allowing for the originally dialogic structure of Lucilius’ grammatical satire, in which different speakers put forward different views, it is nevertheless possible to extract some consistency across the surviving evidence. If one could prove that the following passage, attributed without context to Book 9, belonged to our satire, it would provide the clearest

¹⁸ The inflected demonstrative (*hic, ille*) was used to mark the case of nouns unambiguously: see e.g. 369–70 M. *hoc illi factum est uni . . . haec ille fecere*, Nigid. fr. 37 Swoboda *si huius terrae . . . si huic terrae*, and passim in the late grammatical practice of exemplification.

evidence of Lucilius' identification of *natura* with *ratio* in his linguistic analysis:¹⁹

(349–50 M. *ap.* Non. 442 L.)

labora

discere, ne te res ipsa ac ratio ipsa refellat.

Take pain to learn, lest the very essence and the very principle of the thing should elude you.

In this passage Lucilius seems to amplify the relationship between the two words by doubling the emphatic pronoun (*ipsa*) and trebling the alliteration (*refellat*), just as he does to mark the genetic relationship in one of his etymologies (with anaphora at the pentemimere):

(1340 M. *ap.* Var. L. 5.63)

uis est uita, uides, || uis nos facere omnia cogit.

vital force (*uis*) is life (*uita*), you see, *uis* compels us to do everything.

But speculation can take us too far, and I quickly move on.

1.3.2. *Tone and Influence*

In what fashion exactly the satirist, or one of his speakers, delivered his 'lectures on correct speaking and writing' is hard to tell from isolated short passages; there is no doubt, though, about the prescriptive tone of them. In the 41 lines attributed with certainty to Book 9, all verbs in the second person are imperatives or amount to directives (*labora, tenues, addes, facies, facito, non est quod quaeras*), except, significantly, for *non . . . cognoscis*, 'you do not know' (338–9 M.); first person statements recall the didactic technique of normative grammarians of later ages (351 M. *hinc incipiam*), including widespread use of the prescriptive future (353 *faciemus*, 354 *scribemus*). To quote Colson (1924: 76), 'Lucilius in Book IX is speaking *ex cathedra* as a grammarian'; and grammarians took his poetic treatment of linguistic topics seriously. In his discussion of spelling in *Inst.* 1.7, Quintilian underlines the prescriptive nature of Lucilius' 'advice' (*Inst.* 1.7.14 *Lucilius praecipit*; 1.7.19 *Lucilii praeceptum*); the approach persists in the grammarians of late antiquity, who explicitly speak of Lucilius' 'norms' (Bede, *GL* 7.251.18 *regulam Lucilii*; Isid. *Orig.* 1.33.5 *regulam recte loquendi*; Ter. Saur. *GL* 7.18.23 *Lucilius . . . iubet scribi*) and 'views' (Cassiod. *Gramm.* *GL* 7.149.1 *Lucilio uidetur*). Likewise, modern scholars

¹⁹ Cf. Suess 1927: 346–7.

give Lucilius a prominent role in the formation of Roman educated culture,²⁰ even when not prepared to believe in the seriousness of his linguistic doctrines.²¹ However arbitrary it may be to presume to reconstruct a unitary view from scattered fragments, which may well have belonged to different contexts and different speaking characters in Lucilius' poems, the satirist's reception in the grammatical tradition does permit us to refer simply to 'Lucilius' views' on Latin.

2 The Greek Background

The friend of Scipio Aemilianus, Laelius Sapiens, and Panaetius, Lucilius is generally assumed to have had Stoic inclinations. The longest extant fragment (1326–38 M.) defines *uirtus* in ways reminiscent of the ethical system of Diogenes of Babylon (c. 240–150 BC), Head of the Stoa, the teacher of Panaetius, and most famously associated with his Academic opponent Carneades in the Athenian delegation of philosophers to Rome of 155 BC.²² It was, however, the sceptic Clitomachus (c. 187/6–110/109 BC), Head of the Academy after Carneades, who dedicated to Lucilius a treatise on problems of cognitive theory (Cic. *Luc.* 102). Fragments from early iambo-trochaic satires play with the language of natural philosophers (635–6 M. *principio physici omnes constare hominem ex anima et corpore / dicunt*; 784–90 M. extended wordplay on στοιχεῖα and ἀρχαί as the (philosophical) 'elements' and the (practical) 'means' of life). Lucilius' alignment with Stoic linguistic doctrines is normally inferred from his interest in etymology (1160 M.; 1340 M.), barbarism (1130 M.; 1322 M.), solecism (1100 M.; 1215–7 M.), and the naturalistic principle of natural correspondence between meaning and word form which Lucilius uses as his phonological and inflectional rationale in Book 9. It has been noted that Trypho's formulation of 'sympathy between signifier and signified' is the one theoretical position which can give a coherent explanation of all Lucilius' examples; the principle is often given as a Stoic one.²³

²⁰ Cf. Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 60.

²¹ Bernardi Perini (1983: 165, retracting Bernardi Perini 1982: 12) describes Lucilius' representation of the logic of inflection as ironic and burlesque ('la prescrizione di premiare il bugiardo e il ladro col dargli una 'e' in più', with ref. to 367–8 M. *mendaci furique*) and his attitude to assimilation (374 M. and 375 M.) as indifferent and contemptuous.

²² *SVF* 3 pp. 210–43, Schenkeveld and Barnes 1999: 791. The philosophical ancestry of the 'virtus-fragment' is thoroughly discussed in Görler 1984.

²³ '[L]a dottrina stoica del συμπτώσχειν è l'unico punto di vista teorico "in grado di spiegare coerentemente tutti gli esempi luciliani"' (Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 60, citing Bernardi Perini

The Stoic ascendancy of the συμπαράσχειν linguistic principle is, however, doctrinally problematic. I deal with these topics separately.

2.1 *From Naturalness to Sympatheia*

Reflection on the nature of language was originally a philosophical inquiry (Plato, Aristotle, Stoics), and the terminology used to describe it originated in the context of philosophical schools. Theories on language went their own way, with the Stoics taking a prominent and greatly influential role in the foundations of Greek linguistic analysis.²⁴ As discussed in the *introduction* to this volume, the Stoics developed the theory of correspondence ‘by nature’ (φύσει) between form and meaning in the original state of language (πρωταὶ φωναί).²⁵ The very distinction of ‘signifier’, or content-free expression (τὸ σημαῖνον) and ‘signified’, or content (τὸ σημαίνόμενον) is Stoic in origin. Nature defines the relationship between form and meaning, although (a different question altogether) not the way in which language came about, which was, in Platonic terms, the result of an act of ‘name-giving’ on the part of a superior being who put names to things – in other words by imposition (θέσει), or, in Latin (Varronian) terms, ‘invention’ (*factio*).²⁶ There is a logic (λόγος, *ratio*) governing nature (φύσις, *natura*).

Natural connection between word and meaning is one thing; active influence of meaning on word form in derivation and inflection is quite another. While συμπαράσχειν played an important role in the Stoic organicist world-view, no strict Stoic would have extended the notion of correspondence between meaning and expression to posit actual *influence* of meaning on expression, impossibly breaking the boundaries between ‘incorporeal’ meaning (πράγμα σημαίνόμενον ‘sayable’, signified) and ‘corporeal’ word (φωνή ‘utterance’, signifier) and thereby dissolving a bipartition which is crucial to the entire Stoic theory of meaning.²⁷ The extension of Stoic συμπαράσχειν to language is ‘one of the wildest offshoots of the relationship between form and meaning’²⁸ and must have been a

1983: 165). See also Mariotti 1960: 24–5, and most recently Somerville 2007: 61, Biddau 2008: 148–9.

²⁴ Cf. Egli 1987: 108–9, Kemp 1987: 170.

²⁵ On Stoic linguistic naturalism see further Garcea, in this volume and Blank, in this volume.

²⁶ Var. *L.* 5.9 *finxisset*. On the pervasive influence of Plato’s *Cratylus* see *Introduction*, in this volume, pp. 5–6, Sluiter 1990: 18–26, Schenkeveld and Barnes 1999: 179–84, Ademollo 2011: 5 and *passim*.

²⁷ See Sluiter 1990: 22, Schenkeveld and Barnes 1999: 184–5, Garcea, in this volume, pp. 98–101.

²⁸ Sluiter 1990: 27.

separate elaboration of grammarians. Our sources associate the tenet with the name of Trypho(n) of Alexandria, but the idea must predate its earlier formulation, as it is already at work in Lucilius' text decades earlier. Sluiter (1990: 33) believes Trypho to be responsible for this 'singular step', but coincidence between Trypho's and Lucilius' illustration (*furei* / φηλήτης, section 2.1.1 below) suggests that the notion was already circulating – if not enunciated in a common grammatical source – no later than the late second century BC.

2.1.1. *Lucilius and Trypho*

Sommer (1909) was the first to identify Lucilius' positions with Hellenistic theories later to be systematized by the Greek grammarian Trypho(n) of Alexandria in the second half of the first century BC. Trypho, the 'scholarly grandchild of Aristarchus',²⁹ was an influential figure in the history of Greek linguistic thought, whose contributions are still visible in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus over two hundred years later.³⁰ Trypho was an analogist, or representative of that branch of grammatical science that aligned itself with the Alexandrian theory whereby language is based on the norm (*ratio*) and correct usage of the best authors (i.e. the correct συνήθειο). The traditional dichotomy between Alexandrian analogists and Stoic (Pergamene) anomalists has long been dismissed to give way to a unitary view of the history of grammatical science that accounts for intertwined influences:

Instead of postulating the concurrent development of two schools (i.e. Stoic-Pergamene vs Alexandrian) it is now thought that the Stoics began grammar in a philosophical vein, largely concerned with semantics and logic and that they handed the ball over to the Alexandrians who (together with the Pergamenes) took what they wanted from the Stoics and used it in the development of their own, largely formalistic grammatical theory, beginning with philology and moving to technical grammar with its normative, prescriptive rules and canons.³¹

Trypho drew primarily on the teachings of Aristarchus, but indirectly from later Stoic-oriented grammatical sources,³² as per a major line in the development of grammatical science traceable from the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon to Alexandrian technical writers (Dionysius Thrax, Tyrannion,

²⁹ Dickey 2007: 84.

³⁰ On Trypho, of whose work only 100 fragments remain (ed. Velsen 1853), see Belardi 1990, Baumbach 2002, Matthaios 2003, Dickey 2007: 84.

³¹ Blank 1982: 4. ³² Matthaios 2002: 199, Matthaios 2003: 98.

and Trypho) to early Roman writers to Varro, Remmius Palaemon, and later Roman *artes*.³³ Trypho's treatises on linguistic changes and on orthography are relevant to the present discussion.

Trypho wrote, among other works, *On modification in linguistic usage* (Περὶ πλάθων τῆς λέξεως), which was 'the earliest attempt to explain sound and word changes, as well as linguistic irregularities of dialect forms, work[ing] with the original connection between pathology and dialectology'.³⁴ Only a handful of fragments remain of this work (XXII fr. 130–4 Velsen), two of which repeat Trypho's formulation of the relationship between signifier and signified as 'the word was sympathetically affected by the meaning' (συνέπαθεν ἡ φωνὴ τῷ σημαينوμένῳ).³⁵ This form of συμπασχειν causes word forms to acquire or lose letters in order to conform to their meaning: for example, in ἡμικύκλιον 'half-circle' < ἡμισύκυκλιον the word for 'half' has been halved; in λιμός 'hunger' < λείπω the reduction of diphthong ει to simple ι signals 'lack' (ἔνδεια) of food; the word for 'thief' φιλῆτης comes from *ὑφειλητης < ὑφείλον (ὑφαίρεω) by 'theft' of letters. The natural participation of the utterance in the meaning, which is stipulated at the level of the original word formation in every naturalist position, now operates as a derivational and inflectional mechanism.

This extreme naturalistic doctrine underlies Lucilius' guideline (358–61 M.; 364–6 M.) for the choice between 'ei' and 'i' both in the body of a word (*mille, meilia*) and in the case endings (e.g. gen. sing. *pueri*, dat. sing. *puerei*). Lucilius' rationale is the naturalist principle whereby 'ei' gives the word³⁶ a fuller or richer sound (*plenius, pinguius*), which is apt to symbolize plurality or addition in the word form as appropriate to its signified function. Here we find Lucilius adhering to the συμπασχειν principle enunciated by Trypho. One of the Greek grammarian's examples is, as in Lucilius' text of 100 years earlier, the word for 'thief', φιλῆτης: Lucil. 367–8 M. '*mendaci furi que addes e, cum dare furei / iusseris* 'to a liar and thief you'll add an 'e', when you prescribe to give 'to a thief (in the dative)'. The principle we find applied to derivation in Trypho (φιλῆτης <

³³ See Ax 2002: 126–7, Swiggers and Wouters 2015: 794.

³⁴ Baumbach 2002 s.v.

³⁵ Trypho fr. 130 Velsen = *Etymologicum Magnum* 566 s.v. λιμός, ἡ λείψις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. γίνεται παρὰ τὸ λείπω λείψω λιμός· καὶ ὥφειλε διὰ διφθόγγου γραφεῖσθαι· ἀλλὰ συνέπαθεν ἡ φωνὴ τῷ σημαينوμένῳ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐνδειαν δηλοῖ, τοῦτου χάριν καὶ ἐνδειαν φωνήεντος ἀνεδέξατο, ὡς Τρύφων· fr. 131 = *Etymologicum Magnum* 794.5 s.v. φιλῆτης, i.e. φηλήτης 'thief': λέγει δέ οἱ Τρύφων, ὅτι συνέπαθεν ἡ φωνὴ τῷ σημαينوμένῳ, ὡς ἡμισύκυκλιον ἡμικύκλιον, λείπω λιμός· ὁ γὰρ κλέπτης ἐνδειαν ποιεῖ, οὗ χάριν καὶ φωνῆς ἐνδειαν ἀνεδέξατο. Passages are discussed in Sommer 1909: 73–4, Mariotti 1960: 23–4, Sluiter 1990: 26–33, Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 136–42, Somerville 2007: 62.

³⁶ Not the vowel, as in Terentius Scaurus' reading of the passage: see Belardi 1985: 235–6.

*ὕφειλέτης, with the first letter ‘taken away’, ὑφείλον FOR steals the < ὑφείλω) is extended to inflection by Lucilius (*furi* is given an *e* in the dative).

Futhermore, Lucilius has recourse to two words which he had used in an earlier satire (775 M. *agite agite fures mendaci* (sc. *lingua*) *argutamini* ‘come on, come on, thieves, prattle away to the liar’).³⁷ Is this a coincidence, or an indication that both satirist and grammarian consulted a common source, or that Lucilius’ illustration, playful as it might have been, became paradigmatic to explain the logic of a spelling practice? All we can say is that Lucilius’ ‘rule’ (i) rested on the belief that there is a natural relationship between form and meaning, which should be brought out in writing; (ii) connected Latin practice with Greek usage for the disambiguation of the different quality of [ī] (Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.15 *eadem ratione qua Graeci εἰ uterentur*); and (iii) provided a historically accurate analysis of existing forms, on which see [section 3](#) below. As recently noted by Somerville (2007: 63):

The doctrine of συμπάθεια τῆς φωνῆς τῷ σημαινόμενῳ was used to analyse pre-existing forms, not to invent new ones . . . Surely [Lucilius] knew that [*furei*] was the correct historical spelling of the dative singular of consonant stems, and analysed the (to him) otherwise inexplicable digraph in accordance with the linguistic doctrine to which he adhered. Φηλήτης and *furei*: a noble pair of brothers indeed. . . . We must accede, then, to the opinion of F. H. Colson, who concluded that ‘this doctrine was not called in to justify innovations. It might decide doubtful cases, but its proper function was to give an etymological reason for what actually existed, and this is how I suppose Lucilius would have used it’. (Colson 1921: 17)

2.2 *Orthography, Hellenismos, and Proprietas Verborum*

Lucilius was the first Latin writer to deal systematically with *orthographia*, which Quintilian will define as the ‘science of writing correctly’ (Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.1 *recte scribendi scientia*). The first definition of orthography in Greek scholarship comes from the same Trypho, in *On orthography and its matters of enquiry* (Περὶ ὀρθογραφίας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ζητούμενων):³⁸ ‘Orthography has a twofold definition: it is both the word correctly spelt,

³⁷ I provide a tentative translation of the paradosis. Marx took *mendaci* to be ablative, attached to a word like *lingua* in the following (lost) line. Perhaps more persuasively, Buecheler corrected the transmitted *argutamini* to *arguta manu*, restoring an asyndetic pair *mendaci arguta* for an ablative phrase which modified a verb in the following line. In any case the juxtaposition of *fur* and *mendax* in this line stands.

³⁸ Cf. Velsen 1853: 56.

and the rational account itself containing the demonstration of orthography, as Trypho says, so that the cause and the effect are called in the same way.³⁹ The formulation became standard and was repeated with a similar emphasis on ‘rationality’ (i.e. analogy) by Apollonius Dyscolus, who defined orthography as ‘the accurate details of spelling’ and prescribes that when hearing does not supply sufficient distinction spelling must be corrected via an ‘examination in accordance with reason’.⁴⁰ After Apollonius, the principle of ‘rational account’ (*logos*, in Trypho’s definition) came to be replaced by strictly grammatical (analogical) paradigms based on the four canons of orthography (analogy, dialect, etymology, and history). Orthographical methodology developed according to the doctrine of *Hellenismos* (*Synt.* 7.6–14),⁴¹ whereby models of authorial usage – first of all Homer – remain paradigmatic throughout.

Arguing against geminated ‘aa’ at 352–5 M., Lucilius has literary usage in mind (Hom. *Il.* 5.31 Ἄρες Ἄρες), *Graeci ut faciunt*. Sources call upon Greek educated practice to explain Lucilius elsewhere (e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.19 *ut Graeci*, citing 371 M.). Della Corte (1981: 76) identified an exact parallel for Lucilius’ Homeric example in Dionysius Thrax’s illustration of long and short syllables by nature (p. 17.4 Uhlig):

Μακρὰ συλλαβὴ γίνεται κατὰ τρόπους ὀκτώ, φύσει μὲν τρεῖς, θέσει δὲ πέντε. καὶ φύσει ... ἢ ὅτ’ ἂν ἔχη ἓν τι τῶν διχρόνων κατ’ ἑκτασιν παραλαμβανόμενον, οἷον Ἄρης. ... Βραχεῖα συλλαβὴ γίνεται κατὰ τρόπους δύο ... ἢ ὅτ’ ἂν ἔχη ἓν τι τῶν διχρόνων κατὰ συστολήν παραλαμβανόμενον, οἷον Ἄρης.

A long syllable is constituted in eight ways, three by nature and five by imposition: by nature ... when it has one of the two-valued vowels pronounced in its long value, as in *Áres* ... A short syllable is constituted in two ways ... when it contains one of the two-valued vowels pronounced in its short value, as in *Áres*.⁴²

Dionysius was a younger contemporary of Lucilius, who is unlikely to have seen the *Techne*,⁴³ but whether Lucilius is invoking an Alexandrian

³⁹ Valente 2015: 958, based on Reitzenstein’s text (Reitzenstein 1897: 303) from the Leipzig palimpsest, fol. 22r, ll. 15–21: λέγεται] τοῖνον ὀρθογραφ[ία διχῶς καὶ ἡ ὀρ]θῶς γεγραμμένη λ[έξις, καὶ πάλιν ὀρθογραφ[ία καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος] ὅ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν] περιέχων τῆς ὀρθογ[ραφίας, ὡς φησι Τρύφων, ὥστε τὸ ἀποτε[λοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀποτε]λούμενον ὀνομασθ[ῆναι ὁμοίως].

⁴⁰ Blank 1982: 9. ⁴¹ Valente 2015: 961.

⁴² Transl. Kemp 1987: 175 (adapted). Dionysius gives the nominative Ἄρης as an illustration of both the short and long syllables, but the point is explicitly made only in the vocative Ἄρες (short ‘A’) / Ἄρες (long ‘A’), as in Lucilius.

⁴³ Cf. Belardi 1985: 211.

principle, or aligning himself with Panaetius in his polemical refutation of the Stoic views of Crates and Pergamene philology, remains mere speculation.⁴⁴ The fact remains that Lucilius was the first Roman writer to engage in the debate on the principles of correctness, just as Roman writers were beginning to write *de sermone Latino* (Antonius Gniphio, 110–60 BC),⁴⁵ *de proportione* (Staberius Eros, d. after 65 BC),⁴⁶ and ultimately on analogy (Julius Caesar),⁴⁷ alongside Trypho and other Greek contemporaries of Varro, who wrote *De sermone Latino* after 46 BC.⁴⁸

The implication of an original agreement between form and meaning is that language change causes that natural correspondence to degenerate and to be recoverable only through etymological science, i.e. the methodology applied to discovering and recovering the original relationship which gives the true meaning (*etymon*, *ueritas*) of the word form. This philosophical position becomes intertwined in the grammatical tradition with Alexandrian doctrines of correct usage (*hellenismos*), interest in the formulation of criteria for correctness, and the classification of *uirtutes elocutionis* and of their ‘degenerated’ counterparts (*uitia elocutionis*).

Solecism, or morphosyntactical error, was the subject of Zeno’s treatise Περὶ λῆξεων, developed into the model of ‘pure language’ (*hellenismos*, whence *latinitas*) by Diogenes of Babylon. To Diogenes we owe the definition of the ‘five excellences of speech’ as ‘pure language, lucidity, conciseness, appropriateness, and distinction’, as well as a definition of barbarism as departure from standard *lexis* (including pronunciation) and of solecism as a morphosyntactical error (Diog. Laert. 7.59).⁴⁹

Lucilius came to be seen as an authority on both *uitia*. His mockery of *Cēcilius prētor* (1130 M.) became paradigmatic of rustic pronunciation of the diphthong [ae] as [ē] (Var. *L.* 5.96–7).⁵⁰ He was said to have compiled a catalogue of solecisms (Serv. *In artem Donati* GL 5.446.19 *soloecismorum genera centum dicit esse Lucilius*): 1100 M. (= GRFF 38 ap. Pomp. *Gramm.* GL 5.289.10) *adde soloecismom genera atque uocabula centum* (‘add 100 types of solecisms and words for them’).⁵¹

⁴⁴ See discussion in Lehmann 2004: 178–9. ⁴⁵ Cf. Suet. *Gram.* 7 (GRFF test. 4 p. 99).

⁴⁶ GRFF pp. 106–7. ⁴⁷ Cf. Garcea 2012.

⁴⁸ See Ax 1996: 116 with n. 15, Pagani 2015: 820. ⁴⁹ See most recently Pagani 2014, 2015.

⁵⁰ Cf. Allen 1978: 60; Vine (1993: 151) compares the ‘Faliscan Latin’ inscription *CIL* I².365 *pretod*. See discussions in Adams 2007: 79, 82–3, Chahoud 2007: 47–8, with earlier bibliography at n. 26.

⁵¹ Zago (2015: 158, cf. Zago 2017: 2.197) suggests that Pompeius probably found the quotation in a version of Servius’ commentary on Donatus which still contained examples.

Lucilius also gives the earliest example of a ‘classic solecism’ (Zago 2015: 163) in the history of Latin grammar.⁵² The passage comes without attribution from Charisius, and it would be methodically unwise to assign it to Book 9. It however provides illustration of Lucilius’ attitudes to norm and usage, and is worth a brief discussion.

(1215–7 M. = *GRFF* 39 *ap.* Char. 142.23 B.)
 nam ueluti ‘intro’ aliud longe esse atque ‘intus’ uidemus,
 sic ⟨item⟩ ‘apud te’ aliud longe est, neque idem ualet ‘ad te’:
 ‘intro’ nos uocat, at sese tenet ‘intus’.

For just as we see that ‘into’ is something far different from ‘inside’,

Likewise ‘with you’ is far different from ‘to you’ and doesn’t have the same force.

One calls us ‘into’, but stays ‘inside’.

Charisius cites the fragment as an illustration of the difference between the Latin (and Greek) locative and directional adverbs: ‘intro’ *est in locum*, ‘intus’ *in loco dicimus, ut etiam apud Graecos εἰσω καὶ ἐνδον*. Quintilian explicitly records this pair of adverbs as a case of solecism ‘per partes orationis eiusdem generis’ at *Inst.* 1.5.50 ‘intro’ et ‘intus’ loci aduerbia, ‘eo’ tamen ‘intus’ et ‘intro sum’ soloecismi sunt.⁵³ Confusion in usage between ‘into’ and ‘inside’, however, is not necessarily a feature of substandard or late Latin: in Lucilius’ time alone, locative *intro* is in the prose of Cato (*Agr.* 157.7 and 15, the latter in the expression *intro esse*, also in *Var. Rust.* 1.40.6);⁵⁴ directional *intus* has an even wider distribution, especially in poetry (Lucretius, *Culex*, Ovid, and Statius), where it is sometimes used for special effect.⁵⁵ The grammarians prescribed a norm of correctness that usage – even, occasionally, authorial usage – would contradict. Lucilius was the first to do so. He observed a change that was entering literary Latin from below (cf. Cato’s *Agr.*), and rejected it as a departure from the original Latin usage that had an exact parallel in good Greek.

⁵² *TLL* 7.2.54.9ff.: Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.50 *eo ... intus et intro sum soloecismi sunt* (see Ax 1987: 22–8, 2011: 201 and passim), Caper *GL* 7.92.5, Diom. *GL* 4.394.14, Char. 351.30 B., 142.23 B., Aug. *Gramm.* *GL* 5.517.19, Cledon. *GL* 5.64.21, 67.23, Pomp. *GL* 5.248.7, Isid. *Diff.* app. 3.

⁵³ Cf. Don. *Gramm.* *GL* 4.393; see Colson 1924: 66 and Ax 2011: 201. Adams (2013a: 867) notes, with Russell ad loc. that ‘Quintilian virtually breaks his own rule’ at *Inst.* 11.39.

⁵⁴ *TLL* 7.2.55.54ff. *intro* for ‘in(side)’ is also in Vitruvius (5.10.2); the expression *intro esse* (*TLL* *ibid.* 55.67ff.), after Cato and Varro will resurface in late texts (*Vetus Latina*, Chiron, *Vitae patrum*).

⁵⁵ Cf. Ov. *Met.* 10.45 (Myrrha’s incest): *thalami iam limina tangit | iamque fores aperit, iam ducitur intus*. *intus* for ‘into’ is also in Pliny the Elder and even Tacitus, where the adverb is tied to a particular lexeme (*Hist.* 1.35.1 *ruere intus*; *Ann.* 4.62.2 *ruit intus*). See further *TLL* 7.2.106.42ff., Adams 2007: 17, 589, Adams 2013a: 867, Adams 2013b: 327–34, 589–90, Adams 2016: 314.

Older forms, provided they are not obsolete, still retain the original meaning (*proprietas*) and clarity (*perspicuitas*) of words.⁵⁶ Mixing up adverbs is just as confusing as inconsistency in spelling.

3 The Latin Context

I come to the final part of my analysis, which transfers the discussion from Lucilius' philosophical background to the Latin context of his pronouncements. The question of 'naturalism' cannot be dissociated from that about the specific and distinctive nature of each language, which guides the naming of things (Var. *L.* 5.3 *ea* (sc. *natura*) *enim dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini*) and guarantees their *proprietas*, i.e. the natural meaning (*natura intellectum*) of words 'when they signify that which they were first designated to name' (*id significant in quod primo denominata sunt*).⁵⁷ The questions that I raise here include the following: How topical was Lucilius' discussion in Book 9? What phonological, graphemic, grammatical phenomena did he aim to explain? Did Lucilius' 'theory' describe Latin linguistic realities adequately?

3.1 Geminatio Vocalium

Ancient testimonia refer to a dispute between Lucilius and the tragic writer Accius, his contemporary, on matters of style (Porph. *Hor. Sat.* 1.10.53 = Lucil. 348 M. = *GRFF* 1) and language (Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.14). Traces of a divergence between the two writers on spelling conventions are detected in the distance that Lucilius explicitly sets (352 M. *nos tamen*) between his recommendation of 'natural' forms (= older but not obsolete, rationally motivated, validated by good Greek usage) and the practice of marking the long quality of vowels with a double grapheme (so 'a' not 'aa' for [ā], 351–5 M.). The Republican practice known as *geminatio uocalium* was competing with the use of the apex to mark long vowels (Quint. *Inst.* 1.4.10 *ueteres . . . geminatione earum* (sc. *uocalium*) *uelut apice utebantur*). Why was there any need to mark vowel quantity when our sources speak of the innate knowledge of sound quality and quantity in native speakers

⁵⁶ Cf. e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.71 with Ax 2011 ad loc.; Gell. 1.5.71 *propria sunt uerba, cum id significant in quod primo denominata sunt*, with Viparelli 2004: 360: 'Il uerbum proprium è per G(ellio) un mezzo per attivare il contatto col reale; ma poiché attraverso la verità delle parole si arriva a dare un'immagine più chiara dell'idea che si intende rappresentare e alle cose contorni più precisi e limpidi, il linguaggio, grazie alla *u. proprietas*, acquista anche trasparenza, espressività ed eleganza.'

⁵⁷ See Uhlfelder 1966: 587, Ax 2011: 217.

(Cic. *Orat.* 173):⁵⁸ Is it not pointless to mark the quantity of every single vowel/syllable (Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.2 *longis syllabis omnibus apicem adponere ineptissimum est*)? Disambiguation of homographs for originally distinct sounds is the only reason for recourse to conventional devices, except that extant records do not ‘match the rule’ at all.⁵⁹ In an apt parallel with the English language, over a century ago Kent noted (1913a: 316): ‘Lucilius tried to conserve the practice of earlier years, so far as it was known to him empirically, thus upholding a state of affairs as confusing in English as *seize, siege, believe, receive, proceed, precede*; that such rules as his should be needed at all, implies either an outrageous confusion in the writing of the time or the currency of some such rule as that of Accius.’

Kent speaks of ‘Accius’ rule’, and for the sake of brevity the phrase may be retained although historically inaccurate. The enduring notion of an ‘Accian spelling reform’ originates from references in the grammatical sources to the effect that ‘Accius prescribed that syllables long by nature be written with double vowels’ (Ter. Scaur. 6.2.1 Biddau = *GL* 6.18.12 = *GRFF* 24 = Var. *GRFF* 272 *Accius geminatis uocalibus scribi natura longas syllabas uoluit*).⁶⁰ Inscriptional evidence in fact demonstrates that *geminatio* predates Accius and his alleged reform, as suggested by the wording in Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.14 ‘long syllables were written with double vowels to the time of Accius and beyond’ (*usque ad Accium et ultra porrectas syllabas geminis uocalibus*).⁶¹ The authoritative text of Marius Victorinus merely refers to a practice of the *ueteres*, and while naming Livius Andronicus and Naevius, make no reference to Accius.⁶² Accius was no Claudius: his role in this story was that of a learned systematizer aiming to regularize – on an Alexandrian analogical model – inconsistent patterns of inscriptional (and presumably scribal) *Umgangsschrift*.⁶³

⁵⁸ Uhlfelder 1966: 588. ⁵⁹ Oliver 1966: 133–4.

⁶⁰ Cf. Vel. Long. *GL* 7.55.25–56.14 and Quint. *Inst.* 1.4.10 and 1.7.14. The three authors were probably drawing on a common grammatical source, perhaps Verrius Flaccus (Nettleship) or even Varro: see discussion in Biddau 2008: 143–4.

⁶¹ Oliver 1966: 152–5, Vine 1993: 268, Biddau 2008: 143–4, Ax 2011: 320, Adams 2013a: 868. The view is already implied in Rolfe 1922: 83–4; cf. Bernardi Perini 1983: 152–69.

⁶² Mar. Victor. 4.4 Mariotti (= *GL* 6.8.11) *cum longa syllaba scribenda esset, duas uocales ponebant* (sc. *ueteres*) *praeterquam quae in ‘i’ litteram inciderent: hanc enim per ‘e’ et ‘i’ scribebant*; Ritschl (1867) changed the verbs to singular *ponebat, scribebat* (sc. Accius), a tendentious correction accepted e.g. by Pisani 1950: 81. See contra Oliver 1966: 152, Mariotti 1967: 164–5, and cf. Prisc. *GL* 2.298 *ueteres enim ‘i’ finalem, quae est longa, per ‘ei’ diphthongum scribebant, longas autem uocales uetustissimi etiam geminare solebant*.

⁶³ Bernardi Perini 1983: 141 and 161.

The practice of writing ‘*aa*’ for [ā], ‘*ee*’ for [ē], ‘*oo*’ for [ō], ‘*uu*’ for [ū], and ‘*ei*’/‘*ii*’ for [ī]⁶⁴ is attested in inscriptions from the late second century until the end of the first century BC, with an inconsistency that suggests that the practice was optional.⁶⁵ The feature, which has been traditionally interpreted as an Oscan influence on early Latin,⁶⁶ is found also in other Italic languages (Faliscan, Umbrian) and with different realizations depending on the type of vowel and type of syllable (initial/final, stressed/unstressed). Inscriptions attest to this fact. The famous verse inscription *CIL* I² 364 from Falerii (= *CLE* 2 = 2 Courtney) exhibits duplication of long vowels in 7 *uiitam* (not *ueitam*)⁶⁷ and 8 *aastuteis*: these features date the inscription no earlier than the second half of the second century despite the ‘patina of antiquity’ interspersed here and there.⁶⁸ If one then examines the representation of [ī] as ‘*ei*’, one finds it consistently used in this inscription for dative singular (2.1 *Iouei, Iunonei, 6 aetatei*) and plural forms (2 *quei*, 3 *magistreis*, 8 *soueis aastuteis*, 10 *summeis*).⁶⁹ The doubling of long vowel (and consonant) signs is originally alien to Faliscan, and in its extremely rare occurrences, as in this inscription, is proof of the heavily Latinized character of Faliscan inscriptions in the mid-/late second century BC, under the influence of Latin orthography.⁷⁰ Epigraphic evidence confirms that orthographic rules were set for Latin in the early second century BC, which then spread to non-urban areas as a part of Romanization.⁷¹

The topographical distribution of *geminatio* suggests that it may have come across as a non-urban feature to Greek-educated Romans. Vine systematically examines ‘the linguistic nature of *geminatio* in terms of its Oscan counterpart’ (1993: 269) in view of the then recent evidence of *CIL* I² 4 and finds complete accord between Latin inscriptions and Oscan orthographic conventions (1993: 286); even more importantly, he notes that attestations either come from non-urban areas (esp. Oscan and Umbrian) or, in urban contexts, are associated with freedmen, and that other dialectal features tend to be found in conjunction with *geminatio* in those inscriptions.⁷²

⁶⁴ Spelling ‘*ii*’ for [ī] is rare, but not unattested (e.g. *uiitam* in *CIL* I² 364), and there is no reason to think, with Ritschl, that ‘*ii*’ was excluded from Accius’ prescriptions; the rarest is in fact ‘*oo*’: see Vine 1993: 272.

⁶⁵ Vine 1993: 267–86 with bibliography; cf. Allen 1978: 64, Bernardi Perini 1983: 152–69, Prosdocimi 1983, Mattingly 1987: 73.

⁶⁶ Ritschl 1867: 609–14, Mariotti 1960: 25 n. 3; contra Lazzeroni 1956: 135, Coleman 1963: 3.

⁶⁷ Vine 1993: 271. ⁶⁸ Courtney 1995: 206. ⁶⁹ See further Bakum 2009: 1.138.

⁷⁰ Vine 1993: 272, Adams 2007: 102, Bakum 2009: 1.387.

⁷¹ See Vine 1993: 268–72, with bibliography.

⁷² Vine’s (1993: 272–3) illuminating example is *CIL* I².3013a line 4 *Apollon(ius) Gaa(uius)*, cf. Oscan *Gaav* (Ve. 115, 158) and with the same type of abbreviation as e.g. Pocc. 76 *Paa(pius)*. Vine’s conclusions match previous acquisitions before the publication of Fasc. IV of *CIL* I² (1986): cf.

3.1.1. *Original Latin 'a' vs Dialectal 'aa'*

In his discussion of [ā] (2.2), Lucilius' logic rests on Greek authorial usage, with no hint of a naturalistic motivation for his rejection of geminated spelling other than adherence to the requirement of correct speech (*hellenismos*).

Greek practice in Lucilius' time was different. A member of his own family is recorded as son of 'Maarcus' in the record of a *senatus consultum* of 129 BC from Asia Minor, Μάνιος Λευκέλιος Μαρκου Πωμεντεῖνα 'Manius Lucilius, son of Marcus, of the tribus Pomptina'.⁷³ The earliest example of 'aa' in Latin is again from a Greek area (e.g. *CIL* I².2238 *aaram* at Delos, 135/4 BC).⁷⁴ In this respect Greek matched Oscan practice, where 'aa' constitutes over half of the attestations of geminated long vowels, mostly in an initial syllable. Vine's hypothesis (1993: 274–6) was that onomastic material of the type Osc. *Maak-* / Lat. *Marc-* (transcribed Μαρκ-) ⁷⁵ may have facilitated the spread from Oscan to Latin writing. Vine (1993: 279–80) was the first to notice that Lucilius' 'disavowel of the Accian doctrine' gives examples that show a remarkable agreement with the epigraphic data.

- | | |
|--|--------|
| 'a' primum est, hinc incipiam et quae nomina ab hoc sunt | 351 M. |
| ... | |
| ac primum, longa <an> brevis syllaba, nos tamen unum | 352 M. |
| hoc faciemus et uno eodemque ut dicimus pacto | |
| scribemus 'pacem' 'Pacideianum', 'aridum' 'acetum', | |
| 'Αρες 'Αρες' Graeci ut faciunt | 355 M. |

Not only do the words at 354 M. exhibit the vowel ([ā]) most commonly affected by gemination (as is obvious in an illustration of the graphic representation 'a' 351 M.), but the vowel is in the preferential initial syllable of either disyllabic words (*pācem* like *aara* / *aaram*)⁷⁶ or trisyllabic words (*āridum* like *Paapia*, *Staatia*, etc.). He also notes that 'the root syllables of both *pāc(em)* and *ār(idum)* are remarkably suggestive of two of the most salient items with epigraphic support for *geminatio* in both Oscan and Latin, i.e. Osc. *Paak-* / Lat. *Paac*-⁷⁷ and Osc. *aas-* / Lat. *aar*-. The implication of the striking coincidence between Lucilius' examples and the epigraphic record is that the poet deliberately drew from

Lazzeroni 1956: 135 'procedimento strettamente dialettale'; Bernardi Perini 1983: 159 'tipico dialettismo al confronto col modello greco'.

⁷³ See Heurgon 1959: 17, Lehmann 2004: 178. ⁷⁴ Mattingly 1987: 73–4; cf. Vine 1993: 269

⁷⁵ *CIL* I².747 *Maarcium* ... Μαρκιο[v] (68 BC?).

⁷⁶ *CIL* I².1439, 2238, 3295; Osc. *aas-* Ve. 147A.16, 147B.1, 19, Pocc. 20.

⁷⁷ E.g. *CIL* I².1438, Ve. 72e, 116.

recognizable current practices to put forward his view against Accius' rule: while Accius wanted to disambiguate vowel length in line with orthographic conventions, Lucilius defended the original Latin practice of representing one vowel sound by one grapheme, irrespective of the ambiguity of the Latin vowel-letters; and he used the Greek authorial model to validate his rejection of contemporary practice and Accius' proposal to standardize it.

3.1.2. *Homographs and Homophones*

The case of 'ei'/'i' for long [ī] deserved special attention, and received it from Lucilius and all of the subsequent grammatical tradition. Interest in 'ei'/'i' for [ī] arose from the effort at differentiating the similar outcome of different original sounds, an original diphthong (*[oi] > [ei] > [ê] > [ī]) and an inherited long [ī], which had merged in pronunciation ([ī]) by the late second century BC.⁷⁸ There may have been differences in pronunciation between the two sounds for some length of time while the spelling adopted now 'ei' now 'i' (and the so-called long I, *I longa*); 'i' did not become the prevailing established grapheme, nor was complete standardization achieved, until well into the Imperial period. In this case, spelling with the digraph 'ei' for [ī] was etymological, and its use was extended to cases of original [ī] resisting and displaying duplication.⁷⁹ This Republican spelling convention explains the various degrees of consistency and cases of hypercorrect 'ei' for original [ī] throughout early Republican records, from the third-century Saturnian *Acta fratrum Arualium* (CIL 1.2 = CLE 1) to the *Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*,⁸⁰ to the literary and non-literary records of the Augustan period such as the Gallus papyrus from Qaṣr Ibrim (c. 50–20 BC),⁸¹ and the Suneros letter from Oxyrhynchus (Augustan period?).⁸² The attestations in the Gallus papyrus show that 'ei' for [ī] was still in operation at the end of the first century BC. Unlike the

⁷⁸ Cf. e.g. Sturtevant 1940: 114–15, Leumann 1977: 137, Anderson, Parsons, and Nisbet 1979: 132, Clackson and Horrocks 2007: 95–6, Wallace 2011: 18.

⁷⁹ Cf. Bernardi Perini 1983: 161. ⁸⁰ Rosén 1957: 240, Somerville 2007: 60, Adams forthcoming.

⁸¹ Gallus, or his scribe, wrote 'ei' for [ī], although inconsistently, but did not mark the quantity of other long vowels (Anderson, Parsons, and Nisbet 1979: 132–4, Somerville 2007), confirming Quintilian's statement to the effect that the practice of 'doubling' [ī] lasted longer than the duplication of other long vowels (*Inst.* 1.7.14).

⁸² See Adams 2016: 202–9. For distribution of etymologically justified and unjustified attestations of 'ei' in other Republican texts see Adams 2016: 110–11 (*seique, deicere* in the 'Plotius' *defixio*, c. 100 BC; 205–8 (*tibei* in the Oxyrhynchus letter *P.Oxy.* XLIV.3208, line 5; false archaism *uocareis* l. 6; archaizing *deuom* l. 9). See also Nikitina 2015 and Adams forthcoming.

case of ‘aa’ for [ā], disambiguation of desinential quantity may have been a factor here, as ‘ei’ is often found in unstressed final syllables.⁸³

To summarize Lucilius’ treatment of ‘ei’/‘i’ (passages above, section 1.3.1 (b) and (c)): rather than extending ‘ei’ to represent [ī] indiscriminately, Lucilius advocates ‘ei’ as a means to mark (i) a semantic (*meille*) or an inflectional plural (*puerei*); and (ii) the ‘addition’ engendered by the action of giving (third declension dat. *furei*). Outside these contexts, [ī] would remain ‘i’ in the singular genitive of all second declension nouns. This makes sense historically and phonologically: in the second declension the gen. sing. is originally [ī], while nom. plur. ‘i’ < [-ei] < [-oi], and the two forms ought not to be homographs even when approaching total homophony. The (Stoic-oriented) logic is that spelling should reflect the natural relationship between word form and meaning at both the semantic and the inflectional level (discussion in section 2.1 above). To technical writers of later times, Lucilius’ rationale would seem unnecessary (Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.16 *superuacuum*; Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56 *superuacanea . . . obseruationis*) or downright risible (Mar. Victor. *GL* 6.18.3),⁸⁴ but it is still a rationale which explained in naturalistic terms differences that uniform standardization (‘Accius’ rule) would have obliterated. It is worth repeating the results of Somerville’s comparative analysis of Lucilius and the New Gallus:

The spelling rules of Lucilius can thus be formulated as follows: the phoneme was spelled with a simple <i> if it went back to an etymological */i/, but with the <ei> digraph if it went back to an etymological diphthong – except in the dative singular of pronouns. The astute reader will notice that this is precisely the system we find in the New Gallus. (Somerville 2007: 64)

The exception refers to Lucilius’ ‘error’ at 369 M. *hoc illi* (dative) *factum est uni* vs 367 M. *dare furei*:

‘hoc illi factum est uni’, tenue hoc facies ‘i’:	369 M.
‘haec ille fecere’, addes e, ut pinguius fiat	370 M.

⁸³ Adams *ap.* Anderson, Parsons, and Nisbet 1979: 133 n. 66, Vine 1993: 273.

⁸⁴ Mar. Victor. 4.58–60 p. 80 Mariotti (= *GL* 6.17.13–18.3) *cum uero eadem i e litterae iuncta esset, non solum pro longa syllaba accipiebatur, sed nominatiuum pluralem ita scripta significabat, ut ‘amice’ ‘bonci’ ‘doctei’ ‘Romanei’ et similia. at si per solum i scripta esset, eadem genetium singularem faciebat, ut huius amici et cetera. denique omnes qui de orthographia scripserunt de nulla scriptura tam diu quam diu de hac quaerunt, quae per i litteram singularem genetium et [quae] per ei litteras nominatiuum pluralem faciat, locuti partim acute, <partim> ut mihi quidem uidetur, inepte, illud etiam ridicule, etc.* See Mariotti 1967: 203–8, Lehmann 2004: 181.

In later texts differentiation by number (singular : plural) is the norm, and Lucilius seems to be hinting at this by anaphoric polyptoton of the two pronouns: *hoc : haec = illi : ille*.⁸⁵ Lucilius' 'sympathetic' principle, however, would have required *illei* also in the dative singular. This was, however, inconvenient for a type of word that had homophones ([illī]) in the dative (not genitive) singular and nominative plural: the principle could not work.⁸⁶ The fact is that there is no record, either literary or documentary, for *illei* dat. sing. The form *illei* nom. plur. of the pronoun is in the elaborate 'elogium *Larciae Horae*' at *CIL* I² 1570.5 *ita leibertate illi me hic me decoraat stola*, from the late Republic; abl. plur. *illeis* at 756 and in deliberately archaizing texts (two examples in Sallust's epistles to Caesar, [*Ad Caes. sen.*] 1.1.5, 2.6.3). For the dative singular, *illi* is the only form.⁸⁷

3.1.3. *Naturalism and Analogy*

Lucilius is said to have prescribed that the genitive of *-ius* words must be spelled with one 'i', as in the vocative *Luci*, *Aemili*. The view is reported by Charisius, who cites Varro (*GRFF* 252 = fr. inc. sed. 120 p. 232.6–7 G.–S.) in a review of opinions concerning the spelling of the genitive and vocative of names ending in *-ius*. The passage is worth quoting in full, as it shows how the late grammarian imported an extraneous notion into his reading of the Republican text, misunderstanding it:

Lucilius et Aemilius et cetera nomina quae ante 'u' habent 'i' duplici 'ii' genetiuo singulari finiri debent, ne necesse sit aduersus obseruationem nominum nominatiuo non minorem fieri genetiuum: idque Varro tradens adiecit uocatiuum quoque singularem talium nominum per duplex i scribi debere, sed propter differentiam casuum corrumpi. Lucilius tamen et per unum i genetiuum scribi posse existimat, ait enim [1294–5 = *GRFF* 32]: *seruandi numeri et uersus faciendi | nos 'Caeli' 'Numeri' numerum ut seruemus modumque*. Numquam enim hoc intulisset, nisi et Caelium et Numerium per 'ii', huius Caelii huius Numerii faciendum crederet. Denique in libro VIII sic ait [362–3 M. = *GRFF* 10a]: *porro hoc si filius 'Luci' | fecerit, 'i' solum*,

⁸⁵ Cf. Somerville 2007: 61.

⁸⁶ Against Belardi's attempt to rescue it by distinguishing between dative and dative of agent see Biddau 2008: 149–50.

⁸⁷ A different explanation, with similar conclusions, in Somerville 2007: 64: 'in the pronouns, such confusion was not only possible, it was inevitable, for both the dative singular and nominative plural should have been spelled *illei*. Lucilius was finally forced to make a choice. And he chose wrongly. He opted for the form *illi* (which he supposed to be an acceptable alternative for the dative singular) in order to keep it consistently distinct from the nominative plural, and justified his choice by the Stoic doctrine: the plural, signifying more people than the singular, should therefore have more letters. It was a mistake, but an instructive one, for it put a distinctive stamp on Lucilius' system of orthography.'

ut 'Corneli' 'Cornifici'que et paulo post [366 M.]: 'pupilli', 'pueri', 'Lucili', hoc unius fiet. Et Plinius quoque dubii sermonis V adicit esse quidem rationem per duo 'i' scribendi, sed multa iam consuetudine superari.

'Lucilius', 'Aemilius' and the other names with 'i' before 'u' must have a double 'i' in the genitive ending, so as to avoid that the genitive is shorter than the nominative, which is contrary to what we observe in names. Illustrating this point Varro added that also the vocative singular of such names ought to be written with double 'i', but through the differentiation between cases the ending (of the vocative) has been corrupted. Lucilius, however, thinks that the genitive can be written with one 'i', for he says 'The metre must be preserved and the lines must be composed so that we preserve the metre and the rhythm by writing 'of Caelius', 'of Numerius'.' He would have never included this comment if he did not believe that both 'Caelius' and 'Numerius' must be written with 'ii'. Finally, in Book 9 he says: 'then if the son of Lucius (Luci) has done this, put only one 'i', as in 'the son of Cornelius' and 'the son of Cornificius'.' And a little later: 'pupilli, pueri, Lucili, this will become genitive singular.' And Pliny too in Book 5 of *De dubio sermone* adds that there is indeed a rule for writing with two 'ii's, but that it has long been superseded by usage. (Char. 98.17–99.19 B.)

Varro (perhaps in *De sermone Latino*) took the analogical view that genitives should be written 'ii' as the genitive could not be shorter than the nominative; not so Lucilius and Nigidius after him, who were operating on a naturalistic principle.⁸⁸ Lucilius' rule is in fact an observation, which the συμπαράσχειν principle adequately described. The simple -i was the *only* practice in Lucilius' time. In the first passage, Lucilius does not state that -ii is the norm and -i is acceptable *metri causa*, as Charisius suggests.⁸⁹ Lucilius is saying that *Caeli* and *Numeri* are genitives which *do* fit in the hexameter,

⁸⁸ Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 67. Mariotti 1967: 205 notes that Lucilius' (Stoic) doctrine will be adapted to differentiate between singular and plural in Var. *GRFF* 272 (= 69 G.–S. *ap. Ter. Scaur.* 6.3.2 Biddau = *GL* 7.19.1), hence Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.15 *ea casibus numerisque discreta est, ut Lucilius praecipit* (see Ax 2011: 322–3).

⁸⁹ Cf. Bede *GL* 7.251.18 (14 Kendall) *nisi forte regulam Lucilii secuti sunt, qui Luci[li]um et Aemilium et cetera nomina quae ante 'u' habent 'i' non solum in uocatiuo, sed etiam in genetiuo casu per unum 'i' existimat scribi posse. Quod et auctoritas saepe et necessitas metricorum decreta uiolent* ('unless they followed the norm set by Lucilius, who thinks it possible to write with one 'i' 'Lucius' and 'Aemilius' and all other names which have 'i' before 'u', not only in the vocative, but also in the genitive case. It is often the case that authorial choices and metrical requirements contravene it'). A worse misunderstanding is in Cassiod. *Orth.* *GL* 7.206.26 (from Caesellius Vindex) *si autem Lucius, Magnius . . . proferantur, duo 'i' in genetiuo habebunt . . . quod ipsum Lucilius adnotauit, cum a numero Numerius discerneret*. On this error of interpretation see also Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 67–8 ('semmal dal punto di vista di Lucilio l'alternativa avrebbe potuto essere tra 'ei' e 'i'), in the context of a discussion of Nigidius' application of Lucilius' principle of correspondence between form and meaning when distinguishing between homographs (see Garcea, in this volume, pp. 99–100).

while others do not (as correctly seen by Garcea 2012: 145, and, in this volume, p. 99, n. 56). The second extract from Book 9 prescribes that, just as *Caelius* and *Numerius*, the names *Lucilius*, *Cornelius*, and *Cornificius* should have the genitive written as *-i*, not *-ii*, or, rather, *-iei*. The third fragment confirms that one and the same logic applies to the three different nominatives of the second declension (*pupillus*, *puer*, *Lucilius*).

Lucilius' norm matches the written usage of his times, insofar as our extant inscriptions may give a fair representation of the poet's empirical knowledge. There is very little evidence for *'-ii'* (*'-iei'*) for *-io-* themes in Republican inscriptions: *CIL* I² 698.10 *in eo pariete medio ostiei lumen aperito* ('105 BC but restored in imperial times');⁹⁰ *CIL* I² 989 *collegiei tibicinum* (suppl. Mommsen). The genitive of *Cornelius* is spelled *Cornelei* alongside *Pompei* in *CIL* I² 791 (*Centurio Cornelei Spinteri legio(ne) XIIIX et Cn. Pompei Mag(nei)*): the inscription is given as written 'barbare' in a private workshop, 59 or 56–53 BC.⁹¹

3.1.4. *Naturalism and Archaism*

On one occasion Quintilian lost his patience with Lucilius' notorious verbosity, with the result that we have neither the poet's text nor the key to understanding exactly what position Lucilius defended and how Quintilian viewed it (*Inst.* 1.7.19 = Lucil. 371 M. = *GRFF* 11):

'ae' syllabam, cuius secundam nunc 'e' litteram ponimus, uarie per 'a' et 'i' efferebant quidam semper ut Graeci, quidam singulariter tantum, cum in datium uel genetium casum incidissent . . . est in hac quoque parte Lucili praeceptum, quod, quia pluribus explicatur uersibus, si quis parum credet, apud ipsum in nono requirat.

The syllable 'ae', which now has 'e' as its second letter, was formerly expressed by 'a' and 'i', by some writers in all circumstances (as in Greek), and by others only in the singular, when they came to the dative or genitive . . . Lucilius has advice to give about this too; but it occupies several lines, and I must ask the sceptical reader to consult the poet himself, in Book 9.

Perhaps arguing against the effects of Claudius' recent spelling reform, which prescribed *-ai* for the diphthong *-ae* in all cases,⁹² Quintilian recalls that Lucilius was *not* among those past writers who extended archaic

⁹⁰ Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 67.

⁹¹ *Cornelei* is also in an inscription from Otranto from the late first century: cf. *CIL* I² Index Grammaticus p. 818.

⁹² Cf. Biddau 2008: 130 and 186, arguing that Claudius' reform, although soon abandoned, might have still been topical at the time of Quintilian and discussed in scholarly circles even under Hadrian, thus providing a context for Scaurus' and Longus' remarks.

(etymological) *-ai* to genitive/dative singular and nominative plural. What did Lucilius prescribe exactly, and why?

The only internal evidence available is on the dative singular, from a corrupt line transmitted by Martianus Capella (3.266): *Lucilius in datiuo casu 'a' et 'e' coniungit dicens: huic Terentiae Orbiliae Licinius* (372 M. = *GRFF* 11a) 'Lucilius joins 'a' and 'e' in the dative when he says: 'Licinius . . . to this Terentia and Orbilia'.' The grammatical tradition tells us that:

- a) Nigidius distinguished between dat. *-ae* and gen. *-ai*;⁹³
- b) Velius Longus distinguished between gen. sing. *-ai* and nom. plur. *-ae*;⁹⁴
- c) Terentius Scaurus tells us that *-ai* for *-ae* is archaic and poetic, and in those words *-ai* sounds more like the diphthong *-ae*, as per old Greek usage;⁹⁵ and that one should write *-ae* in all cases: gen. and dat. sing. and nom. and voc. pl.⁹⁶

Scaurus' remark that 'ancient writers changed *-ae* to *-ai*' perversely hints at the phonological change that caused *-ai* to become *-ae*. Originally the three endings of the first declension were neither homophones nor homographs. The gen. *-āi* and dat. *-āi* were still distinct in Plautus' time, and Plautus retains, or rather 'archaistically revives', the original spelling *-ai* for the genitive, as do occasionally Ennius⁹⁷ and later Lucilius⁹⁸ (but not his contemporary Terence), Cicero, Lucretius, and occasionally Virgil in the *Aeneid* (e.g. *Aen.* 3.354).⁹⁹ Gen. sing. *-āi* (not the diphthong *-ai*) is a poetic feature that is adopted when tone and metre permit and/or recommend it.

⁹³ Nigid. fr. 37 S. = *GRFF* 11 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *si huius terrae scribis, 'i' littera sit extrema, si huic terrae, per 'e' scribendum est.*

⁹⁴ Vel. Long. *GL* 6.57.20 *et quidem in hac quoque scriptione uoluerunt esse differentiam, ut pluralis quidem numeri nominatiuus casus per 'a' et 'e' scriberetur, genetiuius uero singularis per 'a' et 'i'.*

⁹⁵ Ter. Scaur. 5.2.2 Biddau (= *GL* 7.16.6) *et apud antiquos 'i' <quoque litterae (sc. 'a') praeponnebatur, apud quos 'i' > (suppl. Biddau) littera pro 'e' scribebatur, ut testantur μεταπλάσμοι, in quibus est eiusdem syllabarum diductio, ut 'pictai uestis' et 'aulai in medio' pro 'pictae' et 'aulae'; sed magis in illis 'e' nouissima sonat, et praeterea antiquae quoque Graecorum hanc syllabam per 'ae' scripsisse traduntur.*

⁹⁶ Ter. Scaur. 8.1 Biddau (= *GL* 7.24.9) *sequitur mutatio, in qua multa quaeruntur: et primum quidem illud de quo diximus, utrum per 'ai' an per 'ae' genetiui et datiuo singulari et nominatiui et uocatiui plurali eiusdem nomina scribenda sint: Senecae et Catilinae et Perpernae.*

⁹⁷ This is the famous *terrai frugiferai* at Enn. *Ann.* 510 Sk. (mocked by Mart. 11.90.5), infamously mistaken for a dative by Charisius 16.22–7 B.: see Skutsch 1985 ad loc. (p. 663).

⁹⁸ 135 M. *rutai*, 164 M. *ferai*, 226 M. *Tiresiai*, 993 M. *uiai*, 1337 M. *patriai*. I note in passing that the ending *-ai* in all these words is a necessary metrical emendation for *-ae*.

⁹⁹ Allen 1978: 60; cf. Biddau 2008: 130–1.

There is no literary record for dat. *-ai*, which probably explains why Nigidius prescribed *-ai* for the genitive and *-ae* for the dative, although Greek usage might have recommended *-ai* for the dative, if one recalls locatives of the type $\chi\alpha\mu\alpha\iota$.¹⁰⁰ Inscriptional records retain the dative in *-ai* for much longer, but only in crystallized formulae.¹⁰¹ If here as in *-ei* / *-i* Lucilius applied his naturalistic principle whereby plurality and addition should be signalled in an augmented form, where ‘*e*’ gives a fuller sound than *tenuis* ‘*i*’,¹⁰² he may have prescribed *-ae* for nom. plur. and dat. sing., and restricted the old form *-ai* to the gen. sing. The old form was on its way out, but it was modelled on Greek usage (Fest. 24.1–2 Lindsay ‘*ae*’ *syllabam antiqui Graeca consuetudine per ‘ai’ scribebant, ut aulai, Musai*) and, from Lucilius’ perspective, worth retaining for that reason alone; he had two more: inflectional *sympatheia* and some currency of *-ai* for the genitive, but not for the dative. Lucilius’ disambiguation of gen. and dat. sing. would then be mirrored in Nigidius’ formulation ((a) above).

But we are in the realm of speculation. More cautiously, Ax (2011: 328–9) notes that all that the evidence (Quintilian, Martianus Capella) tells us unambiguously is that Lucilius used *-ae* for the dat. sing., whereas the satirist’s views on both the gen. sing. and the nom. plur. are uncertain, and he may well have written ‘*ae*’ in all three cases (except for metrical reasons).¹⁰³

I add a couple of remarks on Lucilius’ ‘rule’ concerning ‘*q*’/‘*c*’, which may or may not be relevant to Lucilius’ approach to archaism. The reference (not a quotation) comes from Annaeus Cornutus’ treatise *On pronunciation and correct writing* (*De enuntiatione uel orthographia* (ap. Cassiod. *Orth. GL* 7.149.1 = Lucil. 382 M. = GRFF 14):

‘*q*’ littera tunc recte ponitur, cum illi statim ‘*u*’ littera et alia quaelibet una pluresue uocales coniunctae fuerint, ita ut una syllaba fiat: cetera per ‘*c*’ scribuntur. hoc Lucilio quoque uidetur. non nulli putant auribus deseruiendum atque ita scribendum, ut auditur.

¹⁰⁰ Della Casa 1962: 75–6; cf. Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 75, Garcea, in this volume, p. 100, n. 60.

¹⁰¹ *CIL* I² alone has dative *-ai* in inscriptions not only from the very early period (ten ‘uetustissimae’, most notably the Praenestine Cista Ficoroni’ *CIL* I². 561), but also in personal names from the later Republic, four from the city of Rome (1312 *Helena sororei mei*, 1412 *Petroniai* . . . *Perentai* [sic], 1250 *Titinai nobili uxori*; the only example with noun (personified) is 995 *terrai matri*, which may also suggest a date in the age of Claudius); two examples are in consular *tituli* (723 and 805), eight more attestations come from Latium (1480) Sabine (1892, 1888), Sicily (2222), Histria (2215, 2218), Umbria (?) (2128), and Greece (2230).

¹⁰² Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 155 with n. 23, noting ‘*i*’ *tenuis* / *exilis* vs ‘*e*’ *plena* / *plenissima* (Cic. *de Orat.* 3.46).

¹⁰³ Cf. Funaioli 1907: 39 ‘praeceptum Lucilii in tenebris latet; cf. tamen Nig. Fig. 37, qui fortasse e Lucilio pendet.’

It is correct to write ‘q’ when it is immediately attached to ‘u’ and one or more other vowels, resulting in one syllable; in all other cases ‘c’ is written. This was also Lucilius’ view. There are some who maintain that one should follow one’s ears, and write a sound as it is heard.

Lucilius restricts the use of ‘q’ to words in which ‘qu’ is followed by one or more vowels, i.e. when ‘q’ represents the labiovelar [kw]; in all other cases one should write ‘c’. Early Latin inscriptional practice exhibits ‘c’ before ‘i’ and ‘e’, ‘k’ before consonants, and ‘q’ before ‘u’ and ‘o’, which suggests that the pronunciation of the velar changed depending on the phonetic environment.¹⁰⁴ This may suggest that the final sentence in Cassiodorus–Cornutus (without *nam* or some such connective) could be understood to include Lucilius among those who advocated for a phonetic spelling in the name of φύσις (*auribus deseruiendum . . . ita scribendum, ut auditur*),¹⁰⁵ on which see section 3.2 below. It may not be ruled out that Lucilius is arguing against contemporary (Accius’?) archaizing affectations such as *qum*, *qura*, *pequs*.¹⁰⁶ Graphemic confusion for velar stops persists until the empire (Claudius Terentianus wrote *tequm* in the second century AD).¹⁰⁷

3.2 True Sense and Common Sense

Should one write etymologically or phonetically? Quintilian (*Inst.* 1.7.7–8) phrases the question as one frequently asked still in his own time (*quaeri solet*) and one involving a choice between reason (*ratio*) and ears (*ures*) to decide whether in writing one ‘should be guided by the sound prepositions make in compounds or when separate: for example, when I say *optinuit* (reason requires ‘b’ as the second letter, but our ears hear ‘p’) or *immunis* (the ‘nm’, which the true sense demands, gives way to the sound of the second syllable and is changed into a double ‘m’).’¹⁰⁸

The grammatical source of Lucil. 381 M. (= *GRFF* 13 *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.65.15) regards assimilated [rl] > [ll] in pronunciation (*malunt dicere*) as a mark of refined speech (*elegantioris sermonis*):

¹⁰⁴ Allen 1978: 15, cf. also 16–20.

¹⁰⁵ As argued by Lehmann 2004: 183; cf. Dangel 1990: 52.

¹⁰⁶ Bernardi Perini 1983: 166; cf. Funaioli 1907: 32.

¹⁰⁷ Adams 2016: 277, with ref. to his edition of Terentianus’ letters (Adams 1977).

¹⁰⁸ Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.8 *quaeri solet, in scribendo praepositiones sonum quem iunctae efficiunt an quem separatae obseruare conueniat, ut cum dico ‘optinuit’ (secundam enim ‘b’ litteram ratio poscit, aures magis audiunt ‘p’) et ‘immunis’ (illud enim ‘nm’ quod ueritas exigit, sequentis syllabae sono uictum, ‘m’ gemina commutatur)*. Cf. the Romance outcomes for both spellings (e.g. *subtrus* > Ital. *sotto*; *septem* > *sette*: Sihler 1995: 200).

‘per’ uero praeposito omnibus ⟨uocibus⟩ (*dub. add. Funaioli*) integra praeponitur, nisi cum incidit in l litteram, adfinem consonantem, quam elegantioris sermonis uiri geminare malunt (uolunt *cod.*) quam r litteram exprimere, ut cum pellabor malunt dicere quam perlabor. nec aliter apud Lucilium legitur ‘pelliciendu’, quod est inducendus, geminat l’ [381 M.]. pellicere malunt quam pellicere.

The prefix ‘per’ is attached in its original form to all words except when it falls on the adjacent consonant ‘l’, which refined speakers prefer to double rather than pronouncing ‘r’, for example when they prefer to say *pellabor* than *perlabor*. In a similar way we read in Lucilius ‘the word pelliciendus, meaning ‘he must be led in’, doubles the ‘l’’. The preference is for *pellicere* rather than *pellicere*.

The grammarian’s preoccupation is that spelling must reflect pronunciation; but Lucilius simply says that *perl-* becomes *pell-*, not that one should write ‘pell’. When asked for a spelling rule in comparable cases, Lucilius dismisses the question: ‘it makes no difference’ (374 M. ‘abbibere’: <hic> *non multum est ‘d’ siet an ‘b’*), ‘don’t agonize over it’ (375 M. *atque ‘accurrere’ scribas | ‘d’ne an ‘c’ non est quod quaeras atque labores*). Lucilius does not care for etymological spelling if it does not reflect pronunciation; and the pronunciation of clusters of liquids and stops inevitably involves assimilation. In Quintilian’s terminology, Lucilius seems to admit phonetic spelling, *ures* and *sonus*, instead of (or at least alongside) etymological *ratio* and *ueritas*. The reality of the language supplies enough ‘distinction’ to override the need to write in accordance with ‘rational account’ (in Trypho’s and Apollonius’ definition, [section 2.2](#) above).

3.3 Naturalism and Language Change

Finally, two passages discuss the competing verb forms *feruo* and *ferueo*: 356 M. *feruere ne longum, uero hoc lictoribus tradam* (‘feruere must be long, I’ll actually hand it over to the lictors’) and 357 M. *feruit aqua et feruet, feruit nunc, feruet ad annum* ‘water boils and will boil: it boils now, will boil a year from now’ ([section 1.3.1\(e\)](#) above).

In quoting 357 M., Quintilian (*Inst.* 1.6.7–8) gives the perspective of a speaker at a time when Latin had excluded one of the forms:

si quis antiquos secutus ‘feruere’ breui media syllaba dicat, deprendatur uitiose loqui . . . etiamsi est apud Lucilium: ‘feruit aqua et feruet: feruit nunc, feruet ad annum.’ Sed pace dicere hominis eruditissimi liceat: si ‘feruit’ putat illi simile ‘currit’ et ‘legit’, ‘feruo’ dicet ut ‘lego’ et ‘curro’, quod nobis inauditum est.

If, following the ancients, someone pronounces *feruere* with a short middle syllable, he can be shown to be wrong . . . It is true that we find in Lucilius *feruit aqua et feruet: feruit nunc, feruet ad annum*. But, with all respect to that learned man, if he thinks *feruit* is like *currit* and *legit*, he will have to say *feruo*, like *lego* and *curro*; but that is unheard of.

From a diachronic perspective, the 3rd conjugation form *feruo* was regular in early Latin; *ferueo* is not attested until Cicero and Varro.¹⁰⁹ The 2nd conjugation form was a competing one that would eventually eliminate *feruo* from any currency other than as ‘poetic licence’. Lucretius, however, still uses *feruo* (2.41, 4.608, 6.442) and has no examples of *ferueo*, whereas he oscillates between *fulgo* and *fulgeo*.¹¹⁰ Colson (1924: 76) nicely paraphrases Lucilius’ position: ‘Lucilius, having declared for ‘feruère’, is asked whether he says ‘feruit’ or ‘feruet’. He replies humorously ‘I say both, but *feruit* is present, *feruet* is future.’ The tone in which Lucilius stigmatizes *feruère* at 356 M., ‘if I hear you say *feruère* I’ll call the police’, is playful, with its pun on *corripere*, ‘seizing’ a criminal for arrest / ‘shortening’ a vowel.¹¹¹ A playful tone may be employed for a serious piece of advice.¹¹²

The variation has an exact parallel in the verb *fulgo* / *fulgeo*, which famously occasioned a ‘naturalistic’ explanation by the Stoic Seneca (*QNat.* 2.56, transl. H. Corcoran, Loeb):

Etiamnunc illo uerbo utebantur antiqui correpto, quo nos producta una syllaba utimur; dicimus enim, ut splendere, sic fulgēre; at illis ad significandam hanc e nubibus subitae lucis eruptionem mos erat correpta media syllaba uti, ut dicerent fulgere.

Also, the ancients used to use a short syllable in that verb *fulgere* which we use with one of the syllables long; for we say *fulgēre* just as we say *splendēre*. But to designate the eruption of sudden light from the clouds it was their habit to use a shortened middle syllable, so that they said *fulgēre*.

Lucilius has only *fulgēre*, for the flashing of hot iron (291 M. *primum fulgit, uti caldum e furnacibu’ ferrum*) and the ‘flashing’ attire of a dubious group (409 M. *conuentus pulcher: braciae, saga fulgere, torques*), as later Lucretius with references to the ‘flash’ of lightning (5.1095; 6.160, 165, 174, 214, 218; but *fulgēre* 213) vs *fulgēre* in the sense of ‘glowing’ (2.27 of

¹⁰⁹ *TLL* 6.1.590.41ff. ¹¹⁰ See Bailey 1947 on 2.41.

¹¹¹ See Heurgon 1959: 127, Lehmann 2004: 180.

¹¹² One is reminded of the recent best-seller advertising a ‘zero-tolerance approach to punctuation’: ‘getting your ites mixed up is the greatest solecism in the world of punctuation. No matter that you have a PhD and have read all of Henry James twice. If you still persist in writing “Good food at it’s best,” you deserve to be struck by lightning, hacked up on the spot and buried in an unmarked grave’: Lynne Truss, *Eats, Shoots and Leaves* (2003) 43–4; cited in Horobin 2013: 11–12.

silver furnishings, 5.768 of the moon's *nitor*). The distribution is similar to that of *feru(e)o*, i.e. 2nd conjugation forms of *fulgeo* are unattested before Cicero, Varro, and Lucretius.¹¹³ The *sympatheia* principle does account for Lucilius' preference for the original form *fulgo*, the meaning of the verb recommending a short sound for instantaneous action, as Seneca explains.¹¹⁴ Lucilius may have applied the same line of reasoning to the other verb, thus justifying his preference for the 'bubbling' sound of *feruëre*; but, here as elsewhere, the logic of naturalism operates alongside the observation of linguistic facts. Whereas Seneca invokes a philosophical theory to explain an obsolete form, Lucilius observes the rise of competing forms and introduces a rational motivation to defend the currency of the original one, resisting phonological and morphological change (in vain: as the saying goes, 'once a merger, always a merger').

4 Conclusions

In his review of David Blank's interpretation of Apollonius Dyscolus (Blank 1982), Langslow (1986: 149) raised some broader questions that are relevant to our discussion of Lucilius at the rise of grammatical science in Republican Rome: 'Why did they study and how did they view language change, linguistic diversity and error and correctness in language use?' For Apollonius Dyscolus, Blank advocated a notion of grammaticality independent of contingent truth. The rational character, or at least rational component, of language is called into question by those who maintain that factors for language change are mechanisms operating irrespective of grammatical and semantic information. I refer to mechanisms such as 'lexical regularity, the role of grammatical conditioning, the relation of analogy to sound change, the role of dialect borrowing, and the effect of meaning on sound change' (Labov 2001: 1.37).

The first Latin writer to deal systematically with linguistic topics (section 1 above), Lucilius had both the philosophical background and the empirical knowledge of Latin to take these factors into account. In what ways did 'nature' guide Lucilius' views on Latin spelling, grammar, and usage? Lucilius applied a theory of linguistic naturalism to his empirical observations. Like Trypho and Varro in the next generation, he

¹¹³ TLL 6.1507.63ff.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Sommer 1909: 74, Mariotti 1960: 23 n. 4. Sluiter (1990: 33) observes that Seneca's passage should not be invoked to claim adherence to Stoic orthodoxy ('if such a thing ever existed') for the principle of naturalistic συμπαθεία: see pp. 56–7 above.

adopted a model of linguistic naturalism that had a strong rational component and combined a Stoic-oriented, but by no means strictly Stoic (section 2.1) ‘phonological pathology’¹¹⁵ with Alexandrian principles of regularity based on correct usage vs dialectism, archaism, artificial formations, and misguided conventions. In line with these principles, Lucilius opted for ‘original’ Latin forms which seemed to him to preserve the natural *proprietas* and *perspicuitas* of words, arguing against both obsolete forms (not conforming to usage) and recent departures from *correct* usage (section 2.2) that would associate Latin with non-urban features (section 3.1). Literary Greek remains a model for Lucilius, who counts himself (379 M.) among the ‘*semigraeci*’ (section 1.3.1).

Lucilius’ analysis of ‘orthography’ in Book 9 – the largest body of surviving evidence from his *sermones* – embraces phonological, graphemic, and grammatical phenomena, aiming to provide a rational explanation of inflection (singular/plural, and the special status of the dative as ‘naturally’ subject to augmentation), sound quality (short/long vowel; ‘natural’ quality of phonemes; assimilation in pronunciation), and spelling, which should give an adequate representation of both rationale and correct speaking practices (section 3.1). The satirist’s pronouncements demonstrably find remarkable convergence with the inscriptional evidence of his time, pitting his pronouncements firmly against the spelling standardization that was associated with (but predated) Accius and was still at work in the late first century BC. He called upon experiential evidence (*aures*) to rule out affected pronunciation (section 3.2), while he invoked his rational explanation to discriminate between ‘natural’ and ‘corrupted’ forms (section 3.3).

Lucilius presented his views in a prescriptive fashion and later sources perceived them as normative (section 1.3.2). He came to be seen as ‘some sort of authority on correct usage or pronunciation’, to quote ‘the King’ of modern English usage;¹¹⁶ but just like Kingsley Amis, Lucilius was no pedant, no philosopher, and no antiquarian. When he adopted a theory to describe linguistic phenomena, it was because it was historically correct or deemed acceptable by usage. What he did was to carefully observe current practices and to offer a descriptive analysis in line with the principles of naturalist rationalism.

¹¹⁵ A definition of Pfaffel 1987: 228, on Varro.

¹¹⁶ ‘I would guess that for every acquaintance of mine who looks at me as some sort of authority on correct usage or pronunciation there is at least one who sees me as an officious neurotic who sets right venial blunderers uninvited’ (Amis 2011: 1).

Nigidius Figulus' Naturalism Between Grammar and Philosophy

Alessandro Garcea

Introduction

‘A frustratingly mysterious figure, though he was a friend of Cicero and praetor in 58’ (Rawson 1985: 94), Nigidius Figulus died in exile, in May or June 45, before Cicero could utter any *oratio ad clementiam Caesaris* in his favour. Nevertheless, in the extant beginning of his *Timaeus* (§1 = *test.* 9 Swoboda), Cicero included a vibrant eulogy of his friend, whose character well suited that of the Pythagorean Timaeus of Locri Epizephyrii.¹

Nigidius’ learning was unanimously acknowledged. Even if he does not always agree with him, Aulus Gellius praises him as *homo eruditissimus* (15.3.2): *Nigidius is iuxta M. Varronem doctissimus* (4.9.1), so that this couple of *uiri Romani generis doctissimi* (4.16.1) form the *columina* of the late Republican culture (19.14.2), the sole difference between them being the abstruse character (§3 *obscuritas subtilitasque*) of Nigidius’ writings that hindered their survival.

Putting Nigidius’ *Commentarii grammatici* together with the astronomical and theological works that gave him the reputation of *Pythagoricus et magus* (Hier. Chron. *a. Abr.* 1972 (45) = *test.* 8 S.), modern critics generally interpret Nigidius’ linguistic thought from a Pythagorean point of view, even if our evidence about a supposed preoccupation with grammar by the Pythagoreans is very thin, apart from their interest in the mystic power of words – an aspect that, in any case, is absent from Nigidius’ fragments.² What is unquestionable is rather Nigidius’ allegiance

¹ Yet Nigidius’ Pythagoreanism presents some problems: see Musial 2001, Flinterman 2014: 343–7.

² Carcopino (1926: 199–200) is quite representative of this stance: ‘Jusque dans les étymologies qu’il propose pour les mots de la langue latine, il reconnaît, soit l’action des puissances dont Pythagore lui a livré le secret, soit l’ébauche des commandements que sa sagesse surhumaine défendit d’enfreindre.’ Della Casa (1962: 55–69) associates Nigidius’ fragments with the following testimonies, allegedly representing the ‘studi linguistici del pitagorismo’: Iamblichus *VP* 82 (58C 4 DK) τί τὸ σοφώτατον; ἀριθμός· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον, also found in Proclus, *In Cra.*, who adds (16.20–2): οὐκ ἄρα, φησὶ Πυθαγόρας, τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶ τὸ ὀνοματουργεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν

to a naturalistic point of view, whereby Stoic influences are combined with some original ideas on the overall grammar of the Latin language. The following attempt at a systematic presentation of this approach will start from Nigidius' theory of natural articulatory symbolism (§1), an adaptation of Chrysippus' use of language as a philosophical argument (§2); then, after a reconstruction of Nigidius' lost work on Latin grammar (§3.1), the ethical character of his etymologies will be taken into account (§3.2), as well as their relation to Varro's contemporary explanations (§3.3); finally, a study of the presence of naturalistic theories in Nigidius' morphological fragments on derivation (§4.1), inflection (§4.2), and word classes (§4.3) will be undertaken.

1 Nigidius' Theory of Natural Articulatory Symbolism

In his *Commentarii grammatici*, Nigidius Figulus openly treated the philosophical question of the natural or arbitrary character of language and pleaded for the first conception with different arguments, from which Aulus Gellius singles out a very peculiar one. According to Nigidius, when uttering the personal pronouns, our speech organs change shape depending on whether we are designating someone else (protrusion) or ourselves (protraction):

nomina uerbaque non positu fortuito, sed quadam ui et ratione naturae facta esse P. Nigidius in *grammaticis commentariis* docet, rem sane in philosophiae disertationibus celebrem. (2.) quaeri enim solitum apud philosophos, φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα sint ἢ θέσει. (3.) in eam rem multa argumenta dicit, cur uideri possint uerba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria. (4.) ex quibus hoc uisum est lepidum et festiuum: “uos” – inquit – cum dicimus, motu quodam oris conueniente cum ipsius uerbi demonstratione utimur et labeas sensim primores emouemus ac spiritum atque animam porro uersum et ad eos, quibuscum sermocinamur, intendimus. at contra cum dicimus ‘nos’, neque profuso intentoque flatu uocis neque proiectis labris pronuntiamus, sed et spiritum et labeas quasi intra nosmet ipsos coercemus. hoc idem fit et in eo, quod dicimus ‘tu’, ‘ego’ et ‘tibi’ et ‘mihi’. nam sicuti, cum adnuimus et abnuimus, motus quidam ille uel capitis uel oculorum a natura rei, quam significat, non abhorret, ita in his

νοῦν ὁρῶντος καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων· φύσει ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα; Cicero *Tusc.* 1.62 (see below, n. 35). For a justified scepticism, see Thesleff 1965: 46. Dillon (1977: 181) finds some passages περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσεως in Philo (esp. *Leg. alleg.* 2.14–15; *QG* 1.20), which would show that ‘there is ... a consensus among Platonists, Stoics and Pythagoreans by Philo’s time that words are attached to things by nature, not by convention’. On the complexity of this debate among the Middle Platonists see van den Berg 2008: 31–59.

uocibus quasi gestus quidam oris et spiritus naturalis est. eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque uocibus, quam esse in nostris animaduertimus.

Publius Nigidius in his *Grammatical Notes* shows that nouns and verbs were formed, not by accidental imposition, but by a certain power and design of nature, a subject very popular in the discussions of the philosophers; for they used to inquire whether words originate by nature or by imposition. Nigidius employs many arguments to this end, to show that words appear to be natural rather than arbitrary. Among these the following seems particularly neat and ingenious: 'When we say *uos* (you) – says Nigidius –, we make a movement of the mouth appropriate to the indication of the word; for we gradually protrude the tips of our lips and direct the impulse of the breath towards those with whom we are speaking. But on the other hand, when we say *nos* (us), we do not pronounce the word with a powerful forward impulse of the voice, nor with the lips protruded, but we restrain our breath and our lips, so to speak, within ourselves. The same thing happens in the words *tu* (thou), *ego* (I), *tibi* (to thee), and *mihi* (to me). For just as when we assent or dissent, a movement of the head or eyes is not alien to the nature of the thing signified, so too in the pronunciation of these words there is a kind of natural gesture made with the mouth and breath. The same principle that we have noted in our own speech applies also to Greek words.' (Nigidius fr. 41 S. = GRFF 23 = FDS 562 ap. Gell. 10.4.1–4; transl. after Rolfe 1927: 229)

Like other Republican scholars and men of letters, Nigidius was very interested in phonetics, as many extant fragments prove.³ Yet here his

³ He observed that vocalic *I* and *V* are always in a secondary position (*subditae*) in descending diphthongs but come first (*praeiunt*) in ascending diphthongs, and in this case cannot be deemed to be vowels (fr. 53 S. = GRFF 16 ap. Gell. 19.14.6): *A et O semper principes sunt, I et V semper subditae, E et subit et praeit; <praeit> in 'Euripo', subit in 'Aemilio'. si quis putat praeire V in his: 'Valerius', 'Vennonius', 'Volusius', aut I in his: 'iampridem', 'iecur', 'iocus', 'iucundum', errabit, quod hae litterae, cum praeiunt, ne uocales quidem sunt.* He also studied the relation between phonetics and orthography. Like Accius (GRFF 25 ap. Prisc. GL 2.30.15–21 through Varro's *De origine linguae Latinae* I, GRFF 3 = 46 Goetz–Schoell), he was interested in the velar nasal [ŋ], noted by the sign of the voiced velar plosive in the same way as in Greek (fr. 54 S. = GRFF 17 ap. Gell. 19.14.7): *inter litteram N et G est alia uis, ut in nomine 'anguis' et 'angari' et 'ancorae' et 'increpat' et 'incurrit' et 'ingenius': in omnibus enim his non uerum N, sed adulterinum ponitur. nam N non esse lingua indicio est; nam si ea littera esset, lingua palatum tangeret.* He also studied another old topic that dates back to Accius' (GRFF 24 ap. Quint. Inst. 1.7.14) and Lucilius' (GRFF 10: see below n. 57) times, i.e. how Greek and Latin represent long vowels (fr. 55 S. = GRFF 18 ap. Gell. 19.14.8): *Graecos non tantae inscitiae arcesso, qui OY ex O et Y scripserunt, <quantae>, qui EI ex E et I; illud enim inopia fecerunt, hoc nulla re subacti.* Concern for articulation caused Nigidius (fr. 56 S. = GRFF 19 ap. Mar. Victorin. Ars GL 6.8.16 = §4.5 Mariotti), like Varro (GRFF 49 = 112 G.–S. ap. Cassiod. Orth. GL 7.152.16–153.6 = §§1.84–7 Stoppacci through Cornutus GRFM 16), to ban <X> for being diphthematic. Likewise, <K> and <Q>, which represent allophones of the velar /k/, noted <C>, were proscribed by both Nigidius (ibid.) and Varro (GRFF 240 = 43 G.–S. ap. Prisc. GL 2.13.8–11), albeit Lucilius had already suggested that <QV> should be strictly reserved for transcribing the labio-velar (GRFF 14 = 382 Marx = 9 fr. 18 Ch. ap. Cassiod. Orth. GL 7.149.1–3 = §§1.23–5 S. through Cornutus GRFM 4, where MSS give *Lucio*, emended by Keil to

approach is unique. He starts by contrasting [wōs] with [nōs]: the protrusion and roundedness of the lips at the beginning of the second-person plural pronoun manifests, by a physiological sign, the act of speaking to someone else; conversely, because of its internal nasality and lack of protrusion (*neque profuso intentoque flatu uocis neque proiectis labris*), the first-person plural pronoun designates the speaker her/himself. The same seems to apply to the singular: in [tū], [t] is contextually labialized and assumes the same character of [wōs], whereas [ego] has no labialization nor roundedness, and therefore self-designates the source of an utterance. In the dative, the opposition [tibi] *vs.* [mihi] seems again to rely on the nasality, the bilabial [m] being allegedly taken as a self-reference.⁴

Nigidius also observes that the same principles hold for Greek pronouns (*eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque uocibus*), an additional remark reminding his readers of the origins of this debate. In fact, in a well-known passage of Plato's *Cratylus*, Socrates defined the phonemes not on the basis of the acoustic impressions that they engender, but according to the movements of the speech organs (426C–427C). This indeed shows that words are motivated by nature, since the signifier establishes with its *denotatum* the same relation that a specific articulatory feature has with the same *denotatum* and this correspondence is supposed to prove the truthfulness of the denominations.⁵ More specifically, however, Nigidius' reference to articulatory symbolism, which is different from the phonetic or acoustic symbolism treated elsewhere by Plato, presupposed an important demonstration provided by Chrysippus in his treatise *On Soul*. In order to understand the meaning of this argument, it is necessary to give a brief outline of Chrysippus' work.

2 Chrysippus' Linguistic Argument

When he first arrived in Rome during the summer of 162, Galen performed several experiments on the human spinal column and nerves whose ultimate purpose was to replace the physicians', Peripatetic, and Stoic

Lucilio). A desire to create a one-to-one relationship between phonology and alphabet also led Varro (ibid. and *GRFF* 279 = 78 G.–S. *ap.* Cassiod. *Orth. GL* 7.152.8–12) and Nigidius (fr. 57 S. = *GRFF* 20 *ap.* Mar. Victorin. *Ars GL* 6.8.16–9.1 = §4.5 M.) to deny <H> as a *littera* and treat it instead as a sort of prosodic marker. See also Nigidius fr. 39 S. = *GRFF* 21 *ap.* Gell. 13.6.3 *P. Nigidius in commentariis grammaticis: 'rusticus fit sermo – inquit – si adspires perperam'*. For a general survey see Della Casa 1962 : 76–82.

⁴ See Belardi and Cipriano 1990: 61–2. For another hypothesis see Biville forthcoming.

⁵ See Belardi 1985: 24–43; more generally, on 'referential naturalism' see the Introduction to this volume.

doctrines of the heart as the seat of the main psychic functions (ἡγεμονικόν) with the Platonic tripartite location of the soul in brain (reason), heart (passions), and belly/liver (desire). He also wrote a treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, where he dealt with the first two parts of the soul in books 1 to 3, with passions in books 4 to 5, and with the appetitive part of the soul in book 6.⁶ Chrysippus' *Περὶ ψυχῆς* appeared there as a polemical target, since it mainly relied on instances of primary notions (προλήψεις) stemming from common experience, such as 'the testimony of women, non-experts, etymologies, motions of the hand, upward or downward movements of the head and poets' (*PHP* 3.5.22).⁷ In fact, when the absence of perceptions prevented him from producing proofs, Chrysippus resorted to common speech, even if this expedient had the sole function of 'providing only a systematic account of the types of correspondences between known properties of objects and known properties of their names' (Atherton 1993: 97), not of being 'scientifically heuristic, on a par with syllogisms or sense-experience' (ibid. 95).

Galen observes that Chrysippus used this method in order to prove that most people perceive passions like anger in their heart:⁸ 'The multitude of men seem to me to be brought together to this view since they perceive, as it were, the affections of the mind happening to them in the region of the chest and especially in the place assigned to the heart. I mean especially in fear and distress, in anger, and inflamed anger most of all' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 153). At the end of this demonstration (*PHP* 3.5.2), Chrysippus presented the heart as the centre of speech, starting again with the average person's opinion:⁹ 'The multitude of men, cajoled by common usage, and holding close to the tendency mentioned above, truthfully apply such terms to many of these (things)' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 201). The first step of this new argument consisted in quoting some idiomatic expressions with καταβαίνειν 'go down', which becomes appropriate

⁶ Galen wrote the main part of this work during the Roman period in 162–6; ten years later, having become court physician to Marcus Aurelius, he added three further books on other points of agreement between Plato and Hippocrates.

⁷ Galen's *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 2–3 is the main source of Chrysippus' *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, from which it takes long excerpts, all from the second half of book 1: see *SVF* 2.881–909 (fr. 911 being a tentative reconstruction of the original textual structure). For an outline of the entire *Περὶ ψυχῆς* see Gourinat 2005; see also Blank, in this volume.

⁸ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.887 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 2.7.8 κοινῇ δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ φέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦθ' ὥσανεῖ αἰσθανόμενοι περὶ τὸν θώρακα αὐτοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν παθῶν γιγνομένων καὶ μάλιστα καθ' ὃν ἡ καρδία τέτακται τόπον, οἷον μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν φόβων καὶ τῶν λυπῶν λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θυμοῦ.

⁹ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.891 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.5.3 σαινόμενοι δὲ φήμι οἱ πολλοὶ τούτων πολλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπιλέγουσι τοιαῦτα ἔχόμενοι τῆς ῥηθείσης φορᾶς.

(cf. §5 οἰκειότερον . . . οἰκείως *vs.* ἄλλοτριώτερον) only once the mind, where the auditory perception takes place, is located in the chest. The womanly habit of pointing a finger in the direction of the heart, so as to emphasize that an utterance ‘does not go down’, also corroborates this point of view (*SVF* 2.892 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.5.8).

For his next argument Chrysippus relied on etymology. Unfortunately, Galen’s testimony here is disconnected: he only recalls the example of the word ἐγὼ pointing to the heart at the beginning of book 2, after having affirmed that he had already refuted this interpretation in his *Περὶ ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητος*. Then, he briefly returns to this issue in book 3 (5.24–6). A tentative reconstruction of the lost evidence would imply that, at first, Chrysippus developed the general concept of δειξίς, illustrated by the deictic (ἐνδεικνύμεθα) nod of the head towards the chest in the act of assent:¹⁰ ‘If the act of pointing is sufficient evidence for discovering a governing part of the soul, it is not right that it be sufficient in the case of the chest but inadequate in the case of the nose. It should be just as valid for the latter too; or if it does not hold for the nose, it ought not to hold for the chest either. And why is it that when we nod the head in assent we indicate that the rule of the soul is rather in that member toward which we move the head, and not in the member which is moved?’ (transl. De Lacy 1978: 109).

Only then (οὕτως δὲ καὶ . . .) could Chrysippus have taken into account the case of ἐγὼ:¹¹ ‘We also say *ego* (I) in this way, pointing to ourselves at that place in which thought appears to be, the gesture being carried there naturally and appropriately; and apart from such a gesture of the hand, we

¹⁰ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.895.2 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 2.2.20–1 ἡ δειξίς ἱκανὴ πίστις εἰς εὐρεσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ μορίου ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν στέρνων αὐτὴν ἱκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀσθενῇ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ρίνος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταύτης ἰσχύειν ὁμοίως· ἢ εἴπερ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ ταύτης, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν στέρνων. (21.) διὰ τί δὲ ἐν ταῖς συγκαταθέσεσιν ἐπινεύοντες τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἐφ’ ὃ φέρομεν αὐτὴν μέρος, ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεικνύμεθα μᾶλλον καὶ οὐκ <ἐν> αὐτῷ τῷ κινουμένῳ; See Dahlmann 1932: 22–4, Tieleman 1996: 206 n. 42.

¹¹ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.895.1 = *FDS* 560 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 2.2.10–11 οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, κατὰ τοῦτο δεικνύντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ᾧ φαίνεσθαι διάνοιαν εἶναι, τῆς δειξέως φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκείως ἐνταῦθα φερομένης· καὶ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν χεῖρα τοιαύτης δειξέως νεύοντες εἰς αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν, εὐθύς καὶ τῆς ἐγὼ φωνῆς τοιαύτης οὔσης καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξῆς ὑπογεγραμμένην δεῖξιν συνεκφερομένης. (11.) τὸ γὰρ ἐγὼ προφερόμεθα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν κατασπώντες τὸ κάτω χεῖλος εἰς αὐτοὺς δεικτικῶς· ἀκολουθῶς δὲ τῇ τοῦ γενείου κινήσει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ στήθος νεύσει καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δεῖξει ἡ ἐξῆς συλλαβὴ παράκειται οὐδὲν ἀποστηματικὸν παρενημαίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου συντέτευχεν. According to Galen, since ἐγὼ and ἐκείνος have the same first syllable, in order to forestall objections, Chrysippus insisted on the function of the second syllable, where -κεῖ- is different from -γῶ-. Nevertheless, ‘nothing in the quoted passage itself suggests that for Chrysippus the second syllable is at issue . . . The “impression of distance” in ἐκείνος may simply reside in its relation to ἐκεῖ (“there”)’ (Tieleman 1996: 207).

nod toward ourselves as we say *ego* (I); indeed, the very word *egô* (I) is of this description and its pronunciation is accompanied by the gesture next described. For as we pronounce *ego* (I), at the first syllable we drop the lower lip in a way that points to ourselves, and in conformity with the movement of the chin, the nod toward the chest, and such gesturing, the next syllable is juxtaposed; and it gives no suggestion of distance, such as that produced by the second syllable of *ekeinos* (that person, he)' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 106–7). In the case of ἐγώ, the imitation is based not on an onomatopoeia, but on a form of δεῖξις: in the interior self-perception of the soul, which is the semantics of 'I', the motion of the soul towards its seat or self-directed designation matches – φυσικῶς καὶ οἰκείως – the movements of the speech organs that utter ἐγώ (§10).¹²

After treating the case of ἐγώ (*PHP* 3.5.27 ἐξῆς τῶν προειρημένων), Chrysippus added a new, different etymology. According to him, καρδία was derived from κράτησις 'power' and κυρεία 'authority', because the heart is the seat of the dominant part of the soul:¹³ 'Concordant with all this, the heart (*kardia*) got its name by virtue of a certain power and sovereignty, from the fact that the sovereign and ruling part of the soul is in it; it is called, as it were, *kratia* (power)' (transl. De Lacy 1978: 207).

Although this etymology is closely connected with the self-direction of the soul that is presupposed by the explanation of ἐγώ, it is evident that καρδία needs specific cognitive procedures in order to be clarified. Yet the naturalistic approach can still hold. The representations of the physical objects (σώματα) that are activated by the sensorial perceptions (φαντασῖαι αἰσθητικαί) result in onomatopoeic formations and words that affect us in the same way as their *designata* affect our senses; for the rest of the vocabulary, other types of cognitive relationships are pertinent, especially with the rational representations (φαντασῖαι λογικαί) of incorporeals (ἄσώματα) produced by the elaboration of the sensory perceptions. These are paralleled by the ways in which new notions are created (Chrysippus *SVF* 2.87 = *FDS* 255 *ap.* Diog. Laert. 7.52–3: καθ' ὁμοίότητα, by

¹² Available sources (Chrysippus *SVF* 2.204 = *FDS* 914 *ap.* Diog. Laert. 7.70; *SVF* 2.205 = *FDS* 915 *ap.* Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.96) establish a link between deixis and definite propositions, where a personal or a demonstrative pronoun occurs, and contrast them with indefinite propositions, where an indefinite pronoun or ἐκεῖνος is the subject. Only the first ones presuppose the existence, here and now, of the designated object (Matthaios 1999: 499 n. 337). On the Latin tradition see Garcea 2015.

¹³ Chrysippus *SVF* 2.896 = *FDS* 561 *ap.* Gal. *PHP* 3.5.28 τοῦτοις πᾶσι συμφώνως καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' ἔσχηκεν ἡ καρδία κατὰ τινα κράτησιν καὶ κυρείαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι τὸ κυριεῦον καὶ κρατοῦν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὡς ἂν κρατία λεγομένη.

resemblance; κατ' ἀναλογίαν, by analogy; κατ' ἐναντίωσιν, by contrariety) and by specific rhetorical strategies.¹⁴

Interestingly enough, Galen notes that Chrysippus also developed the etymology of ἐγώ in his *On Etymologies* (PHP 3.5.25 ἐν τοῖς ἐτυμολογικοῖς = SVF 2.884 = FDS 561, see also 2.2.10–11 = SVF 2.883 = FDS 560). These could refer to the six books of his Περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα or to the four books ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα that are quoted in the catalogue of his works by Diogenes Laertius, under the first ethical section 'on the articulation of ethical concepts' (7.199–200 Περὶ τὴν διάρθρωσιν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἐννοιῶν). The word διάρθρωσις 'articulation' specifically designates the conceptual operation performed through the clarification of lexical relations: this raises awareness of the conceptions that are naturally embedded in us and that, as a consequence, could be used as criteria of truth (Tieleman 1996: 200–1). So, if in Chrysippus' *On Soul* 'the expressions whose literal and physical sense . . . is still to some extent present in the speaker's mind appear to have predominated' (ibid. 217), it is probable that the *Etymological Inquiries* focused specifically on etymological analyses of the καρδία type, that apply to the greatest part of the vocabulary.

3 Return to Nigidius

3.1 Nigidius' Commentarii Grammatici

With Chrysippus' theory in the background, it is now possible to make some comments on Nigidius' extract. First of all, Aulus Gellius seems to have condensed his source, where he also found references to the original etymology of Greek ἐγώ: *eadem ratio est in Graecis quoque uocibus* (§4) seems also to suggest that possible formal differences between languages do not invalidate the basic principle of the articulatory symbolism, which holds for both Greek and Latin. Like Chrysippus, Nigidius referred as well

¹⁴ See Barwick 1957a: 32–3. The fullest taxonomy is found in an otherwise polemical presentation by Aug. *Dial.* 6 (9.18–11.8 Crecelius = pp. 92–6 Jackson–Pinborg). It includes *similitudo soni* (*res cum sono uerbi aliqua similitudine concinat*: onomatopoeic expressions like *tininitus*, *hininitus*, *balatus*, *clangor*, *stridor* or phonosymbolic expressions, like *mel* 'honey', with smooth phonemes); *similitudo tactus* (*ita res ipsae adficiunt, ut uerba sentiuntur*: e.g. *crura* 'legs', whose length and hardness remind us of the wood of a *crux* 'cross'); *similitudo rerum* (κατὰχρησις; μεταφορά, μετάληψις); *uicinitas* (μετωνυμία: *per efficientiam* – *per effecta* – *per id quo continetur* – *per id quod continetur* – *a parte totum* – *a toto pars*, e.g. *piscina* 'bath' from *piscis* 'fish', since it contains water, where fishes live); *contrarium* (ἀντίφρασις: e.g. *lucus* 'sacred grove' from *minimum lucere* 'to have very little light').

to the nod of the head towards the chest in the act of assent. Gellius does not explain why *motus quidam ille uel capitis uel oculorum a natura rei, quam significat, non abhorret* (ibid.), but Nigidius almost certainly knew that deixis was connected to this topic, because he used the technical term *uerbi demonstratio* with *uos*.¹⁵ On the other hand, he probably omitted all the psychological aspects of his Stoic source: *spiritus* and *anima* are more related to the breathing in phonation than to the process of self-recognition to which Chrysippus alluded.

Even if Gellius' intermediation does not give all the explanations required for a proper understanding of Nigidius' theories, it is feasible that the latter included Chrysippean etymologies in his grammatical commentaries. Since this work was alien to psychological theories, it is likely that it relied on Chrysippus' ἐτυμολογικά, whose main object was Greek vocabulary.

Be that as it may, Gellius undeniably testifies that, like other ancient sources,¹⁶ Nigidius conflated phylogenesis and the ontology of language: *nomina uerbaque non posito fortuito . . . facta esse* (§1), like parallel Greek expressions such as οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχεν . . . αἱ Ἑλληνικαὶ λέξεις ἐπετέθησαν (GG 1.3.14.27–8; 471.1–2) and πεποιημένα, refer to the origin of language and the lexical imposition by a mythological or historical benefactor, or also by a group of human beings. The fact that those people, whoever they were, assigned names *quadam ui et ratione naturae* (ibid.) then becomes a strong argument in favour of the natural correspondence between language and reality that justifies any etymological research: *uerba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria* (§3); *motu quodam oris conueniente cum ipsius uerbi demonstratione* (§4); *in his uocibus quasi gestus quidam oris et spiritus naturalis est* (ibid.).

In order to find other instances of this conception in the scanty fragments of the *Commentarii grammatici*, one should start with an overview of this rather obscure work in at least 29 books.¹⁷ Like other similar works of the late Roman Republic, this one did not have an immediate

¹⁵ Swoboda (1889: fr. 41 app. crit.) cites the parallel example of Gell. 13.29.2 *multitudinis demonstrationem* 'designation of the plural'; more specifically Nigidius GRFF 8 = 34 S. ap. Gell. 17.7.5 has *temporis demonstrationem* 'designation of the time', but Gell. 10.4.4 *uerbi demonstratio* is probably the equivalent of δειξις in Chrysippus' model. See Tielemans 1996: 206 n. 41.

¹⁶ See Fehling 1965; specifically on Stoic sources: Allen 2005.

¹⁷ New edition by A. Garcea and V. Lomanto in preparation for the Collection des Universités de France. The quotations by Gellius include a reference to *in commentariorum undetricesimo* (10.5.1). There is no proof that there were only 29 books, or that their total was necessarily 30.

pedagogic aim. Gellius considers it as a sort of personal and colossal notebook, where Nigidius wrote everything that he deemed interesting to himself, without putting the material in order or thinking about his possible readership.¹⁸ Trying to reconstruct an overall structure, scholars have been forced to admit that the references to specific books in the ancient sources do not permit us to identify any thematic coherence. Only the following references are explicitly given by the available sources:¹⁹

E NIGIDII LIBRO ARGUMENTVM

4	<i>sempiternum / perpetuum</i> (below, n. 43)
9	<i>irascere / irasci</i> (below, n. 38)
10	<i>uetustiscere / ueterascere</i> (below, n. 50)
11	<i>religentem / religiosus</i> (below, n. 51)
18	<i>tintinnire</i> (below, n. 42)
19	<i>fit / facitur</i> (below, n. 39)
20	adverbs ending in <i>-im</i> (below, nn. 53–4)
23	<i>subruptum erit</i> past or future? (below, n. 41)
24	orthography, accent: <i>Valéri / Vàleri : amici / amicei : terrai / terrae ; mi / miei</i> (below, nn. 58–61)
25	<i>nixurit, qui niti uult</i> (below, n. 50)
29	etymologies of <i>auarus</i> and <i>locuples</i> (below, nn. 23–5)

This meagre evidence seems at least to rule out two possibilities: different topics are not treated in the same book and the same topic is not developed in completely separate books. Nigidius rather devoted one or more books to a single, specific topic, like the inchoative forms that are studied in *Commentarii* 9–10. The fact that he took his notes while reading one or more sources on a given subject does presuppose a certain order. In turn, Gellius seems to quote his 15 extracts in the order in which he read Nigidius; for this reason, the same topic, which he found in a specific book – or series of books – of the *Commentarii*, ends up being treated within the same book of the *Noctes* or in adjacent books:²⁰

¹⁸ Gellius 17.7.5 *anguste perquam et obscure disserit, ut signa rerum ponere uideas ad subsidium magis memoriae suae quam ad legentium disciplinam*. See also Gellius 19.14.2–3, quoted above, Introduction.

¹⁹ See Swoboda 1889: 5–6, Della Casa 1962: 68. ²⁰ See Swoboda 1889: 12–13.

IN GELLII LIBRO	E NIGIDIJ LIBRO	ARGVMENTVM
3.12	?	de adiectiuis <i>bibax</i> et <i>bibosus</i> (below, n. 52)
4.9	11	de adiectiuis <i>religens</i> et <i>religiosus</i> (below, n. 51)
8.14 <i>lemma</i>	?	de etymo adiectiuorum <i>uanus</i> et <i>stolidus</i> (see below, n. 44)
9.12.6	?	de etymo adiectiui <i>infestus</i> (below, n. 28)
10.4	?	uerba sunt naturalia magis quam arbitraria (above, §1)
10.5	29	de etymo adiectiuorum <i>auarus</i> et <i>locuples</i> (below, nn. 23–5)
10.11.2	?	de primaria significatione uocis <i>mature</i> (below, n. 29)
11.11	?	quid differat inter <i>mentiri</i> et <i>mendacium dicere</i> (below, n. 45)
13.6.3	?	<i>rusticus fit sermo, si adspires perperam</i> (above, n. 3)
13.10.4	?	de etymo <i>fratris</i> uocabuli (below, n. 26)
13.26	24	de accentu et orthographia (below, nn. 59–61)
15.3.4	?	de uerbo <i>autumo</i> (below, n. 66)
17.7	23	de tempore quod <i>esse</i> et <i>erit</i> sign. cum p.p. coniuncta (below, n. 41)
17.13	?	de particula <i>quin</i> (below, n. 65)
19.14.6–8	?	de litteris (above, n. 3)

This is particularly true of the forms ending in *-osus*, studied in *Commentarius* 11 (*Noctes* 3–4), the orthographic problems, including aspiration, treated in *Commentarius* 24 (*Noctes* 13),²¹ and especially the etymologies included in, at least, *Commentarius* 29 (*Noctes* 8–10). Given the proximity of Nigidius' etymological extracts in Gellius 10.4 and 10.5, it is feasible that the passage on personal pronouns has been taken from *Commentarius* 29 or 28.²² This would suggest that, like Chrysippus, Nigidius thought of etymology in a broad, inclusive sense, embracing, under the category of referential naturalism, both the deictical value of the speech organs' movements and the possible modifications of the signifier, whereby one has to find the linguistic motivation of human vocabulary.

3.2 The Ethical Character of Nigidius' Etymologies

Just as Chrysippus explained καρδία as being a conflation of κράτησις and κυρεία (see above, p. 85), so Nigidius interpreted the adjective *auarus* as a conflation of *auidus* and *aeris*, with the elimination of the second element

²¹ The presence of the terminus technicus προσωδία / uoculatio both in Gell. 13.6.1 and 13.26.3 would appear to prove the common origin of these extracts: see Kretzschmer 1860: 55, Swoboda 1889: 12–13 and fr. 39 app. crit.

²² See Swoboda 1889: 13.

of the diphthong of *aeris* (still pronounced at the end of the Republican period with two distinct phonemes).²³ This etymology entails an ethical implication, as confirmed by Nigidius' *differentia* between *parcior* and *auarus*, that lies in the insatiable appetite of the latter.²⁴ Another adjective, *locuples*, is also taken as a conflation of *loca* and *plera*, suggesting the idea of wealth as an abundance of possessions. The same interpretation is found in Cicero, in a passage that seems to presuppose common knowledge.²⁵ A sort of variation of the ἔτερος ἐγὼ topos²⁶ is found in Nigidius' explanation of *frater* as *fere alter*, that is probably quoted by heart by Gellius, as a complement to Antistius Labeo's juridical etymology of *soror* (*IAR*⁶ 26 *ap.* Gell. 13.10.3).²⁷ Finally, Nigidius relates the adjective *infestus* to *festinare*,

²³ fr. 42 S. = *GRFF* 14 *ap.* Gell. 10.5.1 'auarus' non simplex uocabulum, sed iunctum copulatumque esse P. Nigidius dicit in commentariorum undetricesimo. 'auarus enim – inquit – appellatur, qui audius aeris est. sed in ea copula E littera – inquit – detrita est'.

²⁴ fr. 43 S. = *GRFF* 25 *ap.* Serv. Dan. G. 1.47 Nigidius: quia qui parcior est, suo contentus est, quod auarus non facit. This interpretation may help us to understand why Nigidius did not choose the obvious derivation of *auarus* from *auere*, as Gellius also suggests (10.5.3): nam de auaro ambigitur: cur enim non uideri possit ab uno solum uerbo inclinatum, quod est auo, eademque esse futura, qua est amarus, de quo nihil dici potest, quin duplex non sit? According to a *differentia* that was widely known in Antiquity, the uox media *audius* derives from *auere*, whereas *auarus*, always a pejorative term, stands apart: Nonius p. 442.9–13 Mercier = 710 Lindsay *auarum et audium ita discernuntur. auarum enim semper in reprehensione est; audium autem ab auendo, quod est etiam honeste cupiendo, et a dilectione intellegi potest, ac per hoc aliquando malis, aliquando bonis adiungitur causis.*

²⁵ fr. 44 S. = *GRFF* 15 *ap.* Gell. 10.5.2 item 'locupletem' dictum ait [sc. Nigidius] ex compositis uocibus, qui pleraque loca, hoc est, qui multas possessiones teneret. See Cicero *Rep.* 2.16 tum erat res in pecore et locorum possessionibus, ex quo pecuniosi et locupletes uocabantur.

²⁶ fr. 50 S. = *GRFF* 28 *ap.* Gell. 13.10.4 'fratris' autem uocabulum P. Nigidius ... interpretatur: 'frater' – inquit – est dictus quasi 'fere alter'. Without quoting Nigidius, Lossmann (1962: 35) gives the following parallels: Theognis 1.97–9 ἄλλ' εἴη τοιοῦτος ἐμοὶ φίλος, ὃς τὸν ἐταῖρον | γινώσκων ὄργην καὶ βαρὺν ὄντα φέροι | ἀντὶ κασιγνήτου; Euripides *IT* 497–8 πότερον ἀδελφῷ μητρός ἐστον ἐκ μᾶς; | φιλόττη γ' ἐσμέν δ' οὐ κασιγνήτω, γύναι; Aristotle *EN* 1161b27–1162a1 γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτοὺς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κερχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῦτό ποιεῖ· ὁθεν φασὶ ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἥλιξ γὰρ ἡλικά, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται; Cicero *Fam.* 2.15.4 (*ad Caelium Rufum*, 3/4 August 50) quem [sc. Quintum] tamen si reliquisset, dicerent iniqui non me plane post annum, ut senatus uoluisset, de provincia decessisse quoniam alterum me reliquisset. As Thesleff (1965: 46) rightly remarks, the fact that the Aristotelian definition ο φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός (*EN* 1166a32) was an allegedly Pythagorean δίκουσμα ([Plutarch], *Vit. Hom.* 151; Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* 33; Jerome, *adv. Rufin.* 3.39) is 'certainly not much to build upon'.

²⁷ This would explain the absence of the title *Commentarii* and of the book number: see Kretzschmer 1860: 66, Swoboda 1889: 14, pace Mercklin 1860: 653, who thinks that Nigidius' quotation comes from Labeo. Nonius (pp. 35.32–36.1 M. = 51 L.) echoes Gellius' passage: see Hertz 1886: 101. The same etymology, with a Greek alternative option, is given by Paul. *Fest.* 80.11 Lindsay *frater a Graeco dictus est φρήτηρ, uel quod sit fere alter*. When treating the *fratres aruales* in his *De lingua Latina*, Varro preferred the derivation from *ferre* but also gave a possible Greek origin, from φρατρία: *fratres aruales dicti qui sacra publica faciunt propterea ut fruges ferant arua: a 'ferendo' et 'aruis' fratres aruales dicti. sunt qui a 'fratria' dixerunt. 'fratria' est Graecum uocabulum partis*

either because an *infestus* takes an aggressive action against someone else (active meaning) or because he is a designated victim of an impending event, causing a sudden damage (passive meaning).²⁸

The polar pattern is a recurrent one in Nigidius' explanations, either for words with double meaning or as a way to express, *ex negativo*, a medial meaning. So, in order to show that the adverb *mature* means not 'so as to anticipate the expected or natural course of events, quickly' (*OLD* s.v. 1), which is taken as a secondary development, but 'in good time' (*OLD* s.v. 2), Nigidius probably established a connection between *maturus* and *maturatus*, the image of the ripened apples being particularly suggestive.²⁹

3.3 Nigidius' and Varro's Etymological Studies

Nigidius' etymological method does not differ from Varro's³⁰ any more than it does from that of other ancient grammarians. They applied for their own purposes the Chrysippean method of analyzing καρδία as a conflation of κράτησις 'power' and κυρεία 'authority'.³¹ They differ, nevertheless, in their respective purposes, as the well-known Varronian taxonomy of the four levels of explanation (*L.* 5.7–8) clearly shows.³² The first degree of etymological explanation is that of the *populus* and applies to transparent

hominum, ut <Ne>apoli etiam nunc (*L.* 5.85). This is not a reason to consider Nigidius as an advocate of purely Latin etymologies: *pace* Roehrig 1887: 46 n. 3.

²⁸ fr. 47 S. = *GRFF* 29 ap. Gell. 9.12.6 *ita in Nigidianis scriptum inuenimus: 'infestum est a 'festinando' dictum; nam qui instat – inquit – alicui eumque properans urget opprimereque eum studet festinatque, aut contra de cuius periculo et exitio festinatur, is uterque 'infestus' dicitur ab instantia atque imminencia fraudis, quam uel facturus cuipiam uel passurus est'*. Nonius (p. 51.16–17 M. = 73 L.) echoes this passage, adding a personal interpretation: *infesti proprietatem hanc esse Nigidius uoluit, quasi nimium festinantis ad scelus uel ad fraudem*. According to Swoboda 1889: 7, the list of 'reciproca' adjectives ending in -ōsus quoted in Gellius 9.12.1 cannot stem from Nigidius, since it is inconsistent with his interpretation of this suffix (fr. 4–5 S., below, nn. 51–2).

²⁹ fr. 48 S. = *GRFF* 30 ap. Gell. 10.11.2–3 *P. Nigidius . . . : "mature" – inquit – est quod neque citius neque serius, sed medium quiddam et temperatum est'*. (3.) *bene atque proprie Nigidius. nam et in frugibus et in pomis 'matura' dicuntur, quae neque cruda et inmitia sunt neque caduca et decocta, sed tempore suo adulta maturataque*. The passage is echoed by Macrobius *Sat.* 6.8.8; Serv. Dan. *G.* 1.260–1. On these Virgilian lines and the meaning of *mature* see Nonius p. 51.18–25 M. = 73 L.; see also Julius Romanus ap. Char. 265.21–26 Barwick; *TLL* 8.502.80–503.3. Hertz (1845: 46) demonstrates that the *Commentarii grammatici*, not an alleged commentary on Virgil by Nigidius, are the source of this passage. Kretzschmer (1860: 57) rightly considers the explanation at §3 as being Nigidian: see also *TLL* 8.495.45; 498.25–7.

³⁰ Since they were written before summer 45, Nigidius' *Commentarii* predate Varro's *De lingua Latina*: Varro does not refer explicitly to Nigidius in this work, but many parallels show that both agreed on grapho-phonetic issues (see above, n. 3), as well as on some, but not all, morphological choices (see below, nn. 55, 59–61).

³¹ The best systematic survey on ancient etymological methods is still Wölfflin 1893.

³² See most recently Piras 1998: 57–71, Lazzerini 2017.

words like *uiocurus* and *argentifodinae*. Then comes the level of the Alexandrian grammar (*grammatica antiqua*), whose focus is on poetical neologisms, like onomatopoeic expressions (e.g. *sibilus*), compounds (e.g. *incuruiceruicum*), and derivations (e.g. *clupeare*). The third level, that of *philosophia*, takes into consideration the ordinary linguistic usage (*quae in consuetudine communi essent*), where one finds non-transparent and apparently unmotivated words like *oppidum*, *uicus*, *uia*. Finally, the fourth, mysterious level allows Varro to reconstruct the origins of Rome.

The majority of scholars make a twofold assumption that consists (1) in taking for granted a general, alleged Pythagorean background for this incipit of *De lingua Latina* book 5, and (2) thus associating Varro and Nigidius, who were both interested in Pythagorean philosophy.³³ Varro does indeed mention Pythagoras at §11, just before announcing the quadripartition *tempus motus locus corpus* (§12) that he will apply in books 5–7; nevertheless, ‘the quadripartition is not actually attributed to Pythagoras, but is rather superimposed by Varro himself on what he says is the Pythagorean principle of the bipartition of the elements of things’ (Blank 2008: 59); moreover, the four etymological levels are completely independent of any Pythagorean reference.

As regards the parallels between Nigidius and Varro, it is important to remember that Varro does give explanations of ordinary words, including those quoted in *L.* 5.8,³⁴ but that his ultimate goal is ‘to discover and investigate the divine and cultic things from which and for which names were invented by Rome’s founders’ (Blank 2012: 280). This endeavour is beyond the lexical world studied by Chrysippus, since it is attained by a sort of revelation of the mysteries belonging to the primitive kings and name-givers. Varro’s stance was Chrysippean only in that it justified the use of etymological inquiries in cases where ‘things are obscure of their own nature – such as the truths about the gods – or have been forgotten over time and disappeared from our world – as have many early Roman customs, rituals, and divinities’ (ibid. 69). Nigidius’ etymologies, for their part, focus on the ordinary language for its ethical implications. They are

³³ See e.g. Della Casa 1962: 60: ‘Nigidio, da buon pitagorico, bene informato sulla leggenda del re legislatore religioso, entra nei penetranti (*adytum*) del re Numa (*regis*) e dedica i suoi studi etimologici a quel settore che Varrone poneva tanto in alto.’ On the supposed parallel between the king’s fourth level and the name-giver *qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae uisum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina* (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.62), see esp. Michel 1965 and Boyance 1975, followed by Lehmann 1997: 304–9.

³⁴ See *L.* 5.35 *qua uehebant, uiae dictae*; 5.141 *oppidum ab opi dictum, quod munitur opis causa ubi sint et quod opus est ad uitam gerendam ubi habeant tuto*; 5.145 *in oppido uici a uia, quod ex utraque parte uiae sunt aedificia*.

truly 'philosophical' etymologies in that they not only correspond to the type of linguistic research that arose historically thanks to the Stoics (Varro's third degree), but are part of an ethical discourse where linguistic awareness and rightful behaviour combine.³⁵

Unlike Varro, Nigidius' interest in the archaic language of the ancients rather reveals a purely philological approach, focusing on diachronic linguistic changes such as the evolution of fricative initials in Latin,³⁶ the simplification of the infinitive passive ending,³⁷ the passage from active to deponent verbal forms,³⁸ and the disappearance of passive forms,³⁹ as well as certain expressions that needed an explanation,⁴⁰ the ambiguities of

³⁵ For this reason, Rawson (1985: 123) rightly describes Nigidius' lexical studies as 'prescriptive as well as descriptive'.

³⁶ Reconstructing a development $\varphi\omicron\beta\eta > fibra > herba$, Nigidius observed that the intermediate stage survived as a dialectal parallel form: fr. 62 S. = GRFF 27 ap. Serv. Dan. G. 1.120 *fibris*] *alii fibras herbas adserunt, ut Nigidius commentario grammaticali: 'ϕοβῆ <herba> [add. Commelin]. sed antea fibra dicta est, ut nunc etiam rustici dicunt*. Saumaise 1689: 280 D: 'Hesychius [Φ 751] $\varphi\omicron\beta\eta$ βοτάνη. Latini antiqui dicebant *ferba*, ut *fircus*, *foedus*, ex Aeolico $\phi\epsilon\rho\beta\eta$ '; Della Casa 1962: 80–1. This reminds us of the parallel drawn between Sabine *fasena* and Latin *harena* by Varro GRFF 280 = 77 G.–S. ap. Vel. Long. GL 7.69.4–9; 81.10–11.

³⁷ fr. 59 S. = GRFF 35 ap. Don. Ter. Phorm. 182 *celari*] *Nigidius 'celari' quaerit, utrum plenum sit an pressum*. TLL 10.2.1183.4–6 convincingly supposes that here Nigidius compared the short infinitive *celari* with the archaic and fuller *celarier*. Developing Swoboda's (app. crit.) point of view, who considers this fragment as an etymological remark, Della Casa (1962: 78) suggests: 'Probabilmente Nigidio aveva presente *celare* = *occultare*, per lui *celare* era *pressum*, mentre *occultare* rappresenta il frequentativo.' It is difficult to believe that Nigidius asked himself if [e] in the first syllable was open or closed (*pace* Roehrig 1887: 43). Other Nigidian remarks on Terentius' *Phormio* are preserved: fr. 60 S. = GRFF 36 ap. Don. Ter. Phorm. 190 *protinus in pedes*] *protinam fuit, et sic Nigidius legit* (also Paul Fest. p. 253 Lindsay, but *protinus* in Terence's MSS and, among others, Julius Romanus ap. Charisius 273.14–22 B. *protinus trium temporum significationem capit, instantis* [Verg. Aen. 3.291] . . . ; *praeteriti* [Verg. Aen. 3.416] . . . ; *futuri* [Ter. Phorm. 190]); fr. 61 S. = GRFF 37 ap. Don. Ter. Phorm. 233 *non pudere*] *hic Nigidius adnotauit neminem uideri pudere ante delictum*. Obviously, this is not enough to imagine a Nigidian commentary on Terence (see already Schopen 1821: 41–2).

³⁸ fr. 2 S. = GRFF 2 ap. Non. p. 127.11 M. = 184 L. *Nigidius commentariis grammaticis lib. VIII: 'ita irascere. quid [quod Rutgers] nunc irascitur? [nunc irasci dicitur Quicherat]*', with the example of Pomponius Com. CRF³ 30. See TLL 7.2.26–33; Keller (1992: 323) quotes this passage as the only example of an ancient active *irascere*. Since he was interested in the *-sc-* suffix, Nigidius could treat *irascere* with *uetustiscere* and *inueterascere* (fr. 3, below, n. 50).

³⁹ Priscian quotes the form *faciatur* of Titinius [Com. CRF³ 97] twice (GL 2.376.24–377.4; 398.20–2; see also 402.9–10), in order to prove that the *uetustissimi* used the passive of *facio*. Nonius cites the same example, preceded by Nigidius' explanation: fr. 10 S. = GRFF 6 ap. Non. p. 507.13–15 M. = 815 L. *Nigidius commentariis grammaticis lib. XIX: 'id quod dico huiusmodi est: uti 'facit' ποιε<τ>, i>ta 'facitur' ποι<ε>ται<τ> est'* [Roth: *tui facit ποιε<τ>ta facitur tinaetae(ss)e* codd.]. Swoboda (1889: 14–15) reads 'τι<υ>ται<τ>' *est*, more paleographically plausible; Della Casa (1962: 71–2) thinks that Nigidius establishes a *differentia* between *fit*, semantic passive of *facio*, and *facitur*, with the meaning of 'appreciate'; so one should rather read: *τιθ<ε>ται esse*. More probably, like eventually Priscian, Nigidius limited himself to noting that *facitur* is an ancient form, analogically legitimate. See TLL 6.1.83.1–9.

⁴⁰ fr. 58 S. = GRFF 33 ap. Non. p. 21.22–3 M. = 31 L. *clamat, quirritatur* [Turnèbe, Scaliger: *quirritatum* codd.: <qui> *quirritatur* Swoboda]. This explanation could refer to *quirrans* in Lucilius' example (261–2 M. = 6 fr. 20 Ch.) quoted by Nonius (ibid. 18–21), and perhaps already by

ancient laws,⁴¹ and the language of the *Carmen Saliare*⁴² – a grammatical topic well-known at least from Aelius Stilo. Besides these technical issues, Nigidius was interested not in reconstructing the lost past as an antiquarian, but in developing the Chrysippean method of the ‘articulation of ethical concepts’ in a form of grammar that, because of its naturalistic foundation, maintained a strong connection with human behaviour.

One interesting consequence of Nigidius’ approach to etymology is the importance of the *differentiae uerborum*, supposed to show ‘philosophical’ definitions. Thus, *sempiternus* and *perpetuus* are different because the first is used for immortals, who are eternal (*semper*), whereas *perpetuus* applies to human beings, whose nature is to endure (*perpeti*) difficult situations.⁴³

Nigidius (Funaioli app. crit.). Var. L. 6.68 gives the same explanation, but it is also possible that the diathesis of this verb was at issue here. Thus, under the heading *de diuersa uerborum positione*, Diomedes *GL* 1.381.22–3 observes: ‘*quirito*’: *Liuius in Attico* ‘*quirit*<*are*>’, *Varro ad Ciceronem de* <*lingua Latina*> [suppl. Goetz-Schoell app. crit. L. 6.68] *, *Fenestella* [FRHist no. 70 frg. 29] ‘*quiritatur*’. *est autem* ‘*quiritare*’ *Quirites* *ciere*. Flobert (1975: 206) interprets the deponent form as more expressive than the active one, like *murmuror* and *musor*, and sees it as inseparable from *quirritare*, which designates the cry of the boar (ibid.: 135 n. 2), even if the ancient etymology was followed by Émile Benveniste, who included *quiritare* among the delocutive verbs (‘to cry out *Quirites!*’).

⁴¹ Gellius 17.7 records that Q. Mucius Scaevola (*IAR*⁶ 7) asked his father Scaevola *pontifex* (*IAR*⁶ 3), M. Iunius Brutus (*IAR*⁶ 7), and M. Manilius (*IAR*⁶ 9) if the text of the *lex Atinia* (about the middle of the second century: *Law* 48 in Crawford 1996) was not only prospective, but also retrospective. In fact, forbidding the usucaption of *quod subruptum erit* ‘whatever shall (at some future date in relation to the text of the statute) be in a state of having been stolen’ was ambiguous. Gellius also testifies that P. Nigidius, *ciuitatis Romanae doctissimus, super dubitatione hac eorum scripsit in tertio uicesimo grammaticorum commentariorum*. For this reason, Dirksen (1851: 59–61) and Kretzschmer (1860: 8) thought that the entire chapter was borrowed from Nigidius. Editors are more cautious: fr. 34 S. = *GRFF* 8 ap. Gell. 17.7.8 *sic igitur – inquit – etiam istud, quod in lege est: si diuidas separeque duo uerba haec ‘subruptum’ et ‘erit’, ut sic audias ‘subruptum <erit>’ tamquam ‘certamen erit’ aut ‘sacrificium erit’, tum uidebitur lex in postfuturum loqui; si uero copulate permixteque dictum intellegas, ut ‘subruptum erit’ non duo, sed unum uerbum sit idque unitum patiendi declinatione sit, tum hoc uerbo non minus praeteritum tempus ostenditur quam futurum*. Nigidius does not give a solution: the forms of *esse* can be considered either on their own, as *uerbum suum*, keeping their temporal value, or with a preterit, which imposes its reference to the past on them.

⁴² See fr. 9 S. = *GRFF* 5 ap. Non. p. 40.15–16 M. = 58 L. *Nigidius lib. XVIII*: ‘*itaque ex re in Saliaribus ‘adatanus tintinnat’* [FPL⁴ 14], *id est sonat*’, where the verb applies the image of the bells to the ritual pottery of the Salii. Swoboda (1889: 15–17), followed by Wissowa (s.v. ‘Atalla. 2’, *RE* 2.2 col. 1895; see *TLL* 2.1116.37–41), explains *adatanus* with reference to the Greek ἄττανον ‘saucepan, vessel’. Likewise, Afranius (*Com. CRF*³ 292), quoted by Nonius (ibid. 13–14) and by Festus (500.17–21 L.) with Naevius (*Com. CRF*³ 114), applied the same verb to the clanking of a slave’s chains; see Della Casa 1962: 60–5, who reads: *ita quaere in Saliaribus: ‘attanu<lu>s tintinnat’, id est sonat*. But the text is not certain: *ex re* is emended by Scaliger to *aere*, adopted by Lindsay in his Nonian edition; Rutgers (1618: 286) reads *itaque ex aere in Saliaribus Alrunus tintinnat*; Roehrig (1887: 52 n. 1), *itaque ex aere in Saliaribus Albanus* (with Lipsius) *tintinnat*. Both attribute this fragment to Nigidius’ *De diis* (see also Hertz 1845: 11 n. 1).

⁴³ fr. 1 S. = *GRFF* 1 ap. Diff. Suet. p. 289 Reifferscheid: *Nigidius in libro quarto * ait: ‘sempiternum immortalium rerum, perpetuum mortaliū est; perpetuas enim in nostra natura est, quae perpeti accidentia potest, sempiternitas infinita est, eo quod semper’*.

The *differentia* between *stolidus*, designating a person with limited intellectual gifts, and *uanus*, a broader term, used both for frivolous individuals and for liars or deceivers, is attributed to Nigidius by Sulpicius Apollinaris. Gellius adds that Nigidius also gave the etymologies of these terms, and noted this elsewhere in his *Noctes*.⁴⁴ Another notable *differentia* makes the distinction between a false assertion (*mendacium dicere*), which simply does not match the reality, and the deceitful behaviour of someone who deliberately lies. This Stoic topic entails, as Nigidius clearly remarks, an ethical aspect, because the agent's inner intention determines the morality of his actions.⁴⁵

4 Nigidius' Morphological Naturalism

4.1 Derivation in Nigidius and Varro

Comparison between Nigidius and Varro permits us also to grasp the consequences of their naturalistic point of view in the field of morphology. Like Nigidius, Varro thought that words were originally assigned according to nature; it was nature that guided humans' lexical coinages, thus justifying the original and most appropriate etymological form of the words.⁴⁶ Nature, nevertheless, does not constrain human freedom, so that

⁴⁴ fr. 45 S. = GRFF 34 ap. Gell. 18.4.10 ex Apollinari didicimus 'uanos' proprie dici, non ut uulgi diceret, desipientis aut hebetes aut ineptos, sed, ut ueterum doctissimi dixissent, mendaces et infidos et leuia inaniaque pro grauibz et ueris astutissime componentes; 'stolidos' autem uocari non tam stultos et excordes quam taetros et molestos et inlepidos, quos Graeci μωθηροὺς et φορτικοὺς dicerent. (11.) ἔτυμα quoque harum uocum et origines scriptas esse dicebat in libris Nigidianis. quas requisitas ego et repertas cum primarum significationum exemplis, ut commentariis harum noctium inferrem, notauit et intulisse iam me aliquo in loco commentationibus istis existimo. This must be an allusion to Gellius 8.14, of which only the lemma survives: *lepidissima altercatio Fauorini philosophi aduersus quendam intempestium de ambiguitate uerborum disserentem; atque inibi uerba quaedam ex Naeuio poeta et Cn. Gellio non usitate collocata; atque ibidem a P. Nigidio origines uocabulorum exploratae*. See Hertz 1845: 20 n. 1, Kretschmer 1860: 56, Swoboda 1889: 17–18; the same hypothesis appears in the notes of Jacques Oisel and Johann Friedrich Gronovius, according to the edition of Gellius by the latter and his son, Jacobus Gronovius (Leiden, 1706: 812 n. 15). Showing that Nonius' borrowings from Gellius (from p. 50.9 M. = 71 L. *fures* to p. 55.3 M. = 77 L. *arcera*) follow the order of the books in the *Noctes*, Hertz (1886: 97–8) also incorporates into this lost Nigidian excerpt Nonius p. 51.13–15 M. = 73 L. = fr. 46 S. *rudentes ea causa sapientissimi dictos uolunt quod fures, cum uento uerberentur, rudere existimentur; atque hunc sonum proprium funium, non asinorum putant*.

⁴⁵ fr. 49 S. = GRFF 31 ap. Gell. 11.11.1–3 *uerba sunt ipsa haec P. Nigidii . . . : 'inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat. qui mentitur, ipse non fallitur, alterum fallere conatur; qui mendacium dicit, ipse fallitur'. (2.) item hoc addidit [GRFF 31a]: 'qui mentitur – inquit – fallit, quantum in se est; at qui mendacium dicit, ipse non fallit, quantum in se est'. (3.) item hoc quoque super eadem re dicit [GRFF 31b] 'uir bonus' – inquit – praestare debet ne mentiatur, prudens, ne mendacium dicat; alterum incidit in hominem, alterum non'. Nonius (p. 441.11–17 M. = 709 L.) echoes this passage. See Colish 1983: 21–2.*

⁴⁶ See especially L. 6.3 *dicemus primo de temporibus quam quae per ea fiunt, sed ita ut ante de natura eorum: ea enim dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini; 8.10 quare duce natura si quae* [Dahlmann :

transgressions (*L.* 8.8 *culpa*; 10.16 *imperitia*) of its norms in the lexical institution are always possible and *inconstantia* (*L.* 9.35) becomes the general feature of this form of linguistic activity. On the other hand, the insertion of a lexeme in the morphological inflectional pattern cannot but follow another form of *natura*, i.e. the intrinsic and systematic regularity of a given language.⁴⁷

Varro treats this topic extensively at the beginning of *De lingua Latina* book 9. After demonstrating that regularity prevails in every part of the universe (§§23–30), he shows that this feature is also more than marginally present in language (§§31–5). However, people who would be ready to admit the presence of analogy, order, symmetry, and regularity in nature (*genus analogiae naturale*), may also think that the presence of these principles in the products of the *ars* (*genus analogiae uoluntarium*) is merely accidental. From this perspective, the correspondence created by a craftsman between the two halves of a theatrical backdrop is not on the same level as the immutable trajectories of astral bodies; nor is language as an arbitrary product of human beings. Analogists do acknowledge an arbitrary component in the creation of anomalous derivations (*uoluntariae declinationes*), like *Roma* from *Romulus*, but at the same time consider the inflectional paradigms (*declinationes naturales*) as a necessary linguistic dimension, regardless of the speakers.⁴⁸ As a result, in their opinion, the field of analogy that mirrors natural regularity does not encompass derivational phenomena. This conclusion, which is echoed in other passages (*L.* 8.35; 9.50), is only nuanced in a single case, when Varro attributes to the analogists what was probably his own opinion, i.e. that derived forms *fere non discedunt ab ratione sine iusta causa* (*L.* 9.71; see also *GRFF* 88 *ap.* Gell. 3.3.10). Therefore, for example, the gladiatorial families took their names *Cascelliani*, *Caeciliani*, *Aquiliani*, and *Faustini* according to the *-ius* or *-us* endings of the basic forms *Cascellius*, *Caecilius*, *Aquilius*, and *Faustus*. In spite of that, in book 10, where he establishes three *diuisiones* permitting him to select the forms that can be judged to be similar or not, Varro endorses the Alexandrian standard precept: first,

† *si, quae Goetz–Schoell*] *imposita essent uocabula rebus, ne ab omnibus his declinandum* [Dahlmann: *declina{n}tus Goetz–Schoell*] *putarent*.

⁴⁷ See *L.* 10.53 *impositio est in nostro dominatu, nos in natura<e>: quemadmodum enim quisque uolt, imponit nomen, at declinat, quemadmodum uolt natura*. On the multiple values of *natura* in Varro's grammatical works see Garcea 2012: 31–2, 185–6, 194–8; see also de Melo, in this volume and Zetzel, in this volume.

⁴⁸ On *declinatio* in Varro, see especially Cavazza 1980, who correctly distinguishes between *declinatio uoluntaria* and *impositio*.

invariable forms must be omitted (§14); second, as Aristarchus enjoined, derivational phenomena must be excluded (§§15–16);⁴⁹ third, each of the four morpholexical classes of the *uerba declinata natura* must be evaluated for its own sake, even if forms belonging to different classes can be identical (§17); fourth, the pronominal forms must not be taken into account (§§18–20), since only the nominal ones pass the analogical test.

The most striking feature of Nigidius' morphological researches is that his more explicit naturalism leads him to apply analogy to every aspect of language, including derivational phenomena, which cannot be arbitrary. So, in relation to adjectival and adverbial coinages, he strives to find the specific function of each suffix.⁵⁰ In the case of adjectives ending in *-ōsus*, Nigidius compares the forms *religens* and *religiosus* in order to show that those ending in *-ōsus* always presuppose a pejorative excess;⁵¹ the same value is clear in *bibosus*, a deverbative parallel to *bibax*, not formed on a nominal stem like other adjectives ending in *-ōsus*, and only attested in

⁴⁹ See L. 10.16 *quare proinde ac simile conferri non oportet ac dicere, ut sit ab Roma Romanus, sic ex Capua dici oportere Capuanus, quod in consuetudine uehementer natat, quod declinantes imperite rebus nomina imponunt, a quibus cum accepit consuetudo, turbulenta necesse est dicere. itaque neque Aristarchii neque alii in analogiis defendendam eius susceperunt causam, sed, ut dixi, hoc genere declinatio in co<m>muni consuetudine uerborum <a>egrotat, quod oritur e populo multiplici <et> imperito: itaque in hoc genere in loquendo magis anomalia quam analogia.*

⁵⁰ Nigidius probably also studied verbal derivation. He treated the forms ending in *-urio*, since Nonius attests that he explained an otherwise unattested *nixurio* parallel to *enitor*: both had the specific meaning of 'to give birth to', but their proper meaning was 'to struggle up, to strive'. As regards *nixurio*, Nigidius observed that often the effort was unfruitful: fr. 40 S. = GRFF 13 ap. Non. p. 144.18–20 M. = 210 L. Nigidius commentariorum grammaticorum XXV: '*nixurit, qui niti uult et in conatu saepius aliqua re perperit*'. He also analysed verbal forms ending in *-sco*: fr. 2 S., above n. 38; fr. 3 S. = GRFF 3 ap. Nonius p. 437.23–6 M. = 704 L. '*uetustiscere*' et '*ueterascere*'. *quid intersit, Nigidius commentariorum grammaticorum lib. X deplanauit: 'dicemus quae uetustate deteriora fiunt, 'uetustiscere', 'inueterascere', quae meliora'. According to Keller 1992: 317–18, '(in) ueterasco ne s'applique en général pas aux êtres animés. D'autre part, il se distingue de senesco... en ce qu'il n'implique que rarement l'idée de déclin: c'est, le plus souvent, 'vieillir' au sens de "s'affermir / s'affirmer par le temps"'. As the suffix *-isc-* becomes widespread in Late Antiquity and replaces *-esc-*, Keller (1992: 318 n. 17 and 338) also thinks that we should restore an original *uetustescere* (cf. *incuruē/isco, frangē/isco, flaccē/isco, perdolē/isco, longē/isco, mītē/isco*).*

⁵¹ fr. 4 S. = GRFF 4 ap. Gell. 4.9.1–2 *Nigidius Figulus ... in undecimo commentariorum grammaticorum uersum ex antiquo carmine refert memoria hercle dictum: 'religentem esse [<ted> esse Fleckeisen : esse <ted> Ribbeck TRF³] oportet, religiosus ne fuas'* [Fleckeisen, Ribbeck TRF³, Marshall : *religiosum nefas* MSS, Funaioli]. *cuius autem id carmen sit, non scribit. atque in eodem loco Nigidius: 'hoc – inquit – inclinamentum semper huiuscemodi uerborum, ut 'uinusus', 'mulierosus', 'religiosus', significat copiam quandam immodicam rei, super qua dicitur. quocirca 'religiosus' is appellabatur, qui nimia et superstitiosa religione sese alligauerat, eaque res uitio assignabatur*. Gellius (4.9.12–14) does not agree with this general evaluation, since qualities are never in excess, as forms like *ingeniosus* confirm. See Mayer 1975. This distinction is essential for the *differentia* between positive *religiosus* and negative *superstitiosus*, on which see Varro GRFF 175 = *Res divinae* fr. 47 Cardauns ap. Aug. Civ. 6.9; Servius, Aen. 6.596.

Laberius (fr. 52 Panayotakis *ap.* Gell. 3.12.4).⁵² As regards adverbs ending in *-im*, Nigidius recognizes that *expulsim* and *cursim* are formed on the stems of verbs of motion,⁵³ and – *adsimulanter* ‘analogically’ – creates similar adverbs for human behaviours that are similar to those of different animals; these are probably purely theoretical creations since they are not attested anywhere.⁵⁴

4.2 The Inflectional συμπτώχεια

Also in the field of nominal inflection, Nigidius’ analogy turns out to be a general principle, which goes beyond single morphological patterns. With regard to the controversial status of the *ŭ*-stems, Nigidius and Varro were in agreement on proposing the genitive *-u-is* and the dative *-u-ī*, since these forms, found in Terence, established a parallel with the genitive and dative singular of consonant stems (*duc-is duc-ī*) and *ī*-stems (*caed-i-s caed-i*), thus contributing to the assimilation of *ŭ*-stems to a nominal group with a firmer identity. The fact that these forms had the same number of syllables in both cases may also have influenced their selection.⁵⁵

⁵² fr. 5 S. = GRFF 26 *ap.* Gell. 3.12.1 *bibendi auidum P. Nigidius in commentariis grammaticis ‘bibacem’ et ‘bibosum’ dicit.* See Panayotakis 2010: 349. Although these passages are not attributed to Nigidius, Swoboda (1889: 6–8) hesitantly puts forward Nonius p. 28.24–5 M. = 41 L. (*mulierosus*), pp. 21.31–22.2 M. = 32 L. (*uirosa*), and pp. 433.26–434.1 M. = 698–9 L. (*morosus*) as, respectively, fr. 6, 7, and 8 of the *Commentarii grammatici*. See Carilli 1997: 72–6.

⁵³ fr. 11 S. = GRFF 7 *ap.* Non. p. 104.31–3 M. = 149 L.: *Nigidius commentariorum lib. XX: ‘cuiusmodi genus aduerbiorum a uerbis motus [Mercier: aduerbii motu codd.] quod uenit [Mercier: quae uenit codd.: quae ueni<un>t Lindsay], ut ‘expulsim’, ‘cursim’.* As Varro’s example (*Men.* 456) given by Nonius (ibid. 28–30) proves, *expulsim* (sc. *ludere*) is a technical term for handball: see TLL 5.2.1811.70–6. Swoboda (1889: 8–11) strives to prove that, in the long section on adverbs by Nonius, other forms ending in *-im* would have been taken from Nigidius’ *commentarii*, even in the absence of any explicit attribution: see fr. 13–33 S.

⁵⁴ fr. 12 S. = GRFF 22 *ap.* Non. p. 40.22–4 M. = 58–9 L.: *Nigidius commentariis grammaticis: ‘sunt etiam adsimulanter [adsimulanter Lugd.] dicta haec: ‘canatim’, ‘suatim’, ‘bouatim’; quae ab animalibus sumuntur.* Swoboda 1889 app. crit.: ‘*adsimulanter* utrum sit “ad exemplum aliorum adverbiorum, quorum similis est forma et vis”, an “similitudinis cuiusdam significandae causa”, incertum est’. Della Casa 1962: 87 n. 158: ‘circa l’avverbio *adsimulanter* ... mi pare invece più adatto al contesto, intenderlo come “creato per analogia”, “formato in modo analogo”’; ‘Nigidio ha creato *adsimulanter*, cioè per analogia, ma per dimostrare la falsità del procedimento, i tre casi ben noti: *suatim*, *canatim*, *bouatim*. La forma vera, se fosse stata analogica, sarebbe stata *suītim*, *canītim*, *bouītim*’ (p. 90). Yet, according to Schaffner-Rimann 1958: 46, ‘Durch Bedeutungswandel des ursprünglich deverbativen *priuatum* ... entsteht eine kleine Gruppe von Adverbien mit der Bedeutung „nach Art von“, abgeleitet von Substantiven, Adjektiven und Pronomina possessiva (z.B. *suatim*, *tuatim*, *bouatim*, *rusticatum*)’.

⁵⁵ fr. 63 S. = GRFF test. 26 *ap.* Gell. 4.16 M. *Varronem [GRFF test. 26 = fr. 18 G.–S.] et P. Nigidium, uiros Romani generis doctissimos, comperimus non aliter elocutos esse et scripsisse, quam ‘senatus’ et ‘domuis’ et ‘fluctuis’, qui est patrius casus ab eo, quod est ‘senatus’, ‘domus’, <‘fluctus’> huic ‘senatus’, <‘domui’> ‘fluctui’ ceteraque in consimilia pariter dixisse.* See Lomanto 1993, Garcea 2012: 225–6.

Following the same formal and analogical criterion, Varro introduced uniformity into the paradigms for *io*- and *o*-stems, recommending a double <I> in the isosyllabic genitive and vocative singular (*GRFF* 252 = 120 G.–S. *ap.* Char. 98.17–23 B.: *Lucii, Aemilii*). Nigidius, for his part, acknowledged the current *exilis* spelling for the genitive singular of *io*- stems (in other words, simply <I>)⁵⁶ and, at the same time, used allographs to distinguish cases with archaic but not totally obsolete graphemes. In all likelihood, he adhered to existing Lucilian proposals; so the same morpheme *-ī*, represented by <I> in the genitive singular, was completed or substituted by <E> in the other cases, a spelling that gave a *plenius* aspect to the word by referring to a multiplicity.⁵⁷

- a) *Valeri* genitive and vocative are homographs but not homophones; if one knows the morphological category, the right accent will be applied, i.e. differently from the genitive *Valéri* (< *Valéri-ī*), the vocative should have its stress moved back (*Vāleri*).⁵⁸

According to Kretzschmer 1860: 97, followed by Swoboda 1889 *app. crit.*, Gellius took this information from Caesellius Vindex's *Lectiones antiquae*.

⁵⁶ See already Lucilius *GRFF* 32 = 1294–5 M. = H fr. 3 Ch. *ap.* Char. 98.23–99.7 B.: genitive singular *Caeli, Numeri*. The incomplete but intelligible version of the Neapolitanus IV A 8 (*nū quā ll hoc intulisset nisi et numerum per .i. huius ciendū crederet*), which Keil (*GL* 1.78.10–12) follows with some corrections (*numquam enim hoc intulisset, nisi et 'Numerium' per I, huius <'Numeri'>, faciendum crederet*), has to be preferred to any attempt to change the text according to the *codex Dusaе*, as Barwick (p. 99.3–6) and the most recent editors of Lucilius do (*numquam enim hoc intulisset, nisi <et 'Caelium' et> 'Numerium' per i<i> huius <'Numerii'>, faciendum crederet*). In fact, this version implies that Charisius made a mistake: Lucilius contrasted not the genitive ending in *-i* with the genitive ending in *-ii* (which was not yet used at his time), but the genitive (or vocative) ending in *-i*, which was compatible with the hexameter, with the remaining forms, which were incompatible with the hexameter.

⁵⁷ See Lucilius *GRFF* 10 = 358–61 M. = 9 fr. 8 Ch. *ap.* Ter. Scaur. *GL* 7.19.1–5 (p. 27.8–12 Biddau): singular *pilum*, plural *peila* (vs. feminine singular *pila*); *GRFF* 10a = 362–3 M. = 9 fr. 9 Ch. *ap.* Char. 99.7–10 B.: genitive singular *Luci, Corneli, Cornifici*; *GRFF* 10b = 364–6 M. = 9 fr. 10 Ch. *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56.7–9 (p. 29.4–6 Di Napoli): genitive singular *pupilli, pueri, Lucili*, nominative plural *puerei*; *GRFF* 10c = 367–8 M. = 9 fr. 11 Ch. *ap.* Quint. *Inst.* 1.7.15: genitive singular *mendaci, Furi*, dative *furei*; *GRFF* 10d = 369–70 M. = 9 fr. 12 Ch. *ap.* Vel. Long. *GL* 7.56.11–12 (p. 29.8–10 Di N.): dative singular *illi*, nominative plural *illei*. See Chahoud, in this volume.

⁵⁸ fr. 35 S. = *GRFF* 9 *ap.* Gell. 13.16.1 *P. Nigidii uerba sunt ex commentariorum grammaticorum uicesimo quarto . . . : 'deinde – inquit – uoculatio qui poterit seruari, si non sciemus in nominibus, ut 'Valeri', utrum interrogandi an uocandi sint? nam interrogandi secunda syllaba superiore tonost quam prima, deinde nouissima deicitur; at in casu uocandi summo tonost prima, deinde gradatim descendunt'*. Gellius himself explains what he read in Nigidius (§3): *summum autem tonum προσῳδίαν acutam dicit, et quem accentum nos dicimus, uoculationem appellat, et casum interrogandi eum dicit quem nunc nos genetium dicimus*. Yet the issue has become highly controversial, since Cocchia (1887: 387–91) thought that Nigidius used *casus interrogandi* and *casus uocandi* for two different intonations of the vocative, when it is used, respectively, for a question or an apostrophe. Moreover (Fay 1915), Gellius would have misinterpreted a grammatical reference to the *casus interrogandi* (instead of 'case of the form *interrogandi*') of *mei* in *Pseud. 6 mei te rogandi et tuis respondendi mihi* (quoted at 20.6.9),

- b) *magni amici* singular genitive and plural nominative are homographs and homophones; the augmentation in quantity in the plural should become explicit with a supplementary <E> (*magnei amicei*).⁵⁹
- c) *terrae* singular genitive and dative are homographs and homophones; the augmentation presupposed by the act of giving in the dative should become explicit by substituting <E> (*terrae*) for <I> (*terrai*).⁶⁰
- d) the genitive of *ego* (*mī* < *meī*) is written with <I> alone, whereas the dative *mī*, with its semantic augmentation, should be rendered with the expansion of <E> (i.e. *miei*).⁶¹

The evidence is too meagre for any generalization, but it seems probable that here Nigidius applied the same principle that governs his etymologies, which consists of analyzing the material dimension of a word as associated with some semantic features of the word itself. Since Sommer (1909), this principle, also found in Lucilius,⁶² has been called συμπράσχειν-*Theorie*, from the formulaic expression συνέπαθεν ἢ φωνή τῷ σημαυνομένῳ which the grammarian Trypho used in his lexical analyses. Its allegedly Stoic origin, at least from an orthodox point of view, is problematic, because it is

read as *mei interrogandi* ... (for *me interrogandi* ... see Nonius 501.14 M. = 804 L. app. crit.). See Ronconi 1971a: 285–98, Della Casa 1962: 83–5. Although *casus interrogandi* ‘genitive’ is paralleled by *casus nominandi*, *dandi*, *accusandi*, *uocandi* (Pisani 1960), scholars have argued for the other hypothesis. They infer the analogy λόγος κλητικός : κλητικὴ πτώσις (*casus interrogandi*) = λόγος ἐρωτηματικός : *casus uocandi* from Ammonius *In Int.* CAG 4.5.5.10–12 (Ronconi 1971b: 299–304) or note that Aristotle (*Po.* 1457a18–23) also refers to the intonations of a question and a command as ‘πτώσις’ (De Martino 2006), even though Aristotelian πτώσις covers every form of non-declarative utterance. Starting from the *interrogatio* used to ascertain the case of an inflected form, Belardi and Cipriano (1990) rather think that *casus interrogandi* is a plural, designating all the oblique cases (and each of them); *casus nominandi*, for its part, would be a controversial πτώσις and *casus uocandi* a holophrastic form.

⁵⁹ fr. 36 S. = GRFF 10 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *id quoque in eodem libro Nigidiano animaduertimus: ‘si huius – inquit – ‘amici’ uel huius ‘magni’ scribas, unum I facito extremum; sin uero hi ‘magnei’, hi ‘amicei’ casu multitudinis recto, tum ante I scribendum erit E, atque id ipsum facies in similibus’.*

⁶⁰ fr. 37 S. = GRFF 11 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *item: ‘si huius ‘terrai’ [Ascensius 1530 : terrae ψ] scribas, I littera sit extrema, si huic ‘terrae’, per E scribendum est.* For Della Casa 1962: 76, ‘Dato che la sopravvivenza di questo esito arcaico era soltanto documentata per il genitivo e non per il dativo, Nigidio poteva concludere, in base all’uso, che l’*ai* fosse da mantenersi per i soli casi del genitivo.’

⁶¹ fr. 38 S. = GRFF 12 ap. Gell. 13.26.4 *item: ‘mei’ qui scribit in casu interrogandi, uelut cum dicimus ‘mei studiosus’, per I unum scribat, non per E; at cum ‘mi<ite mih>ei’ [Holford-Strevens forthcoming a: miei δ : mi ei Φ : mei Fγ], tum per E et I scribendum est, quia dandi casus est.* This question is strongly debated: Belardi and Cipriano (1990: 49–53) think that the issue is the homophony of *mī*, so Nigidius would have proposed a genitive *mī* (< *meī*) and a dative *miei*. Nevertheless, *mī* for genitive and dative is not a standard form and such an intervention would therefore be inexplicable. Holford-Strevens forthcoming b rightly adds a marker for the dative and simply thinks that the opposition I vs. E holds for *me-i* genitive and *mih-ei* dative, even if they are not homophones.

⁶² See Chahoud, this volume.

based on the correspondence between corporeal and incorporeal items; nevertheless, nothing prevented ancient grammarians from thinking that they relied on Stoic authorities, who took a lively interest in universal $\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$.⁶³

4.3 Word Classes

A last point deserves some attention. Nigidius' interest in semantic motivation in every aspect of language leads him also to study aspects that are generally alien to this field, especially the complex topic of connectives.

Gellius 17.13 devotes a thorough analysis to *quin*, starting from a taxonomy of the combinations that this particle can engender with different illocutional modalities: *quin particula, quam grammatici 'coniunctionem' appellant, uariis modis sententiisque conectere orationem uidetur* (§1).⁶⁴ Following a pattern that recalls the Stoic list of $\tau\epsilon\eta\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\eta$, he relies on an implicit truth-conditional criterion that allows him to distinguish *increpare*, *interrogare*, and *exhortari* (§2a) from *confirmare* in a positive or negative way (§§2b–9). Then he resumes his topic, adding a reference to the etymology of *quin*, considered as a compound (< *qui* + *ne*), and to its precise, evidently motivated meaning, that is not its simple connective function. Nigidius treated both aspects in his grammatical work.⁶⁵ Although Gellius does not develop this further, the fact that Nigidius gave a *certa significatio* to a conjunction places him on the side of the Stoic critics against the Aristotelian definition of $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ as an asemantic unit (*Po.* 1456b38–1457a2), and more specifically in favour of the recent developments of the Stoic 'grammar'. It was in fact Posidonius (fr. 45 E.–K. *ap.* Apollon. *Conj. GG* 2.1.214.4–20) who, after affirming that conjunctions and prepositions belong to the same category, showed that $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\delta\omicron\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta\omicron\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota$ are semantically different because they have different prefixes with identical verbal themes. Similarly, in Nigidius' eyes, reconstructing the etymology of *quin* revealed the proper meaning of

⁶³ See Trypho fr. 130–1 Velsen *ap.* *EM* 566.4–8 s.v. $\lambda\iota\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$; 794.4–8 s.v. $\phi\iota\lambda\eta\tau\eta\varsigma$; Belardi 1990, Sluiter 1990: 27–33.

⁶⁴ See Garcea 2000: 153–69 for a more detailed study of this chapter, which is probably entirely borrowed from Nigidius' *Commentarii* (Kretzschmer 1860: 55–6, Mercklin 1860: 653).

⁶⁵ fr. 52 S. = *GRFF* 32 *ap.* Gell. 17.13.10 *hanc uero particulam, de qua dicimus, nisi quis didicerit compositam copulatamque esse neque uim tantum coniungendi habere, sed certa quadam significatione factam, numquam profecto rationes ac uarietates istius comprehensurus est. quod quia longioris dissertationis est, poterit, cui otium est, reperire hoc in P. Nigidii commentariis, quos grammaticos inscripsit.*

this connective, which was further specified by its insertion into different types of sentences.

Prepositions also share similar properties. In a form like *aestumo*, which he connects with **abaestumo*, Nigidius remarks that the prefix *ab* adds a totalizing feature to the verbal stem of *aestumo*, as in *abnumero* compared to *numero*.⁶⁶

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, although his *Commentarii grammatici* are poorly known because of their fragmentary status, Nigidius seems to subscribe to a general form of naturalism that made him believe in an organicistic universe mirrored by the ‘pansemantic’ and phylogenetically justified universe of language. When he reconstructed the articulatory symbolism of the Latin personal pronouns, Nigidius chose a Stoic example that was not disconnected from the rest of his work. Differently from the not always successful combination of naturalism and Alexandrian formal grammar in Varro,⁶⁷ Nigidius multiplied complementary forms of the same conception: ethical etymologies, combined with similar *differentiae uerborum*, and a broad idea of morphological analogy, where every linguistic item, and every formal transformation, not only for inflectional but also for derivational processes, should be significant. For the same reason, Nigidius did not refrain from searching for semantic values also in such word classes as conjunctions and prepositions, which the traditional linguistic debate tended to consider as simple supports for signifying units.

⁶⁶ fr. 51 S. = *GRFF* 2.4 ap. Gell. 15.3.4 *inuenimus autem in commentario Nigidiano uerbum ‘autumo’ compositum ex ‘ab’ praepositione et uerbo ‘aestumo’ dictumque intermiscere ‘autumo’ quasi ‘abaestumo’, quod significaret ‘totum aestumo’ tamquam ‘abnumero’*. This compound is not otherwise attested (*TLL* 1.112.48–51); only *Gloss.* 2.233.21 translates it as ἀπαριθμῶ. For this interpretation of *autumo* as Nigidian see also Johannes Scotus Eriugena *de floratio de Macrobio GL* 5.600.19–22 (p. 17 app. crit. De Paolis), exc. *Bob. de Macrobio GL* 5.632.6–8 (p. 17.1–4 De Paolis), and *frg. Bob. de uerbo GL* 5.637.27–30 (p. 26.17–21 Passalacqua), passages that echo Gellius (*Schoemann* 1871: 39–40) rather than a third, common source (*Kretzschmer* 1860: 56).

⁶⁷ On Varro’s theories on grammatical genre and number see Garcea 2012: 184–6, 194–8.

Naturalism in Morphology
Varro on Derivation and Inflection

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Naturalism is a vague label not only in ancient linguistic thought.¹ When modern linguists speak of naturalism, they mean a variety of different things. A phonologist might consider a symmetrical vowel system, with the same number of front and back vowels, more natural than a system with gaps. The reason is that in such a symmetrical system a minimal number of features, vowel height and front versus back, suffices for a given number of vowels. Here, naturalness comes close to the concept of efficiency. A morphologist might consider a system natural in which derivational morphemes stand closer to the lexical root than inflectional morphemes. We move from the most central element of a word, its lexical meaning, to its least central element, the function of the word in a given syntactic context. Here, naturalness is akin to clarity. And finally, an etymologist might consider changes in sounds and meaning natural if the sound changes are based on articulatory or acoustic similarities and if the semantic changes involve concepts such as metaphor. Here, naturalness is related to similarity.

Thus, there is no unified concept of naturalness in modern linguistics. Efficiency, clarity, and similarity all play a role. Most importantly, however, naturalness is by and large treated as language-internal, the result of articulatory and cognitive mechanisms. Naturalness which transcends the purely language-internal is also found, for example when languages are more likely to place causal clauses before the main clause, and final clauses after it, thereby mirroring the temporal sequence of real-world events.

In this contribution, I shall examine to what extent Varro's naturalism foreshadows the modern linguistic concept of naturalness, and to what extent it differs from it. To this end, I shall look at the *De lingua Latina*, focusing on the morphological books. We shall briefly examine the

* I am grateful for the generous support of the Leverhulme Trust.

¹ On this see [Introduction](#), in this volume and Zetzel, in this volume.

structure of the *De lingua Latina* as a whole before looking at the distribution and functions of *natura* and *naturalis* in our extant text.²

I The Structure of the *De Lingua Latina*

The *De lingua Latina* originally consisted of 25 books. We still have books 5–10 in a more or less complete state, and short quotations or paraphrases from the other books.

Book 5 concerns the etymologies of places and things. The structure within this book follows certain general principles, but there are so many excursuses that this structure is to some extent obscured. Similar considerations apply to the other etymological books.

However, while the structural details in individual books are often not worked out well, the structure of the work as a whole is very clear and regularly outlined at the beginning of each book, and sometimes also at the end:

Book 1: general introduction

Books 2–7: etymology³

Books 8–13: morphology

Books 14–25: syntax

Taylor (2015: 31) argues that after the general introduction, the work should really be regarded as bipartite, with books 2–13 discussing individual words and books 14–25 dealing with the combination of individual words into sentences.⁴ That may be a legitimate way of looking at the *De lingua Latina*, but it is not how Varro sees it, who is explicit about the tripartite structure of his work in 7.110.

Both the etymology and the morphology fall into two parts, three theoretical books and three practical ones. Thus, what we have today is the practical etymology and the theoretical morphology. It has sometimes been claimed that this situation is not the result of chance, but rather of a deliberate decision to leave out those elements that were superseded by later grammatical work (the theory of etymology and the practical morphology) or too difficult to understand (the syntax). This remains an

² See Uhlfelder 1966 for an overview of *natura* in linguistic texts; however, her excellent article has relatively little material on Varro.

³ As 5.1 shows, books 2–4 discussing the theory of etymology were originally dedicated to Septimius. Based on Varro's statement in the same chapter that he wants to write three books for Cicero, Barwick (1957b: 301) concludes that books 5–7 were also originally an independent work.

⁴ Thus also already Barwick 1957b: 300–1.

intriguing, if ultimately misguided, idea. We shall now turn to the distribution of *natura* and *naturalis* over the remaining six books.

2 *Natura* and *Naturalis* in Books 5–10

The sheer number of tokens of *natura* and *naturalis* shows how important nature is to Varro. The two words are attested 94 and 16 times, respectively. That said, the tokens are by no means evenly distributed. Of the 94 tokens of *natura*, only 13 occur in the etymological books, while 81 are found in the morphological ones. Similarly, of the 16 tokens of *naturalis*, only two are in the etymological books, while 14 can be seen in the morphological ones. Clearly, nature matters more in morphology than in etymology.

The following table shows the distribution over the individual books:

Book	<i>natura</i>	<i>naturalis</i>	Total
5	10	0	10
6	1	1	2
7	2	1	3
8	13	4	17
9	37	6	43
10	31	4	35

Among the etymological books, book 5 has twice as many tokens as books 6 and 7 taken together. This is not as surprising as it may appear at first sight; the overall number of tokens is small, and book 5 is as long as the other two books taken together.

What is more interesting is the fact that among the morphological books, book 8 has less than half the tokens we find in books 9 or 10. Book 9 is a little longer than books 8 or 10, but this can only account for the slight discrepancy between books 9 and 10. Book 8 is thus an outlier in the morphological part of Varro's oeuvre. What is more, 12 of the 17 tokens we find in book 8 occur in its first part, chapters 1–23, and only five tokens can be found in the rest of the book. We shall find a reason for this distribution pattern after a brief examination of the etymological books.

3 The Etymological Books

When Varro speaks of *natura* in the etymological books, he mostly means the outside world, as in 5.16, where he states that nature is divided into heaven and earth (also in 5.31), or in 7.6 (twice), where he states that the

word *templum* can refer to a space in nature, in the sky. Similarly, in 5.144 we learn that Alba Longa got its name from the colour and the nature of the place. Nature in this meaning can be personified, as in 5.60, where it mixes hot and cold, dry and wet, or in 5.61, where it does not want to fight against the rain and cold in winter. Similarly, in 5.109 nature teaches us how people developed different cooking techniques.

On occasion, *natura* can refer to the inherent characteristics of an animal, a plant, or a thing. Thus, castration of animals changes their nature (5.98); the palm is by its nature bound on either side, whatever that is supposed to mean (5.62); and at some point, people began to cook because they were dissatisfied with what the earth produces by its own nature.

On only four occasions are *natura* and *naturalis* connected with language, and even here the connection is not uniformly strong. The strongest connection can be seen at the beginning of book 5:

Cum unius cuiusque uerbi naturae sint duae, a qua re et in qua re uocabulum sit impositum (itaque a qua re sit pertinacia cum requiritur, [h]ostenditur esse a perten<den>do; in qua re sit impositum dicitur cum demonstratur, in quo non debet pertendi et pertendit, pertinaciam esse, quod in quo oporteat manere, si in eo perstet, perseuerantia sit), priorem illam partem, ubi cur et unde sint uerba scrutantur, Gr<a>eci uocant ἔτυμολογίαν, illam alteram περὶ σημασινομένων.

Textual notes:

cum unius *Rholandellus*, cui unius *F*
 requiritur *Goetz et Schoell* (quaeritur *G*), sequitur *F*
 perten<den>do *Rholandellus*
 ἔτυμολογίαν *uolgo*, ethimologiam *F*
 περὶ σημασινομένων *uolgo*, ΠΕΡΣΗΜΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *F*

Since every single word has two natures, from what thing and to what thing a name has been applied (hence when it is asked from what concept *pertinacia* ‘obstinacy’ comes, it is shown that it comes from *pertendere* ‘to persist’; to what concept it has been applied is said when it is shown that *pertinacia* exists in a matter in which one ought not to persist, and yet one does persist, because if one stands one’s ground in a matter in which one ought to hold firm, it is *perseuerantia* ‘perseverance’), the Greeks call that first part *etymology*, where they examine why and whence words are, and that second one, *concerning things signified*. (5.2)

In this passage, Varro makes a distinction that would later be taken up again in a modified form by Ferdinand de Saussure, who spoke of the *signifié* (*a qua re*) and the *signifiant* (*in qua re*); for Varro, the latter comprises the etymology and synchronic shape of a word, while for de

Saussure it is only the synchronic shape that matters. However, in Varro the two natures can hardly be regarded as an expression of naturalism in the sense that nature is a guiding principle; *natura* here is virtually equivalent to 'dimension'.

In 6.12, when talking about words for times, Varro draws a distinction between the *naturale discrimen* 'natural division' of times like the year, summer, and winter, and civic names of feasts and commemorations like the *dies poplifugia* 'day of the people's flight'. Yet that does not mean that words like *annus* 'year' are more natural than *dies poplifugia*, only that the underlying concepts are natural phenomena, while the *dies poplifugia* is based on human history.

6.3 is similar. Varro promises to talk about the nature of times, saying that this nature is our *dux* 'guide' for creating words. Here we are dealing with a single occurrence of *natura*, but does it have two distinct meanings? The first is identical with what we saw in 6.12: *natura* is the outside world. The second meaning, while related, could be seen as different in that it points to *natura* as an animate entity that leads us to good decisions. However, as we shall see in the morphological books, Varro considers the imposition of names to be governed by human fancy and to be a process that is by and large arbitrary. Therefore, we should not interpret *natura* as an animate entity in our passage. Rather, the outside world with its change of seasons forces us to create words referring to these time periods.

Our last attestation of *naturalis* in the etymological books is in 7.93. Here, Varro states that the exclamation *euax* is an *effutitum naturaliter*, a 'natural ejaculation'. Such interjections are thus not regular words, but are the result of natural sounds escaping from our mouths.

It should by now be clear that in his etymological books, Varro does not explicitly formulate a theory of naturalism, with nature as a rational entity underpinning the imposition of names. Varro's etymologies may betray an underlying naturalistic framework of Stoic origin, as argued by Blank, in this volume; nevertheless, in these books the term *natura* only refers to the outside world, which influences the imposition of words mainly insofar as it furnishes us with entities that require naming. The naming process, on the other hand, is not directly governed by natural laws. While naturalism in the strong sense cannot be explicitly found in the etymological part, we can see a degree of naturalness in the sense that names need to be imposed on entities occurring in the natural world; however, Varro makes it clear that many of these entities requiring naming are man-made, so even naturalness in this sense is not all-encompassing. We shall now turn to Varro's morphology.

4 The Morphological Books: *Disputare in Vtramque Partem*

Books 8–10 of the *De lingua Latina* are concerned with the question whether analogy or anomaly predominates in morphology.⁵ Just as the now lost books 2–5 followed the rhetorical principle of *disputare in utramque partem* ‘discussing for either side’ with a subsequent exposition of Varro’s own ideas, books 8–10 deal with anomaly, its opposite analogy, and Varro’s moderate stance favouring analogy without excluding anomaly entirely (Ax 1995).

For Varro, analogy is what linguists today would call four-part analogy:⁶

magister : *liber* :: *magistrum* : *librum*
 nom. sg. : nom. sg. :: acc. sg. : acc. sg.

The study of analogy began as a tool in Homeric philology; the correctness of transmitted forms could be assessed by comparing them to similar, uncontroversial ones.

Today, no linguist would doubt the existence of analogy. Without it, inflectional languages would be unlearnable.⁷ Diachronically, it restores regularity where sound change creates irregular paradigms (analogical *tuli* for earlier *tetuli* because of *abstuli*, *attuli*, *pertuli*, where reduplication was lost by syncope in non-initial position). It even operates across paradigms (gen. pl. *uirum* => *uirorum* by analogy to pronominal genitives). Given the almost universal acceptance of analogy already in antiquity, it is legitimate to ask whether Varro merely reports the controversy between analogists and anomalists or whether he makes it up or at least exaggerates it (thus Fehling 1956/7).⁸

Varro’s *disserere in utramque partem* is different from Cicero’s: Cicero regularly puts opposing views into the mouths of friends discussing with him (as in books 1 and 3 of *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, where friends present arguments that are then refuted in books 2 and 4, respectively); Varro does most of it in the first person.

⁵ Varro’s model of morphology is best described as a word-and-paradigm model along the lines of Robins 1959.

⁶ Varro speaks of ‘proportion’ (*pro portione*) if he wants to stress the idea of a mathematical pattern underlying regular inflection, but he uses *analogia* when he focuses on grammatical doctrine (Schironi 2007: 326).

⁷ Varro, too, points this out in 8.3.

⁸ Taylor (2015: 21) goes so far as to claim that the quarrel is entirely made up by modern scholars and does not even exist in Varro; this is absurd. See Fink (1952) for the theories of Greek grammarians on the subject.

The discussion of analogy and anomaly cannot be separated from the question of naturalism. What is the natural state of affairs, analogy or anomaly? Or a mix of both? Which of the two should we follow? The answer to this is already clear from the structure of books 8–10. As is customary, the view an author disagrees with most is dealt with first. This is why Cicero's *De finibus* begins with two books on Epicureanism, a school of thought despised by Cicero. This is also why Varro begins with a discussion of anomaly. After this comes the view an author is in broad agreement with. Thus, books 3 and 4 of *De finibus* discuss Stoicism, and Varro's book 9 discusses analogy. And finally, a compromise is reached. For Cicero, we see it in book 5, where he outlines the views of the Academics. For Varro, we see it in book 10, where he is still in favour of analogy, but in a more moderate way.

Interestingly, Varro's views on analogy and anomaly would be clear to us even if we only had book 8. This is not only because the often whimsical arguments in favour of anomaly represent at best a lukewarm endorsement; it is also because the book starts with a lengthy introduction in which Varro presents his true views (8.1–23). *Natura* and *naturalis* occur commonly in this introduction, but hardly at all in the rest of the book (8.24–84). We shall now turn to this section of book 8.

5 Book 8, Chapters 24–84

In 8.24–84, *natura* occurs only five times, and *naturalis* not even once. In 8.25, Varro in his role as an anomalist speaks of the *natura sermonis*; this 'nature of speech' is directed towards utility. In 8.31, he repeats this statement and adds a second goal, elegance. Each of these goals can apparently be achieved without analogy.

In 8.43, before moving on to specific points of criticism, Varro states that he has said enough about the general *natura* of words. Similarly, in 8.52 he refers to the indefinite *natura* of the *articuli*, a class of words that comprises various types of pronoun.

And finally, in 8.44 Varro states that words are by nature divided into four groups, based on two features, case and tense. Some words have case (nouns, adjectives, pronouns), others have tense (finite verbs), some have both (participles), and others have neither (adverbs and other uninflected words).

The first two tokens deal with the inherent nature of speech as a whole. The second two deal with the inherent nature of words. The fifth token discusses a division of words into parts of speech according to nature.

We may attach different levels of significance to these five instances of *natura*; but even if we were to consider each of them as important and significant, there would not be enough material to warrant the claim that nature matters to Varro in his role as anomalist. At best, we can say that he cares about naturalness in the modern sense of efficiency in language. But on the whole, anomaly and nature do not go hand in hand. We shall now see how closely connected nature is with analogy in the rest of the morphological part of Varro's oeuvre.

6 *Natura and Naturalis in the Rest of the Morphological Books*

We can now examine the tokens of *natura* and *naturalis* in 8.1–23 and books 9 and 10. I shall classify the tokens according to their functions and meanings; any such classification is to some extent arbitrary, but the general picture does not change much even if we mis-classify a few tokens.

6.1 *Non-Linguistic Usages of Natura*

In the introductory chapters of book 8 and in books 9 and 10, there are 80 tokens of *natura*. Only six of them could be argued to be non-linguistic. Thus, in 8.1 *natura secunda* is a 'secondary growth', an offshoot in plants, and while a comparison is made with oblique cases, *natura* itself does not refer to anything linguistic. In 10.55, *natura*, used twice, refers to the universe as a whole as discussed by natural philosophers. The remaining three tokens are not as straightforwardly non-linguistic. In 9.33 Varro says that there are similarities in the nature of animals, and in 9.34 he says that there are similarities in our limbs because that is how nature has made them; but both instances lead to comparisons with linguistic analogy. And in 9.86, it is stated that the numbers 9 and 900 have the same nine-containing nature, but again this is not purely non-linguistic because Varro is discussing numerals.

6.2 *The General Nature of Speech*

We move on to linguistic usages of *natura*. According to Varro speech is by nature divided into three parts, the imposition of words, *declinatio* (derivation and inflection), and syntax (8.1). *Declinatio* has a complex nature; we can ask why it was created, what its goals are, and how it operates (8.2). Sadly, scholars before Varro did not understand the nature of *declinatio* (10.1). In order to understand how *declinatio* works, we can use different

strategies; for instance, in order to determine whether *lupus* ‘wolf’ and *lepus* ‘hare’ belong to the same declension class, it is not against nature to look at an oblique case, which shows us that they belong to the second and third declensions, respectively (9.94). All this is still very general; we learn more by looking at individual grammatical categories.

6.3 *Gender, Sex, and Nature*

In the discussion of gender in book 9, *natura* occurs nine times. Varro is aware of the distinction between real-world sex and linguistic gender when he states that *paries* ‘wall’ is masculine and that *abies* ‘fir-tree’ is feminine even though both are neuter by nature (9.41).⁹ There is thus a discrepancy between natural gender, that is sex, and linguistic gender. Natural gender can be masculine, feminine, or neuter (9.55), but masculine and feminine are closer to each other by nature because they are animate (9.59). Natural gender can be reflected in linguistic gender if it is useful for us to mark it. Hence the underlying male or female nature (9.56, twice) in pigeons came to be expressed as *columbus* and *columba* only when these animals were domesticated; before that, people said *columba*, regardless of sex. A threefold distinction in linguistic gender is only made when nature distinguishes correspondingly, as among adjectives of the type *bonus* / *bona* / *bonum* ‘good’, which have to agree with men, women, and things, and when this natural distinction has come into common use, which it has not in the type *grandis* and *grande* ‘great’ (9.57). If a word refers to a man or a woman, there is a male or female nature which necessitates unchangeable masculine or feminine gender (9.57). If a word refers to a thing, like *terra* ‘earth’, gender assignment is arbitrary, but gender changes cannot be made because the underlying natural distinction of different sexes does not exist (9.38, 9.58).

What we can see in this entire discussion is that Varro can distinguish between sex and gender in theory, but does not have the terminology that we have, for example *male* versus *masculine*. Nature can be seen in sex distinctions, of which gender is an imperfect and incomplete reflection; imperfect, because not all inanimate entities are neuter, and incomplete, because not all animals are given both masculine and feminine forms.¹⁰

⁹ Elsewhere, Varro often uses *materia* or *res* for the underlying features and *figura* or *uox* for their surface expression; see Taylor 1977.

¹⁰ Languages in which gender assignment mirrors sex closely are rare. English is among them, but its gender system is rudimentary and restricted to personal and interrogative/relative pronouns. Tamil and some other Dravidian languages are perhaps better examples. The relationships between sex, morphology, phonology, and gender are discussed by Corbett 1991.

This is a case of what in the introduction to this book is referred to as ‘referential naturalism’: language is supposed to mirror the outside world.

6.4 *Number, Quantity, and Nature*

The mapping of extra-linguistic quantity onto linguistic number is more straightforward than the relationship between sex and gender; this is again a case of ‘referential naturalism’.¹¹ *Natura* is attested nine times in this connection, and it consistently refers to the real-world state of affairs mapped onto linguistic number. Thus, in 9.63 Varro tells us that that entity is singular which signifies one by nature. Nature goes from one to two, but for teaching purposes it may be better to start from the plural because the nominative singular can be irregular in the third declension (10.55). The underlying nature of quantity is regularly expressed by singular and plural (10.83, twice), but in some nouns this underlying nature exists without being expressed, for instance in *faba* ‘bean/beans’ (10.84). Modern linguists would say that *faba* is treated as a non-count or mass noun, and Varro is aware of such nouns in 9.67, where he speaks of nouns which by nature have *mensura* ‘measurement’ rather than number. Varro is equally aware of nouns which are only plural, for instance *scalae* ‘stairs’, and states that by virtue of having several constituent parts they have a different nature from simple nouns like *equus* ‘horse’ (10.24). There is thus a double nature because some nouns are only singular (mass nouns) and some are only plural (nouns with a multitude of constituent parts) (10.54). Finally, it should be mentioned that Varro does not even forget the nature of *uter* ‘which of the two’ (9.65), a word which singles out one member from within a pair.

Unlike with gender, then, Varro does not feel the need to make a consistent distinction between an underlying, natural pattern and its imperfect and incomplete linguistic expression. On occasion, an underlying pattern may not be expressed at all, but where underlying patterns are expressed, there is no mismatch between extra-linguistic quantity and linguistic number.

6.5 *Case, Semantic Roles, and Nature*

In case inflection, the big problem is the nominative singular of the third declension, which is often unpredictable from the oblique forms. In 10.52

¹¹ Across languages, mismatches are particularly common in polite address, compare French *vous* (plural) used for an individual addressee.

and 10.53, Varro distinguishes between the *impositum* of a noun, that is, its nominative singular as imposed by speakers, and its *natura*, that is, the remaining case forms, which are regular. Consequently, if we establish a four-part analogy and follow nature, it means that we go from the oblique cases to the nominative rather than the other way round (10.51).

Varro knows that nominal paradigms may be defective, either because a case form is genuinely lacking (as in *uis* 'force', which lacks a dative), or because a case form does not fit the paradigm and seems to come from a different paradigm altogether (as in *Iupiter*, the synchronically irregular nominative to the genitive *Iouis*). In 9.70 he argues that case forms may be lacking because of nature or because of usage; the two terms are thus in contrast. Consequently, a missing case form may be restored if both nature and usage allow it, as in the unusual *redux* based on the common oblique forms of the adjective (9.78).¹² 9.76, with its two attestations of *natura*, is different in that two nominatives are posited for *frugi*, one by nature (*frux*) and one by usage (*frugis*).¹³

To summarize, what we can see in Varro's discussion of case is a contrast between irregular imposition in the nominative singular and regular nature in the rest of the paradigm. This is quite different from what Varro did with gender and number. There, nature was the underlying, real-world situation reflected in sex and quantity. If Varro had wanted to do the equivalent here, he would have had to look at syntax and semantic roles. He could for instance have said that the natural state of affairs has a nominative agent (*Marcus legit librum*), but that the nominative can express a patient if the verb is in the passive (*liber legitur a Marco*). Instead, he focuses on morphology and leaves out meaning altogether. From nature as real-life states of affairs, as seen in the sex-distinction of male/female/inanimate, we have moved to nature as formal regularity, as seen in the case system.

6.6 *Minor Derivational and Inflectional Patterns*

Apart from gender and number, where the natural world is reflected in language, there are other grammatical categories where this is true. I am

¹² The passage which Varro quotes, Naev. *praet.* 2, may actually show *redux* as a form still alive in early Latin rather than a poetic restoration by Naevius.

¹³ Varro's idea that *frux* is not attested in actual texts is not borne out by the facts; Enn. *Ann.* 314 Sk. contains the form, while Varro's nominative *frugis* is not attested outside his own chapter. That said, *frux* is extremely rare.

speaking of 'minor patterns' not because these categories are necessarily minor ones in grammar, but because Varro devotes less space to them.

As already said in the anomalist section (5), nature uses two features, case and tense, to divide words into four categories, those with case (for example nouns), those with tense (finite verbs), those with both (participles), and those with neither (for example adverbs) (10.17). Among nouns, diminutives can be created to reflect the smaller nature of a thing (8.14). Sometimes, *declinatio* can create a referent extrinsic to the base word, as with *equus* 'horse' and its derivative *equiso* 'stable-boy'; these are two different natures (10.28).¹⁴ Among verbs, there is a triple nature of persons, speaker, addressee, and neither (8.20). In fact, the natures into which words can be inflected are innumerable (8.3).

If we now look at inflectional patterns in the narrower sense, we learn that by nature letters and syllables cannot inflect (9.38 and 9.51). By nature, family names cannot be formed for slaves (9.59). By nature, *luscus* 'one-eyed' lacks a comparative (9.72). And in 9.101, where *natura* occurs three times, we learn that it is by nature that not all animals are the same, that not all verb stems have all tenses, and that only the present stem can form imperatives.

In all these minor patterns, nature refers to the extra-linguistic world mirrored in language; this is again 'referential naturalism'. We saw the same with gender and number, but not with case.

6.7 *Imposition and Nature*

Now that we have looked at different types of *declinatio*, we can examine how words are created or 'imposed'.¹⁵ As we saw in the discussion of case above, Varro contrasts the nominative singular, the imposed case, with the remaining case forms, the natural ones. Sometimes, a value judgement is attached to the distinction. Quite frequently, *natura* contrasts with *libido humana* 'human fancy', as twice in 10.61. In such cases, human will is associated with the imposition of names, while nature is associated with their inflection (twice in 10.15, twice in 10.51, twice in 10.53). Nature is uncorrupted, but incompetent usage, seen especially in the imposition of irregular names, can destroy it (10.60). However, things are not always black and white; in the imposition of names based on pre-existing words, nature sometimes shines through, as word formation is not entirely

¹⁴ On this see Blank, in this volume, p. 133.

¹⁵ On imposition see further Blank, in this volume, pp. 132–3, 139.

irregular (8.23). In fact, it is *duce natura* 'under nature's leadership' that words are imposed, because we do so in accordance with regular rules of compounding or derivation (8.10). Nevertheless, because inflection is more regular than imposition, it makes sense to look at grammatical systems beginning with the oblique, natural cases (10.60); as Varro himself says:

Quare in demonstrando, quoniam potius proficisci [de litteris ostendunt] oportet ab eo quod apertius est quam ab eo quod prius est et potius quam <ab corrupto> ab incorrupto principio, ab natura rerum quam ab lubidine hominum, et haec tria quae sequenda magis sunt minus sunt in singularibus quam in <multitudinis, a> multitudine commodius potest ordiri, quod in his principiis magis <est> [o]rationis uerbis fingendis. <Ex multitudinis> uerborum forma facilius singularia uideri posse quam ex singularibus multitudinis haec ostendunt: trabes trabs, duces dux.

Textual notes:

proficisci *G a*, proficisse *F*

de litteris ostendunt *del. Augustinus*

ab corrupto *add. Canal*

multitudinis a *add. Canal*

principiis *Aldus*, principibus *F*

principiis magis *Taylor*, principibus minus *F*

<est> [o]rationis *Canal*

ex multitudinis *add. Taylor hic, alii alibi, duce Groth*

Thus in demonstrating, since one ought to proceed from that which is more obvious rather than from that which is prior, and from an uncorrupted starting-point rather than from a corrupt one, and from the nature of things rather than from the fancy of men, and since these three factors which are to be followed more, are less in evidence in the singulars than in the plurals, one can begin more conveniently from the plurals, because in these starting-points there is more of a systematic relationship for the formation of words. The following words show that the singulars can be seen more easily from the plural form of words than the plural form of words from the singulars: *trabes* 'beams' and *trabs* 'beam', and *duces* 'leaders' and *dux* 'leader'. (10.56)

In principle, imposition is relevant to every single word class. In practice, Varro uses the term mostly for the creation of nouns. That explains why we find the same concept of nature here as we did in the discussion of case. Nature does not refer to an underlying, real-world state of affairs, but simply to regularity among inflectional patterns. This will become even clearer in the next section.

6.8 *Nature and Analogy*

We can now examine the relationship between nature and analogy. When Varro speaks of the fourfold nature of analogy, he means what we today call four-part analogy (10.41, 10.46, 10.48). That in itself does not mean that analogy is always demanded by nature. In fact, in all parts of the world two natures can be found, analogy and anomaly (9.113). Since these two co-exist, those who deny the existence of analogy fail to see the nature not only of speech, but of the entire universe (9.33), and those who accept the existence of analogy, but fight against it in speech, fight against nature (9.33). That said, even though both analogy and anomaly co-exist, analogy clearly predominates. Speech, like the senses, is analogical by nature (9.30).

Analogy does not apply randomly. As Varro explains in 9.37, there are by nature certain conditions that must apply before analogy can exist; one of them is that the nature of a word must be such that it can be inflected (also 9.37). In 10.5, where a more abstract definition of analogy is sought, Varro uses *natura* twice, referring to the different natures of similar, dissimilar, and neutral.

In this connection, Varro likes to contrast nature and usage (*usus* or *consuetudo*); when he does so, nature is strongly associated with analogy. Thus, analogy exists by nature, but usage may block certain analogical patterns that exist in the abstract (9.4). In other words, the analogies found in the nature of words are purely schematic and are only ever applied if usage allows it (10.74). In 9.62, *natura* again refers to underlying real-world concepts like sex, but the analogies which it creates are only mirrored in speech if usage follows suit. We need both nature and usage for analogy (9.63). And if nature repudiates a prescription made by an analogist, it does not mean that analogy is bad *per se*, only that the analogist has made a mistake (9.111).

On the whole, this section expands on the previous one: nature corresponds to regularity in inflectional patterns. I shall now look at the adjective *naturalis* before drawing my conclusions.

6.9 *The Adjective Naturalis*

The adjective *naturalis* occurs 14 times. In most instances it is combined with *declinatio* (8.22, 10.77) or *declinatus* (10.83) and indicates inflection, in opposition to the *declinatio uoluntaria*, which indicates either the

imposition of words on things and actions or the derivation of new words from old words;¹⁶ for the contrast we can compare 9.34 (twice).

This contrast is not made in an impartial way. *Declinatio naturalis* is marked by *constantia* ‘consistency’, *declinatio uoluntaria* by *inconstantia* ‘inconsistency’ (9.35); neither term is neutral. Similarly, *declinatio naturalis* is guided by *ratio* ‘reason’, while *declinatio uoluntaria* is merely guided by usage (10.15).

That said, Varro does not paint everything in black and white. In 8.23, where *declinatio naturalis* occurs twice, he states that in inflection, analogy prevails, but sometimes human will can override it, just as in derivation, human will prevails, but not entirely without analogy. He even goes so far as to admit that the boundary between inflection and derivation is not always clear-cut:

Quare quocumque progressa est natura cum usu uocabuli, similiter pro portione propagata est analogia, cum in quibus declinationes uoluntariae maris et feminae et neutri, quae uoluntaria, non debeant similiter declinari, sed in quibus naturales, sint declinatus hi qui esse reperiuntur. Quocirca in tribus generibus nominum in<i>qu[a]e tollunt analogias.

Textual notes:

uocabuli *B Augustinus*, uocabula *F*

declinationes uoluntariae *Mette*, declinatus uoluntarii *L. Spengel*, declinationibus uoluntariis *F*

in<i>qu[a]e *Aldus*

Thus wherever nature has progressed together with the use of a vocabulary item, analogy has similarly been extended in proportion, since in words in which there are voluntary inflections of male and female and neuter, those which are voluntary do not have to be inflected similarly, but in those in which there are natural inflections, there are those analogical inflections which are actually found to exist. Therefore they are not justified in removing the analogies in the three genders of nouns. (9.62)

This chapter is part of the discussion of gender. Varro knows that some words, for instance adjectives of the first/second declension, exhibit all three genders because they need to agree with nouns of different genders. In some nouns, we find a distinction between masculine and feminine based on sex, for example *equus* ‘stallion’ and *equa* ‘mare’. In others, no gender distinctions are made even though there is an underlying distinction of sex, for instance in *aquila* ‘eagle’. And in some words,

¹⁶ See Blank, in this volume, p. 132.

the underlying distinction of sex has only recently been made explicit in grammatical gender, as in *columbus* ‘male pigeon’ and *columba* ‘female pigeon’, both of which the ancients used to call *columba* (9.56; see also [section 6.3](#)). All this culminates in the chapter quoted here; for some types of words, gender is inflectional, for others it is derivational, a surprisingly modern view.

Only four more tokens of *naturalis* exist, none of them combined with *declinatio*. In 8.21, the adjective is associated with case inflection. In 10.61, Varro distinguishes between *naturales casus* ‘natural cases’ and *impositicii casus* ‘imposed cases’. The natural cases are the oblique cases, which are fully regular, while the imposed cases are the various nominative singular forms. These need not stand in a straightforward relationship with the oblique cases in the third declension. While here *naturalis* is not combined with *declinatio*, the principle is the same. Imposition of words, always in the nominative, is not as regular as their inflection.

And finally, in 9.34 *naturalis* is used twice in connection with analogy. In this chapter, the idea is proposed, and also rejected, that there are two types of analogy, a natural one and a voluntary one. The former can be found in plants, where lentils grow from lentil seeds, and the latter can be found in fabrics and buildings. Varro rejects such a distinction; it does not fit with his idea that analogy is rational and natural, while anomaly is the result of human inconsistency.

What we can see here is that *naturalis* is mostly used of inflectional regularity, not of an underlying nature expressed more or less imperfectly in language.

7 Conclusions

Natura and *naturalis* are important terms in Varro’s *De lingua Latina*. However, they are by no means evenly distributed. The etymological books contain few instances, as does the treatment of anomaly in book 8. On the other hand, nature is of great importance in the general introduction found in book 8 and in books 9 and 10.

Nature is used in two not entirely separate senses by Varro. When it comes to gender and number, nature refers to the real-world categories sex and quantity, reflected imperfectly in language; Varro’s linguistic naturalism is referential here, and the more closely the outside world is reflected in language, the better. When it comes to case, to the imposition of new words based on already existing words, and to analogy, nature refers

to regularity and contrasts with human inconsistency.¹⁷ Especially in this second meaning, Varro's treatment of *natura* comes close to our modern concept of naturalness: nature creates efficiency and clarity and is found in inflectional similarity.

The importance which Varro attaches to *natura* allows us to conclude that he goes beyond our concept of naturalness and reaches the higher concept of naturalism. What both senses of *natura* have in common is that nature is an intrinsic, rational force resulting in regularity and order.

8 Excursus: Varro as a Prescriptivist

Unlike many of his successors, Varro did not care much for telling people how to speak. He is surprisingly modern in focusing on description rather than prescription. On occasion, however, he does make recommendations, and I would like to end this contribution with one of those rare instances:

Analogia[e] non item ea definienda quae derigitur ad naturam uerborum atque illa quae ad usum loquendi. Nam prior definienda sic: 'analogia est uerborum similitum declinatio similis', posterior sic: 'analogia est uerborum similitum declinatio similis non repugnante consuetudine co<m>muni.' Ad quam harum duarum <si> ad extremum additum erit hoc 'ex quadam parte', poetica analogia erit definita. Harum primam sequi debet populus, secundam omnes singuli e populo, tertiam poetae.

Textual notes:

analogia[e] *Augustinus*

si *add. L. Spengel*

omnes *Augustinus*, omnem *F*

The analogy which is directed towards the nature of words is not to be defined in the same way as that which is directed towards the usage of speech. For the former is to be defined thus: 'analogy is a similar inflection of similar words', and the latter thus: 'analogy is a similar inflection of similar words when common usage does not oppose it'. If to the end of the second of these the following has been added, 'to a certain extent', poetic analogy will have been defined. The first of these the people must follow, the second all individuals from the people, and the third the poets. (10.74)

Three types of analogy are presented. The first has a simple definition. The second is defined like the first, but with one addition. And the third is defined like the second, but with a further addition. The first type is pure

¹⁷ On the relationship between these different notions see Garcea, in this volume, pp. 95–7.

analogy; it is the formal mechanism of four-part analogy. However, this ideal, abstract type of analogy is too powerful and can create forms that are not accepted in usage. The second type of analogy is a moderated version of pure analogy. It follows four-part analogy, but only insofar as common usage allows it. This is what most people ought to adopt. The third type, poetic analogy, may violate the norms of common usage by adhering more closely to pure analogy without following it slavishly.

In a very unobtrusive way, Varro is being prescriptive. Pure analogy is the ideal we should strive for. But ordinary people could not do so without ridicule. Poets, however, are given the duty to improve language by bringing it closer to pure analogy. This is not the only place in our work where poets are charged with this task: in 9.17, poets, especially the ones writing for the stage, are asked to introduce pure analogies, and in 9.78, an example is given where Naevius (supposedly) did just that. Great responsibility is only given to those with great power; in 9.5 and 9.115, Varro acknowledges the linguistic power poets wield.

Today's prescriptive grammars are directed towards foreigners and those who feel that the educational system has let them down. Varro had a rather different mindset: nobody speaks perfect Latin, neither the accomplished orator nor the ordinary man in the street, because perfect Latin is an ideal that has not yet come into existence. The task of improving the language is not given to a wealthy elite or to a language academy, but to poets and playwrights.

*What's Hecuba to Him?**Varro on the Natural Kinship of Things and of Words**David Blank**

ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀλαζών ἐστι μάρτυς ἢ ἐτυμολογία πολλάκις μὲν ὁμοίως μαρτυροῦσα τοῖς τάναντία λέγουσι τῶν ἀληθῶν, οὐκ ὀλιγάκις δὲ τοῖς ψευδομένοις μᾶλλον ἢπερ τοῖς ἀληθεύουσιν, ἐν ἑτέρᾳ πραγματείᾳ δέδεικται μοι, τῇ περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, ἔνθα καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγὼ φωνῆς ἐπέδειξα τὸν Χρύσιππον ἐτυμολογοῦντα μοχθηρῶς.

Indeed I have shown in another work, *On the Correctness of Names*, that etymology is an impostor, often testifying equally for those who speak the reverse of the truth, and not infrequently giving greater support to speakers of falsehoods than of truths. In that work I showed further that Chrysippus gave a faulty etymology of the word ἐγώ. (Galen, *PHP* 2.2.7, transl. De Lacy)

'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, that he should weep for her?' (*Hamlet* 2.2, 536–7), asks Hamlet, watching a player's tear-filled recital of Hecuba's sufferings. Priam and Hecuba make a briefer appearance in Varro's *De lingua Latina*: while we immediately grasp that *lego* and *legi* both express the same action, each at a different time, were one of them expressed as 'Priamus' and the other as 'Hecuba', they would not additionally signify their unity (8.3). Hence the necessity of inflexion in speech: we could never remember enough words, if they were all different and 'unrelated'.

For Varro (8.4) Latin words – like noble Romans – belong to families (*agnationes* and *gentilitates*), or are connected organically, like the roots, trunk, branches, and fruit of a tree. As an *etymologos*, he wants to follow the connexion from derivatives to primitive words, as one connects the fruit to

* This paper was first written for an APA seminar on Varro's *De lingua Latina* and revised for the conference in Oxford and again for a talk at Berkeley. I am grateful to the organizers of all three events – Tony Corbeill and Christopher van den Berg; Beppe Pezzini and Barney Taylor; and Sara Magrin – for their invitations, as well as to the participants and audiences for useful comments. Particular thanks are due to Jim Zetzel, Tony Long, and Mark Griffith, then to Catherine Atherton, whose profound understanding of Stoicism was constantly at my service.

the tree and to the roots, even when the roots go under the wall and into the neighbour's garden. He also wants to treat families of words together.

I have argued elsewhere¹ that pursuing words through their family relations gives Varro confidence in the correctness of his etymologies: each etymology is more plausible if its origin also explains other words in the same family or if it is derived in the same way as other words in its family. Varro also felt justified in using etymology in the way he does, despite the rejection of this method of investigation in the *Cratylus* and the bad reputation etymology had developed for arbitrariness and self-contradiction, because he was interested in investigating a world not susceptible to direct examination, the world of Roman antiquities, the world in which places, things, times, and actions were named by the Roman Kings and their subjects in such a way as to have been perspicuous to them. In so doing, he could be seen as following Socrates' advice at the end of the *Cratylus*, to investigate things themselves and their relations, rather than words.² In this paper I shall connect Varro's conception of the way in which things and names are related to a reconstruction of a particular facet of Stoic theory, that of 'appropriation', οἰκείωσις, by which rational creatures understand our own nature and needs and the relations in which other things stand to that nature and those needs.

In his book *On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses*, Philo recounts (*Opif.* 149–50) how Moses says:

φησὶν οὖν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ζῶα ἤγαγεν ὁ θεὸς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,³ ἰδεῖν βουλόμενος τίνας θήσεται προσρήσεις ἐκάστοις, οὐχ ὅτι ἐνεδοίαζεν – ἄγνωστον γὰρ οὐδέν θεῶ – ἀλλ' ὅτι ᾗδει τὴν λογικὴν ἐν θνητῷ φύσιν κατεσκευασκῶς αὐτοκίνητον, ὅπως ἀμέτοχος αὐτὸς ἦ κακίας. ἀπεπειράτο δ' ὡς ὑφηγητῆς γνωρίμου τὴν ἐνδιάθετον ἕξιν ἀνακινῶν καὶ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν⁴ τῶν οἰκείων ἀνακαλῶν ἔργων, ἵν' ἀπαυτοματίσῃ τὰς θέσεις μὴτ' ἀνοικείους

¹ Blank 2008.

² Plato, *Cratylus* 438e5: Διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὐκ ἔτι προσδοκᾷς ἂν ταῦτα μαθεῖν; ἄρα δι' ἄλλου τοῦ ἢ οὐπὲρ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον, δι' ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ συγγενῇ ἐστίν, καὶ αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν; τὸ γὰρ πού ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἄλλοιον ἕτερον ἂν τι καὶ ἄλλοιον σημαίνει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα. 'Now, through what other thing do you still expect to learn these things? Can it be through anything other than through the very thing that is most likely and correct, that is, through one another, if they are in some way related, and themselves through themselves? Presumably, what is different from them and of another kind would signify something different and of another kind, and not those things?'

³ τὸν ἄνθρωπον codd. ceteri: τὸν Ἀδάμ M; Runia (2001: 351) argues against Cohn's adoption of the reading of M against the other witnesses on the grounds that Philo never uses the name Adam elsewhere, regarding him as a type more than as an individual, and remarks at *Leg. alleg.* 1.90 on the fact that the man's name appears first at Genesis 2:16.

⁴ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν Mangey: πρὸς τι cod. M, προσέτι ceteri. Runia (2001: 351) approves of Mangey's emendation, noting that this expression occurs in the parallel text at *QG* 1.21.

μήτ' ἀναρμόστους ἀλλ' ἐμφαινούσας εὖ μάλα τὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ιδιότητας. ἀκράτου γάρ ἔτι τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως ὑπαρχούσης ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ μηδενὸς ἀρρωστήματος ἢ νοσήματος ἢ πάθους παρεισεληλυθότος, τὰς φαντασίας τῶν σωμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἀκραιφνεστάτας λαμβάνων εὐθυβόλους ἐποιεῖτο τὰς κλήσεις, εὖ μάλα στοχαζόμενος τῶν δηλουμένων, ὡς ἅμα λεχθῆναι τε καὶ νοηθῆναι τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν.

God brought all the animals before the human being, wanting to see what appellations (προσρήσεις) he would impose on each of them, not because he was uncertain of it – since nothing is unknown to God – but because he knew he had equipped the mortal man with a self-moving nature, so that He Himself would have no share of vice. And so, as a teacher does a pupil, He tested him by stirring up his immanent disposition and summoning him to display his own appropriate actions, so that he would improvise impositions that were neither inappropriate⁵ nor unfitting, but that reflected the particular qualities of the objects very well. The rational nature in his soul being as yet unmixed, and no weakness or sickness or diseased state having yet slipped in, he made the appellations hit the mark, getting the purest impressions of bodies and actions, taking very good aim at the things being shown to him, so that their natures would be known as soon as they were said.

In sum, the first human being imposed names (149) spontaneously (ἴν' ἀπαυτοματίση τὰς θέσεις), acting 'appropriately' (τῶν οἰκείων . . . ἔργων) under the self-moving rational nature given him by God (ὅτι ἤδει τὴν λογικὴν ἐν θνητῷ φύσιν κατεσκευασκὼς αὐτοκίνητον). Naming, Philo says, is 'the work of wisdom and kingship, and the human being was wise, both self-learning and self-taught, created by divine hands, and moreover a king; and it is fitting for a ruler to name each of his subjects' (148). God leads the animals to him in order to get the human being to show what he can do; as their king, what he does is give them names. As Adam's epigones, we retain the traces of our relation (συγγένεια) to him: all humans, by their thinking, are appropriated (ὠκείωται) to the divine *logos* and to the entire world in the construction of their body out of the four elements (*Opif.* 146). Surely God could have given the animals names more revelatory of their natures than those given spontaneously by the human being from himself, yet Philo has God test Adam as an instructor does a pupil, and the testing must have him making something for himself (note the middle voice of ἐποιεῖτο) using his own 'self-moving' reasoning facility and thus doing his bit for creation. God has given him a self-moving nature, which

⁵ Cf. *Mut. nom.* 63: γεννήσας φυτὰ τε αὖ καὶ ζῶα ἐκάλεσεν ὡς πρὸς ἡγεμόνα τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ὃν ἐκ πάντων δι' ἐπιστήμην ἐχώρισεν, ἴν' ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία ὀνόματα θῇται.

He then wants to observe in action; presumably, He finds it good. The reason for this must be Philo's belief that it was important that the human user of all the animals make up names that were meaningful to *him*. It was appropriate for God to leave naming to the human being, because of his appropriation to the cosmos: 'We shall not speak falsely if we call the prototypical man not only 'first', but also 'the only citizen of the cosmos', for the cosmos was his home and his city (οἶκος αὐτῷ καὶ πόλις ὁ κόσμος)' when there were no buildings, and 'he had been thought worthy of hegemony over all things on earth, and all mortal beings cowered before him, instructed or forced as by a master' (142).

Central to Philo's interpretation of the human being's naming activity is the Stoic concept of οἰκείωσις, the process by which we are 'accommodated' to our world and by which it is 'appropriated' to or by us. *Oikeiosis* is usually studied in its rôle as appropriation of the infant to itself, to its own nature or constitution, and then in its social rôle, by which each of us comes to appropriate himself or herself to ever wider 'circles' of humanity – parents, siblings, extended family, fellow citizens, etc. Philo actually appears to avoid these ethical uses of *oikeiosis* in favour of a Middle Platonic assimilation to God and His Logos.⁶ There is also a third rôle played by *oikeiosis*, less well known but described by two other authors, in which we appropriate ourselves to external things, presumably those other than people:

... ἡ μ[(έν)] | πρ(ὸς) ἑαυτὸ εὐνοητικ[ή, στερπ]|κτ[ι]κ[ή] δ(ἐ) ἡ συγγεν[ι]κή· καλεῖτ(αι) γ(ὰρ) ἡ οἰκείωσις | πολλ[ο]ῖς [δ]νόμασ[ι]ν. ἡ δ[(ἐ)] | πρ(ὸς) τὰ ἑκτὸς χ[ρ]ήματα (αἰ)|ρετικ[ή]. καθάπερ ο(ὗν) στερκτικῶς μ(έν) κ[α]θόλου οἰ|κε[ι]οῦμεθα τοῖς τέκνοις, (αἰ)ρετικῶ[ς] δ(ἐ) [τοῖς ἐκ]τὸς χρήμασιν, οὗ [τ]ω κ(αἰ) τ[ὸ] ζῶ(ον) ἑαυτῷ μ(έν) εὐνο|ητ[ικ]ῶς, τοῖς δ(ἐ) πρ(ὸς) τ[ῇ]ρησιν τ(ῆς) σφυστ[έ]σεως σ(υμ)φέ|ρουσ[ι]ν [ἐ]κλεκτικ[ή]κ[ω]ς ...

The appropriation (οἰκείωσις) toward oneself is (called) 'well-disposing' (εὐνοητική), that toward family (συγγενική) is 'loving' (στερκτική), for *oikeiosis* is called by many names. And that towards external things is 'choosing' (αἰρετική). So just as we are generally appropriated to our children in a loving way (στερκτικῶς μὲν) but to external things in a choosing way (αἰρετικῶς δὲ), so too is the animal appropriated to itself in a well-disposing way (εὐνοητικῶς μὲν), but in a selective way (ἐκλεκτικῶς δὲ) to the things conducive to the preservation of its constitution. (Hierocles, *Principles of Ethics* col. IX 3–10 Bastianini–Long).

⁶ Lévy 1998.

αὐτῆς δὲ δὴ τῆς οἰ[κ]ειώσεως ἡ μέν | ἐ[σ]τιν κηδεμονικὴ | [ἢ πρὸς ἑα]ν[τοῦς
καί] | [π]ρ[ὸς] τοῦς πλ[η]σίον ἐσ[τ]ιν, ὡς ἂν τι εἰ [ῖ]σοι | [ῖ]σαν, ἡ δ'
αἰρετικὴ, ἣ | οἰ[κ]ο[ν]ομ[ε]θεα ἑαυτοῖς τὰ[γ]α[θ]ά, οὐκ αὐτ[ῶν] ἐνε[κ]α αὐτῶν
κηδόμενοι, | ἀ[λλ]ὰ βουλόμενοι | αὐτὰ γενέσθαι ἡμῖν.

Of *oikeiosis* itself, one kind is ‘caring’ (κηδεμονικὴ), both towards ourselves and towards our neighbours, as if they were practically equals, and the other is ‘choosing’ (αἰρετικὴ), by which we choose good things for ourselves, not because we care for them (κηδόμενοι) on their own, but because we want (βουλόμενοι) them to be ours. (Anon., *Commentarius in Platonis Theaetetum* col. VII 26–37, ed. Bastianini–Sedley).

It is clear from these texts that we (more or less) rationally ‘choose’ among external things for their contribution to our good.⁷ Since, according to the Stoa, everything besides virtue is an ‘indifferent’, that is, not ‘good’ in itself, we must be in a position to evaluate the contribution of all external things to the good, appropriating or accommodating ourselves to some of them and alienating ourselves from others. Such a position may be extrapolated, at any rate, from the evidence Hierocles gives for the innate self-perception of animals. Each knows not only its own body parts and their powers, but also how to comport itself with regard to other animals’ strengths and weaknesses, so that, e.g., a lion is afraid of a bull’s horns, but not of the rest of its body (3.19–52). As Tony Long put it, ‘The discriminations one type of animal is seen to make, in reference to members of another species, imply a comparative assessment, and therefore perception, of its own powers and vulnerability *relative* to those of the others.’⁸ Something similar must apply to other things in an animal’s environment – types of foods, parts of plants, types of place, etc. – so that *oikeiosis* involves one’s appropriation to things as part of one’s perception of oneself as it relates to external things in general. We must be able to recognize when we have an ‘appropriated’ relation to indifferent things (or ‘external goods’, as Varro’s mentor Antiochus of Ascalon would have

⁷ Chrysippus does use the term οἰκεῖον for things in accordance with virtue, as in the citation from his *On Zeus* in Plutarch’s *De Stoic. repugn.* 13, 1038F, speaking of acts done in accordance with virtue and which are ‘appropriate’: ἐργων γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὄντων οἰκεῶν . . ., just the phrase that Philo used of Adam’s ‘own acts’.

⁸ Long 1996b: 256 [96–7]. While Varro may have known an Antiochean version of *oikeiosis* theory, it will probably not have differed in this respect, although Antiochus’ developmental account rejected the idea that an animal’s self-perception began at birth (cf., e.g., *Fin.* 5.24; Long 1996b: 255 [96] n. 12 and Inwood 1984: 169–70, where it is recognized that Antiochus’ ‘Stoic-inspired’ account stays close to the Stoa in ‘the later stages of moral evolution’). The most recent study of Cicero’s presentation of the Antiochean theory and its differences from that of the Stoic theory is given by Gill 2016; more on Antiochus vs. the Stoics in the [Appendix](#), below.

them), if we are to see which are to be classed as 'preferred' or 'dispreferred' and then to choose or avoid them, respectively.

Oikeiosis is therefore also said to be 'a perception and apprehension of what is appropriate';⁹ for us rational animals, it is one's coming to consciousness of that relation, in a move entirely appropriate (so to say) to creatures whose task is precisely the observation of the cosmos. Inasmuch as everything in the cosmos was made by God in relation to everything else and, ultimately, for our use or benefit, we must surely come to recognize the usefulness of these things for us and their relations to one another, and impart this recognition to others; for, as Epictetus said, God made us 'not only spectators but also interpreters of him and his works'.¹⁰

It is this type of *oikeiosis* that Philo's prototypical human being has towards the contents of the cosmos.¹¹ As he also has an untaught understanding of the creatures over which he rules, Adam of course spontaneously gives things names that are appropriate to them; but his naming of them is also his appropriation to them, his recognizing them as part of his household, which is the cosmos; he is a king and the cosmos is his city, and Philo says it is 'fitting' for a king to name each of his subjects: he looks at the things that are paraded before him, and he uses his rational faculty to perceive the way in which he is appropriated to these things, with the natures they possess, and then he gives them names that indicate them as standing in this relation.¹² The first human being was supremely attuned to logos; still uncorrupted, his acts were κατορθώματα (cf. *Opif.* 75: πράξεσιν ἀνθρώπου κατορθούντος). He acts in accordance with ὁρθὸς λόγος, as does the Stoic sage, but that is still human and not identical with the divine λόγος of the cosmos, though in agreement with it. Adam does not give the animals the names God uses for them (nor can he, since the divine language is of a different order than the human one), but God wanted Adam to give the names. According to Stoic theory, humans are by

⁹ Plutarch, *De Stoic. repugn.* 12, 1038C: ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἰσθησις ἔοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι.

¹⁰ Arr. *Epict.* 1.6.19: τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσθήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν.

¹¹ If, as Lévy has argued, Philo avoids the personal and social types of Stoic *oikeiosis*, that may give us a hint to interpret his conspicuous use of *oikos*-terms in his account of the first human being in this third way, as part of the human being's appropriation of everything God has made for him.

¹² We see within families that names, both common ('daughter', Swedish 'farfar' [father's father]) and proper (I am 'David', after my father's father) indicate some such relation, be it place within the family unit, or the wish that a child will be like or preserve the memory of a particular relative. There are Amazonian tribes that do not use proper names at all, only words for relationships.

nature suited both for learning and for teaching,¹³ so that Adam will naturally teach to others the names that he imposes on things as the founder of communication through language (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) and language itself (διάλεκτος), for which names are prerequisite.¹⁴ The names he gave revealed the nature of the animals they named, and presumably their place in the cosmos that belonged to Adam and was his home.

On Piso's account of a theory Varro was likely to have known (and perhaps to have adopted), Antiochus' 'Peripatetic' theory in *De Finibus* 4.18, when early humans learned about things in the world around them and the ways in which they related to them, they naturally wanted not only to understand them but also, as social beings, to communicate their understanding to others,¹⁵ which would require them to name the things they understood, and naming all these things would be easier if done in such a way that the relation of their nature to us would be indicated by the names. Cicero's Stoic spokesman Cato (*Fin.* 3.66) moves from the natural instinct of bulls to defend their calves against lions to the natural impulse of some heroes to protect the human race, and then to a claim that 'when we call Jove 'Optimus' and 'Maximus' and call the same god 'Salutaris, Hospitalis, Stator', we want it understood that humanity's salvation is in his care'.¹⁶ But it is *not* the case that each and every thing in the world stands in a wholly *different* relation to us than everything else; rather, we perceive similarities among things, similarities in their relations to one another, and similarities in their relations to us.¹⁷ Proper use of language,

¹³ Along with Epictetus 1.6.19 (preceding note), cf., e.g., Cicero, *Fin.* 3.65–6 [LS 57F §4] *Quodque nemo in summa solitudine uitam agere uelit ne cum infinita quidem uoluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. impellimur autem natura ut prodesse uelimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. | itaque non facile est inuenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, uerum etiam ad docendum;* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.11b = Wachsmuth–Hense vol. II p. 94.8–20.

¹⁴ Cf. Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 2.15 οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρχὴ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νομισθῇ – μὴ γὰρ ὄντων ὀνομάτων, οὐδ' ἂν διάλεκτος ἦν . . .

¹⁵ *Fin.* 4.18 *Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultiorum, quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequabatur.*

¹⁶ *Fin.* 3.66 *Atque etiam Iouem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi uolumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela.* The argument is evidently made here in support of the thesis that we naturally care for others, but it may also support my contention that names are taken by Stoics to indicate our relation to things.

¹⁷ Inwood 1984: 173: 'The affinities could not be meaningful for the agent unless they were perceived, brought into the cognitive world of that agent.' (ibid. 178) 'At the heart of the Stoic position is the sensible realization that all purposive action is relational, based on a view however inchoate of the agent's relation to the world.'

as practiced by Philo's Moses, reveals these relations,¹⁸ which, after all, were encoded in the words themselves, so that we might understand them and use them accordingly.¹⁹ Taking account of these similarities helps us to understand things and their relation to us, as well as to learn and remember things' names. We shall return to this point with Varro.

Chrysippus himself, one of Varro's guides in etymology,²⁰ considered Greek vocalizations and associated gestures in terms of their οἰκειότης in his three books *On the Soul*, according to Galen's extensive citations of that work. One testimony Chrysippus produces in favour of placing the commanding part (the ἡγεμονικόν) of the soul in the heart, not the head, is the fact that people say that 'none of this goes down for them' or 'having swallowed what was said, he went away', and that Zeno replied to the accusation 'You carry all investigations to your mouth' by saying 'But not everything is swallowed down (καταπίνεται)'.²¹ Chrysippus comments:

οὔτε τῆς καταπόσεως ἄλλως ἂν οἰκειότερον λεγομένης οὔτε τῆς καταβάσεως τῶν ῥηθέντων εἰ μὴ περὶ τὸν θώρακα τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν ἦν εἰς ὃ

¹⁸ Philo *Mut. nom.* 147 νυνὶ δὲ τέκνον εἴρηκεν οὐκ ἀμελῶς οὐδ' ἀπερίσκεπτως, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ παραστήσαι, ὅτι οὐκ ὀθνεῖον οὐδ' ὑποβολιμαῖον οὐδ' αὖ θετὸν ἢ νόθον, ἀλλὰ γνήσιον καὶ ἀστείον [ὅτι οὐκ ὀθνεῖον] ὄντως ἀστῆς ψυχῆς ἔγγονον. παρὰ γὰρ τὸν τόκον τὸ τέκνον εἴρηται πρὸς ἔμφασιν οἰκειότητος, ἥ φυσικῶς ἀρμόζεται τέκνα γονεῦσιν. Philo also apparently connects the derivation of related words to *oikeiosis* at *Deter.* 127–9, esp. 129: ἴδιον δὲ λόγου τὸ λέγειν, πρὸς δὲ οἰκειώσει φυσικῇ τινι σπεύδει.

¹⁹ Hierocles on 'how to treat one's fatherland', quoted by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 3.39.34 = Wachsmuth–Hense vol. III p. 73 l. 2–7 ἔστι γὰρ ὥσανεὶ δευτέρως τις θεὸς αὕτη <ἦ> νῆ Δία πρῶτος καὶ μείζων γονεὺς· παρ' ὃ δὴ καὶ ὁ τοῦνομα τῷ πράγματι θέμενος οὐκ ἀνετρεχῆς ἔθετο, παρασχηματίσας μὲν τῷ πατρί, θηλυκῶς δ' ἐξενεγκῶν, ἵν' οἶον μῖγμα τυγχάνοι τῆς τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρώας <ἀξίας> (von Arnim: (προσγορίας) Blank and Atherton, (μοίρας) Bücheler, *lacunam statuit* Wachsmuth). 'She (sc. one's fatherland) is a second god, as it were, or by Zeus, a first and greater parent. Hence, he who imposed the name on the thing imposed it not inappropriately: while he formed it alongside 'father', he ended it femininely, so that, like a mixture, it would get the sense of both father and mother.'

²⁰ *L.* 6.2 *huius rei auctor satis mihi Chrysippus et Antipater et illi in quibus, si non tantum acuminis, at plus litterarum, in quo est Aristophanes et Apollodorus, qui omnes uerba ex uerbis ita declinari scribunt, ut uerba litteras alia assumant, alia mittant, alia commutent, ut fit in turdo [in] turdario et turdelice* (on this passage, with translation, see below); for Varro's use of another Stoic, see the third *gradus* of the explanation of word origins (5.9) *quodsi summum gradum non attigero, tamen secundum praeteribo, quod non solum ad Aristophanis lucernam, sed etiam ad Cleant<h>is lucubraui.*

²¹ Galen, *PHP* 3.5.2–4 τῆς μὲν οὖν ὀργῆς γιγνομένης ἐνταῦθα, εὐλογον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνταῦθ' εἶναι καὶ νῆ Δία (καί) τὰ λοιπὰ πάθη καὶ τοὺς διαλογισμοὺς καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἐστὶ παραπλήσια. σαινόμενοι δὲ φήμη οἱ πολλοὶ τούτων πολλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπιλέγουσι τοιαῦτα ἐχόμενοι τῆς ῥηθείσης φορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πάντες, ἵνα ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξωμαι, κατὰ τοῦτο φασιν ἀναβαίνειν τινῶν τὸν θυμὸν καὶ καταπίνειν τὴν χολὴν τινὰς ἀξιούσι, λέγοντές τε καταπίνεσθαι τινα αὐτοῖς σπαραγμάτα καὶ μὴ καταπίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην φορὰν λέγομεν. οὕτω δὲ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴδὲν αὐτοῖς τούτων καταβαίνειν καὶ ὅτι 'καταπίων τὸ ῥῆθὲν ἀπῆλθεν', ὃ τε Ζήνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιλαμβανομένους ὅτι 'πάντα τὰ ζητούμενα εἰς τὸ στόμα φέρεις,' ἔφησεν 'ἀλλ' οὐ πάντα καταπίνεται', (the next excerpt in my text immediately follows this).

ταῦτα πάντα φέρεται. ἐν γοῦν τῇ κεφαλῇ ὄντος αὐτοῦ γελοίως ῥηθήσεται καὶ ἄλλοτρίως καταβαίνειν, ἀναβαίνειν [δ'] ἂν οἶμαι οἰκειότερον αὐτῶν λεγομένων καὶ οὐ καταβαίνειν τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον· τῆς <γάρ> κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν αἰσθήσεως καταφερομένης περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐὰν ᾗ περὶ τὸν θώρακα, οἰκείως κατὰβασις ῥηθήσεται, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἄλλοτριώτερον.

In no other circumstances would it be more appropriate (*οἰκειότερον*) to speak of swallowing remarks, and of their going down, if our governing part, to which all these (things) are carried, were not in the region of the chest. Thus if our governing part were in the head, it would be ridiculous (*γελοίως*) and inappropriate (*ἄλλοτρίως*) to say that words go down; I fancy that they would more properly (*οἰκειότερον*) be said to go up, not down in the manner described earlier. For since auditory sense-perception is carried down to the region of the mind, if the mind is in the chest, then ‘descent’ will be the proper term (*οἰκείως κατὰβασις ῥηθήσεται*); but if it is in the head, that expression will be rather inappropriate (*ἄλλοτριώτερον*). (Galen, *PHP* 3.5.4–5, transl. De Lacy).

He interprets other expressions in the same manner:

τούτοις δ' ἀκολουθῶς ἀνεμῖν τέ τινάς φαμεν τὰ φανέντα αὐτοῖς καὶ ἔτι τὸν βαθύν, λεγομένων πολλῶν τοιούτων συμφώνως τοῖς εἰρημένοις· καταπιόντες γάρ, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστί, καὶ ἐναποθέμενοι τοῦτο εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο λέγοντες, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμέρα, μενόντων τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐκ ἄλλοτρίως οὐδ' ἀνοικείως ἀνεμῖν λέγονται.

In keeping with this we say that some people ‘vomit up’ their impressions, and further we call a person ‘deep’, many expressions of this sort being used in a way that accords with our previous discussion. Thus when people have swallowed the statement (let us say) that it is day, and have stored this up in their minds (ἐναποθέμενοι τοῦτο εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν),²² and then make that other assertion, that it is not day—the circumstances remaining the same—, it is not absurd (i.e., improper, alien) or inappropriate to say that they vomit up (οὐκ ἄλλοτρίως οὐδ' ἀνοικείως ἀνεμῖν λέγονται). (Galen, *PHP* 3.5.15, transl. De Lacy).

Not only are *vocalizations* so characterized by Chrysippus, but also their corporeal means of production, as in his well-known explanation of the appropriateness of the way in which we pronounce the first-person singular pronoun referring to ourselves (our chin and lower lip pointing at our heart when saying ἐγώ), as opposed to the motion by which we pronounce the pronoun referring to someone not present (our chin moving outwards

²² This is a reference to the ‘storage’ of thoughts as *ἐννοιαί* in the belly; cf. *PHP* 3.8.16.

in pronouncing ἐκεῖνος).²³ These movements of our organs of articulation may also be accompanied by other bodily gestures, such as pointing a finger at our chest or a hand into the distance. They too are ‘appropriate’ to what they indicate (Galen, *PHP* 2.2.10–11). Further, Chrysippus’ famous – or infamous – etymological explanations of the names of divinities were apparently intended to ‘appropriate’, ‘accommodate’, or ‘conciliate’ what poets say about the gods to Stoic theory, i.e. from Chrysippus’ point of view, to reality.²⁴

There is, then, good evidence that Chrysippus conceived of the thesaurus of Greek vocabulary and idiom as ultimately the result of our rational nature and its connection to the rational nature of the cosmos. Our way of speaking about things or states of affairs is ‘appropriate’ to them when it reflects their natures or is informative about them. Some expressions, such as ‘swallow down what is said’ or ‘ego’ or ‘ekeinos’, not only are appropriate to what is signified, but also, because of the nature of those significations, they help to constitute our appropriation of ourselves to ourselves by way of language; and it is probable that other expressions have their ‘appropriateness’ from our ‘appropriation’ of ourselves to the things to which we refer when we use the expressions.

But what does this have to do with Varro? The question brings us back to Hecuba (and Priam). Varro says that derivation (*declinatio*) of one word form from another has been incorporated into all human languages because it is useful and even necessary: without it, we should never be able to learn as many words as we have done, nor would the family relationship between the things denoted by those words (*inter se rerum cognatio*) we have learnt be clear from the words:

declinatio inducta in sermones non solum Latinos, sed omnium hominum utili et necessaria de causa: nisi enim ita esset factum, neque di<s>cere tantum numerum uerborum possemus (infinite enim sunt naturae in quas ea declinantur) neque <si> quae didicissemus, ex his, quae inter se rerum cognatio esset, appareret.

Declination has been introduced not only into Latin speech but that of all human beings because it is useful and needful. Had things not been done in this way, we should neither be able to learn such a large number of words (for the natures to which derived words are applied are infinite), nor if we

²³ On Nigidius Figulus’ Latin version of this observation, see Garcea, in this volume and, in a broader Stoic context, Atherton and Blank 2013: 326–8.

²⁴ Philodemus, *De pietate*, *PHerc.* 1428 coll. 6.16–7.3, 8.4–13, 9.15–10.8; 7.3–12; Cornutus *De Natura Deorum* p. 13.

learnt them, would it be clear from them what relationship there was between the things (they signified).²⁵ (L. 8.3)

For Varro, the relationship between two words, one derived from the other, is a mirror of the relationship between the thing denoted by the first word and the thing denoted by the word derived from the first word. This is clear from the beginning of Varro's books of etymologies:

cum unius cuiusque uerbi naturae sint duae, a qua re et in qua re uocabulum sit impositum (itaque a qua re sit *pertinacia* cum requi<ri>tur, [h]ostenditur esse a perten<den>do; in qua re sit impositum dicitur cum demonstratur, in quo non debet pertendi et pertendit, *pertinaciam* esse, quod in quo oporteat manere, si in eo perstet, *perseuerantia* sit), priorem illam partem, ubi cur et unde sint uerba scrutantur, Graeci uocant ἐτυμολογίαν, illam alteram περ<i> σηματομένων. de quibus duabus rebus in his libris promiscue dicam, sed exilius de posteriore.

Since every word has two natures, from what thing and on what thing the word was imposed – thus, when one asks from what thing *pertinacia* ('obstinacy') is, it is shown to be from *pertendendo* ('persisting'); on what it is imposed is said when it is shown that there is *pertinacia* in a case where one should not persist, but one does persist; in a case where one ought to stand firm and one does keep at it, there is *perseuerantia* ('perseverance') – the Greeks call the first part, that examines why and whence words come, *etymologia*, and the other part *peri sêmainomenôn* ('concerning things signified'). I shall mix the two in what I say, but I shall say less about the latter. (L. 5.2)

Varro gives an example of what he means by *inter se rerum cognatio* in the continuation of 8.3. This family relationship between two things, he says,

at nunc ideo uidemus, quod simile est, quod propagatum: legi <c>um <de> lego> (Goetz–Schoell dub. in app.: legi(um) F) declinatum est, duo simul apparent, quodam modo eadem dici et non eodem tempore factum; ut si uerbi gratia alterum horum diceretur Priamus, alterum <H>ecuba, nullam unitatem adsignificaret, quae apparet in lego et legi et in Priamus Priamo.

We *do* see, however, for this reason: because the offspring is similar. When *legi* is derived from *lego*, two things are clear at the same time: that in some way the same things are being spoken of, and that their doing was not at the same time. But if, for example, one of these (things) was called 'Priam' and the other 'Hecuba', they would not signify in addition (sc. to signifying each of the two things) the unity that is clear in *lego* and *legi* and in *Priamus*, *Priamo*.

²⁵ Compare Varro's formulation *quae inter se rerum cognatio esset* to that used by Socrates in the *Cratylus*: rather than examining words to learn about the things they denote, one should examine the things, both one another, εἰ πῇ συγγενῇ ἔστιν, and themselves (438e, cited above in n. 2).

The *cognatio* or *unitas* of the things signified and that of the words²⁶ that signify those things is then explicitly juxtaposed with family relations among human beings, particularly Romans:

ut in hominibus quaedam sunt agnationes ac gentilitates, sic in uerbis: ut enim ab <A>emilio homines orti <A>emilii ac gentiles, sic ab <A>emilii nomine declinatae uoces in gentilitate nominali: ab eo enim, quod est impositum recto casu <A>emilius, orta <A>emilii, <A>emilium, <A>emilios, <A>emiliorum et sic reliquae eiusdem quae sunt stirpis.

Just as among people there are relations on the father's side and family belonging to the same clan, so there are amongst words as well: for as men descended from Aemilius are Aemilii and his clan-members, so too do word forms derived from the name of Aemilius belong to his nominal clan: for from it, which is imposed in the nominative case as Aemilius, are descended Aemilii, Aemilium, Aemilios, Aemiliorum and thus all the rest that are of the same stock. (*L.* 8.4)

According to Varro, then, there are two types of word origin (*uerborum principia* 8.5): the 'imposition' (*impositio* = θέσις) of a word for something where the name-giver is not trying to indicate in its name a relation to some other named thing, and the 'derivation' (*declinatio*) of a new word from an older one in such a way that the derived word stands in a relation to the source word recalling the relation between the things named by the two words.²⁷ There are also two types of derivation (8.21–2): *declinatio naturalis*, what we call 'inflexion' or 'declension' (= κλίσις), which is based on the automatic agreement of a group of speakers and generally follows a rule or pattern, and *declinatio uoluntaria*, our 'derivation' (= παραγωγή), which results from an individual name-giver's independent will and reflects, on the one hand, the name-giver's perception of the relation between the thing from which he²⁸ has taken the word and the thing for which he is adapting it,²⁹ and on the other, his choice of the linguistic means of indicating that relation. Both types start from the *res*:

²⁶ See 5.13 *sed qua cognatio eius erit uerbi quae radices egerit extra fines suas, persequemur. . . . multa societas uerborum, nec uinalia sine uino expediti nec curia calabra sine calatione potest aperiri*; also 6.1 *in hoc dicam de uocabulis temporum et earum rerum quae in agendo fiunt aut dicuntur cum tempore aliquo ut sedetur, ambulatur, loquuntur; atque si qua erunt ex diuerso genere adiuncta, potius cognationi uerborum quam auditori calumnianti geremus morem*. So, again, Varro says he will break the plan of his work by following non-time words, if they belong to the kinship group.

²⁷ On *declinatio* and its types see further de Melo, in this volume, pp. 113–14, 116–18.

²⁸ It is usually a 'he', given Varro's focus on the early Roman Kings as name-givers; nothing would rule out a 'she', however.

²⁹ See Varro's example of three men who have each bought a slave in Ephesus: one calls his slave 'Artemas', since he bought him from a certain Artemidorus; another calls his 'Ton' after the region

nomina declinantur aut in earum rerum discrimina, quarum nomina sunt, ut ab Terentius Terenti<a>, aut in earum extrinsecus, quarum ea nomina non sunt, ut ab equo equiso.

Names are declined (i.e. nominal forms are derived) either to distinguish the things which they name, as Terentia from Terentius, or to distinguish things external (sc. to the things named by the original names), which they do not name, for example, (the name) *equiso* (derived) from *equus* (distinguishes something, the 'groom', not named by *equiso*). (*L.* 8.14)

The importance of the *res* in these procedures is emphasized again in the things Varro says, in the voice of his analogist, must be present in order for us to think there is a pattern³⁰ according to which a given word should be inflected (inflexion being more prone to rule-following than is derivation):

in quo animaduertito natura quadruplicem esse formam, ad quam in declinando accommodari debeant uerba: quod debeat subesse res qu<a>e designe[n]tur, et ut sit ea res in usu, et ut uocis natura ea sit quae significauit, ut declinari possit, et similitudo figura<e> uerbi ut sit ea quae ex se declinata³¹ genus prodere certum possit.

Ionia; the third calls his 'Ephesius' after the sale location. Compare the etymology of *Luca bos* ('elephant'), noted below.

³⁰ For example (*Scholia in Dionysium Thracem* [Vat.] 252.26–9), membership in Ps.-Dionysius' first συζυγία comports that verbs with stems in –β, –π, and –φ form their futures with –ψ (e.g., βλέπω, βλέψω), since (ἐπεί) the nouns in –ψ decline in forms with –β, –π, –φ (e.g., λίψ, λιβός). So, confronted with a verb in –β one will want to make its future with –ψ.

³¹ See Ax 1996: 108 n. 3. He proposes to follow Ms. F for the most part, reading: *et similitudo figura<e>* (Mueller: [*similitudo*] *figura* vel *figura<ve>* Goetz–Schoell) *uerbi ut sit ea, quae ex se declinata* (not *declinatu* following Spengel) *genus prodere certum possit*. This reading Ax proposes to support his understanding of the passage as giving rules for establishing an analogical relationship between two lexemes or rather, for prohibiting counting against analogy the failure of two words that appear similar in one or more of their forms but not in all (108): 'The evidence for analogy must be externally derivable, e.g., by examining the vocative case (*lupus* : *lepus* ≠ *lupo* : *lepori*) is not evidence against analogy, since they have different vocatives: *lupe* and *lepus*.' This is a plausible way of reading these rules given by Varro's analogist. However, I am not certain it fits what comes later. In *L.* 10.79–82 Varro takes up this theme again, in the book that expounds his own mediation of the differences between the analogist and the anomalist. There he gives four *genera* of words in which analogy is *not* to be sought: *uerba quae non declinantur; si unum solum habent casum in uoce, quod non decline<n>tur, ut litterae omnes; si singularis est uocabuli series neque habet cum qua comparari possit, ut esse putant caput capiti capitis capite; si ea uocabula quattuor quae conferuntur inter se rationem <non> habent quam oportet, ut socer socrus, soceros socrus*. This is followed (10.83) by a 'staged' set (cf. *gradus*) of criteria showing which words *ought* to have an analogical relation to one another: *primum ut sint res, secundum ut earum sit usus, tertium uti haec res uocabula habeant, quartum ut habeant declinatus naturalis*. The rules excluding words from analogy (10.79–82) appear to support Ax's reading of 9.37 when they cite the failure of a four-part proportion moving from the nominative singulars for 'father-in-law' and 'mother-in-law' to their accusative plurals *socer* : *socrus* :: *soceros* : *socrus*. But the rules inviting us to look for analogy (10.83) require, in their fourth point, only that a word show a pattern of inflexion, and it is the latter passage that closely recapitulates 9.37.

In this one must observe that there is by nature a fourfold pattern to which words should be accommodated in (inflectional) derivation: that there must be an underlying thing³² to be indicated; that this thing be in use; that the nature of the word that has signified it (sc. this thing that is in use) be such as to be open to (inflectional) derivation; and that the word's form be such that, when declined from itself (i.e. when derived forms are compared with the original form), it can show a definite kind. (*L.* 9.37)

And *res* is not the only requirement, for Varro's analogist voice insists that words are made only for things that are in use. In answer to the anti-analogist's point that some nouns do not have forms to distinguish all three genders, he replies:

ad h<a>ec dicimus omnis orationis, quamvis res naturae subsit, tamen si ea in usu<m> non peruenierit, eo non peruenire uerba: ideo equus dicitur et equa: in usu enim horum discrimina; coruus et corua non, quod sine usu id, quod dissimilis natura<e>. itaque quaedam al<i>ter olim ac nunc: nam et tum omnes mares et feminae dicebantur columbae, quod non erant in eo usu domestico quo nunc, <nunc> contra, propter domesticos usus quod internouimus, appellatur mas columbus, femina columba.

To this we say that, however much the thing underlies the nature of all speech, still if that thing has not come into use, then the words do not come into use. Thus, *equus* 'stallion' and *equa* 'mare' are said, for the distinctions between these are in use, but not *coruus* 'male crow' and *corua* 'female crow' because what is dissimilar in their nature is without use to us. Therefore, some things are different now and in the past: for then all male and female doves were called *columbae* because they were not in the domestic use in which they are now; now, on the other hand, because we have distinguished <the sexes> on account of their domestic uses, the male is called *columbus*, the female *columba*. (*L.* 9.56)

So *natura* and *usus* play a part in our naming of *res*. A set of prerequisites and a fourfold pattern similar to that used by Varro's analogist for inflexion could also be formulated for the recognition of classes within *declinatio uoluntaria*, but their application would be less useful, as the will of the imposer of each derivative word was free. One begins with a thing in the world, for which there is a word to designate it; that thing must be in use, so that there is some relationship between it and us who use it or between it and other things, again, as we see them; the word designating the thing can be changed or given an altered form indicating the use being made of it or the relation in which it stands to other things. When these factors are

³² Varro's *subesse* presumably reflects the Greek ὑποκείσθαι, with the 'underlying' thing being the ὑποκείμενον.

present, a word becomes part of a 'class' or a 'family', a *genus* or a *gens*. Perhaps, though, for derivations, Varro's idea of a 'family' – *gentilitas*, *cognatio*, *agnatio* – is broader than this. For, following his moves in explaining words coming after a headword – for example, all the words gathered under *ager* – we see a more fluid conception which brings together words derived from the first word, but also words related in signification and derived in a similar manner. Varro has carefully laid out the plan of his work into the origins of words for places, things in places, times, and things that happen with reference to time. Still, he insists he will purposely violate these divisions by following the family of a word wherever it leads, hunting words down on a neighbour's property or explaining words which would otherwise be the subject of another book, if they belong to the kinship group (*L.* 5.13, 6.1; see below).

Stoics had a similar conception of relationships in language like those within and between families. Thus, their system of verb tenses inspired Ps.-Dionysius' classification into 'related' tenses (συγγενείς), the truth of which we can see, as a commentator explains (*Scholia in Dionysium Thracem* [Vat.] 249.33–250.25, esp. 250.4ff.), both in the word forms and in what they mean: small changes in the verb forms in the related tenses convert them from one tense to the other, as from the present to the imperfect. The same kind of relation, that of forming one word from another to express a certain relation between the things the words signify, is invoked when Philo gives an 'appropriate example' (παράδειγμα οἰκεῖον) to illustrate the point that it is those actively doing something, not those who have the ability to do it but are not actively engaged, who are subject to praise and blame. He applies the metaphor of a family relation to the various psychological states that underlie our practices: 'Habit is brother to positional relation (σχέσει . . . ἀδελφὸν ἕξις) and activity to motion (κινήσει δ' ἐνέργεια)'; then he adds:

τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἕτερα ἕξ ἀνάγκης οἰκεῖα τοῖς προτέροις ὀνόματα προσγίνεται, τῷ μὲν τέκτονι τὸ τεκτονεῖν, τῷ δὲ ζωγράφῳ τὸ ζωγράφειν, κτλ.

To the practitioners of the arts and sciences there are attached different words that of necessity are appropriate to the earlier ones: to the craftsman 'to craft', to the painter 'to paint', etc. (Philo, *Sobr.* 36)

In this family, that of experts in various fields, the relation between the things signified is the same, and so is the mode of derivation of the word forms: the verbs are οἰκεῖα to the nouns they are derived from. Philo also argues that God used the word τέκνον well in promising Abraham a child by Sarah; the word shows the child's genuineness:

νυνὶ δὲ τέκνον εἶρηκεν οὐκ ἀμελῶς οὐδ' ἀπερισκέπτως, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ παραστήσαι, ὅτι οὐκ ὀθνείον οὐδ' ὑποβολιμαῖον οὐδ' αὖ θετὸν ἢ νόθον, ἀλλὰ γνήσιον καὶ ἀστειὸν [ὅτι οὐκ ὀθνείον] ὄντως ἀστῆς ψυχῆς ἔγγονον. παρὰ γὰρ τὸν τόκον τὸ τέκνον εἶρηται πρὸς ἔμφασιν οἰκειότητος, ἣ φυσικῶς ἀρμόζεται τέκνα γονεῦσιν.

Now, He didn't say (that from Sarah He would give Abraham a 'teknon' carelessly or without consideration, but in order to show that it was not foreign, supposititious, adoptive, or illegitimate, but rather genuine and fine, the offspring of a truly fine soul. For the 'teknon' is so called from its 'tokos' to indicate the familial appropriation, by which children are naturally in harmony with parents. (Philo, *Mut. nom.* 147)

Again, it is the things which are primarily related, and names are created for new things that carry on the relation perceived between the second thing and the first thing; when the perceived relation is the same in different pairs of things, the name-givers may well have used the same alteration of the first things' word forms to indicate that the second things stand in the same relation to them.

Perhaps the best illustration of a Stoic affirming the dependence of naming on the relations of things is seen in Strabo's adoption of Posidonius' explanation of the Ἑρεμβοί whom Menelaus says he visited during his eight years on the sea.³³

Κύπρον Φοινίκην τε καὶ Αἰγυπτίους ἐπαληθείς,
Αἰθιοπίας θ' ἰκόμην καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἑρεμβούς
καὶ Λιβύην, ἵνα τ' ἄρνες ἄφαρ κεραιοὶ τελέθουσι.

Having wandered to Cyprus, Phoenicia, and the Egyptians, I came to the Ethiopians and Sidonians and Erembians, and to Libya, where the sheep have horns right from birth. (*Od.* 4.83–5)

There was apparently considerable debate among scholars as to the geography of Menelaus' voyage, so much so that Aristonicus devoted an entire book to it. The identity of the 'Erembians' was particularly difficult, and Strabo discussed the subject twice in his *Geography*, in two passages also discussed by Verlinsky (in this volume, pp. 27–30). In his defense against Eratosthenes' claim that Homer was not a reliable source for geography, Strabo (1.2.34–5 = Posidonius fr. 280 Edelstein–Kidd; cf. 16.4.27 = fr. 281a) agrees with those who say the Erembians are most likely the Arabians, noting that 'our own

³³ For Posidonius' rôle in this controversy, see the texts in Edelstein and Kidd 1989: *test.* 89 and fr. 280, 281a together with the commentary of Kidd 1988: 77–8 and 954–7.

Zeno' (*SVF* I.275 von Arnim) even emended Homer's text to read Αἰθιοπᾶς θ' ἰκόμην καὶ Σιδονίου Ἀραβᾶς τε. Strabo thinks that the emendation is not necessary, and the text, which is old, should therefore be preserved, if possible, explaining the reading as an alteration of the name, something which happens often and obviously in all peoples and which some people actually do by changing letters. The opinion Strabo finds best is that of Posidonius:

ἄριστα δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἰπεῖν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος κἀνταῦθα ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἔθνων συγγενείας καὶ κοινότητος ἐτυμολογῶν. τὸ γὰρ τῶν Ἀρμενίων ἔθνος καὶ τὸ τῶν Σύρων καὶ Ἀράβων πολλὴν ὁμοφυλίαν ἐμφαίνει, κατὰ τε τὴν διάλεκτον καὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τοὺς τῶν σωμάτων χαρακτήρας, καὶ μάλιστα καθὼς πλησιόχωροί εἰσι. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ Μεσοποταμία ἐκ τῶν τριῶν συνεστῶσα τούτων ἔθνων· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ὁμοιότης διαφαίνεται. εἰ δέ τις παρὰ τὰ κλίματα γίνεται διαφορὰ τοῖς προσβάρορις ἐπὶ πλέον πρὸς τοὺς μεσημβρινούς καὶ τούτοις πρὸς μέσους τοὺς Σύρους, ἀλλ' ἐπικρατεῖ γε τὸ κοινόν. καὶ οἱ Ἀσσύριοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀριμάνιοι [codd.] παραπλησίως πῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. εἰκάζει γε δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἔθνων τούτων κατονομασίας ἐμφερεῖς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι. τοὺς γὰρ ὑφ' ἡμῶν Σύρους καλουμένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν Σύρων [Ἀρμενίους καὶ] Ἀραμμαίους καλεῖσθαι· τούτῳ δ' ἔοικέναι τοὺς Ἀρμενίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀραβας καὶ Ἑρεμβούς, τάχα τῶν πάσαι Ἑλλήνων οὕτω καλούντων τοὺς Ἀραβας, ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἐτύμου συνεργοῦντος πρὸς τοῦτο. ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ εἰς τὴν ἔραν ἐμβαίνειν τοὺς Ἑρεμβούς ἐτυμολογοῦσιν οὕτως οἱ πολλοί, οὓς μεταλαβόντες οἱ ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον Τρωγλοδύτας ἐκάλεσαν· οὗτοι δὲ εἰσιν Ἀράβων οἱ ἐπὶ θάτερον μέρος τοῦ Ἀραβίου κόλπου κεκλιμένοι, τὸ πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ Αἰθιοπία.

Posidonius seems to me to have spoken best about this, here too giving an etymology from the relationship and common property of the peoples. For the Armenian people and that of the Syrians and Arabians show a great tribal resemblance, in their language, their ways of life, and their bodily characteristics, especially insofar as they occupy neighbouring lands. Mesopotamia demonstrates this, consisting of these three peoples, for the similarity is especially apparent in them. But if there is some difference due to latitude greater between those to the North and those toward the South than between these two groups and those toward the Syrians between them, what they have in common still predominates. The Assyrians too and the Aramaeans (or Armenians?) are rather similar, both to these and to one another. Posidonius conjectures that the names of these peoples resemble each other, for those called 'Syrians' by us are called 'Arammaeans' by the Syrians themselves, and the 'Armenians' and the 'Arabs' and 'Erembians' resemble this, as the ancient Greeks perhaps used to call the Arabs this (sc. 'Erembians').³⁴ And the

³⁴ Kidd 1988: 955–6 in his excellent commentary on this fragment, correctly ends Strabo's paraphrase of Posidonius here, as the sentences about the common etymology Ἑρεμβοί (ἔραν ἐμβαίνειν disagree with and obviously do not belong to him, but are added by Strabo for contrast. Strabo

original word reinforces this too, for most give an etymology for the Erembians from ‘entering into the earth’, which later people changed to make it more clear, calling them ‘Troglydtes’. These are the Arabs living on the near side of the Arabian Gulf, the side near Egypt and Ethiopia. (Strabo, 1.2.34 = Posidonius fr. 280 E.–K.)

When Strabo comes back to discuss the Erembians, he is more explicit about Posidonius’ idea, which he links to an emendation smaller than Zeno’s made by Posidonius to Homer’s text, changing only Ἑρεμβούς to Ἀραμβούς because referring to what are now called ‘Arabs’, Homer used the name ‘Aramboi’, as did the other people in his day, as well.

φησὶ δὲ ταῦτα τρία ἔθνη, συνεχῇ ἀλλήλοις ἰδρυμένα, ὁμογένειάν τινα ἐμφαίνειν πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ διὰ (τοῦ) το παρακειμένοις ὀνόμασι κεκληῖσθαι, τοὺς μὲν Ἀρμενίους, τοὺς δὲ Ἀραμαίους, τοὺς δὲ Ἀραμβούς· ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπὸ ἔθνους (ένός) ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔστιν εἰς τρία διηρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν κλιμάτων διαφορὰς αἰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξαλλαττομένων, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρήσασθαι πλείοσι ἂνθ’ ἑνός.

He says that these three peoples, located next to one another, show a certain family resemblance to one another and for this reason are called by adjacent names, some ‘Armenians’, others ‘Aramaeans’, others ‘Arambians’. Just as one may assume that one people has been divided into three, deviating from one another more and more depending on the differences of their latitudes, so too can one assume that they use three names instead of one. (Strabo 16.4.27 = Posidonius fr. 281a E.–K.)

From the ‘Arabs’, then, Posidonius thinks there developed three different ἔθνη, whose characteristics differed more, the further they were in latitude from one another; and from the name commonly used in Homer’s day, Ἀραμβοί, Posidonius thinks that variant names arose from forms of their common root: Aram-, Arab-, Arm-, Aramb-.³⁵ In the case of the Erembians (or Arambians), then, Posidonius looks to the relations and similarities among the three peoples of Mesopotamia, tracing the similarity of their names back to these resemblances among the peoples;³⁶ and this is apparently not the only time he works this way (κάνταῦθα). Posidonius’

also disagrees with the common etymology, as is clear from 16.4.27: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τῶν Ἑρεμβῶν ἡ ζήτησις, εἴτε τοὺς ὑπονοητέον λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν ἐτυμολογίαν βιαζόμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς τὴν ἔραν ἐμβαίνειν, ὅπερ ἔστιν εἰς τὴν γῆν, εἴτε τοὺς Ἀραβας.

³⁵ See Kidd 1988: 955.

³⁶ Kidd 1988: 77–8 notes that various etymologies of a typically Stoic kind attributed to Posidonius ‘in fact derive from his natural philosophy; so it would be in tune with his belief that if etymology is a “science”, the right explanation would have to come from the physical philosopher, not the scientist (fr. 18). This is developed in a more interesting and original way in the examples from the *History*, where the etymology of proper names is derived from the philosopher’s study of ethnology:

method in etymology, then, does not proceed by analyzing names into meaningful parts, but by looking at the things they name and finding their resemblances and relations; these are then followed by the names, whose forms may be accounted for by changes in their elements.

The relations among things in the world are governed by the divine *logos*, while the relations between the expressions we use to signify these things and the relations between them are governed by the *λόγος* of the name-giver of each of the expressions. For Varro, it is the name-giver's *voluntas*, which by creating a new word from an old word according to a *ratio*, a rational principle or pattern, shows what he wants to convey as the relation between two things. The imposition of names on things in the world, then, as well as the derivation of names from these, depends on people perceiving things and their relations as they themselves relate to these things and their relations, and, as we saw, according to the Stoa people perceive these by *oikeiosis*.

The fundamental metaphor in *oikeiosis* is, of course, that of the house or household, the core of which is the family. Philo's first human being saw the cosmos as his house, and I think that the early humans, or at any rate their leaders, postulated by the Stoics as name-givers and observers of the natural world and its regularities, likewise saw the whole world as their home;³⁷ certainly, the Stoic sages see themselves as 'citizens of the cosmos', and the cosmos becomes both their city and their house. The first men

the Cimmerian Bosphorus from the Cimbri, fr. 272.34–6; the Ἀβιοί from the Thracian ethnography, fr. 277a.41 ff; and the Ἑρεμβοί from the ethnography of the Mesopotamian peoples, fr. 280.19–24. The last example is the most instructive, because here the etymology of naturally grouped ethnic names is contrasted with the popular etymology of Ἑρεμβοί from εἰς τὴν ἔραν ἐμβάλλειν.³⁷

³⁷ This is especially easy to imagine before there were any houses, but also when there was no private property. For Seneca (*Ep.* 90.36–46), the happiest age was that just after basic survival skills had been invented, but before there were divisions among people and before the invention of private property. Early humans are described as having enjoyed *consortium* with one another (90.3–4); uncorrupted, they followed nature and had one of their fellows as both leader and law, trusting in the will of their better (*commissi melioris arbitrio*), as in nature. This leader was better because of his (or her?) mind (*animo*), and one who thinks he can do only what he ought to do can safely accomplish whatever he wants (*tuto enim quantum uult potest, qui se nisi quod debet non putat posse*). See also Dio Chrysostom, 12.28–35, where to help his audience understand why early humans must have developed a conception of the provident deity, Dio imagines a man (ἄνδρα), anywhere on earth, initiated into sublime mysteries by what he sees and hears around him, without priest or interpreter, so long as he has a human soul, and he points to the whole of humanity being initiated, not in some small building in Athens, 'but in this world, product of a craftsman's skill, varied and ingeniously devised' (ἀλλ' ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ, ποικίλῳ καὶ σοφῷ δημιουργήματι). Humans in this position would naturally come to admire the divinity and to take care to live in accordance with its decree. Philo (*Opif.* 78) envisions the human being as a spectator who on coming into the cosmos immediately finds 'the most holy symposium and theatre', full of wonders and the regularities of nature.

postulated by the Stoics may well have been uncorrupted, with a more direct and reliable access to the natural world and its order, perhaps with greater intelligence than most of us have now, and, perhaps too, better able to apprehend the divine nature and reason.³⁸ Still, they had no monopoly on reason. Thus, Varro may well be following a Stoic model when he makes *ratio* the central feature of each of the three parts of language (imposition of names on things, their inflexions, their combination by reason to express a complete thought (8.1)).³⁹ Varro does not, like Philo, have to reach so far back as early humans, for the world he wants to understand and to reconstruct for his readers is that of early Rome and its Kings, lawgivers who invented institutions and gave them names. In fact, reason is operative across the whole range of language creators and users: the earliest humans, Kings, the people, and individuals among them, especially poets. Each of these is responsible for the invention of different words, each responding to their own perception of things in the world as they related to themselves and to one another, and the work of each must be acknowledged and understood, as far as possible, by the etymologist.

This understanding of word formation as a product of *oikeiosis* gives Varro, working on the four different levels of etymology he outlined and adducing words made from primitives and from words derived from them, just what he needs to understand both the world as given us by divine nature and the construction of the Roman world by its early people and their Kings; he will investigate these worlds through the words invented and derived by choices made by human beings acting under the guidance of human reason, which is a spark from the divine reason. The process of word derivation is a function of *oikeiosis*, in which things are related to one another via their relation to us, and words are derived from one another via our perception of how the things stand in relation to one another and our choice of the right linguistic means to express their natures and relations.

All this belongs to tracing the kin of a word, taking us out of our way – or so it may seem:

sed qua cognatio eius erit uerbi quae radices egerit extra fines suas, persequemur. s<a>epe enim ad limitem arboris radices sub uicini prodierunt segetem. quare non, cum de locis dicam, si ab agro ad †agrosium hominem, ad agricolam peruenero, aberraro. multa societas uerborum, nec uinalia sine uino expediri nec curia calabra sine calatione potest aperiiri.

³⁸ See Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.28 on ‘some of the later Stoics’.

³⁹ Cf. Blank 2008: 54–6 for an explanation of the place of *ratio* in each of these parts.

But where a word has kin that has put out roots beyond its own confines, we shall pursue it. For often the roots of a tree near the property line have spread under a neighbour's crop. Hence, when I speak about places, I shall not be going astray, if from *ager* I arrive at *agrarius homo* and *agricola*. The community of words is large, and the *Vinalia* cannot get going without *vinum*, nor can the *Curia Calabra* (Proclamatory Assembly) be opened without *calatione* (proclamation). (L. 5.13)

origines uerborum qua<e> sunt locorum et ea quae in his in priore libro scripsi. in hoc dicam de uocabulis temporum et earum rerum quae in agendo fiunt aut dicuntur cum tempore aliquo ut sedetur, ambulatur, loquuntur; atque si qua erunt ex diuerso genere adiuncta, potius cognationi uerborum quam auditori calumniandi geremus morem. huius rei auctor satis mihi Chrysippus et Antipater et illi in quibus, si non tantum acuminis, at plus litterarum, in quo est Aristophanes et Apollodorus, qui omnes uerba ex uerbis ita declinari scribunt, ut uerba litteras alia assumant, alia mittant, alia commutent, ut fit in turdo [in] turdario et turdelice.

In my previous book I wrote about the origins of words for places and of those words that name things in places. In this one I shall speak of the expressions for times and for those things which in being done take place or are said with some reference to some time or other, such as 'is sitting', 'is walking', 'are speaking'; and if there are going to be any others attached to them of a different kind, we shall comply with the wishes of the family relation of the words rather than the carper listening to us. In this matter Chrysippus is sufficient authority for me, and Antipater, and those with less acumen but more learning – among them Aristophanes and Apollodorus – who all write that words are declined from words in such a way that some words add letters, others lose them, others change them, as happens in *turdus* ('thrush'), *turdarium* ('thrush-cote'), and *turdelix* ('magpie'). (L. 6.1–2)

Here Varro gives his approval to the method of following the family relations of one sort of word into words for things of a different kind from times and what happens in times directly before citing Chrysippus and Antipater as authorities for his work. Are they meant to be seen as the sources of the family metaphor, or are they meant to be associated with the Alexandrian scholars who are named next and who are said to have less insight but to know more literature than the philosophers? After all, in 5.9 Varro made clear that he was certainly able to go beyond the second *gradus* of etymology, that at which Aristophanes stops, because he had also studied at the lamp of the Stoic Cleanthes.

An examination of his actual procedure in the etymological books will show how Varro implemented this theory. He begins (5.14–15) with the origin of *locus* itself: *locus* is where something can be placed (*locatum*).

That is an old word for what in Varro's day was *collocatum*, and he brings out quotations from Plautus and Ennius to show that *locare* could be used in this sense. Then he adds: 'where anything stands still (*consistit*) is *locus*', using another modern compound verb form with the preverb *con-* that replaced the older, now poetically tinged, simplex form *sistere*; he continues: 'From this the auctioneer is said to *locare* ('to place'), because he goes on to that point at which the price *constitit* ('stood still'). From this comes *locarium* ('rent for a place') too, that is paid for a dwelling or a shop, where (they who pay it) *consistent* ('stand still'); so too *loci muliebres* ('women's places'), where the beginnings of birth *consistunt* ('stand still'). That coincidence between *locus* / (*col*)*locare* and *consistere*, used four times in just the few lines of 5.15, may remind us of the Pythagorean-style binomial⁴⁰ of *status* and *motus*, with which Varro introduced the four-part division of the world into places and things in places, times and actions in times *corpus*, *locus*, *tempus*, *actio*:⁴¹ something moving comes to a stop at a certain place and stands still. As the first of the four classes of things in the world, *locus* is appropriately given an origin (< *locare*) that, via the participle *locatum* ('placed'), is also a name for one of the two principles: a *status* or 'state' is a noun for naming something's being-in-a-place, which, however, is properly expressed using a verb. While a verb necessarily comports time through its formal properties, if we describe the being-of-a-thing-in-a-place using a noun and call it a *status*, we remove that temporal dimension. The nominal reconceptualizes the being-in-time as a thing, one that can occupy a place. Conversely, the verb *locare* and its participle *locatum* that is used to explain *locus* import a reference to time into the idea and the naming of space and place: 'placing' is an action done to a thing with regard to place, and a place is where something 'has been placed' and now 'is placed'. Similarly, if a place is where a thing *consistit*, that is again, implicitly, a temporal conceptualization of place.

⁴⁰ Varro does not actually claim that his pair, *status et motus*, were taken from Pythagoras. Rather, he states that 'Pythagoras says that the principles (*initia*) of all things are pairs, such as limited-unlimited, good-bad, life-death, day-night'. Then he produces his pair as an extrapolation from that principle, rather than as something already proposed by Pythagoras: 'Hence in the same way (*quare item*) there are two, rest and motion.' Aristotle's list of the ten Pythagorean principles (ἀρχαί) as pairs that divide into columns (συστοιχίαι) gives the following: limit-unlimited, odd-even, one-many, right-left, male-female, resting-moving, straight-crooked, light-dark, good-bad, square-oblong (*Metaph.* 986a22–6); do Varro's abstract nouns *status et motus* correspond to Aristotle's participles ἡρεμοῦν καὶ κινούμενον? The same quadripartite division so well liked by Varro was very similar to the division of *historia* attributed to Asclepiades of Myrlea by Sextus Empiricus at *Math.* 1.253. On the division, see Blank 2008: 59–61.

⁴¹ 5.11 *quod stat aut agitur, corpus, ubi agitur, locus, dum agitur, tempus, quod est in agitu, actio.*

In this way Varro links the etymology and the *cognatio* of the overarching term of his first book of word origins, *locus*, to *omnium rerum initia* (5.11). He will recreate this link at the beginning of the second book of etymologies, saying that he is prefacing his discussion of times and things that happen through them by speaking of their *natura*, since that was the guide for the imposition of names (6.3 *de temporibus, tum quae per ea fiunt, sed ita ut ante de natura eorum: ea enim dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini*). Recalling his prior explanation that there is no *tempus* without *motus*, since an interval or pause in motion is *tempus* (5.12), Varro explains the *natura* of time (6.3): *tempus esse dicunt in<ter>uallum mundi motus* ('they say time is the interval of the motion of the world'). This he develops with special reference to the course of the sun and moon,⁴² so that *tempus* is so called from their 'moderated tension or course, from which come 'timely things', and from their motion the world, which is connected with the whole sky' (*itaque ab eorum tenore temperato tempus dictum, unde tempestiua; et a motu eorum qui toto caelo coniunctus mundus*). Tracing this family of things Varro rounds off the *natura* of *tempus* as *interuallum mundi motus* by connecting the word 'tempus' through the 'motus' of sun and moon to 'mundus'.

After treating place itself (5.16–20), Varro says that 'the places of the natural world, according to the ancient division, are in the first instance two, earth and sky, which are then parcelled out: the places of the sky are called 'upper places' and these belong to the gods, those of the earth are 'lower places' and these belong to men'.⁴³ The places called *loca supera* and *loca infera* serve to link *caelum* and *terra* to *locus*. Then *caelum*, like *locus*, can be divided into two, the upper part where the stars are located and the lower part that embraces the earth. The etymology of *caelum* begins with an *antiqua diuisio* of the *res* and ends with the story told by one of the most ancient poets, Hesiod, passing through the words of a couple of ancient Roman poets. The ancients really did understand something about the relation of the parts of the world to one another and the words denoting them, and it is this ancient knowledge that underpins Varro's practice.⁴⁴

From the sky Varro comes down to earth, *terra* (5.21), which Aelius 'correctly' derived from its being trodden (*teritur*), and that etymology is

⁴² 6.3 *id* (sc. *tempus*) *diuisum in partes aliquot maxime ab solis et lunae cursu*. Here *cursu* recalls Varro's clarification of his quadripartite scheme in 5.11: *corpus est ut cursor, locus stadium qua currit, tempus hora qua currit, actio cursio*.

⁴³ 5.16 *loca natura<e> secundum antiquam diuisionem prima duo, terra et caelum, deinde particulatim utriusque multa. caeli dicuntur loca supera et ea deorum, terrae loca infera et ea hominum*.

⁴⁴ For a more detailed discussion of *caelum* and its family, see Blank 2008: 65–6.

supported by the ancient attestation of the spelling *tera* (with one -r-) in the Augural Books. Confirmation comes from a number of other ostensible derivatives, each of which *teritur*: the *locus com<m>unis* left near a town for farmers is *teritorium* because it *maxime teritur*; a linen cloth *quod teritur corpore* is an *extermentarium*; in the harvest, there is the *tritura* ('threshing'), because then the grain *teritur* using the *tribulum* ('threshing sledge'); the boundaries of fields, *termini*, *maxime teruntur* because of the *limitare iter* ('boundary road'). He adds that 'therefore this word is pronounced in some places in Latium with an -i- inserted, as (it appears) also in (the poet) Accius – not *terminus*, but *ter<i>men*; this is τέρμονα in Greek: and perhaps it comes from there, since Evander, who came to the Palatine, was an Arcadian from Greece'.

The abundance of terms related to fields that Varro can derive from *tero* serves to reinforce the etymology of *terra* < *teritur*; even the *lintheum quod teritur corpore extermentarium* ('linen outer-wear that is worn out by the body'), while it is not directly related to a field, fits in among all these agrarian terms in virtue of its combination of a flaxen nature with its use as a covering worn over and worn out by the body. This vocabulary also serves to ease the transition to further words, apparently relatives of *tero* as well. Thus, the explanation of the last of them – that the boundaries of fields, *termini*, are so called as being most worn down on account of the boundary-*iter* – serves as the link to a series of words associated with roads and movement along them: a *via* is an *iter* because it is worn by carrying (*uehendo teritur*), an *actus* ('passage for driving cattle') is an *iter* because it is worn by driving (*agendo teritur*); an *ambitus* ('periphery road') is an *iter* because it is worn by going around (*circumeundo teritur*). This last merits a bit of antiquarian explanation περὶ σημεινομένων: an *ambitus* is the same thing as a *circuitus*, so the interpreters of the Twelve Tables defined the *ambitus parietis* as the *circuitus*. All this culminates in the conclusion: 'Therefore, *tera* (is the origin of) *terra* and from it the poets named the *summa terrae* ('surface of the earth'), which are the sole parts that can be trod, the *sola terrae* ('soil of the earth')' (5.22).

Unlike the words in the earlier paragraph, these are not said to be derived from *tero*. They are 'places', of course, and things rest or move in them. Each is said to be a kind of *iter*, but *iter* is derived (5.35) from *itus* ('going'), not from *tero*. Rather, each name in the group is derived from the motion or action by which the place in question 'is trod', *teritur*; or, in the case of soil, *sola terrae*, from the circumstance of being the sole parts (*sola*) that can be trodden on. That is, these things were all given the names they bear because they were each understood as an *iter* – which is always a

place that is trodden on and worn down by the activity for which it is used – and each such *iter* was given a different name as being worn by a characteristic activity. The name-giver saw a common relation in different things and used a particular mode of derivation to make new words that expressed that relation.

At 5.43 Varro derives *Auentinus* from *aduectus* (not from *aduentus*), for which Varro again uses the word's kinship group: *A(d)ue(he)ntinum* is connected by the raft/ferry to *Ve(he)labrum*, a toponym for a place connecting to the Aventine. That connection, in *res* and *uerbum*, gives Varro a reason for preferring the connection of *Auentinum* to *aduehere*. Similarly, at 5.83 Varro prefers to derive *Pontifex* from *pons sublicius* (not from *posse facere*, as had been suggested by Q. Mucius Scaevola,⁴⁵ himself a *pontifex maximus*): his point in this paragraph is that priests were named from the rites they performed, just as *sacerdotes* are so called from the *sacra* with which they are concerned, and there are rites associated with the bridge-building, as there are with the curia (hence the derivation *curiones* < *in curiis sacra*). Varro is true to his principle that name-givers followed certain recognizable patterns in understanding the relation of one thing to another and then in choosing the means of displaying the relation in the way they created a new word form for the second thing from the word that named the first thing.

There are many other such etymologies, and Varro's requirement that they follow rational patterns can exclude certain derivations as well as suggest them. At 7.39–40 he rejects etymologies of *Luca bos* ('elephant') from *Libyci* and *Lucani* (both can be called 'Lucae'). Varro's source for the latter suggested that the elephant was called *Luca bos* because *nostri* first saw elephants during the war against Pyrrhus in Lucania and *bos* was their name for the largest quadruped they themselves knew, hence 'Lucanian cow'. He rejects these etymologies for being rather unusual ways of deriving names for animals. Surely other animals too would have been named on those patterns, but were not; panthers and lions, for example, would have been called *Lucae* – rather than *Africae* – *bestiae*. Varro is therefore unhappy with the suggestion that the name-giver in these disparate instances *chose* (*declinatio uoluntaria*) to understand what he saw and to represent phonically the relation between two *res* (Libya and an animal native to Libya) in a way he did not for similar Libyan animals. Instead, Varro keeps the Carthaginian connection, but

⁴⁵ Q. Mucius P. f. P. n. Scaevola *GRFF* 7, p. 125: *pontifices, ut Scaeuola Quintus pontifex maximus dicebat, a posse et facere ut pontifices.*

derives the name from the commonplace *bos* and the *lux* ('light', 'glitter') of the gleaming gold shields mounted atop Hannibal's elephants. Such differences are among the more common instances of disanalogy or anomaly, as with the natives of various towns that are cited in Varro's books on inflexion. Still, Varro seems to think that, if he has a good alternative etymology, he would rather reject an unparalleled lexical connection between these two particular kinds of *res*.

Let us take one last look at the Roman landscape through the lens of Varro's etymologies. After moving from earth to soil (*humus*) and from there to moisture (*humor*) and the features that contain it, Varro comes back to land and its regions, the names of the peoples who inhabit them, and the five Roman kinds or *genera* of field, *ager*, the name for 'land into which or from which they used to drive something for the sake of produce' (5.34 *ager dictus in quam terram quid agebant, et unde quid agebant fructus causa*); however, others say that it is so named because the Greeks call it ἄγρός. The derivation from *agere* brings Varro back to *actus*, a 'drove' or path along which cattle are driven, which he included in the family of *tero* in 5.22. Here *actus* is exploited to bring up the rule that its minimum measurement is 4x120 feet, for the four-foot width is said perhaps to come from the four-footed cattle that are driven along the *actus*, so that the use of such a path – as a drove – is connected not only to its name, but also, via the animals that use it, to a traditional rule for measuring the minimum space to be left between fields – an important consideration in farming with livestock.⁴⁶ That rule is indeed an ancient one, as we see from Varro's next comment, that a square *actus* would thus be 120 x 120 feet, a number explained by the fact that *antiqui* fixed many limits using multiples of twelve.

Of course, a square path for driving cattle would be a bit strange, so it is clear that this has been conjured up only to bring us to the next word, *iugerum*, the name for 'two square *actus* yoked together' (5.35 *dictum iunctis duobus actibus quadratis*). That in turn, brings up *centuria*, a name originally designating a land division, *centum iugera*, which was not

⁴⁶ That minimum measurements must be required of such a path between fields is clear from the facts that it must be usable for its purpose of driving oxen and that it may have to be enforced as an easement on the landowner. The minimum length required of an *actus* can be understood from the mechanics of the motion of oxen, as is clear from Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 18.9 *Iugum uocabatur, quod uno iugo boum in die exarari posset; actus, in quo boues agerentur cum aratro uno impetu iusto*. Its four-foot minimum width (not mentioned by Pliny) is here connected by Varro with the ox's four feet – implausibly enough in practical terms (it probably had more to do with the width of the cattle or of a cart), but it yields an obvious and natural connection by association, which is presumably why Varro makes it: oxen and carts vary in width, but the former all have four feet.

changed, however, when the area doubled; this phenomenon is compared to *tribus*, a name given when the Roman people were divided into three parts, and not changed when the number of parts multiplied. Then other terms' origins are analyzed by analogy to that of *actus* < *agere*, the place along which cattle were driven was a drove: the places where they carried things were *uiaie* (*uiaie* < *uehebant*); places to which they 'conveyed' produce were farmhouses (*uillae* < *conuehebant*); what they moved along they called a 'gait' (i.e. a road or path), from a 'going' (*qua ibant*, *ab itu iter*); where that was narrow, it was a 'by-way', *semita*, as if it were a 'half-road' (*semiter*).

Again, these words are not derived from *ager*, but for Varro they show how, in this semantic family, similar relations of one thing to another, relations of use in particular, were seen by the ancients, who used these things and who chose similar linguistic means to express those relations when deriving a word from the use for the thing used. Schematically, as thing *a* is related to thing *b* in manner *M*, while the name given to thing *a* was changed in manner *N* to yield a name 'b' for thing *b*; and things *xyz*, related to things *efg* in manner *M*, were given names 'xyz' changed from the names of things *efg* in manner *N*:

Word ^{'a'} > (Declinatio ^N) > Word ^{'b'}	Words ^{'efg'} > (Declinatio ^N) > Words ^{'xyz'}
Thing ^a > (Relation ^M) > Thing ^b	Things ^{efg} > (Relation ^M) > Things ^{xyz}
quod uehendo / agendo / circumeundo teritur > (deverbative noun) > uia / actus / ambitus	
places worn by travel or transport > (relation=place of action) > places traversed+worn	

Again, the things and their names are related to one another via the ancient people who used them.

Varro's next paragraphs (5.36–40) continue the family history of *ager*. In the first paragraph here, Varro's choice of words to pursue (some under the neighbour's fence) yields a set of terms all interrelated by (an account of) the historical development of farming in Rome. He thereby shows how the early Romans divided up the *loca* according to their usefulness *to them* and, in light of their use, named them accordingly. From *ager cultus* seeds came, and the seeds 'formed' or 'grew together' with the land (*cultus* < *coalescebant*), and where the *ager* was not seeded (*consitus*), it is *incultus*. Once again, an action or process (here, the natural formation of seeds in plants growing in a field) provides a name for one species of a kind of thing (land) whose particular function, for the farmer, is defined by that process – so much so

that the *absence* of the process defines its opposite, ‘unseeded’ land. Varro shows us both the original and the derived forms alongside the undifferentiated *res* and its two species. Again, because at first people used to garner (*capiebant*) produce from a flat field, *that* is called *campus*; after they began to cultivate (*colere*) the neighbouring higher places, they called these *colles* from *colendo*; those fields they did not cultivate because they were covered with woods (*siluas*), or the kind of field where a flock can be grazed, but which they held as property, they called wooded pastures (*saltus*) from their ‘saved use’ (*ab usu s<a>luo*).

The course of this etymological hunting expedition looks like a potted history of Roman land-use. We should have expected this, given Varro’s idea that, while the tracing of inflexion, *declinatio naturalis*, requires an expertise, *ars*, and its rules, tracing the origins of words that were ‘imposed’ on things, *impositicia uerba*, requires research and inquiry, *historia*.⁴⁷ Varro’s antiquarian project is based on such *historia*, which is, I think, one reason why he does not claim to reach *scientia* on the highest of his four steps of etymology. Such a *historia* must amount to a collection of facts about things and their use, then about the words coined and derived to name them as new things come into use. Varro even suggests that such is the origin of the verb *nominare* itself: when new things (*res nouae*) were brought into use, men placed names (*nomina*) on them, by which they might know (*nouissent*) them.⁴⁸

That the process of dividing up their *loca* depended on the ancients’ *understanding* things and their uses in a certain way is clear from the next explanation:⁴⁹ because it ‘*was seen to be*’ the foundation (*quod uidebatur . . . esse fundamentum*) of flocks and money, a field was called *fundus*, or else because it pours out (*fundit*) many things each year (5.37). Varro continues in 5.38⁵⁰ with *area* < *arescere* (an *area* being the place where the cut sheaves dry out for threshing) and then ventures into the city with the

⁴⁷ L. 8.5, cf. Blank 2008: 58, 66–7.

⁴⁸ L. 6.60 *ab eo quoque potest dictum nominare, quod res nouae in usum quom additae erant, quibus ea<s> nouissent, nomina ponebant. ab eo nuncupare, quod tunc <pro> ciuitate uota noua suscipiuntur. nuncupare nominare ualere apparet in legibus, ubi ‘nuncupatae pecuniae’ sunt scriptae.*

⁴⁹ The same is true for times in the next book: *dicemus primo de temporibus quam quae per ea fiunt, sed ita ut ante de natura eorum: ea enim dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini* (6.3); that is, the nature of the two *res* (the thing from which the word was derived and that for which it was made) was the name-giver’s guide in imposing names (cf. Blank 2008: 56 n. 17).

⁵⁰ L. 5.38 *ubi frumenta secta, ut terantur [et], arescunt, area. propter horum similitudinem in urbe loca pura areae; a quo potest etiam ara deum, quod pura, nisi potius ab ardore, ad quem ut sit fit ara; a quo ipsa area non abest, quod qui arefacit ardor est solis.* ‘Where the cut grain-sheaves dry out for threshing is a ‘threshing-floor’. Because of their likeness to these, clean places in the city are *areae*, from which may also be the *ara* (‘altar’) of the gods, because it is clean, unless it is rather from *ardor* (‘heat’) – the

derivation *ara* < *areae* (*ara* being similar to *area* as a *locum purum*, but urban); alternatively, perhaps both *ara* and *area* derive from *ardor*. So according to one etymology, *area* leads to *ara*, but not by the same path as *arescere* leads to *area*; according to another, *ardor* leads to *ara*, but also to *area* again; and both link these locations' names to their functions and to the aspects of their functions that they have in common. This is Varro's way of showing the nature of this particular kinship group: the people who gave these names saw a connection between things, either of threshing floors to altars or of heat to both altars and threshing floors. Varro cannot say which was the particular historical course here, but it may not matter to him, since the circularity reinforces everything in the kinship group, and as there is no rule that the ancients saw one connection only, so there is no norm that etymologies must be exclusive.

Perhaps what I have outlined thus far will give an idea of how one might analyze the remainder of Varro's treatment of *locus*, as well as those of *corpus*, *tempus*, *actio*. My aim has been to show, first, that Chrysippus (and Stoics in general), who may not have constructed a theory of etymology, but certainly used particular etymologies in the course of expounding their doctrines in ethics and physics – for example, in the 'articulation of ethical concepts'⁵¹ – saw the relationship between things and words as explicable through a theory of *oikeiosis*. The interrelations of all things in the world, which were organized systematically by the divine *logos* for our use and benefit, came to be expressed in *logos* only insofar as they were understood by humans, endowed as we are with a spark of that same divine reason, in relation to ourselves. Similarly, Varro viewed the relations between words as dependent on the relations between things, and those relations come into being with the use we make of those things. That view too, I suggest, was inspired and informed by the Stoic theory of *oikeiosis*.

altar comes to be for the sake of burning, so that it may take place; from it (sc. burning, heat) *area* itself is not far removed, because what does the drying is the heat of the sun.'

⁵¹ Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.83 and Blank 2008: 52–3.

Appendix

Varro's apparent adherence to Antiochus of Ascalon⁵² raises the question whether there is anything especially Antiochean in the *oikeiosis* theory I am associating with his account of language or whether we should think of Varro's theory as depending rather on Chrysippus and Antipater, to whom, along with Aristophanes and Apollodorus, he refers (as we have seen) as his authorities in etymology (*L.* 6.2; cf. Aristophanes and Cleanthes in 5.9). Despite the mention of Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater as authorities, Antiochus may be in the background of Varro's etymological practice. This possibility is raised by Cicero's 'Varro' (*Academica* 1.32), who makes etymology a tool by which, in what he is describing as Plato's philosophy, reason can learn the truth.⁵³

Stoic and Antiochean ('Peripatetic') *oikeiosis* theories, as reported by Cicero, both aim generally at giving an account of moral development toward the ethical life, their differences between them explaining the different conceptions of such a life and of its ultimate goal, the *summum bonum*, with which they are associated.⁵⁴ In contrast, Varro is not – at least not in *De lingua Latina* – concerned to ground a moral life or different views of its goal, although he was aware of Antiochus' presentation of moral theories, as we see from his own schematic table of all possible moral theories in *On Philosophy*, summarized in Augustine's *De civitate Dei* 19.1–3. What I find in Varro does not give any clues as to the position he would take on the points on which Antiochus⁵⁵ differed from the Stoics, unless it be his tendency, often characterized as 'Peripatetic', to deal with external objects as (external) goods, albeit not parts of the

⁵² See now Blank 2012 and, for Antiochus' philosophy in its various parts and relations to Stoicism, the Peripatos, and Platonism, the other articles in Sedley 2012.

⁵³ On this connection between Antiochus and Varro, see Blank 2012: 287–8.

⁵⁴ Cf. Gill 2016: 226.

⁵⁵ On Antiochus' developmental account of *oikeiosis*, see: Cicero, *Fin.* 5.24, 41–3, along with Prost 2001: 247–9, Brittain 2012: 126–9, Schofield 2012: 177–8, Magnaldi 2009.

supreme good. Brittain (2012: 127) argues that the differences are small ('the degree of difference is easy to overrate'), emphasizing instead that Antiochus is in agreement with basic Stoic ideas, such as that 'our impulses are conditioned by our self-awareness'. The differences mainly concern babies, who can't talk.

There may be aspects of Antiochus' version of moral development and *oikeiosis* that make it especially well suited to include our relation to external indifferents, even if this aspect is not present in Piso's account of the theory. Antiochus' insistence on the value of external goods or what are often called 'the goods of fortune' and their being necessary for the 'happiest' life, if not for the 'happy' life, may give a reason for a greater focus on our relation to all the things we encounter in the world around us, the relation I claim is central to Varro's conception of naming. Still, there is little reason to think that Chrysippus did not think about such matters, especially as he had to counter Aristo's radically reductionist ethics. Cicero's Cato has the Stoic 'exercising selection among natural things, excluding their being all at the same level, *unlike* Aristo'.⁵⁶

The Stoic conception of the *telos* went through several stages of clarification and/or development: Cleanthes' articulation of Zeno's original formulation as 'to live in accordance with nature'; Chrysippus' expansion of this as 'to live in accordance with experience of what happens by nature';⁵⁷ clearer still are Diogenes of Babylon's formulation, 'to reason well in the selection of what is according to nature and deselection', and Antipater's, 'to live selecting what is according to nature and deselecting what is contrary to nature'.⁵⁸ Stoics must, therefore, have conceived of a way of selecting among the things that are according to nature, perhaps interpreted as things that are 'according to nature', perhaps interpreted as things that are or happen in accordance with *our human* nature. Still, it was only Aristo who interpreted our human nature as being *only* our reason, while the others were at pains to oppose this view. We must not think,

⁵⁶ Emphasis in the original: Ioppolo 2016: 196, referring (n. 128) to *Fin.* 3.12 *cum enim uirtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum quae secundum naturam sint, habere delectum, qui omnia sic exaequauerunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent uti nulla selectione uterentur, hi uirtutem ipsam sustulerunt.*

⁵⁷ Diog. Laert. 7.87 (*SVF* 3.4 πάλιν δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Τελῶν (the same formula in Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.6.a.9–11 = Wachsmuth–Hense vol. II p. 76.6–8).

⁵⁸ See Arius Didymus, *ap.* Stob. *Ecl.* 2.7.6a.12–16 (*SVF* 3.44 and 3.57) Διογένης δὲ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ . . . Ἀντίπατρος ζῆν ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν διηλεκῶς. Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἀπεδίδου· πᾶν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ποιεῖν διηλεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν προηγουμένων κατὰ φύσιν'.

then, that in order for a Stoic to think about how we relate to external indifferents, it would have required Antiochus' emphasis on the *physis* of the human being as a compound of body and soul, each with their parts, all of which have some importance to the highest goal.

The remaining question is at what point such thinking was or became part of a theory of *oikeiosis* as we see it in Hierocles and the Anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus*. Like the origin of Stoic *oikeiosis* theory itself, this is unclear, although Antipater's alternative formula for the *telos* may be informative here: 'to do everything in one's own power, constantly and without transgression, with a view to getting the things that are preferred, in accordance with nature'. That one should 'do everything in one's own power', which could also be translated as 'to do everything in accordance with oneself', the use of 'oneself' and not just 'according to nature', as in Antipater's first formulation, may point toward 'oneself' and the knowledge of one's own powers as the first point of reference in one's relation to external preferred indifferents. Perhaps, however, it is unnecessary to insist that earlier versions of a theory requiring selection and deselection among indifferents should be part of a theory of *oikeiosis*, when it suffices that the recognition of which indifferents are to be selected rests on a recognition that and how they are *oikeia* to us.

Linguistic Naturalism in Cicero's Academica

Tobias Reinhardt*

O

The *Academica* is a dialogue completed in 45 BC, near the beginning of the second of the two phases in his life when Cicero produced – broadly speaking – philosophical dialogues. The work is devoted to epistemology, and specifically the question of whether there is empirical knowledge as the Stoics defined it, an issue which had been debated by Stoics and Academics since the third century BC. There are speakers for the Stoic side, in particular Stoic epistemology as adopted by Antiochus of Ascalon (previously an Academic sceptic, who then turned to dogmatism), and speakers who represent Academic scepticism. Each side advances arguments for its position, as well as offering a historical account of the Academic tradition as they construe it (only one of them is extant in full). Cicero published the work in two editions, changing the speakers and shifting the fictional date of the dialogue from 62 or 61 BC to a time near the date of composition. Of these, the second book of the first edition in two books and part of the first book of the second edition in four books are extant. While some modification of the material beyond the necessary changes of speakers and scenery is likely, there is little reason to suspect substantial differences in subject matter between the two editions.¹

Stepping back from the complexities of the extant remains, we can observe that on one level the debate in the *Academica* is about whose position is the more natural one, that is, whose account of what we might

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¹ Helpful discussions of the editorial history of *Ac.* are Griffin 1997 and Rösch-Binde 1998, whose primary focus is the tracing of the personal relationship of Cicero and Varro.

call the cognitive position of humans in the world is an accurate reflection of how things really are. Correspondingly, both sides present the other side as in some sense unnatural, an inaccurate presentation of the cognitive habits and resources of human beings and in that sense alien to human nature. The Academics say that, by the extreme standard applied by the Stoics themselves, nothing can be known at all, which is eminently unnatural not from their but from the Stoics' own point of view, while the Stoics say that the Academics, in rejecting firm knowledge of the kind envisaged by the Stoics, deprive us of our senses and plunge us into darkness when it is plain that this is not the position we are in. It is compatible with this that the speakers in the dialogue sometimes seem to formulate their arguments with reference to what 'we' (actually existing, inherently flawed human beings) do, and sometimes develop them with reference to the uniquely rational Stoic sage, whose powers and abilities are quite unlike those of ordinary human beings.²

The general tendency to present one's own position as natural and that of the opponent as unnatural in the sense described has a linguistic dimension, which will be the subject of this paper.

I

I will first look at some material in which the Antiochian speaker Lucullus defends the Stoic view that there are cataleptic impressions with reference to linguistic usage, arguing that the way in which people express themselves reveals assumptions about the nature of knowledge which are consistent with the Stoic conception of knowledge but incompatible with other conceptions (or competing conceptions of belief). On Lucullus' argument, as I hope to show, the expressions in question presuppose such assumptions because they reflect how things actually are, rather than as a result of convention.

In §§19–29 Lucullus offers a defence of the senses, arguing firmly within the framework of the Stoic position, which defines perception as assent to a cataleptic impression. Our senses, according to Lucullus, are so precise, so sharp that, if human nature was offered something better, there would be nothing it could ask for. In making his case, Lucullus relies on the famous Zenonian definition of the cataleptic impression, which was mentioned in §18. Consider Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.248 (= SVF 1.59):

² Cf. *Luc.* 57 (Lucullus speaking): ... *quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem de quo omnis hic sermo est.*

καταληπτική (sc. φαντασία) δέ ἐστιν ἡ (i) ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ (ii) κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεςφραγισμένη, (iii) ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος.

A cataleptic impression is (i) from what is and (ii) is imprinted and sealed on in accordance with that very thing which is, (iii) of a kind which could not arise from what is not.

On this definition, an impression, i.e. a thought arising from perception, is cataleptic if it is true, if its representational content, and correspondingly the alteration in the mind of the perceiving subject it gives rise to, corresponds in its fine detail to the object of the impression, and if it is such that it could not be false.³ We leave aside many of the issues which are subject to debate about this definition, notably those to do with the interpretation of the second clause, and focus on passages in which Lucullus attempts to show that there are true impressions which cannot be false, i.e. that there are impressions which have the properties stipulated in the first and the third clause of the definition.⁴ Once a subject assents to such impressions, he is left with an apprehension (κατάληψις, *comprehensio*).

Having praised the senses, Lucullus goes on to argue that without apprehension and concepts, which arise from apprehensions, faculties and dispositions of the human mind which are universally agreed to exist would not be conceivable. Consider §22:

Memoriae quidem certe, quae non modo philosophiam sed omnis uitae usum omnesque artes una maxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. **Quae potest enim esse memoria falsorum, aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet?** Ars uero quae potest esse, nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem ab inscio? **Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere uidemus, alterum non item.**

In that case there's no room left at all for memory, which is our only storehouse not just of philosophy but also of the experience we derive from life and of all the arts. **What sort of memory can there be of false contents? Can anyone remember anything he hasn't apprehended and**

³ Important discussions include Frede 1987b, Sedley 2002, and Reed 2002.

⁴ In *Luc.* 78 the character Cicero calls the question of whether the condition named in the third clause is ever met the one remaining point of contention (*haec est una contentio quae adhuc permanserit*).

doesn't retain in his mind? Again, how can there be a systematic art that isn't constituted by not one or two but a set of apprehensions? If you take that away, how will you distinguish the expert from the layman? **It's no accident that we will call one person an expert and not another: we say this when we see that one of them has a set of apprehensions and the other doesn't.** (transl. Brittain)

The first highlighted sentence states in factual terms (i) that there can be no memory of *falsa*, and (ii) that nobody ever remembers something that is not securely grasped. (i) and (ii) relate to the first and the third clause of the Zenonian definition respectively. Lucullus makes a point of speaking generally: the suggestion is that everyone's pre-philosophical conception of memory somehow presupposes a conception of memory contents on which the latter meet the requirements of the first and the third clause of Zeno's definition. However, questions arise immediately: of course one can misremember something, be certain that a certain event occurred when in actual fact it did not occur. That e.g. eyewitnesses are often unreliable is not just a truism of contemporary court proceedings but was recognized in Rome as well, and it would not be difficult to assemble further deeply familiar examples of defective memory. However, it would not be in keeping with Cicero's technique of composing dialogues to land an interlocutor with a manifestly feeble point, which makes it incumbent on the reader to look for an interpretation of the text according to which it advances claims which are at least tenable.

I suggest that the point Lucullus makes is linguistic, which could be brought out by placing inverted commas around *memoria falsorum* and *meminit*. The claim would be that in ascribing 'memory of p' to an individual or in making statements of the form 'he remembers that p',⁵ the proposition p needs to be true and such that it could not be false for the statement to be regarded as well-formed in communicative situations.⁶ Lucullus would be invoking something like the factivity of the verb *meminisse* (and corresponding noun phrases),⁷ which would be attested

⁵ See Brittain 2012: 112: 'Lucullus accepts the Stoic account of memory, in which it is defined as the retention of a proposition rather than an irrational sensory input'; cf. also Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.373 for memory as *θησαυρισμὸς φαντασιῶν* (on the Stoic view). On ancient conceptions of memory see Nikulin 2015; on the Stoic conception of memory *ibid.*: 69–72, as well as Ierodiakonou 2007.

⁶ Consider e.g. 'he remembers that the moon landing was an elaborate hoax', which would either prompt an objection ('surely you mean he thinks he remembers') or concern about the subject's mental state.

⁷ See e.g. Hazlett 2010: 3: 'Certain two-place predicates, including 'knows', 'learns', 'remembers', and 'realizes', which denote relations between persons and propositions, are factive in this sense: an

here for the first time in ancient reflections on language by philosophers and grammarians.

A reading on which Lucullus' point turns on linguistic expressions is encouraged by what he says next, i.e. in the second part of the passage above, where he turns to the conception of an art (τέχνη). While he begins with a reference to the philosophical conception of an art (on which more in a moment), the highlighted sentence is best read as relating to ordinary usage and the way people speak about craftsmen (*artifexes* are recognized by everyone, not just philosophers, and the first person plural used by Lucullus is unlikely to signal 'we philosophers' or 'we Antiochians').⁸ What Lucullus is saying is that when Latin speakers apply the term *artifex* to someone, they do so because they ascribe to the person beliefs – those which jointly account for the *artifex's* technical expertise, as is brought out well by Britain's translation – that are true and cannot be false, i.e. what the Stoics term apprehensions.⁹ (The argument from the application of the term *artifex* cannot be described in terms of the factivity of certain expressions, and we shall return to the issue in section 4. What matters for now is that Lucullus is arguing from linguistic usage.)

Lucullus had introduced this point with a reference to the formal conception of an art as formulated by the Stoics but widely used in a variety of fields once aspects of Stoic thinking on epistemological matters had become part of the shared cultural background of educated people. Consider e.g. the following definition of a craft (Olympiodorus *In Grg.* pp. 53–4 Jahn = *SVF* I p. 21):¹⁰

Ζήνων δὲ φησιν ὅτι τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

Zeno says that a craft is a system composed of co-exercised apprehensions aimed at a most useful end for the things in life.

A craft is an organized body of knowledge whose individual elements are καταλήψεις. Other texts describe crafts not as an abstract organized body

utterance of "S knows p" is true only if p, an utterance of "S learned p" is true only if p, and so on'; Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970; on factive attitudes see Williamson 2000: 5–8 and 21–38.

⁸ We take the future *dicemus* to have the function of inviting the agreement of the interlocutor.

⁹ The point we are making would be unaffected if *dicemus* in *Luc.* 22 was rendered 'we shall assert', as it strictly ought to be given the presence of *esse* (which turns the construction into an accusative with infinitive rather than a double accusative). On that reading, too, the issue would be the application (or not) of the term *artifex* to certain individuals (note the demonstrative pronouns) in everyday contexts.

¹⁰ A collection of passages where Cicero refers to the formal conception of a craft can be found in Reid 1885: 201. See also Barnes 2015.

(α σύστημα), but also, on a different level of description, as a disposition of the human mind (α διάθεσις). Lucullus' shift from this technical conception to how 'we' speak about *artifices* implies that the Stoic conception of a craft is but a philosophical enshrinement of the – correct – everyday conception of artistry which is reflected in the manner in which we apply the term *artifex* to some but not to others.

A little later, in §26, Lucullus steps up his attack on the Academics and argues that reason itself (*ratio*) would be abolished if they were right in their criticism of the cataleptic impression and κατάληψις resulting from it:

Quid quod si ista uera sunt ratio omnis tollitur quasi lux lumenque uitae? Tamenne in ista prauitate perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit uirtutem, cum esset ipsa [ratio] confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio cognitionis quaestionisque finis inuentio; **at nemo inuenit falsa, nec ea, quae incerta permanent, inuenta esse possunt, sed cum ea, quae quasi inuoluta ante fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inuenta dicuntur**: sic et initium quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendi tenet<ur>. Itaque argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece ἀπόδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit'.

Here's another point: if these Academic views are true, reason – the light and illumination of life, as we might call it – is entirely done away with. Will you persist in your perversity all the same? Reason provides the starting point for investigation and reason achieves virtue when it has strengthened itself by investigation; and investigation is the impulse for apprehension, ending in discovery. **But no one discovers what is false, nor can something that remains unclear be a discovery – rather it is when something that had been veiled (so to speak) has been revealed that it is called a discovery.** Thus <reason> contains both the starting point for investigation and its result, i.e. apprehension. That's why proof (*apodeixis* in Greek) is defined as 'an argument from apprehended premisses leading to something that wasn't apprehended before'. (transl. Brittain)

Several of the themes already touched on reappear here. In the highlighted sentence, the way in which the verb 'to find out that *p*' is used apparently in everyday contexts is again invoked as an argument why truths of the kind posited by the Stoics and Antiochus must exist.¹¹

¹¹ Given that Lucullus is made to speak of *inuenire falsa*, we are clearly not supposed to think of 'finding' in the sense of 'discovering a physical object'. Admittedly, the adjective *falsus* can modify nouns designating physical objects (cf. e.g. *falsae tabulae* in Cic. *Caec.* 71) and then denotes an object which is not genuine, but the overall context here precludes such an interpretation.

'To find out that *p*', on the argument made here, is another factive verb. How people talk about finding something out is treated as revelatory of a key double function of reason, investigation and discovery. The philosophical conception of scientific proof is, like the philosophical conception of a craft earlier, treated as growing out of a pre-theoretical understanding, in this case of this double function.¹² Lucullus' exposition is compressed, but whether he is thinking of a search for a fact or of the search for the reason for an unexplained event, the suggestion seems to be that a proof presents the findings of a relevantly similar search within the domain of the science in question.

These passages will be revisited below when Cicero's reply in the second half of the *Lucullus* has been considered. For now I expand on the linguistic naturalism which, or so I claim, Lucullus is deploying. In principle, one could argue that certain expressions, notably verbs like *meminisse* and *inuenire*, have truths which cannot turn out to be falsehoods as objects only by convention, and those modern linguists who hold that there are factive expressions would take this view. But clearly, given Lucullus' overall argumentative aim of showing that apprehension exists and is nature's gift to human beings,¹³ showing that Latin speakers use the expressions in question of truths by convention would do little to prove his point. Any inference from the *consensus omnium* about the use of e.g. *meminisse* of truths which cannot be falsehoods to the existence of such truths would only go through if the consensus was indicative of how things really are. In that case the *consensus* would capture a real feature of the thing designated and would fall on the naturalism side of the naturalism/conventionalism divide. One may compare, not coincidentally, the Stoic name-giver who assigns names but does so with an understanding of the thing designated (see [Introduction](#), in this volume, p. 9, Blank, in this volume, esp. pp. 122–8); this is the reason why etymological analysis is

¹² With the definition given by Cicero cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.310–14 (= *SVF* 2.266): Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἔχοντων ἢ ἀπόδειξις πρὸ παντὸς ὀφείλει λόγος εἶναι, δεύτερον συνακτικός, τρίτον καὶ ἀληθής, τέταρτον καὶ ὁδὸν ἔχων συμπεράσμα, πέμπτον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων . . . συνδραμόντων οὖν πάντων τούτων, τοῦ τε συνακτικὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον καὶ ἀληθὴ καὶ ὁδὸν παραστατικόν, ὑφίσταται ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἔνθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφουσιν 'ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ὁδὸν', which, however, does not characterize the premisses as apprehended; and Diog. Laert. 7.45 (= *SVF* 2.235): Εἶναι δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν σύστημα ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς τὸν δὲ συλλογισμὸν λόγον συλλογιστικὸν ἐκ τούτων· τὴν δ' ἀπόδειξιν λόγον διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον καταλαμβανομένων τὸ ἦττον καταλαμβανόμενον περαίνοντα.

¹³ Cf. *Ac.* 1.42 (from Varro's account of Zeno's views, which he regards as mere corrections of the Old Academic view): *E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et uera esse illi et fidelis uidebatur . . . quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur.*

deemed by the Stoics to be a device for inquiring into the nature of the thing designated, not for obtaining historical insights into the language in question.

2

Cicero's reply on the subject of memory is given in *Luc.* 106:

'Vnde memoria, si nihil percipimus?' Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? Meminisse uisa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaeus, qui magnus mathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentienti totam geometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est? Atqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut uobismet ipsis placet. Si igitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque meminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendere nihil potest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata; uera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime uis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit.

'What happens to memory if we don't apprehend anything?' That was one of your questions. Well, is it true that we can only remember impressions we have apprehended? Is it true in the case of Polyaeus? He is said to have been a great mathematician, who later, in agreement with Epicurus, came to believe that geometry was false. Is it true that he therefore forgot what he used to know? But falsehoods aren't apprehensible, as you think, too. So if memory is only of things apprehended, everything anyone remembers is something he has apprehended. Nothing false is apprehensible, then, and Siron remembers all of Epicurus' doctrines – so they all turn out to be true! That's fine by me; but you must either concede that that's the case – which is far from your intention – or you're going to have to give memory back to me and admit that there's space for it even if there's no apprehension. (transl. Brittain)

Cicero begins with Lucullus' claim, cast as a rhetorical question: memory cannot exist without κατάληψις, i.e. without cataleptic impressions which the mind has accepted by assenting to them. At the end of the paragraph Cicero poses a dilemma, whose horns are equally unacceptable for Lucullus: either one concedes that Siron has memories of Epicurean tenets or one concedes that memories are possible without κατάληψις. So Cicero thinks he has refuted Lucullus. What exactly has he shown?

Polyaeus was a famous mathematician who made contributions to geometry still recognized today. In his middle years he met Epicurus and became an Epicurean. The Epicureans rejected geometry, since they regarded the elementary concepts of geometry (point, line, plane) as

incompatible with their physical doctrines.¹⁴ So Polyaeus rejected his geometrical *katalepseis* as false, even though – and that must have been Cicero's view, too – he still 'had' them. For Lucullus propositions relating to central tenets of geometry are true and cannot be false.¹⁵ Siron is the famous Epicurean who is said to have taught Vergil.¹⁶ He can 'remember' Epicurean doctrines (like 'the world is made of atoms and void'), which Lucullus regards as wrong, because his physical outlook is Old Academic (or so his character is constructed).

How do the counterexamples relate to the argument made by Lucullus? Cicero takes Lucullus to be committed to the view that, for a proposition *p* to count as a memory, it must meet at least two conditions at the same time: (i) that the proposition *p* is true and cannot be false **and** (ii) the subject has the second-order belief (= belief about a belief) that *p* is true. Polyaeus and Siron qualify as counterexamples because in Polyaeus' case only the first condition is met (his geometrical beliefs are *de facto* true, even though he regards them as false), while in Siron's case his 'memories' only meet the second condition (he regards them as true, even though they are false).

With this the connection with Lucullus' argument from factive expressions has not yet been made, but it can be supplied straightforwardly

¹⁴ The fragments of Polyaeus are collected by Tepedino Guerra 1991; see also Dorandi 2012. Polyaeus rejected geometry because of his commitment to theoretical *minima*; see Sedley 1976: 23: 'That Epicurus believed in a minimal unit of measure out of which not only atoms but also all larger lengths, areas and volumes are composed, is nowadays widely accepted; and most would also agree that it is not merely a physical minimum, contingent upon the nature of matter, but also a theoretical minimum, than which nothing smaller is conceivable. Others before and since Epicurus have been seduced by similar theories without being led to reject conventional geometry. Yet this is precisely the penalty which a theory of minimal parts should carry with it, for one of its consequences is to make all lines integral multiples of a single length and therefore commensurable with each other, whereas incommensurability of lines in geometrical figures had been recognized by Greek mathematicians since the fifth century. Moreover, the principle of infinite divisibility lay at the heart of the geometrical method commonly called 'method of exhaustion', which was fruitfully developed by Eudoxus in the fourth century.' See also Mueller 1982: passim, but esp. 92–5, who is primarily concerned with Sextus' arguments against geometry in *Math.* 3, but notes continuities between sceptical and Epicurean attacks on the subject, and considers possible cross-influences; White 1989.

¹⁵ That geometry was a subject of interest in the Old Academy is suggested by *Ac.* 1.6, but the very compressed physical section of Varro's speech (*Ac.* 1.24–9), which draws heavily on Plato's *Tim.*, makes no further reference to it. Compare also Galen (*Ord. lib. prop.* 19.40–1 K., *Pecc. dig.* 5.68 K, *Aff. dig.* 5.40–1 K), whose methodology was strongly indebted to the Stoics. He famously reports that he once had a crisis of confidence about the possibility of scientific knowledge and was tempted by scepticism. But then he followed geometrical proofs and regained his confidence in scientific demonstration.

¹⁶ See Servius on Verg. *Ecl.* 6.13 and *Aen.* 6.264. The fragments of Siron are collected by Gigante 1990.

enough: it is an implication of Cicero's reply that a first-person statement of the form 'I remember that p ' only reveals second-order beliefs in the case of Siron (if p is a peculiarly Epicurean dogma), while the second-order beliefs of Polyaeus would prevent him from saying 'I remember that 'a point is an unextended σημείον' (= q)',¹⁷ even though q is true. Thus statements of the form 'I remember that r ' do not imply the truth of r , still less show that the relationship of verbs like *meminisse* to truths is a natural one (in the relevant sense).

We have just used examples with a first-person singular verb ('I remember'), since they allow us, guided by what Cicero says in *Luc.* 106, to devise plausible counterexamples to Lucullus' argument from linguistic usage. But once we move beyond these first-person examples, Cicero's retort looks less compelling. If we consider third-person examples, then 'Siron remembers that the world is made of atoms and void' would appear to feature a deviant use of 'to remember', except to a fellow Epicurean (leaving aside the possibility that 'remembers' is a quotation). As to Polyaeus, the statement 'he remembers that a point is an unextended σημείον' is not a clear-cut case; arguably it involves a deviant use of 'to remember' as well, since there has to be a temptation to qualify it by adding 'but he no longer believes it'. Alternatively, Lucullus might recognize it as a standard use and reject the suggestion that second-order beliefs about the truth of the memory content in question necessarily enter the picture. If we now look back to §26 of *Lucullus*, we see that Lucullus uses the passive *dicuntur* there, i.e. chooses a formulation which actually excludes that the expressions in question are first-person statements and instead suggests minimally third-person singular statements as the reference point, and quite possibly the usage shared across a linguistic community.

Cicero could reply that the person whose memory is at issue and an outside observer may both be wrong about the truth of the memory content in question, and that agreements on second-order beliefs are not necessarily indicative of the truth of the memory content but could equally reveal collective aberrations. Lucullus might here fall back on his Stoic convictions and say that divine providence has made the world rational and well-organized (cf. *Ac.* 1.29), and that this tells against collective aberration of the rational beings in it.

This shows that Cicero's reply to Lucullus would not necessarily mark the end of the debate, although it is of course the privilege of the author Cicero to give the interlocutor Cicero the last word. What Lucullus could not hope to secure against Cicero is that factive

¹⁷ This is the definition of a point considered by Sext. Emp. in *Math.* 3; see Mueller 1982: 74.

expressions reflect how things really are, i.e. his naturalist claim; this is, for Lucullus, an article of faith. However, while to the modern reader linguistic naturalism may look like a non-starter, it held considerably more attraction in antiquity. It is thus not surprising that Cicero, when he complements the *pars destruens* which we have just surveyed with a *pars construens*, introduces naturalistic considerations of his own in support of the Academic epistemological position. These will be the subject of the next section.

3

In §146 Cicero is building up to the conclusion of his speech and criticizes the Stoic conception of knowledge (*scientia*; ἐπιστήμη):

Sed quo modo tu si nihil comprehendi posset artificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id quod probabile esset satis magnam uim habere ad artes, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in eis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos docuisset aliquis quam uim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci; ne nobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos quod nusquam esset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam conprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare ex sui animi sententia quemque uoluerunt, deinde ita teneri si sciens falleret, quod inscientia multa uersaretur in uita; tum qui testimonium diceret ut arbitrari se diceret etiam quod ipse uidisset, quaeque iurati iudices cognouissent ut ea non aut esse <aut non esse> facta sed ut uideri pronuntiarentur.

But just as you claimed that crafts would collapse if nothing could be apprehended and just as you did not concede that the persuasive is of sufficient power with respect to the arts, so I reply to you now that art cannot exist without knowledge. Would Zeuxis or Phidias or Polyclitus accept this, that they knew nothing, even though they had such skill? But if someone taught them which force knowledge is supposed to have, they would cease to be angry; not even about us would they get exercised, having learnt that we remove only what exists nowhere and that we leave them with what is sufficient. The care and diligence of our ancestors confirms this way of thinking. They wanted first that everyone took an oath 'to the best of his knowledge', then that someone would only be held liable if he knowingly deceived, since much ignorance pervaded our lives, finally, that someone who gave a witness statement should say that he 'took a view' even on matters which he had seen himself, and what judges found they should not state as having been done or not but as something that appeared to them. (transl. Brittain, modified)

The passage begins with a reference both to the earlier section in §106 which we discussed above and the paragraph immediately following it in which Cicero drew attention to the fact that even the dogmatists recognize a category of so-called stochastic arts, which do not invariably yield their intended outcomes but are deemed arts nonetheless. Cicero chose to present these as, as a matter of fact, grounded in the *πιθανόν*, the persuasive impression which Carneades initially suggested as an *ad hominem* rejoinder to the Stoics and which some of his Academic successors promoted as a quasi-doctrine.¹⁸ Cicero then attempts to turn the tables on Lucullus and the Stoic conception of a *τέχνη*: on the Stoic view, only the sage is perfectly rational, i.e. he does not have a single false belief and consequently all his beliefs are consistent. Since he has also perfected the ability to assent to cataleptic impressions only, any new beliefs he acquires will be true. By contrast, the non-sage will have numerous false beliefs and will also assent to non-cataleptic impressions on occasion, some of which will be false. If one has false beliefs, one may forego epistemic opportunities in the shape of cataleptic impressions, because their propositional content will be incompatible with certain false beliefs; as a consequence, these cataleptic impressions may not attract assent.¹⁹ False beliefs can also drive out true beliefs which one already has, including ones which arise from cataleptic impressions, for similar reasons: on reflection, the subject becomes aware of an inconsistency in his beliefs and mistakenly lets go of the true belief. For the conception of a *τέχνη*, this poses a problem: while the Stoics allow for craft-knowledge in non-sages, this knowledge would not be immune to the sort of problem outlined above, since at least some beliefs which are part of the ordered body of knowledge that *is* the craft on one level of description will be susceptible to the threat posed by false beliefs from outside the domain of the craft in question. Cicero assumes that it can only be the sage who is in total possession of a craft, because only he has *scientia* (= *ἐπιστήμη*), the sort of stable knowledge which comes from having and acquiring true beliefs, which then mutually secure one another and make it impossible, e.g., to be argued out of a belief belonging to the domain of a given art. Because the Stoics held that sages are either an idealized construct or exceedingly rare, and because Lucullus had made clear in his speech in a number of places that the reference

¹⁸ On the *πιθανόν* see *Luc.* 32–6, 98–113; *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.166–89 and *Pyr.* 1.227–30; Frede 1987c, Bett 1989, Allen 1994, Reinhardt 2018.

¹⁹ See Brittain 2014 on situations envisaged by the Stoics in which cataleptic impressions do not invariably give rise to assent.

point of his exposition was the Stoic sage (see n. 2 above), Cicero introduces an absurd scenario in which celebrated practitioners of certain creative arts are told that they 'knew nothing' (sc. since by the extreme standards employed by the Stoics they could not have the kind of knowledge which only the sage had). This gives rise to anger on their part, which dissipates once the absurdly high standards of the Stoic conception of knowledge are mentioned. When Cicero says that he removes what exists nowhere and leaves the artists with what is sufficient, he is talking about the Stoic conception of knowledge and of apprehension, on which the former is founded, and about the persuasive impression. Note how this remark is open to a naturalist reading already: the cataleptic impression does not exist and is consequently made-up, while the persuasive impression is there and is something one can leave with the artists (sc. because it has always been available to them *qua* human beings). Their expertise, so it is implied, has always been grounded in it, long before philosophers came along to 'theorize' it.

This way of thinking (*quam rationem*), Cicero thinks, is borne out by the manner in which the Roman ancestors (*maiores*) implemented certain legal concepts (e.g. liability) as well as introduced a number of hedging phrases which are traditionally used in public pronouncements of various kinds like oaths, witness statements, and importantly the official issuance of the verdict by a judge or judges presiding over a trial, where *uideri* features in a loaded sense.²⁰

It is this last point, of course, which is of interest in the present context. Quite apart from the fact that Cicero is here working on his larger project of 'importing' Greek philosophy into Rome, by asserting effectively that Academic scepticism is not some alien contrivance devised by unworldly and un-Roman Greek philosophers but a mode of thinking and of approaching the human existence which has a fundamental affinity with, indeed is an articulation of, traditional Roman ways, Cicero suggests that the hedging phrases only make sense if whoever formulated them assumed human beliefs to have the status of persuasive impressions (which tend to be true but can be false) rather than of what the Stoics term apprehensions.

Now one might think that legal constructs and legal procedure are poorly chosen examples in a context where the issue is whether certain institutions and ways of talking about them are 'natural', given that legal constructs and procedures are an archetypal example of something that

²⁰ See *OLD* s.v. *uideo* no. 22: '(pass., in legal and other technical contexts) to appear after due consideration, or sim., be deemed'; Daube 1956: 73–7.

exists by convention, an attempt to impose order on messy human affairs (and a culturally contingent one at that). Yet what Cicero is focusing on here is not the legal constructs (like ‘liability’) but the conception of human cognitive behaviour which underlies such constructs, the *Menschenbild* and corresponding epistemology on which anything that is legal convention is predicated. This conception of human cognitive resources, Cicero suggests, is carving nature by its joints, unlike the Stoic conception of apprehension.

Roman legal epistemology as Cicero construes it is germane to §146 in ways not apparent from the passage itself. Just as the Stoic conception of apprehension represents one conception of belief, the character Cicero in *Luc.* argues for a competing conception, in which assent to a cataleptic impression is replaced with ‘approval’ (the noun does not occur; the verbs used are *adprobare*, *probare*, and *sequi*) of a persuasive impression. ‘Approval’ is the kind of endorsement which Cicero associates with the hedging phrases cited at the end of §146. This is plain from the fact that the loaded sense of *uideri*, which features in the standard phrase with which judges introduce their verdicts (§146 *fin.*) as we saw, is also used in §105 *init.*, at the end of the passage in which Cicero – for once avowedly translating from a Greek source, the first book of Clitomachus’ *On the suspension of judgement* (see *Luc.* 98 *fin.*) – introduces the Academic notion of approval ascribed to Carneades by Clitomachus.²¹ (*Ad*)*probare* was probably chosen for a number of reasons to designate the kind of endorsement which a Clitomachean Academic may officially give to impressions,²² but one of them was arguably that there was a legal concept of *adprobatio* which has an affinity with Clitomachean ‘approval’.

The concept of legal approval is associated with hire contracts and building work in particular:²³ when an *artifex* has been hired to execute a project of some kind, he bears the risk of failure during the construction process. Upon successful completion the party which commissioned the work is expected to ‘approve’ the work carried out as done in a proper, craftsman-like fashion,²⁴ as well as in accordance with the specifications. At that point liability passes from *artifex* to customer, except for later damage due to fraudulent actions of the *artifex*. ‘Approval’ thus given is, on one level, not qualified: hence the simple passing of liability from

²¹ See Cic. *Luc.* 105 *Haec si uobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, inuidiosa certe non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus sed ea quae uos percipi comprehendique eadem nos, si modi probabilia sint, uideri dicimus.*

²² See Görler 2004. ²³ See Samter 1905, Martin 1986, and Zimmermann 1996: 401–6.

²⁴ This is explicitly specified in the relevant legal texts; see Martin 1986: 336.

craftsman to customer. At the same time, the customer has no way of knowing if the work carried out will not reveal a fault which is not due to fraudulent behaviour at some later point in time, indeed cannot know whether, say, parts of the work which are not immediately visible (e.g. because they are encased by masonry) are not faulty at the time of approval. In that sense his acceptance, although unqualified as far as the force of the endorsement is concerned, is qualified. Cicero, by using *adprobare* of approval given to persuasive impressions, characterizes the nature of beliefs in this way and implies that human belief generally can be conceptualized on this model.

What, if anything, does what Cicero says in §146 have to do with linguistic naturalism? We suggested above that Lucullus cites factive expressions as an instance where linguistic properties of, in particular, certain verbs (e.g. 'to remember') reveal actual properties of the thing they designate: in the case of memory, that it is made from apprehensions. We considered that the fact that 'to remember' is used of truths might be put down to convention and an agreement between language users, but argued for Lucullus' argument to deliver on his argumentative aim (i.e. to show that apprehension exists, not that it is taken to exist by language users), he would have to make the stronger claim that verbs like 'to remember' behave as they do because their semantic properties were fixed with a profound understanding of the nature of the thing they designate and that they reflect an important aspect of reality for this reason. Analogously, Cicero would be suggesting in §146 that the various hedging expressions which he cites do not just reveal an agreement amongst the *maiores* about the nature of oaths, witness statements, and announcements of verdicts – so that he would merely be arguing from the authority of the ancestors –, but do actually, *pace* Lucullus, reflect an important feature of human cognitive resources as they really are, which was captured by the *maiores*.

With this Cicero positions his own naturalist argument squarely in opposition to Lucullus'. As he says in *Luc.* 105 *init.* (above, n. 21), it is the same impressions of which the Stoics say that they are cataleptic and the Academics that they appear true after due consideration.

4

The way in which Lucullus argues from certain linguistic expressions for the existence of κατάληψις is, as far as I can see, unparalleled in our Greek sources, but that we should not therefore ascribe it to Ciceronian ingenuity alone is suggested by *Luc.* 26, concerned with reason as we saw.

The manner in which that paragraph moves from a general observation of what reason does to the usage of ‘to find’ (*inuenire*) which, the argument goes, bears out the general observation, to a Latin translation of a Stoic definition of scientific proof, complete with a code-switch to the Greek term for it (ἀπόδειξις), suggests that Cicero derived the basic idea from the Antiochian source on which Lucullus’ speech draws. Further, the train of thought in §26 is not as lucid as one might wish, and it is tempting to surmise that Antiochus developed his argument by exploiting the fact that ἀποδεικνύναι is actually a particularly good example of a verb which has truths as its object.²⁵

Before trying to relate the linguistic naturalism I have ascribed to Lucullus to other varieties, one might ask what attitude Antiochus is likely to have had with respect to the naturalism (or not) of names. The Antiochian passage which comes closest to speaking to the issue comes from Varro’s speech on the history of the Academic tradition in the fragmentary first book of the second edition of *Ac*. The first part of Varro’s speech discusses Old Academic thought by subject area (ethics, physics, logic). In the section on logic, etymology is mentioned as among the teachings of the *antiqui*, i.e. the Academic successors of Plato prior to Arcesilaus and the Peripatetics beginning with Aristotle (*Ac*. 1.32):

... qua de causa definitiones rerum probabant et has ad omnia de quibus disceptabatur adhibebant; uerborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata, quam ἐτυμολογίαν appellabant.

... Accordingly, they approved the use of definitions of things and applied them to all the subjects they discussed. The analysis of words was another practice they approved, i.e., investigating the explanations for the names things had been given (which they called *etumologia* [‘etymology’]). (transl. Brittain)

While this extract comes from a historical survey which Varro explicitly calls the *prima forma* of philosophy,²⁶ later passages which introduce modifications and corrections to the *prima forma* leave the question of etymology untouched, which suggests that Antiochus’ own view, which he construed as said *prima forma* modified by later contributors to the Academic tradition (Academics prior to Arcesilaus, Peripatetics, Stoics), could be described as the extract has it.²⁷ By itself,

²⁵ Burnyeat 1997: 300 argues that passages of the first edition of *Ac*. which we are able to compare with passages from the second edition are less satisfactory in terms of ‘clarity, precision, and detail’.

²⁶ See *Ac*. 1.17 and 1.23; the occurrence in 1.33 is an emendation, albeit a compelling one.

²⁷ Contrast the interpretation of the passage given by Blank 2008.

the characterization of etymology as concerned with the question *qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata* might be open to a conventionalist reading (i.e. one on which the relationship between sign/word and referent is entirely arbitrary), so that an explanation of the *causae* would call for a philologist, but given that Antiochus is in his epistemology indistinguishable from a Stoic,²⁸ it is much more natural to assume that Antiochus thought, as the Stoics did, that etymological analysis of names can yield information on the thing designated by the name. In their introduction the editors of this volume helpfully survey which forms naturalism about names could take.

However, in the passages we have discussed Lucullus appears to rely on two models of how linguistic expression relates to reality which do not simply turn on a natural relationship of particular words designating particular things, although what Lucullus says is arguably compatible with and complementary to a Stoicizing naturalism about names:

- (i) For *meminisse*, *inuenire* (in the sense of 'to find out'), and possibly ἀποδεικνύναι, he observes that they take as grammatical objects statements which express propositions that are true and cannot be false. This linguistic property of the verbs in question is, on my construal of Lucullus' argument, analogous to properties of the faculty of memory and of the faculty of enquiry (itself a function of reason): memory, *qua* disposition of the mind of a human being, is made up of apprehensions (καταλήψεις, viewed as πάθη of the soul), and enquiry aims at and issues in apprehensions. (Cicero's naturalist counter-suggestion in *Luc.* 146 relies on a similar model, *mutatis mutandis*.) We may compare the pairs of related terms which, as David Blank, in this volume, shows, Varro identifies in Latin (and which can be traced back to Greek sources on Stoic syntax): two Latin terms, one the *explanandum* and one the *explanans*, correspond to two things in the world which are revealed to be related to one another. But while Varro's pairs of terms are related to one another through *deriuatio*, this is not the case for *meminisse* or *inuenire* and their respective grammatical objects, i.e. the infinitive constructions which play the role of their grammatical objects and correspond to statements expressing propositions. However, like the clusters of terms related to one another by *deriuatio* which Blank discusses, the three verbs in question (others could be added) form a

²⁸ See Brittain 2012.

family of sorts (in virtue of the shared property of the kind of grammatical objects they take), and it would not be difficult to adapt the account which Blank gives, about the assignment of related terms to certain – ‘evidently’ related – things as a process which is part of οἰκειώσις, to the creation of ‘factive’ verbs. A version of the doctrine of οἰκειώσις was part of Antiochus’ ethical theory.²⁹

- (ii) In the case of the justified application of the term *artifex* to certain people, a different model is required. ‘X is in possession of truths which cannot be falsehoods’ or, more elementary, ‘there are truths which cannot be falsehoods’ may be interpreted as a presupposition of statements of the form ‘x is an *artifex*’.³⁰ The presupposition, for Lucullus’ argument to have the required force, does not just correspond to a belief of speaker and/or audience which may or may not be true, but correctly captures an essential feature of craft-knowledge *qua* disposition of the human mind which the observer finds to be instantiated in a particular individual.³¹ Note that Lucullus says in *Luc.* 22 that we say that someone is an expert when we ‘see’ that he has the relevant set of apprehensions (... *cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere uidemus*). *Videre* has a veridical sense here,³² but is used metaphorically, because apprehensions are of course nothing that one can directly observe. Our belief that an *artifex* is in possession of the set of apprehensions which constitutes his craft is presented as grounded in observation, presumably of actions executed in manifest accordance with the rules of the art. While linguistic naturalism usually aims at grounding language in natural structures (of the world or of language itself), the arguments studied in this paper draw on an implicit linguistic naturalism (i.e. our linguistic practices mirror reality) to argue the other way around, from language to reality (i.e. the types and degrees of knowledge required by all men for their daily activities).

²⁹ See Gill 2016. ³⁰ For general orientation see Beaver and Geurts 2014.

³¹ Comparable and arguably also open to an analysis in terms of presupposition are Chrysippus’ arguments from standing phrases (‘none of this goes down for them’, ‘having swallowed what was said, he went away’) for the location of the soul’s ruling part in the heart rather than the head; cf. Galen, *PHP* 3.5.4–5), discussed by Blank, in this volume, pp. 128–30.

³² Cf. the use of *uidere* in Var. *L.* 5.37 (Blank, in this volume, p. 148): a field was called a *fundus* because it was seen to be the foundation of flocks and money (*quod uidebatur ... esse fundamentum*).

Linguistic Naturalism and Natural Style *From Varro and Cicero to Dionysius of Halicarnassus*

Casper C. de Jonge

1 Introduction

The most effective style . . . is that which most resembles natural speech. And nature demands that the expression should follow the thought, not that the thoughts should follow the expression.

(Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Isocrates* 12.3–4)¹

The Greek rhetorician and historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus was active in Rome at the end of the first century BC.² His extant works include a history of early Rome, critical letters, and rhetorical treatises with a focus on style: *On Composition*, *On Imitation*, *On Thucydides*, and *On the Ancient Orators*, including separate essays on Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, and Demosthenes. Engaged as he was in the oratory, history, and poetry of the classical Greek past, Dionysius himself lived in the Golden Age of Latin Literature. Born before 55 BC, he was a contemporary of Virgil and Horace. When Dionysius arrived in Rome in 30 BC, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC) had been dead for more than a decade, but Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC) was still alive. Dionysius used Varro’s *Antiquities* as one of the principal sources for his own *Roman Antiquities*, as he indicates in several references.³ He admired Varro as ‘the most learned man of his age’ (*Ant. Rom.* 2.21.2 ἀνὴρ τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἀκμασάντων πολυπειρότατος).

The concept of ‘natural style’ is very prominent in Dionysius’ rhetorical works. He frequently praises the orator Lysias for his natural diction and

¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus is cited according to the edition of Aujac 1978–1992 but in some passages I prefer the readings of Usener and Radermacher 1904–1929. References to *On Lysias* (*Lys.*), *On Isocrates* (*Isoc.*), *On Isaeus* (*Is.*), *On Demosthenes* (*Dem.*), *On Composition* (*Comp.*), and *On Thucydides* (*Th.*) give the chapters and paragraphs in Aujac’s edition. Translations of Dionysius are adapted from Usher 1974–1985. Translations of Varro, Cicero, and Quintilian are adapted from Kent 1951, Hendrickson and Hubbell 1952, and Russell 2001 respectively.

² On Dionysius, see De Jonge 2008 and Wiater 2011.

³ See Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.14.1, cf. 2.47.4, 2.48.4. For the text, see Cary 1937. Cf. Gabba 1991: 99–101.

word order, whereas he criticizes Thucydides for his unnatural grammatical constructions.⁴ This paper will examine the relationship between Dionysius' concept of natural style and Roman accounts of linguistic naturalism, in order to cast light on the interaction between Greek and Latin scholarship in the Late Republic and Early Empire. I will first discuss the role of nature (φύσις) in Dionysius' stylistic theory (section 2). I will then examine three themes that connect Dionysius' views on natural style with contemporary discussions of linguistic naturalism in Varro and Cicero. First, there is the general concept of a natural style, which is associated with the Attic orators not only in Greek but also in Roman versions of Atticism (section 3). Second, there is the idea that nature plays a guiding role in the imposition of names (section 4). Finally, as Greek and Latin scholars are interested in language as the representation of reality, they believe that the structure of language should reflect the ontological order of nature. The latter idea can be found both on a theoretical level, in Varro's *De lingua Latina*, and on a practical level, in Dionysius' *De compositione verborum* (section 5).

Parallels between Dionysius' rhetorical works and Latin texts of the first century BC can be explained in various ways.⁵ In some cases we may be inclined to acknowledge the influence of Roman authors on Dionysius' thinking: the *Antiquities* may not have been the only work by Varro that Dionysius knew, and he was probably also familiar with Cicero's rhetorical theories.⁶ But similarities between Greek and Latin texts may also result from the use of a common source or tradition. Both Varro and Dionysius were deeply familiar not only with Alexandrian grammar, but also with Stoic philosophy. In his work *On Composition* (4.17–20) Dionysius refers to Chrysippus' treatises *On the Syntax of the Parts of Speech* (Περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν), which he found rather disappointing not only because of the contents – the Stoic philosopher approached syntax from a logical rather than a rhetorical perspective –, but also because Chrysippus himself turned out to be such a boring writer. Dionysius complains that 'of writers who have been judged worthy of renown or distinction, none has written treatises on logic with more precision, and

⁴ I have examined Dionysius' views on natural language and natural style in De Jonge 2008: 251–328. While this paper builds on that discussion, it adds a new perspective in exploring the Roman context of Dionysius' ideas.

⁵ On Dionysius and Augustan Rome, see Hunter and De Jonge 2019.

⁶ On Cicero and Dionysius, see De Jonge 2008: 214–16.

none has published discourses which are worse specimens of composition'.⁷ Finally, parallels between Greek and Latin texts, like those between Dionysius and Varro, may also reflect a common discourse or a more general set of ideas that was shared by Greek and Roman intellectuals in Rome. Recent scholarship indeed strongly suggests that Greek and Roman scholars were not working in separate groups, but rather participating in one intellectual world, in which ideas were exchanged and knowledge shared.⁸

2 Dionysius on Natural Style

'Nature' (φύσις) runs as a constant theme through Dionysius' rhetorical works.⁹ The term φύσις is applied to various aspects of writing: literary imitation may be natural, the general style of an orator can be 'natural', but also specific aspects of style, like vocabulary, word order, or composition.¹⁰ Although some scholars have been keen to interpret Dionysius' emphasis on 'nature' as revealing a Stoic mindset, we should not forget that by the first century BC many Stoic ideas had become part and parcel of general intellectual discourse.¹¹ Furthermore, we should remember that Dionysius is first of all a teacher of rhetoric with a very practical agenda. In agreement with the principles of Atticism, he finds nothing more important than clarity (σαφήνεια): Dionysius wants his students to communicate lucidly, while avoiding poetic, obscure, or bombastic language. He presents Lysias as the primary model of clarity and natural language, while warning his students not to imitate the exotic vocabulary of Isocrates, the poetic figures of Plato, or the complex syntax of Thucydides.¹² In this context, the term 'natural' becomes almost a synonym for 'normal', 'usual', or 'familiar', but a more appropriate translation would be something like 'uncontrived', 'unconsidered', or 'inartistic'. In Dionysius' essays, φύσις is in most cases not used in opposition to θέσις (natural origin of language versus imposition of names) or to νόμος (natural correctness of names versus convention); in rhetorical contexts, the basic opposition is between φύσις and

⁷ *Comp.* 4.17 τούτου γὰρ οὐτ' ἄμεινον οὐδεὶς τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας ἡκρίβωσεν οὔτε ἁρμονίᾳ χεῖροσι συνταχθέντας ἐξήνεγκε λόγους τῶν γούν ὀνόματος καὶ δόξης ἀξιοθέντων.

⁸ See e.g. Asmis 1995 on Philodemus and Lucretius; De Jonge 2019 on Dionysius and Horace.

⁹ Cf. De Jonge 2008: 250–3. ¹⁰ On natural versus artistic imitation (μίμησις), see *Din.* 7.5.

¹¹ Aujac and Lebel 1981: 77 on *Comp.* 5.1 (see below): 'Est-ce une profession de foi stoïcienne?'

¹² Dionysius criticizes Plato's bombastic and poetic style in *Dem.* 5–7. In *Th.* 2.4 and *Amm.* 2 he objects to Thucydides' complex syntax as 'acquiring the appearance of solecism'. See De Jonge 2011.

τέχνη (nature versus art). 'Natural style', then, is the style that *imitates* the inartistic speech of laymen, who have not been trained to impress their audience with prose rhythm, figures of speech, and similar rhetorical tricks.¹³

For Greek rhetoricians the absolute champion of the 'natural' was the orator-speechwriter Lysias, who had many supporters in the first century BC thanks to the emergence of Roman and Greek Atticism.¹⁴ Dionysius describes Lysias' style as 'displaying the natural to a high degree' (πολὺ τὸ φυσικόν ἐπιφαίνουσα, *Lys.* 10.1), and representing 'the reality of human nature' (ἀλήθειαν ... φύσεως, *Lys.* 13.5). More particularly, Dionysius points out that the word arrangement in Lysias' speeches is natural (σύνθεσιν ... φυσικὴν, *Isoc.* 2.4; cf. *Is.* 3.2), and he praises their 'moral character, which is not contrived, but natural' (ἡθὺς τε οὐ πεπλασμένον ἀλλὰ φυσικόν, *Is.* 9.1). The result is that 'a certain natural euphony and charm' flows over the speeches of Lysias (φυσικὴ τις ... εὐστομία καὶ χάρις, *Dem.* 13.7). These different aspects of Lysias' writing are of course interconnected: natural composition and euphony are aspects of his natural style, which in its turn contributes to the natural (or realistic) portrayal of the speaker's character. It is important to observe that Dionysius does not use the word 'natural' in the sense of 'instinctive'. Far from being instinctive or inartistic, the speeches of Lysias are in fact, as Dionysius points out, the product of art (τέχνη), for 'to imitate nature was the greatest achievement of art' (τῆς τέχνης τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν, *Is.* 16.1: see also below).

Natural style is thus the style that consciously and artistically aims to represent the language of the layman (ιδιώτης). The underlying idea is that professional orators are suspect, because their studied, thought-out, and artistic use of language was (since Gorgias) associated with lies, misleading, and deception. When analyzing the opening statement of a speech by Lysias (fr. 62), Dionysius points out that the orator's words display a moral flavour that is not contrived (πεπλασμένον) but natural (φυσικόν): 'Nobody would say that these are the words of an orator, but only that it is the language of any ordinary person (ιδιώτης) who is exposed to unjust litigation.'¹⁵ In this respect, there is a fundamental difference between the styles of Lysias and Isaeus (*Is.* 16.1–2):

¹³ For a more extensive discussion of Dionysius' concept of natural style, see De Jonge 2008: 253–73.

¹⁴ On Greek and Roman Atticism, see Wisse 1995 with further bibliography. For Lysias' purity and clarity, see e.g. Cic. *Orat.* 29; Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 4.1–3.

¹⁵ Dion. Hal. *Is.* 9.1 οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι ῥήτορος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ιδιώτου καταστάντος εἰς ἀγῶνα ἄδικον.

τοῦ Λυσίου μὲν οὖν τις ἀναγινώσκων τὰς διηγήσεις οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπολάβοι λέγεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην ἢ πονηρίαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια φέρει, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν τῆς τέχνης, ὅτι τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔργον ἦν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν Ἰσαίου διηγημάτων τοῦναντίον ἂν πάθοι, μὴδὲν ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτοφυῶς καὶ ἀπραγματεύτως λέγεσθαι μὴδ' εἴ τινα ὥς ἔτυχε γενόμενα εἴρηται, ἐκ κατασκευῆς δὲ πάντα καὶ μεμηχανημένα πρὸς ἀπάτην ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ κακουργίαν.

Any reader of Lysias' narratives would suppose that no art (τέχνη) or dishonesty (πονηρία) had gone into their composition, but that they are written in accordance with nature and truth (ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια). He would not know that this illusion is itself the product of an art (τέχνη) whose greatest achievement was to imitate nature (μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν). In the case of Isaeus' narratives he would receive the opposite impression, that not a single statement was spontaneous or unconsidered, not even when it described something as it actually happened, but that everything was artfully designed and contrived to mislead, or for some other sinister purpose.

In the examples that we have seen so far, 'the natural' corresponds to that which makes the impression of being 'unaffected', 'unconsidered', and 'uncontrived'. But Dionysius adds a more philosophical dimension to his concept of φύσις when he argues that natural style is also the style that follows the ideas (νοήματα) (*Isoc.* 12.3):

κράτιστον δὲ ἐπιτήδευμα ἐν διαλέκτῳ πολιτικῇ καὶ ἐναγωνίῳ τὸ ὁμοίότατον τῷ κατὰ φύσιν. βούλεται δὲ ἡ φύσις τοῖς νοήμασιν ἔπessθαι τὴν λέξιν, οὐ τῇ λέξει τὰ νοήματα.

The most effective style to cultivate in political and forensic oratory is that which most resembles natural speech. And nature (φύσις) demands that the expression should follow the thought, not that the thoughts should follow the expression.

In the context of this passage, Dionysius is criticizing Isocrates for paying more attention to stylistic elegance than to the accurate presentation of subject matter: through the composition of periodical sentences and figures of speech, 'the thought often becomes slave to the rhythm of the words, and truthfulness is sacrificed to elegance' (δουλεῖ γὰρ ἡ διάνοια πολλάκις τῷ ῥυθμῷ τῆς λέξεως καὶ τοῦ κομποῦ λείπεται τὸ ἀληθινόν, *Isoc.* 12.3). If the form becomes more important than the contents, the speech will be obscure.

Natural style also requires that the organization of a text accurately reflect the chronological order of events in reality. In the narration of a Lysias speech the events are reported in the order in which they actually

happened, as this orator recounts an event ‘as it was natural for it to *happen* and to be described’ (ὥς φύσιν εἶχε γενέσθαι τε καὶ ῥηθῆναι, *Is.* 11.2). The speeches of Isaeus, on the other hand, are characterized by the fact ‘that things that were done are told in other than their chronological order’ (τῷ μὴ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τὰ πραχθέντα εἰρησθαι) and by the fact ‘that everything is told neither as it was natural to have been done nor as a layman would recount it’ (τῷ μὴ πάντα μηδ’ ὥς φύσιν εἶχε πραχθῆναι μηδ’ ὥς ἂν ἰδιώτης τις εἴποι λέγεσθαι, *Is.* 15.3). In the latter formulation, two different concepts of naturalism are combined: the unaffected language of untrained speakers is now identified with the language that closely corresponds to the order of reality.

This second concept of ‘natural language’, i.e. language that directly and accurately represents reality, deserves some further attention. One method that Dionysius frequently employs for his literary analysis is the rewriting (or metathesis) of classical texts.¹⁶ When he finds that a certain passage in Plato, Thucydides, or Demosthenes is characterized by unnatural syntax or word order, Dionysius is not afraid to rearrange the original passage in what he considers a more ‘natural’ style. In many cases, Dionysius presents his own version of the passage as the basic, natural (one might almost say ‘original’) form, which underlies the ‘contrived’ literary passage that is actually found in classical literature. One instructive example is Dionysius’ analysis of the opening sentence from Demosthenes’ third *Philippic*:¹⁷

Πολλῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γινομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐκκλησίαν περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἅφ’ οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἀδικεῖ, . . .

Many speeches, Athenians, are delivered in all but every assembly about the outrages that Philip, ever since he made peace with us, has been committing not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks . . .

Dionysius points out that Demosthenes has in this passage adopted the stylistic character of Thucydides, which he considers highly unnatural (*Dem.* 9.3):

κατὰ τί δὴ ταύτην ἡγοῦμαι τὴν λέξιν εἰκέναι τῇ Θουκυδίδου; καθ’ ὃ κακείνην πειθομαι μάλιστα διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων. τοῦτ’ ὅτι τὸ μὴ κατ’ εὐθεῖαν ἐρμηνεῖαν ἐξηγητέχθαι τὰ νοήματα μηδ’, ὥς ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις σύνηθες λέγειν, ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀφελῶς, ἀλλὰ ἐξηλλάχθαι καὶ ἀπεστράφθαι τὴν

¹⁶ On metathesis in Dionysius, see De Jonge 2005 and De Jonge 2008: 367–90.

¹⁷ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 9.2–8 on *Dem. Phil.* 3.1 and 13. Cf. De Jonge 2008: 259–60.

διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὰ μὴ συνήθη τοῖς πολλοῖς μηδ' ὥς ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ.

In what respect do I consider this style to resemble that of Thucydides? In that which I believe most distinguishes Thucydides' style from others: the expression of thought by indirect means, not simply and plainly, as is the normal practice of other writers, but in language removed and divorced from what is customary and natural (κατὰ φύσιν) and containing instead expressions which are unfamiliar to most people and not what nature demands (ὥς ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ).

Dionysius then rewrites the passage from Demosthenes in a more straightforward style, making three adaptations: he changes ὀλίγου δεῖν ('almost') into the simple σχεδόν; he resolves the hyperbaton by uniting ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος ('Philip does wrong'), and he rewrites 'not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks', replacing οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καὶ ... with the simple connectives τε καὶ ('you and the other Greeks'):

Demosthenes, *Philippics* 3.1:

Πολλῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γινομένων ὀλίγου δεῖν καθ' ἐκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἀδικεῖ ...

Many speeches, Athenians, are delivered in all but every assembly about the outrages that Philip, ever since he made peace with us, has been committing not only against you but also against the rest of the Greeks ...

Dionysius' metathesis:

Πολλῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λόγων γινομένων καθ' ἐκάστην σχεδόν ἐκκλησίαν, περὶ ὧν ἀδικεῖ Φίλιππος ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο ...

Many speeches, Athenians, are delivered in almost every assembly about the outrages that Philip has been committing against you and the other Greeks ever since he made peace with us ...

For our understanding of Dionysius' concept of natural style, it is important to observe that Dionysius presents his own rewriting as the basic form of language, which underlies the actual sentence composed by Demosthenes. We are invited to believe that it is not Dionysius who rewrites Demosthenes, but rather Demosthenes who has turned away and deviated from the natural version as reconstructed by Dionysius.

The critic tells us that in the text of Demosthenes ὀλίγου δεῖν has been ‘adopted instead of’ (παράληφθ' ἐν ἀντί, *Dem.* 9.5) the more common word σχεδόν. Here and elsewhere Dionysius implies that his own meta-thesis is the natural expression of thought, from which Demosthenes departed for the sake of artistic and rhetorical effect. The technical terms for the underlying, natural expression are ἀκολουθία (logical order) and ὁ κατάλληλος λόγος (syntactically congruent discourse), which were popular in Stoic philosophy. Dionysius’ use of these terms anticipates their important role in the grammatical works of Apollonius Dyscolus (second century AD).¹⁸

Having considered Dionysius’ ideas on natural style, let us now examine some connections between Greek criticism and Latin scholarship of the first century BC. Three aspects of the discourse of naturalism allow us to compare Dionysius and his Roman colleagues. Firstly, the general concept of natural style itself; secondly, the idea of nature as a teacher in the imposition of names; and finally, the concept of language as the direct and accurate representation of reality.

3 Cicero on Natural Style

We have seen that Dionysius’ praise of natural style is closely related to the principles of Atticism, which favours qualities such as linguistic purity and stylistic clarity. It is therefore not surprising that similar views on natural style can be found in those works of Cicero in which he responds to the so-called *Attici*, Gaius Licinius Calvus and his followers: these works are *Brutus* and *Orator* (46 BC).¹⁹ Authors who adopt the discourse of Atticism regard the language of classical Greek oratory as natural, whereas the prose style of post-classical, Hellenistic writers is often described as artificial and effeminate.²⁰ We find this discourse for example in the brief history of oratory in Cicero’s *Brutus*.²¹ Having discussed Isocrates, Lysias, and

¹⁸ On κατάλληλος, see Blank 1982: 24–39, 55–7 and Sluiter 1990: 50–2; 61–9. On ἀκολουθία, see Blank 1982: 16–17 and Sluiter 1990: 13–16. Apollonius Dyscolus, *Pron. GG* 2.1.42.8–9 refers to ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθία, ‘the natural sequence’. On Dionysius’ use of these terms, see also De Jonge 2008: 261–3.

¹⁹ On the connection between Roman Atticism (C. Licinius Calvus and the *Attici*) and Greek Atticism (Dionysius, Caecilius of Caleacte), see Wisse 1995.

²⁰ See Dionysius’ criticism (*Comp.* 4.15) of Hellenistic historians like Phylarchus of Athens, Duris of Samos, Polybius, Hieronymus of Cardia, etc.

²¹ On Cicero’s *Brutus*, see the collection of essays edited by Aubert-Baillet and Guérin 2014.

Demosthenes, Cicero introduces some further Attic orators who retained the typical ‘natural colour’ of Attic eloquence (*Brutus* 36):

Huic Hyperides proximus et Aeschines fuit et Lycurgus et Dinarchus et is, cuius nulla exstant scripta, Demades aliique plures. haec enim aetas effudit hanc copiam; et, ut opinio mea fert, sucus ille et sanguis incorruptus usque ad hanc aetatem oratorum fuit, in qua naturalis inesset, non fucatus nitor.

Next to Demosthenes in point of time and rank were Hyperides and Aeschines, Lycurgus and Dinarchus, Demades (of whom no writings are extant) and several others. So prodigal was this age in its output; and, as I hold, the sap and blood of oratory remained fresh and uncorrupted down to this time, and retained a natural brightness (*naturalis nitor*) that required no rouge.²²

The term *fucus* refers to the reddish seaweed from which the Romans made red dye; the oratory of the classical Greek orators did not need such cosmetics or artificial tools.²³ After the classical age, however, oratory declined quickly: Cicero goes on to discuss Demetrius of Phaleron, who was ‘the first to modulate oratory and to give it softness and pliability’ (*primus inflexit orationem et eam mollem teneramque reddidit*, *Brut.* 38).²⁴ A similar view on the decline of eloquence, with similar qualifications of post-classical rhetoric as soft, effeminate, and decadent, is presented in Dionysius’ preface to his work *On the Ancient Orators*, the so-called manifesto of classicism, and in his treatise *On Composition*.²⁵ In a discussion of the Hellenistic author Hegesias of Magnesia (c. 300 BC), Dionysius points out that ‘the manner of description used by the Magnesian could be adopted only by women or emasculated men (ὕπὸ γυναικῶν ἢ κατεαγόντων ἀνθρώπων), and not seriously even by them, but in a spirit of mockery or ridicule’.²⁶

The distinction between nature and art (τέχνη, in Latin *ars* or *doctrina*) is of course also crucial to Cicero’s concept of natural style (*Brutus* 111):

Quid dicam opus esse doctrina? sine qua etiam si quid bene dicitur adiuuante natura, tamen id, quia fortuito fit, semper paratum esse non potest.

²² Translation: Hendrickson and Hubbell 1952.

²³ See Douglas 1966 ad loc. For the metaphorical use of *fucus* in rhetorical contexts, see also Cic. *de Orat.* 2.188, 3.100; *Orat.* 79; Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.6; Tac. *Dial.* 26.1.

²⁴ Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.12–13. Chiron 2014 examines Cicero’s evaluation of Demetrius of Phalerum.

²⁵ Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett.* 1–4. See Hidber 1996 and De Jonge 2014.

²⁶ Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 18.28. Translation: Usher 1985.

Need I speak also of the need of theoretical training? For even without it one succeeds in saying something good with nature's help, yet because this is fortuitous it cannot always be at one's disposal.²⁷

Where Dionysius picks out Lysias, Cicero selects Marcus Aemilius Scaurus (163–89 BC) as a perfect model of natural style: according to Cicero (*Brutus* 112), Scaurus had a 'natural authority' (*naturalis auctoritas*), and his manner of speaking 'conveyed the impression not only of experience and wisdom, but of that quality which holds the secret of success, namely trustworthiness (*fides*). Thus he possessed by nature (*a natura ipsa*) that which art (*doctrina*) could not easily lend . . .'.²⁸ Both Cicero and Dionysius distinguish between nature and art, but we should notice that their evaluations of Scaurus and Lysias are in fact different. Scaurus is presented as an orator who had a strictly natural command of speaking: in *De oratore* it is said that Scaurus, 'although not at all a negligible speaker, still relies more on his sound judgement in handling important affairs than on the art of speaking'.²⁹ Lysias, on the other hand, is an orator whose excellent art of speaking so perfectly imitates nature (i.e. the natural language of laymen) that it hides itself. In other words, the oratory of Scaurus is nature without art, whereas Lysias' style is pure art imitating nature. Cicero and Dionysius agree, however, that art can teach orators to speak naturally like Scaurus. Having introduced Scaurus' natural qualities, Cicero immediately hastens to emphasize that nature cannot do without art: 'As you know the books give precepts for that too' (*huius quoque ipsius rei . . . praecepta sunt*). In other words, rhetorical theory instructs the orator how to make a natural impression – a few decades later Dionysius echoes this point of view when he states that 'to imitate nature is the greatest achievement of art' (*Is*. 16.1, cited above).

4 Varro and Dionysius on Etymology and the Imposition of Names

Let us now consider the connections between Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Marcus Terentius Varro.³⁰ As I mentioned above, Dionysius used Varro's *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum* as a source for his

²⁷ Translation: Hendrickson and Hubbell 1952.

²⁸ *Habebat hoc a natura ipsa, quod a doctrina non facile posset*. Aubert-Baillet 2014: 127–8 discusses Cicero's comparison (*synkrisis*) of Aemilius Scaurus and the Stoic orator Rutilius Rufus.

²⁹ *Cic. de Orat.* 1.214. Translation: May and Wisse 2001.

³⁰ Brink 1963 examines the relationship between Varro and Horace, Dionysius' contemporary in Augustan Rome.

own *Antiquitates Romanae*. We do not know whether Dionysius was also familiar with Varro's *De lingua Latina*, which originally consisted of 25 books. The works of both Dionysius and Varro have been described as 'eclectic', as they integrate Aristotelian, Stoic, Alexandrian, and Epicurean thought on language.³¹ It is not surprising, then, that common themes and formulations can be identified in the works of these two scholars. Parallels between Varro's work and Dionysius' rhetorical treatises may be explained either by Varronian influence on Dionysius or by a common source or by their being in touch with the intellectual discourse of Rome in the first century BC.³²

There is one obvious difference between the two authors: whereas the Roman grammarian adopts a descriptive approach to language and its structures, the Greek rhetorician prescribes how language could be used in order to compose effective speeches. Although the aims of their treatises are thus quite different, we can identify a variety of linguistic topics in which both Varro and Dionysius were highly interested. One example is the concept of language as a hierarchical structure, with the word (*ὄνομα*, *uerbum*) as its primary unit or element: this is a starting point of both Varro's grammatical analysis and Dionysius' theory of composition.³³ Another example concerns the nature of the Latin language. Dionysius' views on the origin of the Latin language as a corrupt dialect of Greek might be related to the theories of Greek grammarians like Philoxenus and Tyrannio, who wrote treatises *On the Dialect of the Romans* and *On the Roman Language*. But there are also connections with Varro's lost work *On the Origin of the Latin Language*.³⁴ Both Dionysius and Varro suggest a relationship between Latin and Aeolic Greek: Dionysius and the Greek grammarians of the first century BC believed Aeolic to be the language of the early Greek settlers in Italy.³⁵ A further topic that connects Varro and Dionysius is syntax. It would be extremely rewarding if we were able to compare Dionysius' views on syntax and composition with the lost books

³¹ See Taylor 1996: 15–16 on Varro's 'manifest eclecticism' and De Jonge 2008: 34–41 on Dionysius' use of various philosophical, philological, and rhetorical ideas.

³² The publication date of *De lingua Latina* is uncertain, but it was dedicated to Cicero, who died in 43 BC. See Taylor 1996: 7. This means that the work was available when Dionysius arrived in Rome in 30 BC.

³³ See Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 2.1–3; cf. De Jonge 2008: 50–3. On Varro's parts of speech, see Taylor 1974 and Taylor 1996: 13–14.

³⁴ Varro *GRFF* 295. De Jonge 2008: 60–5 on Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.90.1.

³⁵ See Philoxenus fr. 323 (Theodoridis 1976) and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.20.2–3, 1.90.1; Varro offers Aeolic etymologies of Latin words in *De lingua Latina* 5.25–6, 5.96, 5.101–2. On Varronian etymology, see Schröter 1963, de Melo, in this volume.

14–25 of Varro's *De lingua Latina* on syntax.³⁶ This third part of his monumental work examined (according to Varro, *De lingua Latina* 8.1) 'how words are combined systematically with each other and produce a sentence' (*ut ea inter se ratione coniuncta sententiam efferant*). This formulation makes us wonder how this Latin account of syntax related to Dionysius' treatise *On Composition*, also known as *On the Arrangement of Words* (Περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων). Did Varro, like Dionysius, deal with logical sequence and natural word order? We will probably never know the answer. But fortunately we can point to a few intriguing points of contact between *De lingua Latina* and *De compositione verborum*, which are indeed related to linguistic naturalism.

Varro (*De lingua Latina* 6.3) famously states that 'nature was man's guide for the imposition of names' (*dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini*).³⁷ Dahlmann has suggested that this statement played a role in Varro's ideas on the origin of language, which can only be reconstructed from different parts of his work.³⁸ These passages suggest that language emerged by an act of imposition (θέσις) by certain name-givers; and that these men 'who first assigned names to things' were guided by nature.³⁹ It is not exactly clear how nature would have guided them; one possible interpretation is that these men tried to express the nature of a thing in its name, like the name-givers in Plato's *Cratylus*.⁴⁰ The very first words may have been onomatopoeic, as Dahlmann suggests: Varro (*De lingua Latina* 7.103–5) elsewhere discusses 'words that are transferred from the cries of animals to men', like 'to bark' (*latrare*), 'to yelp' (*gannire*), 'to bleat' (*dibalaré*), and the 'neighing' of horses (*hinnitus*). With these Varronian passages in mind, let us now turn back to Dionysius.

In *On Composition* Dionysius presents four factors that contribute to beautiful and elegant composition: rhythm, variety, and propriety are important, but the first factor is melodious sound (μέλος: *Comp.* 14–16). Having discussed the phonetic qualities of letters and syllables, Dionysius (*Comp.* 16) examines the mimetic quality of words. Writers can use the phonetic properties of letters and syllables to express (and imitate) length of time, size, emotion, brevity, speed, and urgency. Dionysius quotes several lines from Homer, in which the poet uses such onomatopoeic words

³⁶ For Dionysius' views on syntax, see De Jonge 2011.

³⁷ On Varro's linguistic naturalism see de Melo, in this volume, Blank, in this volume, and Zetzel, in this volume.

³⁸ Dahlmann 1932: 12–14.

³⁹ Cf. Blank, in this volume on the name-giver Adam being guided by his natural, God-given reason.

⁴⁰ See Sedley 2003.

as ῥοχθέω ('to dash with a roaring sound'), κλάγξας (from κλάζω, 'to scream'), and ῥοῖζος (the 'whistling' of an arrow).⁴¹ Dionysius states that such words, which 'imitate things' (μιμητικά τῶν πραγμάτων), can either be coined, like Homer did, or borrowed from earlier writers. And nature (φύσις) is the great source and teacher in these matters (*Comp.* 16.2–4):

μεγάλη δὲ τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς καὶ θετικούς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τινὰς εὐλόγους καὶ κινητικὰς τῆς διανοίας ὁμοιότηας· ὅφ' ἧς ἐδιδάχθημεν ταύρων μυκήματα λέγειν καὶ χρεμετισμούς ἵππων καὶ φρυαγμούς τράγων πυρός τε βρόμον καὶ πάταγον ἀνέμων καὶ συριγμόν κάλων καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις ὅμοια παμπληθῆ τὰ μὲν φωνῆς μιμήματα, τὰ δὲ μορφῆς, τὰ δὲ ἔργου, τὰ δὲ πάθους, τὰ δὲ κινήσεως, τὰ δ' ἡρεμίας, τὰ δ' ἄλλου χρήματος ὅτου δὴ. περὶ ὧν εἴρηται πολλὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, τὰ κράτιστα δ' ὡς πρῶτω τὸν ὑπὲρ ἐτυμολογίας εἰσαγαγόντι λόγον Πλάτωνι τῷ Σωκρατικῷ, πολλὰ χεῖρ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῷ Κρατύλῳ.

The great source and teacher in these matters is nature (μεγάλη . . . ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις), who prompts us to imitate and to coin words, by which things are designated according to certain resemblances, which are plausible and capable of stimulating our thoughts. It is she who has taught us to speak of the bellowing of bulls, the whinnying of horses, the bleating of goats, the roar of fire, the beating of winds, the creaking of ropes, and a host of other similar imitations (μιμήματα) of sound, shape, action, feeling, movement, stillness, and anything else whatsoever. These matters have been discussed at length by our predecessors, the most important work being that of the first writer to introduce the subject of etymology, Plato the Socratic, especially in his *Cratylus*, but in many places elsewhere.

Some scholars have interpreted this passage as expressing Stoic views on the origin of language: Schenkeveld in particular has argued that Dionysius here adopts the Stoic theory of the first name-givers, who assigned mimetic names to things.⁴² I have argued elsewhere that this interpretation is not correct.⁴³ Firstly, Dionysius does not talk about first name-givers in a distant past, but about 'us' (ἡμᾶς), i.e. all human beings who use onomatopoetic language to imitate things. Secondly, φύσις is not to be understood as opposed to νόμος or θέσις, but as opposed to τέχνη, just as in Dionysius' discussions of 'natural' style that have been discussed above. The point is that writers of artistic prose and poetry, the practitioners of τέχνη, can learn from what happens in nature (φύσις): in everyday life we

⁴¹ Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 16.1 cites *Od.* 5.402; *Il.* 2.207, 2.210, 16.361.

⁴² Schenkeveld 1983: 89.

⁴³ De Jonge 2008: 70–7.

human beings also use onomatopoeic words, like ‘bellowing’ or ‘whinnying’, names that mimetically express things – and this natural (non-technical) use of language can teach poets and orators to do the same thing in artistic prose or poetry. The words διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις (*Comp.* 16.2) should thus be understood as a Greek equivalent of the Latin dictum *natura artis magistra*, ‘Nature is the teacher of art’.

Although I do not believe that this passage makes a philosophical claim about the origin of language, it may well be true that Dionysius is adopting the philosophical discourse of language theory. There are three indications that point in this direction. Firstly, Dionysius refers to a tradition of thinking about etymology, which he traces back to Plato’s *Cratylus* (*Comp.* 16.4). He may be particularly thinking of the long etymological section of that dialogue, in which Socrates proposes numerous etymologies, including explanations of mimetic or onomatopoeic words.⁴⁴ Secondly, Dionysius states that nature makes us θετικούς τῶν ὀνομάτων (‘prompt at giving names’), a formulation that echoes philosophical views on the imposition of names, like Varro’s *uocabula imponenda* in *De lingua Latina* 6.3 (cited above).⁴⁵ Finally, the examples of onomatopoeic words that Dionysius mentions are also known from Stoic sources. His first three examples are ‘the bellowing of bulls, the whinnying of horses, and the bleating of goats’ (ταύρων μυκήματα, χρεμετισμούς ἵππων καὶ φρυαγμούς τράγων, *Comp.* 16.3). We have seen that Varro likewise quotes poetic lines containing terms for ‘barking’ (*latrare*), ‘bleating’ (*dibalarē*), and ‘neighing’ (*hinnitus*). Augustine (*Dial.* 6) includes similar examples in his discussion of the Stoic views on the origin of language: according to Augustine’s (admittedly late) account, the Stoics believed that the first words were formed on the basis of onomatopoeia, like *tinnitus*, *hinnitus*, and *balatus*, ‘the clash of bronze, the whinnying of horses, and the bleating of sheep’.⁴⁶ It is certainly possible, then, that both Varro and Dionysius preserve traces of Stoic thinking on the origin of language. But if so, they have each applied and adapted the theory so as to fit their purposes – etymology and stylistic composition respectively. Their formulations may sound quite similar in the first instance, but on closer inspection Varro’s *natura* turns out to be rather different from Dionysius’ φύσις. For the

⁴⁴ On the etymologies in Plato’s *Cratylus*, see Sedley 2003.

⁴⁵ In *Comp.* 16.2 Aujac and Lebel 1981 (following manuscript P) leave out the words καὶ θετικούς (manuscript F), reading ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων. But μιμητικούς τῶν ὀνομάτων makes no sense. I therefore follow Usener 1929 in reading ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς καὶ θετικούς ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων.

⁴⁶ On the Stoic views on the origin of language see Verlinsky, in this volume and Blank, in this volume; see further Allen 2005, with reference to Augustine’s discussion.

Roman scholar, nature was the guide (*dux*) to the *imposition* of names, so that we are able to explain why things have the names that were once assigned to them; for the Greek rhetorician, on the other hand, human nature is the teacher (διδάσκαλος) of poets and prose writers, showing them how to *use* mimetic words in artistic language.

5 Varro and Dionysius on Language and Reality

Let us finally turn to the relationship between language and reality. We have seen that Dionysius believes that a natural style accurately represents the order of events in reality. Whereas Lysias adopts this ‘natural’ presentation in his narrations, Isaeus creates obscurity by deviating from the chronological order of events. In the fifth chapter of *On Composition* this concept of natural style as a close and direct representation of reality is further developed in ontological terms. Dionysius sets out to examine if nature (φύσις) could be our guide in the arrangement of words (*Comp.* 5.1–4).⁴⁷ It would be ‘natural’ to place nouns before verbs, as Dionysius asserts; but is the natural order of these parts of speech also more aesthetically pleasing? Dionysius tests both the natural order (noun – verb) and the unnatural order (verb – noun) by comparing examples from the Homeric epics:

Ἐδόκει δὴ μοι τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐπομένους οὕτω δεῖν ἀρμόττειν τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, ὡς ἐκείνη βούλεται. αὐτίκα τὰ ὀνόματα πρότερα ἡξίουں τάττειν τῶν ῥημάτων (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῦν, τὰ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός, πρότερον δ’ εἶναι τῇ φύσει τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν συμβεβηκότων), ὡς τὰ Ὀμηρικὰ ἔχει ταυτί·

ἄνδρά μοι ἔννεπε Μοῦσα πολύτροπον
καὶ
μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά
καὶ
ἥελιος δ’ ἀνόρουσε λιπῶν

καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις· ἡγεῖται μὲν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τὰ ὀνόματα, ἔπεται δὲ τὰ ῥήματα. πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἔδοξεν εἶναι μοι. ἕτερα γοῦν παράσχοι τις ἂν παραδείγματα παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ποιητῇ κείμενα ἐναντίως συντεταγμένα ἢ ταῦτα συντέτακται, καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἦττον καὶ πιθανά. τίνα οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα·

κλυθὶ μευ αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη
καὶ
ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχουσai
μνησαι πατρός σεῖο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ’ Ἀχιλλεῦ.

⁴⁷ On Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 5 see De Jonge 2008: 273–315.

ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡγεῖται μὲν τὰ ῥήματα, ὑποτέτακται δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα· καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν αἰτιάσαιτο τὴν σύνταξιν ταύτην ὡς ἄηδῆ.

Well, it seemed to me that we, following nature as much as possible, should fit together the parts of speech as she demands. For example, I thought that I should place nouns before verbs (since the former indicate the substance, the latter the accident, and in the nature of things substance is prior to its accidents). Thus Homer has these lines:

A man, tell me, Muse, the man of many devices (*Od.* 1.1)

The wrath, sing, goddess (*Il.* 1.1)

The sun arose, abandoning (*Od.* 3.1)

and others like them, in which the nouns lead and the verbs follow. The theory is persuasive, but I decided that it was not true. At any rate, one could furnish other examples from the same poet in which the arrangement is the opposite of this, and yet these lines are no less beautiful and convincing. What are these examples?

Hear me, child of Zeus who bears the aegis, Atrytone! (*Il.* 5.115)

Tell me now, you Muses who have dwellings on Olympus (*Il.* 2.484)

Remember your father, godlike Achilles (*Il.* 24.486)

In these lines the verbs lead the way, and the nouns follow in the second rank; yet no one could criticize this arrangement as unpleasant.

The first set of examples presents lines in which a noun precedes the verb. Dionysius does not pay attention to the syntactic function of the nouns (subject or object), but he has selected Homeric lines in which the noun is the first word. In the second set of examples Dionysius adduces counterexamples that all start with a verb. Dionysius concludes that the rule of nature (nouns precede verbs) is plausible (πιθανός) but not really true (ἀληθής, *Comp.* 5.3). In the rest of the chapter, he presents seven further rules of ‘natural’ word order: verbs precede adverbs, earlier events are mentioned before later events, substantives precede adjectives, appellative nouns precede proper nouns, pronouns precede appellative nouns, indicatives precede other moods, and finally finite verb forms precede infinitives. I have argued elsewhere that we can understand these natural principles on the basis of philosophical ideas about ontological priority.⁴⁸ The Stoic categories seem to play an important role in the hierarchy of parts of speech that Dionysius suggests:⁴⁹ in Stoic thinking substance is

⁴⁸ De Jonge 2008: 312–15.

⁴⁹ The Stoic categories are (1) substance (ὑποκείμενον, οὐσία), (2) quality (ποιόν), divided into (a) commonly qualified (κοινῶς ποιόν) and (b) peculiarly qualified (ιδιῶς ποιόν), (3) disposition

prior to quality and disposition, and the commonly qualified is prior to the peculiarly qualified. Dionysius seems to adopt this Stoic perspective when he states that nouns should precede verbs because ‘accident’ (συμβεβηκός) naturally presupposes ‘substance’ (οὐσία, *Comp.* 5.2);⁵⁰ verbs precede adverbs because circumstances (συνεδρεύοντα) naturally presuppose that which acts or is acted upon (τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, *Comp.* 5.5). Some of the other ‘natural’ rules can be explained in similar terms, although Dionysius does not make his reasoning explicit. Thus appellative nouns precede proper nouns (presumably) because the peculiarly qualified (Socrates) presupposes the commonly qualified (man).⁵¹ Not surprisingly, it turns out that Homer is oblivious to these rules of nature, so that Dionysius decides to reject his experiment on natural word order (*Comp.* 5.10–11).

What should interest us here is the concept of naturalism underlying Dionysius’ linguistic experiment. The starting point of the quest for natural word order is the idea that written or spoken language should mirror reality as closely as possible. For Dionysius this implies that the order of words should ideally not only mirror the chronological order of events (as in Lysias’ natural narrations), but also the ontological order of substance, accident, disposition, and circumstances. For the idea that language reflects the natural (logical) order of ontological priorities, we may now turn to a Latin text of the first century BC.

In his discussion of the parts of speech, Varro (*De lingua Latina* 8.12) draws a distinction between ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ words, i.e. *priora* (primary) and *posteriora* (secondary): for example, the noun *homo* (man) is primary, the adjective *doctus* (learned) is secondary. Likewise, the verb *scribit* (writes) is primary, whereas the adverb *docte* (learnedly) is secondary:

Utriusque generis, et uocabuli et uerbi, quaedam priora, quaedam posteriora; priora ut homo, scribit, posteriora ut doctus et docte: dicitur enim homo doctus et scribit docte. Haec sequitur locus et tempus, quod neque homo nec scribit potest sine loco et tempore esse, ita ut magis sit locus homini coniunctus, tempus scriptioni.

(πῶς ἔχον), and (4) relative disposition (πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχον). The sources are collected in Hülser 1987–1988, *FDS* 852–65. For a discussion of the Stoic categories, see Menn 1999.

⁵⁰ In *Comp.* 5.2 one should read τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῦν (manuscript F, followed in the edition by Usener and Radermacher 1904–1929), not τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν δηλοῦν (manuscript P, followed by Aujac and Lebel 1981); note that Aujac and Lebel do read οὐσίαν in the next line.

⁵¹ See *FDS* 849: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινῶς ποιούς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. ‘Even the Stoics place the commonly qualified individuals before the peculiarly qualified individuals.’ Cf. De Jonge 2008: 302–3.

Of the two kinds, noun and verb, certain words are primary and certain are secondary: primary like *homo* ‘man’ and *scribit* ‘writes’, and secondary like *doctus* ‘learned’ and *docte* ‘learnedly’, for we say *homo doctus* ‘a learned man’ and *scribit docte* ‘writes learnedly’. These ideas are attended by those of place and time, because neither *homo* nor *scribit* can be asserted without the presupposition of place and time – yet in such a way that place is more closely associated with the idea of the noun *homo*, and time more closely with the act of writing.⁵²

Varro further explains (*De lingua Latina* 8.13) that the noun is ‘first’ and prior to the verb and the remaining words:

Cum de his nomen sit primum (prius enim nomen est quam uerbum temporale et reliqua posterius quam nomen et uerbum), prima igitur nomina: quare de eorum declinatione quam de uerborum ante dicam.

Since among these the noun is first – for the noun is earlier than the verb and the remaining words are later relatively to the noun and the verb – the nouns are accordingly first. Therefore I will speak of the form-variations of nouns before I take up those of verbs.⁵³

The noun is said to be ‘earlier’ (*prius*) than the verb: it is clear that Varro is here talking about ontological priority: the adjective *doctus* presupposes a man (*homo*), the adverb *docte* presupposes the act of writing (*scribit*), and the noun is ‘prior’ to the verb because – as Dionysius would say – to act or to be acted upon presupposes substance.

The latter view about the relative hierarchy of nouns and verbs can also be found in later grammatical texts, like Apollonius Dyscolus’ *Syntax* (second century AD) and Priscian’s *Institutiones* (ca. 500 AD).⁵⁴ Priscian argues that the pronoun and the noun precede the verb, because the former indicate substance and person, ‘which must naturally be prior to the act itself’ (*prior esse debet naturaliter*):⁵⁵

Sciendum tamen, quod recta ordinatio exigit, ut pronomen uel nomen praeponatur uerbo, ut ‘ego et tu legimus’, ‘Virgilius et Cicero scripserunt’, quippe cum substantia et persona ipsius agentis uel patientis, quae per pronomen uel nomen significatur, prior esse debet naturaliter quam ipse actus, qui accidens est substantiae.

⁵² Translation: Kent 1951. ⁵³ Translation: Kent 1951.

⁵⁴ Apollonius Dyscolus, *Synt.* 1.16: in the (theoretical) hierarchy of the parts of speech the noun (ὄνομα) precedes the verb (ῥῆμα) because ‘to act and to be acted upon’ (τὸ διατιθέναι καὶ τὸ διατιθεσθαι) is peculiar to a body (σῶμα).

⁵⁵ Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae* 17.105 (GL 3.164.16–21).

One must know that right order requires that the pronoun or the noun should be placed before the verb, as 'I and you are reading', 'Virgil and Cicero have written', inasmuch as the substance and person of the one who acts or suffers, which is designated through the pronoun or the noun, must naturally be prior to the act itself, which is an accident of the substance.

The act itself (*ipse actus*) is 'an accident of the substance' (*accidens substantiae*). Priscian's terminology closely corresponds to that of Dionysius (*Comp.* 5), who as we have seen above asserts that accident (τὸ συμβεβηκός) presupposes substance (οὐσία). Varro's rules of ontological priority in *De lingua Latina* 8.12–13 (cited above) in fact correspond to three of Dionysius' principles of presupposition: nouns precede verbs, verbs precede adverbs, and substantives precede adjectives. The difference is of course that for Varro, as far as we can tell, these rules have no consequences for the practical word order of a real sentence. The Roman scholar uses the rules of ontological priority to demonstrate the rational order of language, which also determines the order in which he discusses the linguistic items in his treatise. Dionysius takes a similar view on language and its relationship to reality, but he – unsuccessfully – attempts to apply the theoretical order of linguistic units to the practical level of word arrangement. Fortunately, Homer was there to stop Dionysius from pursuing this project any further.

At the end of the first century AD, Dionysius' experiment with natural word order is echoed in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*. In his discussion of *naturalis ordo* (9.4.23), which is part of his treatment of composition, Quintilian adopts a more practical perspective on the matter. He identifies natural order with the regular order of common speech: we are used to say 'men and women', 'day and night', 'rising and setting' ('*uiros ac feminas*', '*diem ac noctem*', '*ortum et occasum*'), although the opposite order is also fine, as Quintilian points out. But he has less patience for the more philosophical aspects of natural order. Where Dionysius set up a linguistic competition between nature and Homer, the Roman rhetorician rejects the logical rules of nature right away (9.4.23–5):

Illa nimia quorundam fuit obseruatio, ut uocabula uerbis, uerba rursus aduerbiis, nomina adpositis et pronomini-bus essent priora: nam fit contra quoque frequenter non indecore. Nec non et illud nimiae superstitionis, uti quaeque sint tempore, ea facere etiam ordine priora, non quin frequenter sit hoc melius, sed quia interim plus ualent ante gesta ideoque leuioribus superponenda sunt.

The rule given by some theorists, that nouns should precede verbs, verbs adverbs, nouns adjectives, and pronouns nouns, is much too rigid, for the

contrary order is often excellent. Another piece of gross superstition is the idea that as things come first in time, so they should also come first in order. It is not that this is not frequently the better course, but earlier events are sometimes more important and so have to be given a position of climax over the less significant.⁵⁶

6 Conclusion

The ancient rhetorical views on natural style are in various ways connected to notions of linguistic naturalism. For Dionysius, natural style is first of all the language that consciously imitates the non-technical speech of laymen. On a second level, however, nature also requires that the words follow the ideas and accurately represent the events in the order in which they actually happened. Natural language is thus understood as a perfect representation of reality, reflecting and mirroring the logical, chronological, and ontological order of the extra-linguistic world.

Dionysius' views on natural style can be fruitfully related to the ideas of Roman authors; Cicero shares his interest in the naturalism of Attic oratory; Varro makes observations on the role of nature in the imposition of names, and he likewise believes that language to a certain extent represents the order of reality. In all these texts, the 'natural' is always good – nature is the primary model and the final aim in both grammar and rhetoric. This may be the most remarkable result of a comparison between Greek and Latin scholarship on linguistic naturalism in the first century BC: φύσις and *natura* can mean many different things, but all grammarians and rhetoricians, both Greek and Roman, agree that nature is our 'guide' (*dux*), 'our great source and teacher' (ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος).

⁵⁶ Translation: Russell 2001.

Natural Law and Natural Language in the First Century BCE

James Zetzel

The various chapters in this volume have shown how ubiquitous is the appeal to nature in writings about language in the first century BCE; several of them have explored further the place of linguistic naturalism in the overall structure of the philosophies, notably Stoicism, on which that naturalism was based. At the same time, however, even a rapid survey of the volume shows equally clearly not only how inconsistent the various claims about the relationship between nature and language are among one another – scarcely surprising, since they derive from widely divergent philosophical systems – but also how inconsistent the most important surviving text, Varro’s *De lingua Latina*, is in itself. Does naturalism have any meaning? Or rather, does ‘nature’ have any meaning? And what good is an appeal to nature if that nature is in itself as uncertain and unintelligible as it often seems to be?

It should not come as any surprise, of course, that ‘nature’ in the context of the first century BCE (or, for that matter, the twenty-first century CE) should not have any fixed meaning: Lovejoy and Boas itemized 66 different meanings of *natura* and *physis*, and the terms could probably be split up even more than that.¹ Broadly speaking, however, nature appears, at least in connection with language and other social institutions, in two ways: on the one hand, nature can be seen as the source for human inventions, as in the Stoic view that originally there was a direct relationship between words and (natural) things;² on the other hand, nature provides the set of rules that constantly govern

¹ Lovejoy and Boas 1935: 447–56. The present version of this paper retains much of its original shape as a lecture. I am grateful to Katharina Volk for reading several versions of it, as also to those who offered comments on the oral version, to the editors of this volume, and to the anonymous referees. I offer a fuller and perhaps more balanced account of Roman philology in the first century BCE in Zetzel 2018: 31–58.

² See in particular Verlinsky, in this volume, Garcea, in this volume, and Blank, in this volume.

human behavior. In the first sense, nature is behind us; in the second, nature's laws are always with us. Nature is what we build on, our foundation; but nature is also the framework we struggle with every day. One might map these two aspects of nature onto Lovejoy and Boas' famous distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' primitivism, or between history viewed as progress (Whig history), rising from a crude original, and (much more Roman) history viewed as decline from a golden age.

It is not because 'nature' has so many possible meanings that using it as an explanatory tool is so contradictory: the reverse is true. 'Nature' has multiple meanings because in fact it has none: what nature is or wants is not within our capacity to know, and certainly not even Varro was around to watch Romulus or Latinus attach names to things. As a result, the claim that X is natural, without any context to explain it, means almost anything, and therefore nothing. How we define the relationship between us and nature is very important and is a major element in much philosophy of language; but it says much less about nature than it does about us. And given the fact that nobody can reliably comprehend what we mean when we invoke a natural cause for something, the useful question is not 'What is natural?' but 'Why do we call something natural?'

If in itself 'nature' denotes no single thing, its meaning can only be determined by context, and that is not always helpful. In talking about language, Varro frequently invokes nature, but he is scarcely consistent about what he means: in various passages *natura* is opposed to *ars* or *ratio*, to *usus* or *consuetudo*, or to *uoluntas*, leaving it perfectly unclear what it means.³ But in fact these oppositions constitute the only possible avenue of explanation: while *ratio* and *consuetudo* actually mean something, *natura* simply does not.

In *De lingua Latina*, to begin with a text that actually exists (at least in part), *natura* is hopelessly unclear and inconsistent.⁴ In the first place, even though *impositio* seems to be the work of individual *impositores* including, at the opening of Book 5, Romulus and Latinus, we know that the source

³ Thus Siebenborn 1976, usually both clear and judicious, is left bemused: 'Was man darunter verstehen soll, ist sehr umstritten, ... wegen des schillernden *natura*-Begriffes innerhalb der grammatischen Schriften Varros' (151). For further discussion, see also Uhl 1998: 27 n. 28.

⁴ Thus, most recently, Seppänen 2014: 145: 'The word *natura* is particularly problematic as it seems to carry more than one meaning in Varro's linguistic thought.' There are more detailed and constructive discussions of *natura* in Varro elsewhere in this volume: see particularly the chapters by Blank and de Melo. My goal is not to make sense of Varro's argument (or thought) but to show how it does not make sense.

of these *impositiones* is, ultimately, nature: every word has two natures, *a qua re* and *in qua re uocabulum sit impositum*.⁵

In his ad te scribam, a quibus rebus uocabula imposita sint in lingua latina et ea quae sunt in consuetudine apud <populum et ea quae inueniuntur apud> poetas. cum unius cuiusque uerbi naturae sint duae, a qua re et in qua re uocabulum sit impositum . . .

In these books addressed to you I will write about the things from which words have been imposed in the Latin language, both words which are in customary usage among the people and those which are found in the poets. Each and every word has two natures, the thing from which a word has been imposed and the thing on which it has been imposed . . . (L. 5.1–2)

The two natures here are clearly two relationships, one of source (*etymologia*), according to which words are derived naturally from some real thing, and one of meaning (περὶ σημαινόμενων), according to which words naturally apply to actions. Moreover, as he says in the preface to the next book, it is nature that leads us to impose names (in this case the names of units of time):

Dicemus primo de temporibus quam quae per ea fiunt, sed ita ut ante de natura eorum: ea enim dux fuit ad uocabula imponenda homini.

We shall speak first about times before the things that take place in times, but before that about the nature of times: for nature was man's leader in the imposition of names. (L. 6.3)

On the other hand, at 10.51 (and elsewhere in this section of the discussion of analogy), we are told that the person who wants to inflect words following *impositio* starts from the nominative singular, while the person who wants to follow *natura* starts from the oblique cases:

Voluntatem dico impositionem uocabulorum, naturam declinationem uocabulorum, quo decurritur sine doctrina. qui impositionem sequetur, dicet, si simile in recto casu *dolus* et *malus*, fore in obliquo *dolo* et *malo*; qui naturam sequetur, si sit simile in obliquis *Marco Quinto*, fore ut sit *Marcus Quintus*.

I call the imposition of words 'will' and the inflection of words 'nature' – where we end up without studying anything. Someone who follows imposition will say that if *dolus* and *malus* are alike in the nominative, then in the oblique cases it will be *dolo* and *malo*; someone who follows nature, (will say that) if in the oblique cases *Marco* and *Quinto* are alike, then it will be (in the nominative) *Marcus Quintus*. (L. 10.51)

⁵ The text of *De lingua Latina* is generally cited from Kent's Loeb edition; translations are my own.

Thus, in terms of the distinction between *impositio* and *declinatio*, *impositio* is natural, but in terms of the distinction between voluntary and natural *declinatio*, inflection is natural, while derivation (which is closely related to *impositio*) is not, but depends on each person's whim. As the preface to the whole discussion of analogy and anomaly states:

Cum utrumque nonnunquam accidat, et ut in uoluntaria declinatione animaduertatur natura et in naturali uoluntas, quae, cuiusmodi sint, aperientur infra . . . quod in declinatione uoluntaria sit anomalia, in naturali magis analogia.

Since sometimes both things occur, that nature can be observed in voluntary inflection and voluntary action in natural inflection; what sort of thing they are will be discussed below . . . because anomaly resides in voluntary inflection, but analogy more in natural inflection. (*L.* 8.23)

Varro does not make coherent sense.⁶

The only way to understand this incoherence is to acknowledge that it is incoherent: 'nature' has very different meanings in different sections of the work: the 'nature' – essentially the relationship between things and words – that underlies etymology is one thing, while the 'nature' that protects the uniformity of paradigms from innovation and invention is quite another. 'Nature' is not a term with a single meaning, and therefore claims to rely on nature are necessarily inconsistent and incoherent; naturalism approaches meaninglessness. To call something 'natural' is a rhetorical manipulation of language, not a term of art. But, at least in Books 8 and 9, that is precisely what we should expect: these books are rhetorical polemic, not scholarly exposition.⁷ And, as one of my teachers told me long ago, the use of 'naturally' in any argument simply means that the author has no evidence. 'Nature' is in the mind of the beholder. 'Nature' is what we invoke in order to explain what we do not understand and therefore cannot explain. So why use it, other than to conceal our ignorance and uncertainty?

I will return to that question, and to *De lingua Latina*, below; for now I want to look at a different passage of Varro, a fragment almost certainly from *De sermone Latino*. Two almost identical versions of the criteria for judging *Latinitas* are preserved in Charisius and Diomedes; that in

⁶ I note that the bibliography on *De lingua Latina* is large and of varied quality. The works to which I owe most in this paper are Collart 1954, Fehling 1956/7, Schroter 1960, Ax 2000, Blank 2005, Blank 2008, Garcea 2008, Gitner 2015. De Melo, in this volume offers a more detailed interpretation of *natura* in Varro than do I.

⁷ On this in particular, see the articles of Fehling and Blank cited in n. 6.

Diomedes is explicitly ascribed to Varro.⁸ I give Diomedes' version with some notes in brackets (*GL* 1.439.15–30; Varro, *GRFF* 268 = fr. 41 Goetz–Schoell):

Latinitas est incorrupte loquendi observatio secundum Romanam linguam. constat autem, ut adserit Varro, his quattuor, natura analogia consuetudine auctoritate. natura uerborum nominumque inmutabilis <est> nec quicquam aut minus aut plus tradidit nobis quam quod accepit. nam si quis dicat *scrimbo* <pro eo> quod est *scribo*, non analogiae uirtute sed naturae ipsius constitutione conuincitur. analogia sermonis a natura proditi ordinatio est secundum technicos neque aliter barbaram linguam ab erudita quam argementum a plumbo dissociat. consuetudo non ratione analogiae sed uiribus par est, ideo solum recepta, quod multorum consensione conualuit, ita tamen ut illi artis ratio non accedat sed indulgeat. nam ea e medio loquendi usu placita adsumere consueuit. auctoritas in regula loquendi nouissima est. namque ubi omnia defecerint, sic ad illam quem ad modum ad ancoram decurritur. non enim quicquam aut rationis aut naturae aut consuetudinis habet, cum tantum opinione secundum ueterum lectionem recepta sit nec ipsorum tamen, si interrogentur cur id secuti sunt, scientium.

Latinitas [*Latinus sermo* Charisius] is the maintenance of uncorrupted speech according to the language of the Romans. It is based, as Varro states, on nature, analogy, usage, and authority. The nature of words is unchangeable and is handed down to us exactly as it was received: if someone says *scrimbo* instead of *scribo*, he is proved wrong not because of analogy but by the structure of nature itself. Analogy is the organization, on the part of technical grammarians, of language sprung from nature; it separates barbarism from proper speech the same way we separate silver from lead. Custom is the equal of analogy not through reason but through its strength; we only accept it because it has grown powerful through the agreement of many people, but reason does not join it, it merely lets it alone. Authority comes last in the rules of speech. When everything else fails, we run to it as if to an anchor [*ad aram sacram* Charisius]. It has nothing of reason, or nature, or usage, but just opinion based on reading early writers [*opinioe oratorum* Charisius]; but if they were asked, they would admit that they didn't know why they followed it.

⁸ Fehling 1956/7: 225 is surely right to think that Diomedes' version is closer to the original than Charisius'. On this text see also Law 1990: 193–5, with translation and discussion, and more recently Garcea 2012: 31–3. Varro's authorship of the passage has occasionally been doubted (see Schenkeveld 1996: 30–1 and Dammer 2001: 184–207), but while there are clearly variations in the text as cited by Charisius and Diomedes, there is no reason to think that Diomedes has simply added the name of Varro because it sounded appropriate (Dammer 2001: 207) or that because the meaning of *natura* differs from its use elsewhere in Varro (so Schenkeveld 1996: 30–1) the definitions must belong to the Elder Pliny rather than Varro. Consistency is what is not to be expected from Varro.

Varro identifies four criteria for *Latinitas*: *natura*, *analogia*, *consuetudo*, and *auctoritas*. This collection of criteria is unique to him among surviving texts; the other relatively early set is found in Quintilian Book 1:

Sermo constat ratione uetustate auctoritate consuetudine. Rationem praestat praecipue analogia, nonnumquam etymologia. Vetera maiestas quaedam et, ut sic dixerim, religio commendat. Auctoritas ab oratoribus uel historicis peti solet . . . cum summorum in eloquentia uirorum iudicium pro ratione, et uel error honestus est magnos duces sequentibus. Consuetudo uero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone, ut nummo, cui publica forma est.

Language is based on reason, age, authority, and usage. Analogy, and sometimes etymology, are the principal manifestations of reason. A certain grandeur and as it were religious awe recommends old words. The usual source of authority is the orators and historians . . . since the judgement of the most eloquent men stands in the place of reason, and even mistakes are honorable when you are following great leaders. But the most sure teacher of speech is usage, and one must use words, like coins, that have currency among the public. (Quintilian, *Inst.* 1.6.1–3)

Similar, but discarding *natura*, is the triad of *ratio*, *auctoritas*, *consuetudo* used in the second century by the grammarian Terentius Scaurus, who was himself probably drawing on Varro.⁹

A full history of these sets of criteria would go far from the first century and indeed is not relevant here,¹⁰ but the most important changes between Varro and Quintilian are worth looking at. In the first place, the definitions of *natura* and *analogia* given by Varro are, as Barwick saw, complementary.¹¹ he defines nature as something immutable and inherited, the reason why we say *scribo* rather than *scrimbo*, while *analogia* appears as *sermonis a natura proditi ordinatio*. They are thus equivalent to what Quintilian calls *etymologia* and *analogia*, categorized as the two elements of *ratio*; in Quintilian, however, the role of *natura* / *etymologia* is clearly less important than that of *analogia*. The other change in Quintilian is the addition of *vetustas*. That is not, as Barwick thought, an early clue to

⁹ See the excerpt apparently from Scaurus given by Audax *GL* 7.322.21–323.3, also in Victorinus *GL* 6.189.2–7.

¹⁰ See above all Siebenborn 1976. Fehling 1956/7: 222–35 discusses the Latin texts on the criteria for *Latinitas* in great detail, but assumes that they must all derive from a single source which he reconstructs; his argument seriously distorts the evidence and is ultimately unconvincing. Grebe 2000 compares Varro's definition to Quintilian's, but wrongly assumes that one derives directly from the other. The use of these criteria in Servius' commentary on Virgil is important for the later history of *Latinitas* (although that is beyond the scope of this chapter): see especially Kaster 1988: 176–83 and, more extensively, Uhl 1998.

¹¹ See Barwick 1922: 183–4. Barwick is ascribing these definitions to Pansa, who in turn (in Barwick's reconstruction) is drawing on Varro.

second-century archaism,¹² but rather a Ciceronian gesture to the importance of old words to add dignity to speech as described in *De oratore* 3.153; its absence from Scaurus also suggests that *vetustas* looks back to Cicero rather than forward to Fronto. The only two criteria that are the same in Varro and Quintilian are *auctoritas* and *consuetudo*, but at the same time, the greatest difference between the two lists is in the weight given to those two: for Varro, *auctoritas* is contemptible and *consuetudo* the equal of *analogia*, but *non arte . . . sed uiribus*, while for Quintilian *auctoritas* is respectable, even if sometimes wrong, and *consuetudo* is by far the most important source of linguistic authority. The different weighting of the elements of *Latinitas* reflects different orientations: Varro's concern is correct language, Quintilian's is effective speech. *Latinitas* itself, moreover, was a contested area between grammar and rhetoric; not surprisingly, the two disciplines evaluated it differently.

Most of the terms used in defining the criteria of *Latinitas* will concern me eventually; for the moment, however, *natura* alone is my focus. *Natura* is alone, and that seems to me very significant: in all those lists of criteria (and there are quite a few, stretching deep into Late Antiquity), there is only one, Varro's, that places *natura* in a central position. What is more, in the fragment on *Latinitas* it is abundantly clear what *natura* means and where it fits: it is the starting point of proper speech, writing or saying correctly the words that nature gave us, the bedrock heart of language which is then pinched, pulled, and folded by the grammarians into some kind of proper order. And given that Varro is so cavalier about the many inconsistent meanings of *natura* in *De lingua Latina*, it is striking to find it given a place in a rigid structure of the constituent elements of Latinity. '*Natura* ist ein Lieblingsbegriffe Varros', says Fehling quite correctly, and he points out that, aside from its not appearing in any of the other Latin lists, it has no place in the equivalent Greek lists of the criteria for *Hellenismos*. Varro added it.¹³

Varro may be quirky, however, but it is hard to imagine that he simply went around gaily scattering *natura* over his writings because he liked the idea: it has, I want to suggest, a purpose and a context, and to demonstrate that, it will be necessary to look outside Varro, both synchronically, among his contemporaries and near contemporaries writing on other subjects, and diachronically, among his Latin successors over the centuries writing about language. It will, I hope, emerge that *natura* is one of a related group of terms – *consuetudo* and *ratio* are the other important ones – that are very

¹² Barwick 1922: 210–11, tracing it back to Pliny's *Dubius sermo* and forward to Capet.

¹³ Fehling 1956/7: 253.

conspicuous in the first century BCE in a number of contexts, but that fade from view after Varro in most areas of writing about language, not to reappear with any frequency until the end of the fourth century CE.

Varro wrote *De lingua Latina* in the mid-40s, and probably wrote *De sermone Latino* (if the Marcellus to whom it is dedicated is the Marcellus who was murdered in 45, as seems likely) slightly earlier. That is only a few years later – admittedly, separated by a civil war – than Cicero wrote his dialogue *De re publica*. There, in explaining the secession of the plebs in 494 BCE that ended with the establishment of the tribunate, Cicero comments first, that it was natural for the people to want more rights than they were being given, then that the nature of *res publicae* often defeats *ratio* (2.57):

Sed id quod fieri natura rerum ipsa cogebat, ut plusculum sibi iuris populus ascisceret liberatus a regibus, non longo intervallo . . . consecutus est. In quo defuit fortasse ratio; sed tamen uincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem.

Nature itself, however, required that, as a result of their having been freed from monarchy, the people should claim rather more rights for themselves; that took place not much later . . . This development was perhaps not completely rational, but the nature of commonwealths often overcomes reason.

The *natura* in question is essentially the same as the *anakyklosis*, the cycle of constitutions, and the *ratio* is that of statesmen. Nature, here, is some kind of sociological constant: the tendency of people to seek power, the tendency of constitutions to change in a relatively fixed pattern and to degenerate. Reason, in this instance, is human reason which, when it operates properly, can recognize, interpret, and channel the necessities of nature.¹⁴

The nature of ‘nature’ (if I can call it that) in this passage is related to the underlying *natura* of Varro’s criteria for Latinity: the ‘nature’ of political societies is something built into us, a raw force that can be mastered if properly understood by the educated reason of statesmen. And like Varro’s *natura* in the list of criteria, it is fairly unusual: Cicero does not often, nor does anyone else so far as I know, talk about the ‘nature’ of political systems, and that very rarity points to the importance of the vocabulary used. What is more, like Varro, but very unlike his usual clear-headed self, Cicero uses the same language of *natura* and *ratio* to mean exactly the opposite: in Laelius’ unfortunately very fragmentary speech on justice in

¹⁴ For the interpretation of this passage, see Zetzel 1995 ad loc.

Book 3, he sets out an ideal picture of law that begins, famously, with the statement (*Rep.* 3.33):

Est quidem uera lex recta ratio naturae congruens . . .

True law is right reason, consonant with nature . . .

This is clearly Stoic doctrine, and the speech and context are too fragmentary to know just how it fitted into the argument of the dialogue as a whole. But the Stoic argument about the identity of nature, reason, and law is much fuller and clearer in *De legibus*, the unfinished dialogue which was meant to be a companion to *De re publica*. The discussion of natural law occupies half of the first book and is summarized in a substantial introduction to the second; I will quote only one passage that conveniently uses the terminology I want to emphasize: (*Leg.* 1.33)

Quodsi, quomodo est natura, sic iudicio homines humani (ut ait poeta) nihil a se alienum putarent, coleretur ius aequae ab omnibus. Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, eisdem etiam recta ratio data est; ergo et lex, quae est recta ratio in iubendo et uetando; si lex, ius quoque. Et omnibus ratio; ius igitur datum est omnibus.

But if human judgement corresponded to what is true by nature and men thought nothing human alien to them (to use the poet's phrase), then justice would be cultivated equally by all. Those who have been given reason by nature have also been given right reason, and therefore law too, which is right reason in commands and prohibitions; and if they have been given law, then they have also been given justice. All people have reason, and therefore justice has been given to all.

Reason comes from nature; it is only human failings that distort the working of right reason and therefore misunderstand and misuse law. Reason and nature are, in this argument, essentially identical. The contrast between my first quotation from *De re publica* and the Stoic arguments about the sources of justice and law illustrates nicely the two completely opposite meanings of nature.

Not all uses of *natura* are significant: when all is said and done, it is a common word with a great many innocuous meanings, and it occurs nearly 2,000 times in Cicero. In *De oratore* alone (a text I want to concentrate on for the moment), it is found more than 100 times, in most cases simply as *natura rerum* or as a term for the underlying character or characteristics of either a single person or of humanity at large. But one also finds it in a use far closer to its place in the history of language, as the equivalent of *ingenium*: the familiar triad of *ingenium*, *ars*, and *exercitatio* – talent,

technical training, and practice, the three things needed in a successful orator – also appears as *natura*, *doctrina* (sometimes *studium* or, once [1.113], *ratio dicendi*), and *usus*.¹⁵ Thus, in Crassus' praise of the young Hortensius at the end of the whole dialogue, he uses the phrase *nihil enim illi adulescenti neque a natura neque a doctrina deesse sentio* 'I believe that that young man lacks nothing from the point of view either of *natura* or of *doctrina*' (3.229). Nature is what underlies technical refinement, just as, in Diomedes' version of Varro's criteria, we find analogy defined as *sermonis a natura prodicti ordinatio est secundum technicos* 'the organization, on the part of technical grammarians, of language sprung from nature': *ars* works on *natura*.¹⁶

The explicit combination of *ars* and *natura* also appears in an extended discussion of why we appreciate prose rhythm:

Illud autem ne quis admiretur, quonam modo haec uulgius imperitorum in audiendo notet, cum in omni genere tum in hoc ipso magna quaedam est uis incredibilisque naturae. Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac praua diiudicant; idque cum faciunt in picturis et in signis et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intellegentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, tum multo ostendunt magis in uerborum, numerorum uocumque iudicio; quod ea sunt in communibus infixis sensibus nec earum rerum quemquam funditus natura esse uoluit expertem. [196] Itaque non solum uerbis arte positis mouentur omnes, uerum etiam numeris ac uocibus. Quotus enim quisque est qui teneat artem numerorum ac modorum? At in eis si paulum modo offensum est, ut aut contractione breuius fieret aut productione longius, theatra tota reclamant. Quid, hoc non idem fit in uocibus, ut a multitudine et populo non modo cateruae atque concentus, sed etiam ipsi sibi singuli discrepantes eiciantur? [197] Mirabile est, cum plurimum in faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in iudicando. Ars enim cum a natura profecta sit, nisi natura moueat ac delectet, nihil sane egisse uideatur . . .

Nobody should be surprised at how the mob of uneducated people recognizes these things when they hear them, since in this, as in everything else, there is a huge, incredible force of nature. Everyone, by some sort of silent sensation, makes judgements about what is good and bad in technical matters – without any technical training. They do this in the case of pictures and statues and other material objects, for the understanding of which nature supplies fewer tools, and even more in making discernments

¹⁵ On the terminology, see for instance Mankin 2011 on 3.5.

¹⁶ This distinction between *natura* and *ars* applies to other areas besides oratory, such as divination; see the passages collected by Wisse, Winterbottom, and Fantham 2008 on 3.195.

concerning words, rhythms, and voices, because they are rooted in the senses we all have, and nature did not want anyone to be completely ignorant in such matters. [196] And so they are all swayed by words artfully arranged, and even by rhythms and voices. How few people there are who know the art of rhythms and modes? But if there's even a tiny error in them, making long syllables short or short syllables long, the whole theater roars. Isn't it the same for voices, that not only choruses and vocal groups, but even inconsistencies in individual performances, are tossed out by the crowd? [197] What's amazing is that there is such a huge difference between the professional and the amateur in performance, but so little difference in appreciation. Since art arises from nature, if it does not naturally move and delight, it does nothing at all. (*de Orat.* 3.195–7)

Here *natura* is more than the source of *ars*: it is *natura* that enables us to recognize the accomplishments of *ars*, and thus is not just raw material that is surpassed, but something, like the nature of commonwealths, that remains constant. But here *ars* and *natura* are not quite enough: *Omni que in re posse quod deceat facere artis et naturae est, scire quid quandoque deceat prudentiae* (3.212 'Art and nature provide the ability to do what is appropriate in every case, but it's up to *prudentia* to know what is appropriate, and when'). *Prudentia* is the virtue of the statesman, and 'what is appropriate, and when' seems to me very much like linguistic *consuetudo*. In rhetoric, even more than in everyday speech, knowing what is acceptable is not at all the same as knowing what is correct, on either historical or technical grounds.

A much earlier passage of Cicero's rhetorical theory in *De inventione* has, I think, a genuine bearing on this and actually does talk about *consuetudo*. In explaining in very Hermagorean terms how one addresses a *constitutio generalis*, Cicero observes that it is necessary, when there is disagreement, to understand the sources and meaning of *ius*:

Initium ergo eius [sc. iuris] ab natura ductum uidetur; quaedam autem ex utilitatis ratione aut perspicua nobis aut obscura in consuetudinem uenisse; post autem adprobata quaedam a consuetudine aut uero utilia uisa legibus esse firmata; ac naturae quidem ius esse, quod nobis non opinio, sed quaedam innata uis adferat, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, uindictionem, obseruantiam, ueritatem. [66] . . . [67] ac naturae quidem iura minus ipsa quaeruntur ad hanc controuersiam, quod neque in hoc ciuili iure uersantur et a uulgari intellegentia remotiora sunt; ad similitudinem uero aliquam aut ad rem amplificandam saepe sunt inferenda. consuetudine autem ius esse putatur id, quod uoluntate omnium sine lege uetustas comprobarit. In ea autem quaedam sunt iura ipsa iam certa propter uetustatem. quo in genere et alia sunt multa et eorum multo maxima pars,

quae praetores edicere consuerunt. quaedam autem genera iuris iam certa consuetudine facta sunt; quod genus pactum, par, iudicatum.

The beginning of law seems to be drawn from nature; certain things either obvious or obscure to us, taking account of utility, have entered custom. Later some of them that either gained approval from customary usage or seemed useful were strengthened by law. There is also a type of natural law that not our own feelings but some innate strength brings to us, as religion, pietas, gratitude, vindication, observance, truth. [66] . . . [67] But the laws of nature are less relevant for this kind of argument, because they aren't involved in our civil law and they are too remote from the understanding of the man in the street. Often, however, they should be brought in for some comparison or for the sake of expansion. That is said to be law by custom, which antiquity has sanctioned by universal agreement with no statutory basis. In it, there are some laws that are in fact certain because of their antiquity. In that category the most significant part is the content of the praetors' edict. Some kinds of law have become certain through customary usage, such as agreement, equity, and precedent. (*Inv.* 2.65–7)

Ius derives from nature – but in fact natural law (the content of which he summarizes in §66, which I have mostly omitted) is unimportant, because it is irrelevant to Roman law and largely incomprehensible to most people. But aside from the vague content of natural law, considerations of utility have brought some matters, either clear or obscure to us, into *consuetudo*, and length of time, *uetustas*, has turned *consuetudo* into *ius* without its becoming statute law, because it is approved by the *uoluntas* of all. And within this large category of customary law mostly represented by the praetor's edict, certain areas have become regularized: *certa consuetudine facta sunt*. The same set of ideas is summarized more briefly near the end of the book, in Cicero's definition of *iustitia* in the context of deliberative oratory:

Eius initium est ab natura profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione uenerunt; postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.

Its starting point came from nature, and then some things became custom on account of utility. Afterwards things that started from nature and were approved by custom gained sanction through fear of the laws and religion. (*Inv.* 2.160)

From *natura* through *consuetudo* via *utilitatis ratio* (and through *uetustas* and *uoluntas*): we might as well be talking about language rather than law. The only term in accounts of language that is missing here is *auctoritas*, but

in the context of law, the language of *religio* is surely a good equivalent. Cicero's account of *ius* and *iustitia* in these passages is very different from the parallel passage in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (2.19–20). There, the author simply lists, and defines in very bald terms, six constituents of *ius* as nature, statute, *consuetudo*, *iudicatum*, equity (*aequum et bonum*, equivalent to Cicero's *par*), and *pactum*. There is nothing in *Ad Herennium* of the relationship between nature and custom, no narrative of the process by which custom becomes law. The account in *De inventione* is Cicero's own.

Language, rhetoric, politics, and law are all, in a sense, related, in that they are all about the skilful and educated use of words. But in at least one passage, the language of *natura* and *consuetudo* extends into the physical world. Among the six aspects of well-built temples described by Vitruvius at the outset of *De architectura*, *decor* (described as *emendatus operis aspectus probatis rebus conpositi cum auctoritate*, 1.2.5) is subdivided into three elements (1.2.5–7). The first is *statio* – the appropriate order and location for the appropriate divinity. The second is *consuetudo*, described as the consistency of construction (harmony). And the third is *natura*, a salubrious physical setting. The meanings of *consuetudo* and *natura* here are not at all the same as in the other texts discussed, but that is the point: it is the vocabulary that matters, not what it means. There is not one single pattern of meaning or structure of development shared among the incipient disciplines of language, rhetoric, politics, law, and architecture; the terms have no single meaning, much less a fixed relationship.¹⁷ Thus, in the discussion of law in *De inuentione*, custom arises from nature, while in arguments about language, custom and nature are generally opposed to one another. But there is in these texts a shared discourse for describing the process in which institutions (and even buildings) are shaped: nature has a part, custom has a part, and so, when relevant, do choice, reason, utility, and precedent. These are not explanations; they are the tools of explanation. The use of these terms is too widespread and too variable in meaning and relationship for any succinct history to be practicable; but that variability itself is, for me, precisely the point: these are not philosophically pure definitions, they are the language of the day.

And it is the language of the day: these terms are not equally to be found in all periods. An emphasis on 'nature' in talk about language was particularly important in the first century BCE: my own sense is that in most grammatical texts, *natura* appears almost exclusively in connection with

¹⁷ I note (what will be evident in any case) that I am not discussing uses of these terms in technical philosophical writing: that is a different problem.

the natural length of syllables and more rarely in connection with natural gender of nouns; even so, it is uncommon before Servius except in a few texts.¹⁸ Up to the middle of the fourth century the argument from nature is all but invisible. It does not re-emerge until the commentators on Donatus in the fifth century, from Servius on, who use 'natural' as the explanation not just of syllables, but of the order of the parts of speech and various uses of them; the hexameter also becomes a 'natural' meter. The same seems to hold for *consuetudo*: it is simply not a customary word of grammatical discourse in the age of Donatus. While *natura* and *consuetudo* appear with great frequency in Charisius – and are not rare in Diomedes either – they are largely, if not quite exclusively, found in sections that fall squarely into the tradition of works on *Latinitas* stretching from Varro through (maybe) Pansa to Pliny and Caper. In Sacerdos, *natura* appears only once other than about syllabic length, *consuetudo* only once altogether. In the major works under the name of Probus, *natura* appears once (about syllables) and *consuetudo* never in the *Instituta artium*, and each word appears once in the *Catholica*. In Audax (drawing on earlier sources), *natura* is used frequently of syllabic length, and in four other passages about word order, natural accent, and the like; *consuetudo* appears only in the definitions of *Latinitas* and barbarism taken from Victorinus/Scaurus, and almost the same definition of *Latinitas* appears in the opening of Augustine's *Ars breuiata*. A few grammarians, notably Priscian, have a real taste for the word *natura* and its derivatives; so do Consentius, the early commentators on Donatus (Servius, *Explanationes in Donatum* I, and particularly Pompeius), and Julian of Toledo. Likewise, other than Charisius and Diomedes, *consuetudo* only seems genuinely popular in Velius Longus, Consentius, and Augustine. In the case of the last of these, it is perhaps worth noting that Vivien Law argued that the use of *consuetudo* in Augustine's grammar reflects not so much the grammatical tradition as it does the kind of arguments that Augustine makes in non-grammatical works.¹⁹

If the use of *natura* and *consuetudo* as explanatory tools is not natural, then why are they used? Let me return to Varro, and try to characterize his uses of the terms of argument I have been collecting in *De lingua Latina*. There is no point in reviewing all the uses of *consuetudo*: it is everywhere,

¹⁸ I rely here on word searches in the online *Corpus Grammaticorum Latinorum* and Packard Humanities Institute Classical Latin Texts. *Natura* rises again in the fifth century, with Servius; but that is beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁹ Law 1990.

and it generally refers to current usage that has displaced or altered older forms and usage; it also refers, as in the famous passage on the four stages of etymology, to common or garden everyday words like *oppidum*, *uicus*, and *uia* (5.8). In general, it stands in opposition to both *natura* and *ratio*; but it is not, for that reason, to be scorned as a source of correct, if not pristine, morphology and usage. There is a frustratingly incomplete discussion of the relationship between analogy and *usus* at the end of our text of Book 10 of *De lingua Latina*, describing not one but two kinds of analogy (10.74):²⁰

Analogia non item ea definienda quae derigitur ad naturam uerborum atque illa quae ad usum loquendi. Nam prior definienda sic: ‘analogia est uerborum similium declinatio similis’, posterior sic: ‘analogia est uerborum similium declinatio similis non repugnante consuetudine communi.’

One should not define the analogy which is directed to the nature of words in the same way as that which is directed towards usage in speech. The first should be defined thus: ‘Analogy is the similar inflection of similar words.’ The second thus: ‘Analogy is the similar inflection of similar words, so long as common custom does not fight back.’

Varro’s point, to paraphrase slightly, seems to be that abstract analogy defined as the similar inflection of similar words is all very well, but it has limited application: analogy in actual speech must conform to *consuetudo communis* – current usage, as opposed both to strict analogy and (10.78) to *usus uetus*.

The discussion of the relationship between custom and analogy or between *natura uerborum* and usage at the end of Book 10 can be supplemented from the arguments against and for analogy in the previous books, particularly Book 9. The anomalist argument in Book 8 is, of course, in favor of *consuetudo*, in part on the basis of comprehensibility: clarity, he says, comes from *consuetudo*:

Omnis oratio cum debeat dirigi ad utilitatem, ad quam tum denique peruenit, si est aperta et brevis, quae petimus, quod obscurus et longus orator est odio; et cum efficiat aperta, ut intellegatur, brevis, ut cito intellegatur, et aperta <m> consuetudo, breuem temperantia loquentis, et utrumque fieri possit sine analogia, nihil ea opus est. neque enim, utrum Herculi an Herculis clauam dici oporteat, si doceat analogia, cum utrumque sit in consuetudine, non neglegendum, quod aequae sunt et breui <a> et aperta. Praeterea quouiis utilitatis causa quaeque res sit inuenta, si ex ea quis id sit consecutus, amplius ea <m> scrutari cum sit nimium otiosi, et cum

²⁰ On this passage see further de Melo, in this volume, pp. 119–120.

utilitatis causa uerba ideo sint imposita rebus ut ea<s> significant, si id consequimur una consuetudine, nihil prodest analogia.

All speech ought to be directed to utility, which it reaches only if it's clear and short; that's what we want, because an obscure and long-winded speaker is hateful. Clear, to be understood, short, to be understood fast; and it's custom that makes a speech clear and self-control on the part of the speaker that makes it short. And since both these things can be achieved without analogy, we have no need of that. So if analogy should teach us whether to say Hercules' club or Hercules's club, although they're both customary, we shouldn't forget that they're equally short and clear. Besides, if someone gets what he wants through the use of something invented for that purpose, only if he has too much time on his hands will he look at that thing more closely. And since words were imposed on things for the sake of utility in signifying them, if we can get there just by custom, then what's the use of analogy? (*L.* 8.26–7)

The analogist argument starts (9.2–3) by claiming in a fairly specious argument that analogy and *consuetudo* are more closely related than one might think in that both analogy and anomaly spring from *consuetudo*. But then, in discussing the conditions under which one ought to employ one or the other approach, he starts from the pairing of *natura* and *usus*, and eventually reaches consideration of how analogy should be observed by *plures*, most people. Some words, he says, are everyone's, *populi uniuersi*, others are those of orators, others yet of poets; they differ, because they do not have the same *ius*:

Alia enim populi uniuersi, alia singulorum, et de eis non eadem oratoris et poetae, quod eorum non idem ius. Itaque populus uniuersus debet in omnibus uerbis uti analogia et, si perperam est consuetus, corrigere se ipsum, cum orator non debeat in omnibus uti, quod sine offensione non potest facere, cum poeta[e] transilire lineas impune possit. populus enim in sua potestate, singuli in illius: itaque ut suam quisque consuetudinem, si mala est, corrigere debet, sic populus suam. ego populi consuetudinis non sum ut dominus, at ille meae est. ut rationi optemperare debet gubernator, gubernatori unusquisque in naui, sic populus rationi, nos singuli populo.

Some words belong to the people as a whole, others to individuals; and among them the same words do not belong to the orator and the poet, because they don't have the same rights. So the people as a whole ought to use analogy in all words, and if it has bad customs, it ought to correct itself; but the orator should not use analogy in all words, because he can't do that without offending, while a poet can cross the line and get away with it. The people are in their own control, and individuals are in the people's: and so just as each person should correct his own custom, if it's bad, so too the

people should correct its own. I don't act as master of the people's custom, but the people is master of mine. The helmsman ought to pay attention to reason, and everyone on the ship ought to pay attention to the helmsman; in the same way the people should obey reason, and we individuals should obey the people. (*L.* 9.5–6)

Varro distinguishes here between the use of analogy (which is here, I think, a part of *natura* although *natura* is not mentioned) by the people at large and by individuals: the people make mistakes because of *consuetudo* (*si perperam est consuetus*) and ought to correct themselves back to proper analogy, while the orator should not always follow analogy, but should stick to the errors of the people to avoid offending them. Poets – and Varro throughout *De lingua Latina* seems not to have a very high opinion of poets – can do whatever they like.²¹ We should all, of course, strive to correct bad *consuetudo*, but individuals cannot correct the people at large: the *populus* rules my *consuetudo* and I must obey it, just as the crew of a ship must obey its helmsman, while the helmsman, like the *populus*, should follow *ratio*.

There is much that is remarkable in this passage. Most striking to me is the reversal of the normal (i.e. Ciceronian) relationship between orator or statesman and people, accompanied by the peculiar reversal of a standard political simile: here the crew is equated to the individual orator, the helmsman to the collective people. Beyond that is simply the emphasis placed on the orator as a user of language: language is seen as a vehicle for public communication, and the speaker, like the user of language more generally at the end of Book 10, must obey *consuetudo communis*. While pure and proper language (whether described as *ratio* or *analogia* as in Book 9 or *natura uerborum* as in Book 10) remains a standard to be desired, the actual *use* of language must, to be effective, follow custom rather than the rules. This is, I repeat, an argument made by the analogist, but it so closely corresponds to what we can see of Varro's own argument in Book 10 that we should accept it as not too far from his own position.

If it is accepted that this explanatory language, above all the use of arguments from *natura*, *ratio*, and *consuetudo*, is more typical of the first century BCE than of other periods where we can trace it, then the obvious last question is: Why? Several features of the use of this vocabulary deserve

²¹ Thus at 5.9 and 7.2 Varro is quite dismissive of the utility of poetic language for any purpose other than poetry; at 10.35 he criticizes poets for getting away with bad grammar; and in the present passage he seems to resent the fact that poets can break rules with impunity. De Melo, in this volume has a more positive view of Varro's opinion of poets.

emphasis. One is that, in terms of language, its most significant area of use is the question of *Latinitas*. That is where Varro uses it in *De sermone Latino*, and that is the central issue in the books on analogy and anomaly of *De lingua Latina*. Second is that *Latinitas* itself lies on the disputed frontier between grammar and rhetoric: it is no accident that the earliest discussion of *Latinitas* is in *Ad Herennium* (4.17) in connection with barbarism and solecism, for discussion of which the author refers us to his future, probably never written, *ars grammatica*. Third is that, even when applied to language, the context of this kind of argument is not only rhetorical but political: what kinds of words actually *work* in a public setting? And last, I want to suggest very tentatively that in Roman public discourse the natural setting (if I may call it that) for these words is in the discussion of law, as in *De inventione*, in debates before the praetor deploying arguments about natural behavior, custom, statute, and equity.

I must admit, unfortunately that I know of only one legal context in which *natura* and *consuetudo* appear together, but it is an intriguing one. When the jurist Gaius is talking about the natural modes of acquisition of property, he includes those things of which we are the first takers, such as wild animals (*Inst.* 2.67–8):

Itaque si feram bestiam aut uolucrum aut piscem ceperimus, simul atque captum fuerit hoc animal, statim nostrum fit, et eo usque nostrum esse intellegitur, donec nostra custodia coerceatur; cum uero custodiam nostram euaserit et in naturalem se libertatem receperit, rursus occupantis fit, quia nostrum esse desinit: naturalem autem libertatem recipere uidetur, cum aut oculos nostros euaserit, aut licet in conspectu sit nostro, difficilis tamen eius persecutio sit. In iis autem animalibus, quae ex consuetudine abire et redire solent, ueluti columbis et apibus, item ceruis, qui in siluas ire et redire solent, talem habemus regulam traditam, ut si reuertendi animum habere desierint, etiam nostra esse desinant et fiant occupantium: reuertendi autem animum uidentur desinere habere, cum reuertendi consuetudinem deseruerint.

So if we catch a wild animal or bird or fish, it becomes ours the instant it is captured, and it is understood to remain ours so long as it is held under our guardianship. But when it escapes from our guardianship and gets itself back to the liberty of nature, it then again becomes any taker's property, because it is no longer ours. And something is understood to regain the liberty of nature either when it has escaped from our sight or (if we can still see it) it is hard to pursue it. In the case of animals which customarily come and go, like pigeons or bees or deer that make a habit of going in and out of the woods, we have been handed down this rule, that if they stop intending to return then they stop being ours and become any taker's property.

They are understood to have stopped intending to return when they have abandoned the habit of returning.

Some animals are truly wild and belong to us only so long as we control them; when they escape, they recover what Gaius calls ‘natural liberty’. Others are semi-wild and only stop being ours when they stop coming back. Gaius is not inventing new law; he is in fact an antiquarian, and the parallel passage of the *Digest* (41.1.5) on the ownership of wild animals, drawn from Gaius’ *rerum cotidianarum libri*, includes a citation from Cicero’s friend Trebatius (*Dig.* 41.1.5.1) and almost certainly reflects a debate older than that. The passage offers two states of being for bees and deer (and peacocks and doves, but not chickens and geese, in the parallel passage in the *Digest*): they either have a *consuetudo* of coming back, or they give it up and regain natural liberty. Peacocks and doves aside, the status of naturally wild animals is in fact not an altogether trivial question in Roman law, and the issue of *pauperies* (damage by animals) provoked a discussion about owners’ responsibility for the ‘natural wildness’ of their animals (*Dig.* 9.1.1) that goes back as far as Quintus Mucius and Cicero’s other legal friend Servius Sulpicius Rufus.²²

The legal validity of *consuetudo* in general is in fact a very important question (see *Dig.* 1.3.32–40). Varro, in *De lingua Latina*, quotes legal texts and makes legal jokes about the ownership of words; in fact, the entire framework of arguments about sources, usage, and natural origins owes a great deal to jurisprudence.²³ If I had to hazard a guess, I would say that the most likely source for all these arguments, or at least their most influential early expression, was Cicero’s teacher, and one of the great theorists of ethical law, Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, who is in fact cited four times by Varro in the books on etymology. Perhaps the question about the role of nature in language would be more suitably framed not as a question about origins, but as a question about results, not where nature is coming from, but where nature is going. Maybe we should try to think

²² I am grateful to the press’s referee for directing me to Thomas 1991. Thomas discusses (214–18) the legal problems of captured wild animals in the context of legal casuistry involving *natura* rather than the place of *natura* in a broader Roman conceptual framework. The excerpt from Gaius in *Dig.* 41.1.5–9 is long, detailed, and fascinating; parts of it clearly go back to Q. Mucius, but I am not clear why Thomas (218) thinks that Pomponius’ comments at *Dig.* 41.1.44 also do; Lenel does not recognize this passage as a fragment of Q. Mucius.

²³ On Varro’s legal language in *De lingua Latina* I am indebted to an unpublished paper by Adam Gitner, ‘Latin’s Creeping Roots: Varro on Latin across Space and Time’ (American Philological Association. Annual Meeting, 2014). On legal language in Cicero’s *Academica*, see Reinhardt, in this volume.

about words and forms the way the lawyers think about bees and deer. How do naturally wild words become domesticated, and who owns them?

A question like this can easily become ridiculous: 'The question is', said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master [i.e. you or the words] – that's all.' But there are rather more serious issues involved in the use of arguments from nature. How do we justify our actions and choices, in language, law, or life? The appeal to nature can be used to support almost any position, but it is in all cases an attempt to find a principle of explanation that goes behind mere positive law or habit, one that is used to justify human behavior on grounds that are not merely empirical or capricious. The issues of order and control that are implicit in the invocation of 'nature' as cause are not at all trivial. And whether or not naturalist arguments in law, at least, derive from Quintus Mucius, it is striking that these arguments from nature start to appear in the Sullan period, a decade in which all the kinder and gentler assumptions about human and humane behavior were shattered: the marches on Rome, the proscriptions, civil war, the murder of Quintus Mucius himself.²⁴ Nor, I suspect, is it an accident that Cicero's ideas about the relationship between nature and law move over his lifetime from a relatively benign linking through *consuetudo* to the rigorous Stoic position of *De legibus* of law as absolute reason based on divine, not human nature.²⁵ He does so not because he is a Stoic (he was not), but because Stoic natural law provides a tool for claiming that one's choices are both rational and moral. The chaos of the late Republic, as Benjamin Straumann has recently argued, produced a constitutionalism that appealed to nature precisely because of the contingency and corruption of human government.²⁶ We need some better standard than that.

War, above all civil war, is, as Thucydides knew, a violent teacher; and his pupil Hobbes, writing about nature during the English Civil War, is rightly classified by Lovejoy and Boas among the followers of what they name 'animalitarianism' in its pessimistic vein: the belief, in their words, 'that man is by nature an 'unnatural' animal'.²⁷ In its substance, the appeal to nature as cause is essentially meaningless, because it is circular.

²⁴ I have discussed the importance of Q. Mucius to Cicero's legal thinking in Zetzel 2013. There, and here, I am much indebted to Harries 2006.

²⁵ Nor do I think it an accident that the anti-Ciceronian Sallust, in the only passage in which he pairs *natura* and *consuetudo*, puts into Marius' mouth a deliberate reversal of normal usage (*Jug.* 85.9): *Illis* [sc. the *nobiles*] *difficile est in potestatibus temperare, qui per ambitionem sese probos simulauere; mihi, qui omnem aetatem in optumis artibus egi, bene facere iam ex consuetudine in naturam uortit.*

²⁶ Straumann 2016. ²⁷ Lovejoy and Boas 1935: 20.

Its importance lies in the fact of its being used, in the attempt to turn normative statements into descriptive ones, to offer an explanation of the unintelligible and the inexplicable. Its virtue lies in the fact that because it is in fact meaningless, it is also irrefutable. 'For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions.' So Hobbes, in the final paragraph of his chapter 'Of Speech' in which he also paraphrases Thucydides' language about language in the Corcyrean Stasis. And as Hobbes says earlier in the same chapter: 'Natural sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot err: and as men abound in copiousness of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary.'

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Index Locorum

- Accius
GRFF 24, 81
GRFF 25, 81
- Afranius
Com. (CRF³) 292, 94
- Ammonius
In Int. CAG 4.5.5.10–12, 100
In Int. CAG 4.5.34.10–35.12, 4
- Anon. *In Tht.*
 col. VII 26–37, ed. Bastianini-Sedley,
 125
- Antistius Labeo
IAR⁶ 26, 90
- Apollonius Dyscolus
Conj. GG 2.1.214.4–20, 34,
 101
Pron. GG 2.1.42.8–9, 178
Synt. 1.16, 188
Synt. 7.6–14, 60
- Aristotle
EN 1161b27–1162a1, 90
EN 1166a32, 90
Int. 16a27–8, 7
Metaph. 986a22–6, 142
Po. 1456b38–1457a2, 101
Po. 1457a18–23, 100
- Arius Didymus
SVF 3.44, 151
SVF 3.57, 151
- Arrian
Epict. 1.6.19, 126
- Atilius Fortunatianus
GL 7.278.17, 49
- Audax
GL 7.322.21–323.3, 196
- Augustinus
Civ. 19.1–3, 150
Civ. 5.2, 33
Civ. 6.9, 97
Dial. 6, 17, 38, 86
Gramm. GL 5.517.19, 61
- Bede
GL 7.251.18, 54, 70
- Caper
GL 7.92.5, 62
- Cassiodorus
Orth. GL 7.149.1, 50, 54, 73
Orth. GL 7.149.1–3, 81
Orth. GL 7.152.16–153.6, 81
Orth. GL 7.152.8–12, 82
Orth. GL 7.206.26, 70
- Cato
Agr. 157, 62
- Charisius
 16.22–7 B., 72
 98.17–99.19 B., 70
 98.23–99.7 B., 99
 142.23–30 B., 62
 265.21–6 B., 91
 273.14–22 B., 93
 351.30 B., 62
- Chrysippus
SVF 2.87, 85
SVF 2.204, 85
SVF 2.205, 85
SVF 2.881–909, 83
SVF 2.883, 86
SVF 2.884, 86
SVF 2.887, 83
SVF 2.891, 83
SVF 2.892, 84
SVF 2.895, 84
SVF 2.896, 85
SVF 2.914, 17
SVF 2.950, 32
SVF 2.973, 22
SVF 3.4, 151
- Cicero
Ac. 1.6, 161
Ac. 1.17, 168
Ac. 1.23, 168

- Ac.* 1.24–9, 161
Ac. 1.29, 162
Ac. 1.32, 150, 168
Ac. 1.33, 168
Ac. 1.42, 166
Brut. 36, 179
Brut. 38, 179
Brut. 111, 179
Brut. 112, 180
Brut. 259, 48
Caec. 71, 158
de Orat. 1.113, 200
de Orat. 1.214, 180
de Orat. 2.188, 179
de Orat. 3.46, 73
de Orat. 3.100, 179
de Orat. 3.153, 197
de Orat. 3.195–7, 200–1
de Orat. 3.212, 201
de Orat. 3.229, 200
Div. 1.16, 32
Div. 2.47, 33
Div. 2.88, 32
Div. 2.94, 32
Div. 2.96–7, 32
Div. fr. 4 Giomini, 33
Fam. 2.15.4, 90
Fat. 5–7, 33
Fat. 7, 31–2
Fin. 3.12, 151
Fin. 3.65–6, 127
Fin. 3.66, 127
Fin. 4.18, 127
Fin. 5.24, 125, 150
Fin. 5.41–3, 150
Hort. fr. 50 Grilli, 15
Inv. 2.65–7, 201–2
Inv. 2.160, 202
Leg. 1.33, 199
Luc. 18, 154
Luc. 19–29, 154
Luc. 22, 155–7, 170
Luc. 26, 158, 167
Luc. 32–6, 164
Luc. 57, 155
Luc. 78, 159
Luc. 98, 166
Luc. 98–113, 164
Luc. 102, 55
Luc. 105, 166–7
Luc. 106, 160, 162, 164
Luc. 146, 163–4, 166–7, 169
N. D. 2.129, 19
N. D. 2.150–3, 23
Orat. 29, 174
Orat. 79, 179
Orat. 173, 64
Rep. 2.57, 198
Rep. 3.3, 19–20
Rep. 3.33, 199
Tim. 1, 79
Tusc. 1.62, 19, 80, 92
Tusc. 5.5, 19
CIL I²
2, 67
364 (= *CLE* 2), 65
365, 61
561, 73
698.10, 71
723, 73
747, 66
791, 71
805, 73
989, 71
995, 73
1250, 73
1312, 73
1412, 73
1438, 66
1439, 66
1480, 73
1570, 69
1888, 73
1892, 73
2128, 73
2215, 73
2218, 73
2222, 73
2230, 73
2238, 66
3013a, 65
3295, 66
Index Grammaticus p. 818, 71
Cledonius
GL 5.64.21, 61
GL 5.67.23, 62
Cornutus
De natura deorum p. 13, 130
De natura deorum p. 76.2–5, 18
GRFM 4, 81
GRFM 16, 81
GRRF 14, 73
Demetrius Lacon
P.Herc. 1012 col. 67.1–10 Puglia, 4
Democritus
68B 26 DK, 20
Demosthenes
Phil. 3.1, 176–7
Phil. 3.13, 176

Digest

- 1.3.32–40, 209
- 9.1.1, 209
- 41.1.5, 209

Dio Chrysostom

- 12.27–9, 42
- 12.28, 20, 43
- 12.28–35, 139

Diodorus of Sicily

- 1.8.3–4, 20

Diogenes Laertius

- 2.2.10–11, 86
- 7.45, 159
- 7.49, 41
- 7.52–3, 85
- 7.58, 34
- 7.59, 61
- 7.63, 41
- 7.70, 85
- 7.83, 18, 149
- 7.87, 151
- 7.149, 32
- 7.199–200, 86

Diogenes of Oinoanda

- fr. 12 Smith, 44

Diomedes

- GL 1.381.22–3, 94
- GL 4.394.14, 62

Dionysius of Halicarnassus

- Amm.* 2, 173
- Ant. Rom.* 1.14.1, 171
- Ant. Rom.* 1.20.2–3, 181
- Ant. Rom.* 1.90.1, 181
- Ant. Rom.* 2.21.2, 171
- Ant. Rom.* 2.47.4, 171
- Ant. Rom.* 2.48.4, 171
- Comp.* 2.1–3, 181
- Comp.* 4.15, 178
- Comp.* 4.17, 173
- Comp.* 4.17–20, 172
- Comp.* 5, 185
- Comp.* 5.1, 173
- Comp.* 5.1–4, 185–6
- Comp.* 5.2, 187
- Comp.* 5.3, 186
- Comp.* 5.5, 187
- Comp.* 5.10–11, 187
- Comp.* 14–16, 182
- Comp.* 16, 182
- Comp.* 16.1, 183
- Comp.* 16.2, 174, 184
- Comp.* 16.2–4, 183
- Comp.* 16.3, 184
- Comp.* 16.4, 184
- Comp.* 18.28, 179

Dem. 5–7, 173

Dem. 6.1, 180

Dem. 9.2–8, 176

Dem. 9.3, 176–8

Dem. 13.7, 174

Din. 7.5, 173

Is. 3.2, 174

Is. 9.1, 174

Is. 11.2, 176

Is. 16.1, 174

Is. 16.1–2, 175

Isoc. 2.4, 174

Isoc. 12.3, 175

Isoc. 12.3–4, 171

Isoc. 15.3, 176

Lys. 4.1–3, 174

Lys. 10.1, 174

Lys. 13.5, 174

Orat. Vett. 1–4, 179

Thuc. 24, 173

Dionysius Thrax
p. 17.4 Uhlig, 60

Donatus

Ter. Phorm. 182, 93

Ter. Phorm. 190, 93

Ter. Phorm. 233, 93

Gramm. 4.393, 62

Ennius

Ann. 314 Sk., 113

Ann. 510 Sk., 72

Epicurus

Ep. Hdt. 75, 7, 9

Ep. Hdt. 75–6, 8, 26, 37

Ep. Hdt. 76, 7, 44

Euripides

IT 497–8, 90

FDS

650–80, 17

849, 187

Fenestella

FRHist no. 70 frg. 29, 94

Festus

24.1–2 L., 73

500.17–21 L., 94

fragmentum Bobiense de uerbo

GL 5.637.27–30 (p. 26.17–21 Passalacqua), 102

Gaius

Dig. 41.1.5–9, 209

Inst. 2.67–8, 208–9

Galen

Aff. dig. 5.40–1 K, 161

Ord. lib. prop. 19.40–1 K., 161

- Pecc. dig.* 5.68 K, 161
PHP 1.320.22–322.25, 32
PHP 2.2.5, 17
PHP 2.2.7, 121
PHP 2.2.9–11, 17
PHP 2.2.10–11 (= *SVF* 2.895), 5, 84, 130
PHP 2.2.13, 17
PHP 2.2.20–1, 84
PHP 2.7.8, 83
PHP 2–3, 83
PHP 3.5.2, 83
PHP 3.5.2–4, 128
PHP 3.5.4–5, 128–9, 170
PHP 3.5.8, 84
PHP 3.5.15, 129
PHP 3.5.22, 83
PHP 3.5.25, 86
PHP 3.5.27, 85
PHP 3.5.28, 85
PHP 3.8.16, 129
PHP 5.5.22–5, 32
PHP 5.24–6, 84
 Gellius
 3.3.10, 96
 3.12.1, 98
 4.9.1, 79
 4.9.1–2, 97
 4.9.12–14, 97
 4.16, 98
 4.16.1, 79
 8.14, 95
 9.12.1, 91
 9.12.6, 91
 10.4.1, 87
 10.4.1–4, 81
 10.4.3, 87
 10.4.4, 86–7
 10.4–5, 89
 10.5.1, 90
 10.5.2, 90
 10.5.3, 90
 10.11.2–3, 91
 11.11.1–3, 95
 13.6.1, 89
 13.6.3, 82
 13.10.3, 90
 13.10.4, 90
 13.16.1, 99
 13.26.3, 89
 13.26.4, 72, 100
 13.29.2, 87
 15.3.2, 79
 15.3.4, 102
 17.7, 94
 17.7.4, 94
 17.7.5, 87–8
 17.7.8, 94
 17.13, 101
 17.13.10, 101
 18.4.10, 95
 19.14.2–3, 79, 88
 19.14.6, 81
 19.14.7, 81
 19.14.8, 81
 20.6.9, 99
Genesis 2: 16, 122
GG
 1.3.14.27–28, 87
 471.1–2, 87
GRFF 7
 p. 125, 145
 Herodotus
 2.2, 6
 Hierocles
 Principles of Ethics col. IX 3.19–52, 125
 Principles of Ethics col. IX 3–10, 124–5
 Hippocrates
 Æt. 5.4, 30
 Æt. 6.5, 30
 Æt. 7.2, 30
 Æt. 15.5, 30
 Homer
 Il. 2.783, 27
 Il. 5.31, 60
 Od. 4.83–5, 136
 Od. 4.84, 27
 Iamblichus
 VP 82 (58C 4 DK), 79
 Isidore
 Diff. app. 3, 62
 Orig. 1.33.5, 50, 54
 Jerome
 Chron. a. Abr. 1972 (45), 79
 adv. Rufin. 3.39, 90
 Johannes Scotus Eriugena
 defloratio de Macrobio GL 5.600.19–22, 102
 Laberius
 fr. 52 Panayotakis, 98
 Lactantius
 De ira Dei 13, 23
lex Atinia (Law 48 Crawford), 94
 Lucilius
 135 M., 72
 164 M., 72
 181–8 M., 49
 226 M., 72

Lucilius (cont.)

- 261–2 M., 93
 291 M., 76
 338–9 M., 54
 339–47 M., 49
 348 M., 63
 349–50 M., 54
 351 M., 51, 54
 351–5 M., 63, 66
 352 M., 63
 352–5 M., 51
 353 M., 54
 354 M., 54
 356 M., 53, 75–6
 357 M., 53, 75
 358–61 M., 51, 81, 99
 362–3 M., 51, 69, 99
 364–6 M., 52, 99
 366 M., 70
 367 M., 68
 367–8 M., 52, 55, 58, 99
 369–70 M., 52–3, 68, 99
 371 M., 52, 60
 372 M., 52, 72
 374 M., 55, 75
 375 M., 53, 55, 75
 377–8 M., 49–50
 379 M., 78
 379–80 M., 50
 381 M., 48, 53, 74–5
 382 M., 73, 81
 635–6 M., 55
 650 M., 48
 775 M., 59
 784–90 M., 55
 964 M., 48
 993 M., 72
 1100 M., 48, 55, 61
 1111 M., 49
 1130 M., 48–9, 55, 61
 1160 M., 48, 55
 1168 M., 49
 1215–17 M., 48
 1294–5 M., 69, 99
 1322 M., 48, 55
 1326–38 M., 55
 1337 M., 72
 1340 M., 48, 54–5
- Lucretius *De rerum natura*
 5.948–57, 25
 5.1011–23, 25
 5.1011–4, 26
 5.1028–32, 8
 5.1028–9, 44
 5.1041–55, 44

5.1056–90, 37

5.1101–4, 26

Lysias

fr. 62, 174

Macrobius

Sat. 6.8.8, 91

Manilius

1.85, 20

4.731, 42

Marius Victorinus

GL 6.8.11, 64*GL* 6.8.16, 81*GL* 6.8.16–9.1, 82*GL* 6.17.13–18.3, 68*GL* 6.18.3, 68

Martial

11.90.5, 72

Martianus Capella

3.266, 72

Naevius

praet. 2, 113

Nigidius Figulus

fr. 1 S. (= *GRFF* 1), 94fr. 2 S. (= *GRFF* 2), 93fr. 3 S. (= *GRFF* 3), 97fr. 4 S. (= *GRFF* 4), 97

fr. 4–5 S., 91

fr. 5 S. (= *GRFF* 26), 98fr. 9 S. (= *GRFF* 5), 94fr. 10 S. (= *GRFF* 6), 93fr. 11 S. (= *GRFF* 7), 98fr. 12 S. (= *GRFF* 22), 98fr. 34 S. (= *GRFF* 8), 87, 94fr. 35 S. (= *GRFF* 9), 99fr. 36 S. (= *GRFF* 10), 100fr. 37 S. (= *GRFF* 11), 53, 72, 100fr. 38 S. (= *GRFF* 12), 100fr. 39 S. (= *GRFF* 21), 82fr. 40 S. (= *GRFF* 13), 97fr. 41 S. (= *GRFF* 23), 80–1fr. 42 S. (= *GRFF* 14), 90fr. 43 S. (= *GRFF* 25), 90fr. 44 S. (= *GRFF* 15), 90fr. 45 S. (= *GRFF* 34), 95

fr. 46 S., 95

fr. 47 S. (= *GRFF* 29), 91fr. 48 S. (= *GRFF* 30), 91fr. 49 S. (= *GRFF* 31), 95fr. 50 S. (= *GRFF* 28), 90fr. 51 S. (= *GRFF* 24), 102fr. 52 S. (= *GRFF* 32), 101fr. 53 S. (= *GRFF* 16), 81fr. 54 S. (= *GRFF* 17), 81

- fr. 55 S. (= *GRFF* 18), 81
 fr. 56 S. (= *GRFF* 19), 81
 fr. 57 S. (= *GRFF* 20), 82
 fr. 58 S. (= *GRFF* 33), 93
 fr. 59 S. (= *GRFF* 35), 93
 fr. 60 S. (= *GRFF* 36), 93
 fr. 61 S. (= *GRFF* 37), 93
 fr. 62 S. (= *GRFF* 27), 93
 fr. 63 S. (= *GRFF test.* 26), 98
- Nonius
 p. 21.22–3 M. (= 31 L.), 93
 pp. 21.31–22.2 M. (= 32 L.), 98
 p. 28.24–5 M. (= 41 L.), 98
 pp. 35.32–36.1 M. (= 51 L.), 90
 p. 40.15–16 M. (= 58 L.), 94
 p. 40.22–4 M. (= 58–9 L.), 98
 pp. 50.9–55.3 M. (= 71–7 L.), 95
 p. 51.13–15 M. (= 73 L.), 95
 p. 51.16–17 M. (= 73 L.), 91
 p. 51.18–25 M. (= 73 L.), 91
 p. 104.31–3 M. (= 149 L.), 98
 p. 127.11 M. (= 184 L.), 93
 p. 144.18–20 M. (= 210 L.), 97
 pp. 433.26–434.1 M. (= 698–9 L.), 98
 p. 437.23–6 M. (= 704 L.), 97
 p. 441.11–17 M. (= 709 L.), 95
 p. 442.9–13 M. (= 710 L.), 90
 p. 501.14 M. (= 804 L.), 100
 p. 507.13–15 M. (= 815 L.), 93
- Olympiodorus
In Grg. pp. 53–4 Jahn (= *SVF* I p. 21), 157
- Origen
Cels. 1.24, 4–5, 39
- Ovid
Met. 10.45, 62
- P. Oxy.*
 XLIV.3208, 67
- Pauli Epitome Festi*
 p. 80.11 L., 90
 p. 253 L., 93
- Persaeus
SVF 1.448, 23
- Philo
De incorr. mundi 24, 23
Deter. 127–9, 128
Leg. alleg. 1.90, 122
Leg. alleg. 2.14–15, 80
Leg. alleg. 2.15, 127
Leg. alleg. 2.15c, 20
Mut. nom. 63, 123
Mut. nom. 147, 136
Opif. 75, 126
Opif. 78, 139
- Opif.* 142, 124
Opif. 146, 123
Opif. 148, 123
Opif. 149, 123
Opif. 149–50, 122–3
QG 1.20, 80
Sobr. 36, 135
- Philodemus
De Pietate, PHerc. 1428, 130
- Philoxenus
 fr. 323 Theodoridis 1976, 181
- Plato
Cra. 384b, 5
Cra. 385a, 4
Cra. 385d, 4, 35
Cra. 388b–e, 18
Cra. 389a5–390a10, 35
Cra. 390c–e, 18
Cra. 391c, 5
Cra. 424b–425c, 36
Cra. 426c–427c, 82
Cra. 435a, 4
Cra. 438c, 7
Cra. 438e, 131
Cra. 438e5, 122
Phlb. 16c, 24
Phlb. 18b–d, 19
Prt. 322a, 20
- Pliny
Nat. 18.9, 146
- Plutarch
De Stoic. repugn. 1045b, 22
De Stoic. repugn. 12, 126
De Stoic. repugn. 13, 125
 [Plutarch]
Vit. Hom. 151, 90
- Pocetti (Pocc.)
 20, 66
 76, 65
- Pompeius
GL 5.248.7, 62
- Pomponius
Com. 30, 93
- Porphyrion, Pomponius
Hor. Sat. 1.10.53, 63
- Porphyrus
Vit. Pyth. 33, 90
- Posidonius
 fr. 13, 16
 fr. 18, 138
 fr. 45, 34, 101
 fr. 49, 20
 fr. 49.310–17, 20
 fr. 49.310–63, 20
 fr. 49.317–9, 21

Posidonius (cont.)

- fr. 49.319–26, 21
 fr. 49.319–27, 21
 fr. 49.360–3, 21
 fr. 71 Theiler, 41
 fr. 104, 33
 fr. 109, 33
 fr. 169.84–96, 32
 fr. 192, 34
 fr. 272.34–6, 139
 fr. 277a41, 139
 fr. 280, 27–9, 136–8
 fr. 280.5–6, 27
 fr. 280.15, 21
 fr. 280.19–24, 139
 fr. 280–281a, 136
 fr. 281, 27–8
 fr. 281a, 29, 136, 138
 fr. 281a.11–13, 27
 fr. 281a.13, 27
 fr. 281a.18, 27
 fr. 281a.22–30, 27
 fr. 284.22–4, 25
 fr. 368 Theiler, 42
test. 1a, 10
test. 9, 10
test. 10, 10
test. 13, 10
test. 28, 10
test. 29–34, 10
test. 35–39, 10

Priscian

- GL* 2.13.8–11, 81
GL 2.30.15–21, 81
GL 2.298, 64
GL 2.376.24–377.4, 93
GL 2.398.20–2, 93
GL 2.402.9–10, 93
GL 3.164.16–21, 188–9

Proclus

- In Alc.* 259, 5
In Cra. 16, 5
In Cra. 16.6.20–7.16, 20
In Cra. 16.20–2, 79
In Cra. 17, 3, 6–7

Pythagoras

- 58C 4 DK, 19

Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria*

- 1.4.10, 63–4
 1.5.50, 62
 1.5.71, 63
 1.6.1–3, 196
 1.6.7–8, 75
 1.6.8, 53
 1.7, 54

- 1.7.1, 59
 1.7.2, 64
 1.7.7–8, 74
 1.7.8, 47
 1.7.14, 63–4, 81
 1.7.15, 48, 59, 70, 99
 1.7.16, 68
 1.7.19, 48, 52, 60, 71
 8.3.6, 179
 9.4.23, 189
 9.4.23–5, 189–90
 9.4.38, 48
 9.4.113, 48
 11.39, 62
 12.10.12–13, 179

Rhetorica ad Herennium

- 2.19–20, 203
 4.17, 208

Sallust

- Jug.* 85.9, 210

[Sallust]

- Ad Caes. sen.* 1.1.5, 69
Ad Caes. sen. 2.6.3, 69

Scaurus, Terentius

- 5.2.2 Biddau (= *GL* 7.16.6), 72
 6.2.1 Biddau (= *GL* 6.18.12), 64
 6.2.2 Biddau (= *GL* 7.18.17), 48
 6.3.2 Biddau (= *GL* 7.19.1), 51
 6.3.2 Biddau (= *GL* 19.1–5), 48
 8.1 Biddau (= *GL* 7.24.9), 72

Scholias ad Odysseam

- 4.84 p. 181.21–2 Dindorf, 27

Scholias in Dionysium Thracem [Vat.]

- 249.33–250.25, 135
 252.26–9, 133

Seneca

- Ep.* 90, 22
Ep. 90.3–4, 139
Ep. 90.7, 25
Ep. 90.16, 24
Ep. 90.22, 24
Ep. 90.25, 25
Ep. 90.35, 22
Ep. 90.36–46, 139
Nat. 2.56, 76

Servius

- Aen.* 6.264, 161
Aen. 6.596, 97
Ecl. 6.13, 161
In artem Donati GL 5.446.19, 61

Servius Danielis

- G.* 1.47, 90
G. 1.120, 93
G. 1.260–1, 91

Sextus Empiricus

Math. 1.142–3, 4*Math.* 1.253, 142*Math.* 3, 161–2*Math.* 7.166–89, 164*Math.* 7.248, 155*Math.* 7.373, 156*Math.* 8.70, 41*Math.* 8.96, 85*Math.* 8.310–14, 159*Math.* 9.28, 140*Pyr.* 1.227–30, 164

Simplicius

in Ph. p. 291.21–292.31 (Diels), 16

Stobaeus

Ecl. 2.7.6a.9–11, 151*Ecl.* 2.7.6a.12–16, 151*Ecl.* 2.7.11b, p. 94.8–20, 127*Ecl.* 3.39.34, 128

Strabo

1.2.34, 27–8, 137–8

1.2.34–35, 136

2.3.7, 20, 42

16.4.27, 27, 29, 42, 136, 138

Suetonius

De verborum differentiis p. 289 Reifferscheid,

94

Gram. 7, 61

Tacitus

Ann. 4.62.2, 62*Dial.* 26.1, 179*Hist.* 1.35.1, 62

Terentius

Ad. 172, 48

Theognis

1.97–9, 90

Titinius

Com. (*CRF*³) 97, 93

Trypho

fr. 130 Velsen, 58

fr. 130–1 Velsen, 101

fr. 130–4 Velsen, 58

fr. 131 Velsen, 58

On Orthography p. 303 Reitzenstein 1897,

60

Varro

fr. 18 G.–S. (= *GRFF test.* 26), 98fr. 41 G.–S. (= *GRFF* 268), 195–6

fr. 43 G.–S., 81

fr. 46 G.–S. (= *GRFF* 3), 81fr. 69 G.–S. (= *GRFF* 272), 70fr. 77 G.–S. (= *GRFF* 280), 93

fr. 78 G.–S., 82

fr. 112 G.–S. (= *GRFF* 49), 81fr. 120 G.–S. (= *GRFF* 252), 69, 99*GRFF* 295, 181*L.* 5.1, 103, 131*L.* 5.1–2, 193*L.* 5.2, 106*L.* 5.3, 63*L.* 5.7–8, 91*L.* 5.8, 92, 205*L.* 5.9, 12, 52, 128, 141, 150, 207*L.* 5.11, 92, 142–3*L.* 5.12, 143*L.* 5.13, 135, 140–1*L.* 5.14–15, 141*L.* 5.15, 142*L.* 5.16, 105, 143*L.* 5.16–20, 143*L.* 5.21, 143*L.* 5.22, 144, 146*L.* 5.25–6, 181*L.* 5.34, 146*L.* 5.35, 92, 144, 146*L.* 5.36–40, 147*L.* 5.37, 148, 170*L.* 5.38, 148*L.* 5.43, 145*L.* 5.60, 106*L.* 5.61, 106*L.* 5.62, 106*L.* 5.63, 54*L.* 5.80, 47*L.* 5.83, 145*L.* 5.85, 91*L.* 5.96, 181*L.* 5.96–7, 61*L.* 5.98, 106*L.* 5.101–2, 181*L.* 5.109, 106*L.* 5.141, 92*L.* 5.144, 106*L.* 5.145, 92*L.* 6.1, 135*L.* 6.1–2, 141*L.* 6.2, 12, 141, 150*L.* 6.3, 95, 107, 118, 143, 148, 182,

184, 193

L. 6.12, 107*L.* 6.60, 148*L.* 6.68, 94*L.* 7.2, 207*L.* 7.6, 105*L.* 7.39–40, 145*L.* 7.93, 107*L.* 7.103–5, 182*L.* 7.110, 104*L.* 8.1, 110, 140, 182*L.* 8.2, 110

Varro (cont.)

- L.* 8.3, 108, 114, 121, 130–2
L. 8.4, 121, 132
L. 8.5, 132
L. 8.8, 96
L. 8.10, 1, 95, 115
L. 8.12, 187–8
L. 8.12–13, 189
L. 8.13, 188
L. 8.14, 114, 133
L. 8.20, 114
L. 8.21, 118
L. 8.21–2, 132
L. 8.22, 116
L. 8.23, 115, 117, 194
L. 8.25, 109
L. 8.26–7, 205–6
L. 8.31, 109
L. 8.35, 96
L. 8.43, 109
L. 8.44, 109
L. 8.52, 109
L. 9.2–3, 206
L. 9.4, 116
L. 9.5, 120
L. 9.5–6, 206–7
L. 9.17, 120
L. 9.23–30, 96
L. 9.30, 116
L. 9.31–35, 96
L. 9.33, 110, 116
L. 9.34, 110, 117–18
L. 9.35, 96, 117
L. 9.37, 116, 133–4
L. 9.38, 111, 114
L. 9.41, 111
L. 9.50, 96
L. 9.51, 114
L. 9.55, 111–12
L. 9.56, 111, 118, 134
L. 9.57, 111
L. 9.58, 111
L. 9.59, 111, 114
L. 9.62, 116–17
L. 9.63, 112, 116
L. 9.65, 112
L. 9.70, 113
L. 9.71, 96
L. 9.72, 114
L. 9.76, 113
L. 9.78, 113, 120
L. 9.86, 110
L. 9.94, 111
L. 9.101, 114
L. 9.111, 116

- L.* 9.113, 116
L. 9.115, 120
L. 10.1, 110
L. 10.5, 116
L. 10.15, 114, 117
L. 10.16, 96
L. 10.17, 114
L. 10.24, 112
L. 10.28, 114
L. 10.35, 207
L. 10.41, 116
L. 10.46, 116
L. 10.48, 116
L. 10.51, 113–14, 193
L. 10.52–3, 113
L. 10.53, 96, 114
L. 10.54, 112
L. 10.55, 110, 112
L. 10.56, 115
L. 10.60, 114
L. 10.61, 114, 118
L. 10.74, 116, 119, 205
L. 10.77, 116
L. 10.78, 205
L. 10.79–82, 133
L. 10.83, 112, 116, 133
L. 10.84, 112
L. 14–20, 97
L. 41.1.44, 209

Men. 456, 98

Res divinae fr. 47 Cardauns (= *GRFF* 175), 97

Velius Longus

- GL* 6.57.20, 72
GL 7.47.5–6, 48
GL 7.47.8–9, 48
GL 7.55.25–56.14, 64
GL 7.56, 68
GL 7.56.2, 50
GL 7.56.7–9, 48, 99
GL 7.56.11–2, 52
GL 7.56.13–4, 48
GL 7.60.15, 48
GL 7.62.1–2, 48
GL 7.62.18, 50
GL 7.63.3, 48
GL 7.65.15, 74
GL 7.65.15–6, 48
GL 7.69.4–9, 93
GL 7.81.10–11, 93

Vergil

Aen. 3.354, 72

Vetter (Ve.)

- 147A.16, 66
 147B.1, 19, 66
 72e, 116, 66

Vitruvius *De architectura*

1.2.5, 203
 1.2.5-7, 203
 2.1, 20
 5.10.2, 62
 6.1, 41
 6.1.3-4, 42
 6.1.3-12, 41

6.1.5-8, 42
 6.1.8, 42

Xenophon

Mem. 1.4.12, 19

Zeno

SVF 1.275, 137

Index Nominum et Rerum

- Abraham, 135
- Academics, 13, 23, 55, 109, 153–4, 158, 161, 164, 165–8
- Accius, 63–4, 67–8, 74, 78, 81, 144
- Adam, 9, 122–3, 125–7
- adverbs, 62–3, 91, 97–8, 109, 186–7, 189
in *-im*, *see* morphology
- ages, *see* decline
- allographs, *see* orthography
- Ammonius, 3, 100
- analogy, 5, 11, 46–7, 57, 60–1, 64, 69–71, 77, 86, 96–9, 102, 108–10, 113, 116–20, 133–4, 193–6, 205–7; *see also* reason
- animal sounds, *see* sounds
- anomaly, 47, 57, 108–10, 116, 118, 133, 146, 193–4, 206
- Antiochus of Ascalon, 125, 127, 150, 152–3, 158, 168–70
- Antipater, 141, 150–2
- antiquarianism, 144, 148, 209
- antiquity (*uetusitas*), 65, 196–7, 201–2
- Apollonius Dyscolus, 34, 57, 60, 75, 77, 178, 188
- apprehension (*katalepsis*, *comprehensio*), 155–60, 165, 167, 169–70; *see also* impression, cataleptic
- appropriateness, *see* words, correctness or appropriateness of
- appropriation, *see* *oikeiosis*
- Arabs, *Aramboi*, *see* *Eremboi*
- arbitrariness, arbitrary (fancy, *libido*), 1, 5, 8, 12, 20, 80–1, 87, 89, 96–7, 107, 111, 114–15, 169
- archaism, 48, 67, 69, 71–4, 78, 93, 99, 197
- architecture, 203
- Aristarchus, 57
- Aristotle, Aristotelian, 7, 21, 34, 39, 90, 100–1, 142, 168
- Arius Didymus, 151
- art, skill, expertise, technique (*techne*, *ars*, *doctrina*), 54, 60, 96, 106, 148, 157, 159, 165–6, 179, 192, 200–1
- articulation, 19–20, 43–4, 81, 103, 130
of concepts, 86, 94, 149
- articulatory symbolism, 11, 17, 80–2, 85–6
- artificial, 43–4, 78, 178; *see also* arbitrary
- Asclepiades of Myrlea, 142
- assimilation, *see* orthography
- astrology, 20, 32–3
- Atticism, 13, 172–4, 178
- auctoritas*, 195–7, 202
- Augustine, 38–9, 86, 150, 184, 204
- barbarism, 48, 55, 61, 195, 204, 208
- cacophony, *see* sounds
- case, *see* morphology
- cataleptic impression, *see* impression
- Carneades, 55, 164, 166
- Cato, 62, 127, 151
- chance, 21, 104, 116
- Charisius, 62, 69–70, 99, 194, 204
- Chrysippus, 5, 11–13, 16–18, 22–3, 31–3, 38–9, 80, 82–7, 89, 92, 125, 128–30, 141, 149, 151, 170, 172
- Cicero, 10, 12–13, 19, 33, 45, 48, 72, 76–7, 79, 108, 125, 127, 150–1, 153–72, 178–80, 188, 190, 197–9, 201, 203, 209–10
- civilization, *see* culture and civilization
- clarity (*perspicuitas*), 61, 63, 78, 103, 119, 168, 173, 205; *see also* language
- Claudius, 48, 71
- Cleanthes, 12, 141, 150–1
- climate, 20–1, 30–3, 35, 37, 40, 42, 45
- Clitomachus, 55, 166
- cognatio*, *see* relationship
- cognitive procedures, theory, 18, 103, 154, 166–7

- common usage, *see* usage
comprehensio, *see* apprehension
 conjunctions, connectives (*syndesmoi*), 11, 34, 65, 74, 101–2, 177
 convention, conventionalism, 1, 4, 7–8, 13, 17–18, 20, 34–7, 39, 44, 60, 78, 80, 154, 159, 166–7, 169, 173
consuetudo, *see* usage
 Cornutus, 73, 81
 correctness, *see* words
 corruption, *see* decline, language
 cosmos, 33, 124, 126–7, 130, 139
Cratylus, *see* Plato
 culture and civilization, 22, 24–6
 development, 23–4, 27, 30
 influence, 6
 origin, 19, 22–3, 25–6, 31, 40, 42, 44–5
cunabula, *see* words, primitive
 custom, *see* usage

declinatio, *see* morphology
 decline, narrative of, 179, 192, 210; *see also*
 language, culture and civilization
 deixis, 5, 84–5, 87, 89
 Demetrius Lacon, 4
 Demetrius of Phaleron, 179
 Democritus, 5, 19
 Demosthenes, 171, 176–8
denotatum, *designatum*, *see* signified
 dialect, dialectism, 58, 60, 65, 77–8, 181
diarthrosis, *see* articulation
 Didymus, *see* Arius Didymus
 differences, *see* language, differences
 Dio Chrysostom, 42, 44, 139
 Diodorus of Sicily, 15, 20
 Diogenes Laertius, 18, 86, 151
 Diogenes of Babylon, 19, 55, 57, 61, 151
 Diogenes of Oinoanda, 44
 Diomedes, 194, 200, 204
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 13, 171–90
 Dionysius Thrax, 57, 60
 distortion, *see* words, distortion of
doctrina, *see* art

 emotions, emotional, 33, 37, 40–1, 43
 Ennius, 46, 72, 142
 environment, 22, 25, 29–33, 37–8, 41; *see also*
 geography
 Epictetus, 126
 Epicurus, 2–3, 7–10, 12, 18, 23–6, 37–45, 49, 109, 160–2, 181
 epistemology, 13, 41, 153, 157, 163, 166, 169;
 see also Stoics and Stoicism
 Eremboi, 27–9, 136–8
 ethics, 12, 15, 55, 86, 92, 149–51, 168
 ethnic diversity, ethnography, 21, 29–31, 33, 35, 40
 etymology, etymological, 4–5, 12, 18, 24, 34–6, 38–9, 47–8, 54–5, 60–1, 67, 74–5, 80, 84–7, 89, 91–5, 100, 103–8, 121–2, 137–8, 143, 145–7, 150, 168–9, 180–5, 193–4, 196
 ethical, 11, 89–91, 102
 in Stoicism, 16–18, 87, 130, 149, 159
 Varro's taxonomy, *gradus etymologiae*, 140–1, 148, 205
 euphony, *see* sounds
 evil, problem of, 23
 evolution, evolutionary (model), 7, 9, 12 *see also*
 language, development
 expertise, *see* art
 expression, linguistic, *see* signifier

 factivity, 13, 156–7
 fancy, *see* arbitrariness
 false beliefs, falsehood, 121, 155–61, 164, 169–70
 Figulus *see* Nigidius Figulus
 functionalism, *see* linguistic naturalism

 Galen, 5, 15, 17, 32–3, 82–4, 86, 128
 Gellius, 79–80, 86–8, 90, 95, 101
 gender, *see* morphology
 Genesis, 9, 122
 geography, 15, 20–1, 27–8, 40–2, 136; *see also*
 environment
 geometry, 160–1
 gesture, 6, 8, 81, 84
 golden age, *see* decline
 gradual, gradualism, 20, 24, 30, 41, 43; *see also*
 language, development
gradus etymologiae, *see* etymology
 grammar and grammarian(s), 11, 47–9, 54, 57, 61, 77, 79, 91, 94, 101–2, 120, 172, 181, 190, 197, 200, 204, 208

heimarmene, *see* providence
 Hellenism (*hellenismos*), 59–61, 66, 197
 Herodotus, 6
 Hesiod, 3, 143
 hierarchical structure, *see* language, structure
 Hierocles, 124–5, 128, 152
 Hippocrates, Hippocratic corpus, 30–1, 35, 40
 history (*historia*), 15, 22, 142, 148, 171, 192
 Homer, 3, 27–9, 60, 136–8, 182, 185–7, 189
 homograph, *see* orthography
 homophone, *see* sounds

- imposition (*thesis*), 9, 12–13, 17–19, 21, 25, 31, 39, 43–5, 56, 81, 87, 107, 110, 114–18, 123–7, 132, 139–40, 143, 172–3, 178, 180–5, 190, 193
impositicia uerba, *see* words, primitive
impositores, *see* name-giver(s)
impression (*phantasia*, (re)presentation)
 cataleptic (*kataleptike*), 154–5, 158, 160, 164–6; *see also* apprehension
 rational (*logike*), 85
 sensorial (*aisthetike*), 85
inflection, *see* morphology
invention, inventors (of crafts), 19, 21–6, 31, 44, 56, 139, 191, 194
Isaeus, 171, 174–6, 185
Isocrates, 173, 175

katalepsis, *see* apprehension
kings, *see* name-giver(s)
knowledge (*episteme, scientia*), 16, 157, 163–5, 170

language, linguistic; *see also* culture; grammar; Latinity; linguistic naturalism; names; words
 aesthetics, 42, 49, 185; *see also* sound(s), euphony, cacophony
 corruption, 3, 9, 12, 61, 70, 78, 181; *see also* decline
 development, change, history of, 7–9, 12, 20, 27, 30, 43, 47, 58, 75–7, 199
 differences, 10, 16, 20–2, 25, 30–1, 34–7, 39–42, 45, 140
 natural, *see* nature; words, primitive
 origin, 4, 7–9, 16–20, 23, 25–7, 38, 40, 45, 56, 58, 81, 87, 132, 135, 148, 173, 181, 183–4; *see also* nature
 standardization, 68
 structure, 1, 41, 172, 181
Latinity (*Latinitas*), 48, 61, 195–7, 204, 208
 criteria of, 194–8, 200
law(s), 18, 22, 31, 37, 94, 139–40, 165–6, 199, 201–3, 208–10; *see also* nature, laws
linguistic naturalism, 1–16, 35–6, 69–77, 102–3, 163, 167–8, 170, 172, 182, 190–1, *see also* *Cratylus*; nature; *sympatheia*; articulatory symbolism
 formal, morphological, 11, 95–102, 113
 functional, 6–7, 9–10
 referential, 1, 5–7, 10, 59, 82, 87, 89, 112, 114, 118
logic, 15, 168, 172
Lucilius, 11, 46–78, 81, 93, 99–100
Lucretius, 7–8, 26, 37, 44, 72, 76
Lysias, 171, 173–5, 180, 185

Marius Victorinus, *see* Victorinus
meaning, *see* signified
memory, 155–6, 160–2, 169
metaptosis, *see* words, distortion of
morphology, 11–12, 46, 80, 95–120, 130; *see also* linguistic naturalism, formal; orthography
 adverbs in *-im*, 88, 98
 case, 109–11, 115, 118, 193
 derivational (*declinatio uoluntaria*), 12, 56, 95–6, 102, 116–17, 132–4, 145, 194
 gender, 111, 117–18, 134, 204
 inflectional (*declinatio naturalis*), inflection, 12, 56, 96–7, 102, 110, 117–18, 132–3, 147–8, 194
 number, 69, 112–14, 118
 quantity, 68, 100, 112–13, 118
Moses, 122, 128

name-giver(s) (*onomathetai, impositores*), 8, 12, 19, 24–5, 30–1, 35, 38, 40–1, 43, 92, 124–7, 132, 136, 139, 145, 159, 182–3, 192; *see also* imposition, Adam, *oikeiosis*
 Roman Kings, 122, 132, 140
names, *see* words; imposition; nouns
naturalism, *see* linguistic naturalism
nature (*natura*), natural
 as a criterion of Latinity, 192, 198, 202, 204, 206–7
 language, 4, 6, 9, 13, 61, 176, 180, 190–1; *see also* words, primitive
 law, 12, 107, 192, 199, 202, 210
 names (by nature), 1, 3–4, 7, 9, 39, 81–2, 110, 112, 114, 116, 182, 199, 210; *see also* language, origin; linguistic naturalism
 problematic meaning of, 2, 9, 12, 103, 105, 107, 110, 185, 190–2, 197
 style, *see* style
 word order, *see* word(s), order
Neoptolemus of Parium, 49
Nigidius Figulus, 5, 11, 47–8, 70, 72–3, 79–102
nouns, 53, 68, 81, 112, 114–15, 117, 134–5, 142, 185–6, 188–9, 204
 proper, 27, 138, 186
number, linguistic, *see* morphology, number

oikeiosis, 12, 124–6, 139–40, 149–52; *see also* name-giver(s); imposition
onomathetai, *see* name-giver(s)
onomatopoeia, 38–9, 85–6, 92, 182–4
Origen, 4–5, 39
orthography, 46, 49–55, 59–63, 81
 allographs, 99
 assimilation, 50, 53, 74–5, 78
 case, 112–13

- homographs, 51, 64, 67–70, 72, 99–100
 of *ai* and *ae*, 50, 52, 72–3
 of genitive and vocative *-i(i)*, 69–71
 of *i* and *ei*, 59, 65, 67–9, 71, 73, 100
 of long vowels, *geminatio uocalium*, 46, 60, 63–7, 81; *see also* Accius
 of *q* and *c*, 73
 of *r* and *s*, 50
 phonetic spelling, 74–5
 reform of, standardization, 48, 64, 67, 71, 78;
see also Accius, Claudius
 Oscan language, 65–6
- Panaetius, 10, 31, 33, 55, 61
 Peripatetic(s), 82, 127, 150, 168
 Persaeus, 23
phantasia, *see* impression
 Philo of Alexandria, 9, 20, 80, 122–6, 128, 135, 139–40
 Philodemus, 49
 philology, 57, 60, 93, 108, 169, 191
 philosophy, philosophical, 9–12, 15–16, 19, 22, 24–6, 45, 55–6, 63, 80–1, 92, 138, 155, 157, 165, 168, 175, 184
 Philoxenus, 181
 phonetic spelling, *see* orthography
 phonetic symbolism, *see* linguistic naturalism, referential
 phonology, phonetic content, phonetics, *see* sounds
 Plato, 1, 19, 24, 26, 36–8, 40, 56, 80, 82, 150, 168, 173
Cratylus, 1, 3–6, 9–10, 14, 17–20, 24–6, 31, 35–6, 38–41, 43, 45, 82, 122, 182–4
 poetry, poets, poetics, 9, 12, 54, 62, 66, 72, 83, 92, 119–20, 130, 140, 171, 173, 184–5, 206–7
 Polyaeus, 160–2
 Posidonius, 10, 15–45, 49, 101, 136–8
 prepositions, 11, 34–5, 74, 101–2
 prescriptive, prescriptivism, 54, 57, 78, 93, 119–20
 pre-Socratics, 3
 primary notions (*prolepseis*), 83
 primitive words, *see* words, primitive
 primitivism, 24–5, 192; *see also* words, primitive
 Priscian, 93, 188, 204
 Proclus, 3–7, 20, 79
 Prodicus, 5
 pronouns, 11, 17, 68–9, 80, 82, 85–6, 89, 102, 109, 129, 157, 186, 188–9
 pronunciation, 49–50, 61, 67, 73, 75, 78
 proper nouns, *see* nouns
 Protagoras, 5
protai phonai, *see* words, primitive
protai lexeis, *see* words, primitive
 providence (*heimarmene*), 19, 21–2, 32–3, 40–1, 43, 162
 Psammetichus, 6
 psychology, 15, 22, 32–3, 41–2, 45, 83, 87, 135
 punctuation, 76
 Pythagoras, Pythagorean, 3, 5, 9, 11, 19, 79, 92, 142
- quantity, *see* morphology
 Quintilian, 47–8, 67, 71, 75, 189, 196–7
- reality, 12, 95, 130, 167, 174–5; *see also* nature
 language and, 1, 7, 39, 87, 169–70, 172, 178, 185–90; *see also* linguistic naturalism; nature, language; *sympatheia*
- reason, rationality (*ratio*), 7–9, 12, 18, 26, 30–1, 44, 47, 54, 60, 74–5, 77–8, 117–19, 123, 130, 139–40, 158–9, 162, 164, 169, 189, 195–9, 207; *see also* analogy; impression, rational
- referential, referents, *see* linguistic naturalism; signified
- regional variations, 22
- relationship (*cognatio*), 127, 130–2, 135, 139–42, 170
- representation, *see* impression
- rhetoric, rhetorical, 3, 10, 14, 86, 108, 171–4, 179–80, 190, 194, 201, 203, 208
- Roman kings, *see* name-giver(s)
- Sallust, 69, 210
- science, 16, 21, 33–4, 135; *see also* knowledge
semainomenon, *see* signifier
semainon, *see* signified
- semantic(s), 100–2, 112–13, 167
- Seneca, 15, 22–3, 25–6, 76–7, 139
- sensorial perception, *see* impression
- Sextus Empiricus, 4, 44, 154, 156, 161
- signified (*semainomenon*, *denotatum*, *designatum*, *nominatum*), 6, 31, 34, 36–8, 46, 55–6, 58, 81–2, 85, 106, 130–2, 134–5, 193
- signifier (*semainon*, *nomen*, linguistic expression), signification, 6, 37, 46, 55–6, 58, 82, 89, 112; *see also* words
- Siron, 160–1
- skill, *see* art
- Socrates, 4, 17–19, 35–6, 38, 40, 82, 122, 131, 184
- solecism, 48, 50, 55, 61–2, 76, 173, 208; *see also* syntax
- Sophists, 3, 5
- sounds; *see also* orthography
 animal, 8, 19, 37, 182
 cacophony, 49

- sounds; (cont.)
 euphony, 43, 49, 174; *see also* language,
 aesthetics
 homophones, 50, 67–9, 72, 99–100
 phonetic(s), phonology, 19, 30–1, 34, 36, 40,
 42, 55, 74, 77–8, 81–2, 182
 speech, *see* language
 spelling, *see* orthography
 standardization, *see* language
stoicheia, *see* words, primitive
 Stoics and Stoicism, 4–5, 9–13, 15–19, 21, 23,
 25–6, 31, 33–4, 38, 42–6, 55–7, 78, 80,
 82, 93, 100–1, 107, 122, 126, 130,
 135–6, 139–40, 149–51, 153–4, 157–9,
 162–9, 172–3, 178, 181, 183–4, 186,
 191, 199, 210; *see also* epistemology,
 etymology, *telos*, *oikeiosis*, linguistic
 naturalism, imposition
 Strabo, 15, 20–3, 25, 27–30, 32–5, 42, 136–7
 structure, *see* language
 style, stylistic theory, 63, 171, 184
 natural, 10, 13, 171–80, 183, 185, 190
 suffixes, 91, 93, 97; *see also* morphology,
 orthography
 symbolism, *see* articulatory symbolism
sympatheia, 46, 51, 55–6, 58–9, 69, 73, 77,
 98–101, 169; *see also* linguistic
 naturalism, articulatory symbolism
 syntax, 103–4, 110, 113, 169, 172–3, 176, 178,
 181, 186, 188; *see also* solecism

technē, *see* art
 technology, 22–3, 25–6; *see also* art
telos, 151–2
thesis, *see* imposition
 Timaeus of Locri Epizephyrii, 79
 Trypho(n) of Alexandria, 6, 46, 55, 57–61, 75,
 77, 100

uetustas, *see* antiquity
 usage (*consuetudo*, *usus*), 47–8, 62, 78, 83, 92,
 113, 116–17, 119–20, 134, 157,
 162, 192–3, 195–7, 201–2, 204–5,
 207
 usefulness (*utilitas*), 8, 23, 43, 109, 126, 130,
 134, 157
usus, *see* usage
utilitas, *see* usefulness

 Varro, 6, 11–14, 45, 47–8, 69–70, 76–7, 91–9,
 102–22, 127–8, 130–5, 139–52, 168–9,
 171–90
 Victorinus, Marius, 64, 204
 Vitruvius, 19, 41–2, 203
 vocalization, 128–9

 wise kings, *see* name-giver(s); *see also* language;
 name-giver(s); imposition
 word(s)
 correctness or appropriateness of, 4–5, 11, 18,
 31, 34–6, 40, 47, 50, 57, 61–2, 77–8,
 121, 123, 130, 173, 197; *see also*
 Hellenism, Latinity
 derivative, 44, 134, 144–5, 204; *see also*
 morphology, derivational
 distortion of (*metaptosis*), 27, 31
 formation, 36, 58, 114–15, 140
 naturalness of, *see* nature, language
 order, 13, 172–3, 176, 182, 186–7, 189,
 204
 primitive, primordial (*stoicheia*, *protai phonai* /
 lexeis, *cnabula*, *impositicia uerba*), 4, 6,
 17–18, 34, 36, 38, 42, 44, 56, 121, 140,
 148, 187

 Zeno, 23, 27, 61, 128, 137–8, 151, 154,
 156–7